16 LTD Case Digests JP Tabios

Land Titles and Deeds
16
BARANDA VS GUSTILO
FACTS: Both parties claim that they own the parcel of land disputed in this case. The Court, after
discovering that the private respondents TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession
against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondents. Another group filed a separate civil case against petitioners and applied for lispendens on
the TCT of said lot, which the Court found out to be privies of the private respondents tasked to delay
the implementation of said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil cases with the Court of Appeals
prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lispendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which
were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court?
HELD: Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the acting register of deeds stand. He
forgot the 1st paragraph of Section 77 of PD 1529: Cancellation of lispendens before the final
judgment, a notice of lispendens may be cancelled upon order of the court after proper showing. It is
necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private
respondent Valeriano have converted it into a fishpond. In their application in 1976, private respondents
claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by
purchase and that; it is not within any forest or military reservation .The Republic of the Phil.,
represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the principal
ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of obando, bulacan and that such area
are denominated as forestlands-do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public
domain. the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This was
affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fish pond
purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
HELD: Courts cannot reclassify. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
ExecutiveDepartment of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession
Applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.The
conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants does notautomatically render the
property as alienable and disposable.The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject
property fromunclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS VILLAREAL
FACTS: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration a land consisting of 178, 113 sq. m. mangrove
swamps located in Sapian, Capiz on January 25, 1945. He alleged that he and his predecessors in
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons
including the Director of Forestry. The Court of First Instance of Capiz approved the application and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute was forestall in nature and not subject to private
appropriation.
HELD: Yes, mangrove swamps form part of the public forestry of the country. The land in dispute in not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: September 4, 1950, a demand was submitted to petitioner by respondent On union through its
officers for various concessions, among which were (a) an increase of P0.50 inwages, (b) commutation
of sick and vacation leave if not enjoyed during the year, (c) various privileges, such as free medical
care, medicine, and hospitalization, (d) right to a closed shop, check off, etc., (e) no dismissal without
prior just cause and with a prior investigation, etc.- Some of the demands, were granted by the
petitioner, and the others were rejected. Hearings were held in the respondent court (CIR). After the
hearings the respondent court rendered a decision fixing the minimum wage for the laborers at P3.20,
declaringthat additional compensation representing efficiency bonusshould not be included as part of the
wage, and making theaward effective from September 4, 1950 (the date of thepresentation of the
original demand, instead of from April 5,1951, the date of the amended demand).
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations erred in fixing the minimum wage at P3.202.
2. Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations erred in declaring that the additional compensation
representing the efficiency bonus should not be included as part of the wage3. WON the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in making the award effective from September 4, 1950
HELD
1. NO- Petitioner contends that the laborer and his family need only the amount of P2.58 for food so this
should be the basis for the determination of his wage, not what he actually spends. Furthermore, that it
is not justifiable to fix a wage higher than that provided by Republic Act No. 602 and that
respondentunion made the demand in accordance with a perniciouspractice of claiming more after an
original demand is granted. The respondent court found that P2.58 is the minimumamount actually
needed by the laborer and his family. But this does not mean that it is his actual expense. A person's
needs increase as his means increase. This is true not only as to food but as to everything elseeducation, clothing, entertainment ,etc.
The law guarantees the laborer a fair and just wage. The minimum must be fair and just. The "minimum
wage" can by no means imply only the actual minimum. Some margin or leeway must be provided, over
and above the minimum, to take care of contingencies, such as increase of prices of commodities and
increase inwants, and to provide means for a desirableimprovement in his mode of living.
That the P3 minimum wage fixed in the law is still far below what is considered a fair and just minimum
is shown by the fact that this amount is only for the year after the law takes effect, as thereafter the law
fixes it at P4. Neither may it be correctly contended that the demand for increase is due to an alleged
pernicious practice. Frequent demands for increase are indicative of a healthy spirit of wakefulness to
the demands of a progressing and an increasingly more expensive world.
2. NO- Petitioner contends that the efficiency bonus paid the laborer should have been included in his
minimum wage, in the same manner as the value of living quarters.
Whether or not bonus forms part of wages depends upon the circumstances or conditions for its
payment. If it is an additional compensation which the employer promised and agreed to give without
any conditions imposed for its payment, such as success of business or greater production or output,
then it is part of the wage. But if it is paid only if profits are realized or a certain amount of productivity
achieved, it cannot be considered part of the wages.
In the case at bar, it is not payable to all but to laborers only. It is also paid on the basis of actual
production or actual work accomplished. If the desired goal of production is not obtained, or the amount
of actual work accomplished, the bonus does not accrue. It is evident that under the circumstances it is
paid only when the labor becomes more efficient or more productive. It isonly an inducement for
efficiency, a prize therefore, not a part of the wage.3. NO- Both parties agreed that any award should be
retroactive to the date of the presentation of the demands, which is September 4, 1950. The terms of the
stipulation are clearly against petitioner's contention. There being no question as to its agreement, the
same must be given force and effect.

REPUBLIC V. VDA. DE CASTILLO
FACTS: The late Modesto Castillo who was married to Amanda Lat, applied for registration of two
parcels of land located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas and same was issued to him as absolute owner
of the land with improvements by the Register of Deeds Batangas. The two parcel of land with original
certificate of title were consolidated and divided into lots 1 to 9 which was covered by transfer certificate
of title (TCT). Amanda Lat Vda. De Castillo executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in
favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et. al. after the death of Modesto Castillo. Original certificate of title was
cancelled and new transfer certificates of title were issued to the appellants-defendants. The Republic of
the Philippines filed a case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title and for the
reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State. It was said that the lands had always formed part of
the Taal Lake and because it is publicly owned, could not be subject of registration as private property.
They alleged in their answer that the action of the Government was already barred by the decision of the
registration court and that action has already prescribed. Government was stopped from questioning the
ownership. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the original certificate of title in the name of
Modesto Castillo and the subsequent transfer of certificate of title over the property in favor of the
defendants. It declared that lots 1 and 2 are public lands belonging to the State. The Court of Appeals
reversed said decision and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration involving shore lands constitutes res
judicata.
HELD: There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and,
therefore, not registrable.

HILARIO VS. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Hilario is the heir of a land located at Barrio Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal. Said
land was leaping on the western part by the San Mateo River. A stone wall was built on the northwestern
side to prevent entry into the land. Unfortunately, a great flood destroyed said wall and the river had its
course inside Hilarios land. The US Army opened sand and gravel plant within the premises sometime
in 1945. They begin scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand. A case for damages was
filed against the US Army and they paid. The management was consequently turned over to the City of
Manila. Hilario filed a complaint for injunction and damages against defendants but the latter alleged that
the extractions were made from the riverbed which is a part of public domain.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new riverbanks formed, by reason of the occurrence of alteration of the route
of a river through a private property, are part of public ownership?
HELD: The Supreme Court is of the opinion that all riverbank are of public ownership in accordance with
the provisions of the old Civil Code and the Law of Waters of 1866. Under State v. Ricardson, A river
consists of water, a bed, and banks, these several parts constituting a river, the whole river. It is a
compound idea; it cannot exist without all its parts. Therefore, it is concluded that the riverbanks from
which the City of Manila extracted soil, gravel, and sand, form part of the public domain absolving the
defendants herein from liability to plaintiff.

MANECLANG VS. IAC
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title over a fishpond located within the parcels of land
which they own situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan and annulment of the resolutions
issued by the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan. Resolution No. 38, is the ordering of an ocular
inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and
Resolution No. 95 authorizes public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including
the fishpond under consideration. Trial court dismissed the complaint finding that the body of water
crossing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a branch of the Agno River; therefore
public in nature and not subject to private appropriation and that the two resolutions were passed in the
exercise of the Municipal Councils legislative power. Petitioners, not satisfied with the decision appealed
to Intermediate Appellate Court but the latter affirmed the decision made by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creek is public in nature and not subject to private appropriation.
HELD: The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an
adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found
by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River.
Considering that as held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592
[1934], a creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow
of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in
the name of any individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil.
455]; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor
its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain,
the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary
to law and public policy.
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual
determination binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted
municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal
waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as mere
publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.

REPUBLIC V. REYES
FACTS: Respondents Urbano Lara and GodofredoEusebio filed their Free Patent Applications for their
parcels of lands situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal with the Bureau of Lands. After posting notices and
upon the recommendation of a representative of the Bureau of Lands, said application was approved
and patent nos. was issued to Lara and Eusebio. However, in a subsequent investigation conducted by
the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered that the land patented
and titled to the respondents were actually part of the Laguna de Bay. Neither of the respondents was
able to occupy said lands. Petitioner herein represented by the Director of Lands filed separate
complaints against respondents and respondent Register of Deeds Rizal for the cancellation of patent
nos. and original certificate of titles issued to respondents. Accordingly, summons together with copies of
the complaints were duly served upon all the defendants. However, notwithstanding their receipt of the
summons and copies of the complaint, respondents Eusebio and Lara failed to file their answers to the
complaint. Court of First Instance declared the patent nos. and corresponding certificate of titles null and
void and ordered Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles. For failure of defendants to
move for reconsideration, decision became final and executory. Respondent Register of Deeds
addressed separate and identical letters to the other two respondents informing them of the decision of
the court and advising them to surrender their owners duplicate copy of titles for cancellation. Said
respondents wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds stating that the said duplicate of title was already
surrendered to Atty. Eduardo Javier of the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Lands. After the lapse
of almost 5 years, respondents instituted a case against the Director of lands for the annulment of the
decision alleging that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons and decision was
procured through fraud. Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly
served with summons, Court of First Instance of Rizal acting upon an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara declared
defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in default and allowed the plaintiffs (respondents herein)
to adduce their evidence before the Special Clerk of Court. Court ordered the Director of of Lands to
reinstate the patents and titles to respondents Lara and Eusebio.
ISSUE: Whether or not a decision which has long become final and executed, can be annulled on the
grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that the decision was
procured through fraud.
HELD: "Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are
deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated
comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed the
nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of
the loser is generally ministerial." A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did
not appeal said judgment (Malia vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 116 [1985]) and courts are without jurisdiction over
the case once judgment has become final (Vda. de Emmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of the courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 [1987]).

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON C. FERNANDEZ [ponente],
ANDRES REYES, MARIANO V. AGCAOILI and DELFIN FL. BATACAN [concurring] with JUSTICE
RICARDO C. PUNO [dissenting] ARTURO RODRIGUEZ and GUILLERMO REYES
Facts: Petitioner Director of Lands interposes the instant appeal by certiorari from the resolution of the
Court of Appeals decreeing the confirmation of title of the applicants-appellees under Republic Act No.
496 in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, over an area identified as Lot No. 1736,
Cadastral Survey of Orion, Bataan. Said lot is a large tract of agricultural land situated in Barrio Kapok,
Orion, Bataan, containing 233.6883 hectares, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the
grandfather of applicant Arturo Rodriguez, the late Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed
Lease Application No. 1206 with the Bureau of Lands, but which application was rejected upon
investigation and ascertainment that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation
under Executive Order dated December 16, 1924 of the President of the United States of America. Upon
the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of the property was taken over by his sons,
Victorino Rodriguez (the father of applicant Arturo Rodriguez) and Pablo Rodriguez. Subsequently in an
instrument of quitclaim, both Victorino and Pablo Rodriguez waived their rights as heirs of the late
Vicente Rodriguez over the subject property ceding all their participation, ownership and possession
thereon in favor of Arturo Rodriguez. Thereafter, Arturo Rodriguez sold two-thirds undivided portion of
the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara.
In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from
the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. On August 29, 1965, Arturo Rodriguez together with
Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara filed a verified petition for registration of their title to the lot
of the Cadastral Survey of Orion, Bataan under Act No. 496 alleging that they, by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more than thirty years immediately preceding the filing of their
application. Applicant Francisco Alcantara subsequently withdrew his application by motion dated March
21, 1966.
Thirty-nine persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the petition for
registration contending, among others, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous
possession of portions of Lot No. 1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced improvements
thereon consisting of fruit-bearing trees; that the applicants have never been in possession of the
property; and that applicant Arturo Rodriguez could not have inherited the land from his grandfather,
because the children of Vicente Rodriguez are still living.
On March 13, 1967, oppositor Director of Lands filed a "Motion to Dismiss or for Reconsideration" of the
Order dated August 30, 1966 alleging in substance that the present petition for registration was intended
to reopen Cadastral Case No. 15, L.R.C. Record No. 1021, wherein a cadastral court already declared
Lot 1736 as public land; that the application for registration cannot be treated as a pleading for the
reopening of the cadastral case as provided under Republic Act No. 931 because it does not contain
material allegations justifying the applicants' failure to file their answer during the cadastral proceedings;
and that a decision in a cadastral case constitutes res judicata.
In a decision dated July 12, 1967, the lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their
title to Lot 1736 of Orion Cadastre, Bataan and ordering its registration in the names of said applicants in
the following proportion: 2/3 undivided portion to Arturo Rodriguez and 1/3 undivided portion to
Guillermo Reyes. On June 2, 1976, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting
aside the decision of the lower court on the ground that the land in question had been decreed in 1938
to be part of the public domain by the cadastral court in proceedings commenced as early as 1927 and
which had become final thereby constituting a bar to the subsequent application for registration on the
principle of res judicata.
Applicants-appellees filed a motion for the reconsideration of the appellate court's decision
alleging three grounds, namely: that the decision in Cadastral Proceedings does not constitute res
judicata on the same land subject of the present application for land registration; that the application for

land registration and/or confirmation of an imperfect title is not a petition for reopening of the cadastral
proceedings; and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the land registration case.
In a resolution of the Court of Appeals thru a division of five and by a vote of four to one reversed
its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public
land way back in 1930 does not bar the present application for registration of title or confirmation of
imperfect title under Act 496 of the same parcel of land.
Issues: the court of appeals erred in ruling that the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper
cadastral proceedings declaring the lot in question as public land does not constitute res judicata, or
otherwise stated, does not bar the present application by subsequent possessors for registration of title
and/or confirmation of imperfect title under act 496 of the same parcel of land.
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the applicants had registrable title over the large tract of public
land herein applied for.
Ruling: Petitioner's main contention in elevating the case to this Court is that the case of Mindanao
relied upon by the appellate court in reversing its original decision is not applicable to the case at bar the
basic and fundamental distinction resting on the fact that the declaration of the land in question as public
land in said case was made in ordinary land registration proceedings which was a voluntary application
commenced by a private party under Act 496, whereas in this case, the land in question was declared
public land in compulsory cadastral proceedings initiated by the government under the Cadastral Act.
We grant the petition but not on the principle of res judicata invoked by petitioner. Admittedly, the land in
question had been declared public land in a decision rendered by the cadastral court. When Cadastral
Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the land in question was still classified as
within the U. S. Military Reservation of the Governor General of the Philippines dated February 16, 1925
and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. On this basis, the Court finds that the
decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for
land registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in question since the same
would nevertheless have been denied due to the fact that during the pendency of the cadastral case,
said land was not alienable nor disposable and this was shown by the denial of the lease application
filed then by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest.
It would be unfair to consider the said cadastral decision as binding upon private respondents because
there was nothing they could have done then to protect their rights. Apparently, at that time they had no
registerable right to speak of considering that in 1927, private respondents' possession could not have
met the thirty year requirement under the law, their predecessor-in-interest having entered the land only
in 1913, which if computed up to 1927 would add up to only fourteen years.
WHEREFORE, the November 10, 1976 resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Land
Registration Case No.N-122 (LRC Rec. No. N-28819) of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan is
DISMISSED. No costs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS
Facts: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the question of
whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land
by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao (now Davao City. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao
District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded
for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Jose Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The
Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was
the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of
P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. On November 23, 1934, the
Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio
de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio
de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. On September 7, 1936,
President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and
settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff,
Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. Thereafter, or on May
15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus,
pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the
barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural
public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares.
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of
the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked
this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes
under the administration of the Director of Hospital.
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical
Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area
for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus,
opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right on
the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio
Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the
northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan
Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square
meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial
court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals it which it held that the appealed
judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is
hereby affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot 1176-B-2,

situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby
decreed in the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the
appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease
pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership
over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the
motion on June 17, 1975.
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to the SC thru the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering its decision.
Ruling: The SC find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious on the following grounds.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081
hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical
Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated
October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center,
Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio de Jesus, had
acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to
him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied
for, including the 12.8081 hectares. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded
as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria
Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest
by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to
20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with
by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on
May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." In like manner, the Sales Patent
issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of
agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area
of 20 hectares 64, acres 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of
Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de
Jesusas20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio
de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion
that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general
description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity
and in boundaries Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Government, and
most strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of
the Government, is to be resolved in its favor.
4. The SC cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that Eugenio de Jesus' alleged
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site)
since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which
right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land
which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected,
but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by
a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase

5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the military
"camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin
Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would
be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936,
the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name
of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2
consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939.
Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of such
donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw it. ADMITTEDLY, the appealed judgement
of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2,
Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in
favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. With costs against private respondent.

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. SPOUSES FRANCISCO LAHORA and
TORIBIA MORALIZON vs. EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Facts: The spouses Francisco Lahora and ToribiaMoralizon brought the present appeal to the Court
from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing their petition with respect to Lot No.
2228 on the ground of previous registration, said appellants claiming that the question of the validity of a
certificate of title based on a patent allegedly obtained by fraud can be raised by them in a land
registration proceeding, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
The records show that on 26 November 1965 herein appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Davao for registration of nine parcels of land located in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay, province
of Davao, one-half of which having been acquired by appellant ToribiaMoralizon allegedly by inheritance,
and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse possession in the concept
of owner. One of the said parcels of land is identified as lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856,
ManayCadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands belonging to him and his
wife were included in the application for registration, mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which was
said to be already covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's wife. The
Director of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that the applicants or their
predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land sought to be registered, nor
have they been in open, continuous, and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years.
On 14 June 1967, counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion for correction of the number of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously referred to as OCT No. P-6055, when it should
properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise prayed in the same motion that the petition be dismissed
insofar as it includes Lot No. 2228, for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in the
name of oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its order of 18 June 1967, which was amended on 29
June 1967, the court granted the oppositor's motion and directed the dismissal of the petition as regards
Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land can
no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in its decision
Ruling: It may be recalled that the action filed by petitioners-appellants in the lower court on 26
November 1965 was for original registration of certain parcels of land, including Lot No. 2228 of the
ManayCadastre. It is not here denied by appellants that said Lot No. 2228 was the subject of a public
land grant in favor of the oppositor's wife, and by virtue of which grant or patent Original Certificate of
Title No. P-6053 was issued in her name on 21 June 1956. Appellants, however, try to make a case
against the dismissal-order of the lower court by contending that the patent issued to oppositor's wife
was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual occupants of the land, were not notified
of the application for patent therefor and of its adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since they
were the actual occupants of the property, the government could not have awarded it to oppositor's wife,
and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the original certificate of title subsequently obtained by her,
were null and void. In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of
oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine years earlier. Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the
same parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title covering the
said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a
proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic fraud, the action for review of the decree should
have been filed before the one year period had elapsed. Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action
would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act. Furthermore, the relief provided by
the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party, not in another registration, for land
already registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of another registration, but in an
appropriate action such as one for reconveyance or reversion, or for damages in case the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

As regards the complaint against the alleged correction of the number of the certificate of title covering
Lot No. 2228 which was erroneously stated in the oppositor's motion as OCT No. P-6055, when it should
properly be OCT No. P-6053, it appearing that the motion was intended to rectify a clearly typographical
mistake, there is nothing irregular in the lower court's order granting the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellants.

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL
SANTOS, JR., v. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Facts: Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its decision finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants,
Spouses Marciano [sic] and ErlindaLaburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described
as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order dated March
15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused
with the following reasons. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision
plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe
Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano Laburada and ErlindaLaburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it
might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case Nos. 699, 875 and
817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan.
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos.
240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila,
issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355 was received by this
Authority
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of
land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15,
1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet
been received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found
that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O.
7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of PuraEscurdiaVda.
deBuenaflor, Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the
title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595
consisting of several sheets are incomplete. For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated
March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being
premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4,
1995, for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to
which was attached a letter.
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same
parcel of land.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the
corresponding decree in LRC Case No.N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
Ruling: The petition is not meritorious. Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for
the LRA "unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act. They cite four reasons why the writ should be
issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA
has the imperative duty to perform" because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding. Since there

was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the
corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to "take the cudgels for the private persons
in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 TCT No. 6595." Rather, it is the "sole concern of said
private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may
have against the property subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third, petitioners contend
that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of "the failure of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No.
6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles. Fourth, the State "consented
to its being sued" in this case. Thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered
in this case "as final and make provision for its satisfaction."
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial
court is not valid, considering that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and so a second decree for the
same land is null and void.
The Court agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three
reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet
executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal
right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become
executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of
negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land
would be null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only
once.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of
such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the
performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A court may be
compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be
enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to
require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless
delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in
Pasig City.

Republic v. Alexandra Lao
G.R. No. 150413 July 3, 2003
FACTS: On September 4, 1995, respondent filed with the Tagaytay RTC an application for the
registration of title over a parcel of land consisting of 9,349 sq. m. in Silang, Cadastre. She prayed that it
be awarded to her by virtue of C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, based on her
predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and
occupancy under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years. She allegedly acquired said
land by purchase from RaymundoNoguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzule, who inherited it from Generosa
Medina, who, in turn, inherited it from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from
EdilbertoPerido by transfer. The RTC approved the application and the corresponding decree of
registration was issued. The petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the CA which affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not respondent was able to prove that she met the required period of open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject land, and (2)
whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.
HELD: According to Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. and Sec. 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Sec. 4 of P.D.
1073, before one can register his title over a parcel of land the applicant must show that (1) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier, and that (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. Respondents witnesses did not state nor showed evidence as that respondents
predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land prior June 12, 1945. There was no
extrajudicial settlement of property to establish how it was transferred from Generosa Medina to
RaymundoNoguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela. Thus, respondent failed to meet the first requisite
under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, unless public land is reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State. No certification from the appropriate government agency or
official proclaiming the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable was presented.
Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land which is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Wherefore, the Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decision of the CA,
further denying the application for original registration of the subject land.

Manuel Bernardo et. al. v. CA et. al.
G.R. 111715 June 8, 2000
Facts: On July 16, 1985, Manuel Bernardo, claiming to be the legitimate son and only heir of Tomas
Bernardo, filed with the Pasig RTC a verified petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 that the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Tomas Bernardo. The land in question covered an area
of 334,511 sq. m. in Quezon City. However, said TCT was never presented because of a futile diligent
search and that it had been lost/destroyed and could no longer be recovered by Registry of Rizal.
Pasig RTC granted the petition and having become final and executor, the Order was entered in the
Registry of Deeds. In their petition for reconstitution, petitioners failed to notify the private respondents
who were in possession of the property and merely indicated the properties adjoining the questioned
property. Despite the fact that Lot 802 overlapped with another property covered by TCT No. 148176
issued to Freeman Inc., TCT No. 12568 in the name of Tomas Bernardo was entered in the Quezon City
Registry.
Petitioners then filed before the QC RTC a complaint for the annulment of the certificates of title of the
defendants on the ground that they were null and void as these originated from a non-existent and
falsified subdivision plans and that their predecessors-in-interest had not been purchasers of certificate
of sale from the Piedad Estate or any portion of said Lot 802 of said estate thru the Bureau of Lands.
Anita Lim filed a motion for intervention, alleging to be a co-owners of the land in question because
Manuel conveyed to them portions of it. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
contending that the Pasig RTC gave due course to the reconstitution without the usual LRA Report to
pass upon the authenticity of the claim and alleged title of the plaintiffs. They further alleged absolute
ownership of the parcel of land that was within the area covered by TCT No. 12658 and that the same
was already under private ownership. Hence, they also prayed for the declaration of nullity of Bernardos
title. QC RTC denied the motion to dismiss and for preliminary hearing. The defendants filed a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition before CA. They alleged that they only learned of the
reconstitution of the questioned land when they were summoned in the QC RTC case. CA rendered a
decision declaring null and void the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 in the name of Tomas Bernardo.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA may entertain and render a decision on a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition annulling an Order of reconstitution and questioning the denial of motion to dismiss the
complaint for nullification titles covering the lots that overlap the area covered by the reconstituted title.
HELD: The CA, in petitions for certiorari and prohibition, is limited in determining error of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Although the object of the petition was for the
annulment of the judgment of the Pasig RTC, however, a question of jurisdiction is still involved ergo CA
had appellate jurisdiction. Bernardos complaint was aimed at nullifying private respondents respective
titles, the existence of which was determinative as far as the matter of jurisdiction was concerned. The
CA was correct in annulling the judgment of the Pasig RTC because Bernardo failed to observe the
requirement in Secs. 12 and 13 of R.A. 26: that actual occupants of the property must be notified of the
proceedings. Although said judgment was final and executory, it may, according to Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court, be set aside through a petition for relief when, inter alia, the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or lack of due process. The private defendants were deprived of their day in court. Bernardo
only found out that the property was occupied and titled to the private respondents after they instituted
annulment of the latters respective titles. Nevertheless, this does not warrant the dismissal of the said
case. Nullification of the reconstitution proceedings did not divest Bernardo of proprietary rights over the
property. The Torrens system of land registration does not create or vest title; it has never been
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership. Reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new
duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It is merely an
evidence of title over a particular property. Private respondents admission that a portion of Lot 802 was

subdivided to Tomas Bernardo mandate the continuance of the proceedings. The Civil Case before the
QC RTC should be considered as one of quieting the various titles involved in the case.

FAUSTA FRANCISCO V. CA, ALEJANDRO SANTOS AND RAMONA FRANCISCO (SUBSTITUTED
BY JOSE SAN DIEGO, CELSO, HONORIO, EDILBERTO, AMALIA, VIRGINIA, PACITA AND LOPE,
ALL SURNAMED GARROVILLAS) G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980
FACTS: On May 23, 1964, the Rizal CFI rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in
dispute situated in Rizal in the names of the private respondents and a corresponding decree was
issued in their favor. Petitioner filed a petition for review alleging: (1) that she is the absolute owner in
fee simple of the said, her father, Diego Francisco, occupying said land since 1918, (2) that the private
respondents obtained a Decree of Registration for the said land through fraud, (3) that she and her five
brothers and sisters nor her tenant were not notified of any alleged survey of the land nor of the
application for registration, (4) that although the proceedings was published in the Official Gazette,
petitioner does not read it, and (5), that the land was never actually surveyed. Private respondents
opposed said petition. The trial judge reversed the earlier decision granting the decree or registration
and OCT of private respondents and ordering instead the said land to be registered in the name of
petitioner. He reasoned that Alejandro contended in his application that the land belonged to his father,
Toribio Santos, which he inherited upon the latters death, but he later on testified that the land had no
previous owner and that he merely occupied it on 1920 and had been in possession thereof for more
than 30 years. After the death of Diego, the title was cancelled and transferred to his children heirs,
evidenced by TCT No 23434. In private respondents application, they did not state the true adjoining
owners of the said land and such omission can only reveal their deliberate intention of preventing
notices of their application for registration to be sent to the true adjoining owners. The decision was
again reversed in favor of private respondents. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents committed fraud that would warrant the cancellation of the
decress of registration and Torrens Title already issued to them.
HELD: Sec. 21 of Act No. 496 states that the applicants shall also state the name in full and the address
of the application, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining
owners, if known, and, if not known, shall state what search has been made to find them. In conducting
their searches, the private respondents would have found out that two of the adjoining owners they
stated in their application had long been dead and buried. By noting the deceased former owners, they
committed fraud. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of CA and reinstated the second decision of the
RTC, without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court in complying with the additional requirements for
the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.

TOMASA AGUILAR ET. AL. (PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES), V. EMILIANOCAOAGDANET. AL.
(DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS) G.R. No. L-12580 April 30, 1959
FACTS: JanuarioHermitano, grantee of plaintiff, who died during pendency of the case, sought to
recover from the defendants the possession of the portions of land they were occupying. Alberta Aguilar,
heir of plaintiff, also sought to recover from defendants plus damages. The plaintiffs claim the land in
question originally belonged to her evidenced by TCT No. 10499 of the land records of Tarlac and was
inherited by Alberta when the former died, and later sold to Hermitano.
The registered land in question is the same identical property object of Registration Case No. 494 of the
Supreme Court, filed wherein it was declared part of the public domain which decision was later
reversed on appeal. The decree and title which was issued to the applicants, Simon Castro and Tomasa
Aguilar, was later transferred to the latter. The defendants claim that the decree issued by the CFI of
Tarlac, adjucating the land in question to Tomasa is invalid on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
court. When the petition for registration was filed in CFI of Tarlac, another registration in Pangasinan
involving a bigger portion of land which embraces certain portion of the land subject of the Tarlac
registration was already pending and thus, the Pangasinan court acquired exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to the land covered in the case. Further, that they were not notified of the proceedings of the
case pending in Tarlac. A bigger portion of land which Antonio Fuster sought to register in his name in a
later registration case in Pangasinan happens to embrace portions now in dispute was subseuquently
declared public land by the Supreme Court. The trial court sustained the action of the plaintiffs and
ordered the defendants to vacate the portions of land occupied by them. Hence, this appeal.
Issues: Whether or not the decree of the land in question to Tomasa by the CFI of Tarlac is invalid for
lack of jurisdiction.
Held: The Pangasinan court dismissed the registration case, without prejudice, filed by the appellees
when it found out that portions of the land were subject of this case were actually situated in Tarlac. The
jurisdiction was thus transferred to the Tarlac court. The registration case in Tarlac filed before the
dismissal of the Pangasinan case rectified the error committed as to the venue that should take
cognizance of the case, the CFI of Tarlac that which has territorial jurisdiction over the property, pursuant
to Section 10 of Act No. 2347. Although the defendants were not notified of the pendency of the Tarlac
case, such defect would not affect the jurisdiction of the court because registration proceedings are in
rem in nature, not in personam. Further, they were already represented indirectly by the Bureau of
Lands, where they filed their homestead patent application, when the latter was opposed R.C. No. 494.
After the decree and title were issued to Simon Castro and Tomasa Aguilar, the Bureau ordered
defendants relocation covered by their application and exclusion from the land covered by registration
case. The very purpose of the Torrens System is the indefeasibility of its title after the lapse of one year.
The defendants brought the action questioning the validity of the decree issued by the CFI of Tarlac after
more than 30 years from its issuance and thus, such can no longer be impugned on ground of fraud,
error or lack of notice to the defendants. The inclusion of the portion of land in dispute in the Fuster case
cannot have the effect of nullifying the decree issued in a previous registration case.

NICOLAS v. PRE
G.R. No. L-7402
FACTS: Domingo Nicolas prayed for the nullification of a judgment rendering Ulyses Pre, et al., as
owners of a parcel of land containing an area of 5 hectares. The defendants filed a motion for the
dismissal on the grounds of (1) action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) complaint states no cause
of action. This motion was sustained and the court dismissed the case without pronouncement as to
cost.
Domingo Nicolas, appellant, filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land containing an area
of 31 hectares, 21 ares and 18 centares located in Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. Ulyses Pre, et al., appellees,
opposed the application with regard to a portion of the land containing an area of 5 hectares, 17 ares
and 70 centares claiming to be the owners thereof. The court, on January 27, 1950, rendered judgment
declaring appellees owners in fee simple of the portion of land claimed by them in their opposition. No
appeal has been taken from this decision within the reglamentary period. The same became final on
April 7, 1950. appellant, through counsel, filed a petition to set aside the decision under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court alleging, among others, that said decision was null and void because it was rendered
without jurisdiction and in violation of sections 31, 36 and 37 of Act No. 496.
ISSUES: Whether or not Court of First Instance of Tarlac has the power of jurisdiction.
RULING: In section 37 of Act No. 496, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3621, wherein it is provided
that "in case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the conflicting interests of the
applicant and the adverse claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of
them succeeds in showing that he has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the
land applied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled thereto." The only condition prescribed for this
variation is that the court "shall order the adverse claimant to whom a portion of the land applied for has
been awarded to pay to the applicant such part of said expenses as may be in proportion to the area
awarded to said adverse claimant. "This is what the trial court has done. It ordered the oppositors to pay
to the applicant his proportionate share in the expenses. It is, therefore, evident that the claim of
appellant that the trial court acted contrary to law in acting on the adverse claim of the oppositors has no
legal basis.
The foregoing considerations show that the lower court did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss
filed by appellees and, hence, the error assigned by appellant in this respect is without merit.

LIM v. C.A
G.R. No. 112876
FACTS: Manuel Silvestre Bernardo, claims that he is a legitimate son and only surviving heir of Tomas
Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Pasig a verified petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title
that the register of deeds of Rizal Province issued in the name of Tomas Bernardo. The said land covers
an area approximately three hundred thirty-four thousand five hundred eleven square meters in Quezon
City. Manuel Bernardo alleges that since his deceased father died, he had continuously exercised
actual ownership and possession over the property embaraced in and covered by the said title. Manuel
sough the help of Attys. Juilan F. Salcedo , Norberto Nolasco and Antonio Gonzales in the action for
reconstitution and relocation of actual boundaries of the land, and the settlement of the estate of Tomas.
Due to these lawyers failure to provide the appropriate legal services that petitioner desired he then
retained Atty. Antonio Gonzales and hired Atty. Benjamin Tango. They then filed the petition for
reconstitution of title. When it was granted, Manuel continued his researches on the plan of the adjoining
or boundary owners in order to effect the relocation survey with the help of the surveyor.
Bernardos alleges that the defendants certificates of title were null and void as these originated from a
non-existent and falsified subdivision plan and from spurious subdivision plans and their predecessorsin-interest had not been purchasers or assignees of certificate of sale. Thereafter, Anita S. Lim,
Benjamin A. Tango and Antonio C. Gonzales, filed a motion for intervention, they alleged that as the
only son and surviving legal heir of Tomas Bernardo, Manuel Bernardo inherited the entire parcel of
land through an affidavit of self-adjudication.
The defendants raised that an oder of a court such as that granting reconstitution of title, if rendered
without jurisdiction, may be assailed at any time in any proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not, under the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals may entertain and render a
decision on a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with two-pronged purpose.
Whether or not it could give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition that also prayed for
annulment of judgment/
Whether or not in an action for reconstitution of title, the requirement of notice for publication be
complied first before the court can act on the petition?
RULING: Court of Appeals is vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final decisions and
orders of regional trial courts, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with, among others, the Constitution and Republic Act No. 296. The Court of appeals
may thus resolve petitions for the annulment of final orders rendered by a court without jurisdiction at
any time and in any proceeding by a party whom it is sought to be enforced.
It is undisputed that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of a judgment
of a Regional Trial Court. The law explicitly provides an exclusive and original jurisdiction over actions
for annulment of judgment of regional trial courts. The rule on joinder of parties is not violated by the
institution of the action for annulment of judgment as the Bernardos themselves were the petitioners in
that action.
The requirement of notice for publication is thus a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance
therewith is fatal to the petition for reconstitution of title. However, notwithstanding compliance with that
requirement, actual notice to the occupants of the property is still manadatory.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEE
G.R. No. 158230
FACTS: Lee Liong bought a lot from the Franciscos with an area of 1,574 located in corner of Roxas
Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. Lee Liong died and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his
sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. They extra-judicially settled among themselves the lots. When the
sons of Lee Liong died the lot were transferred to their respective wives; Elizabeth Lee and Pacita YuLee.
Elizabeth and Pacita filed a petition for the reconstitution of a title of lot because the record of the
register of deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. The court held that the trial courts order of
reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it was based merely on the plan and technical
description approved by the land registration authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are the lawful owner of the lot considering that Lee
Liong is constitutionally prohibited to own real property in the Philippines?
RULING: The government may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to
aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the constitution. However, in such case that the lot is
already transferred to a Filipino citizen militates against escheat proceedings. In the case at bar,
subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of
Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, had since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs
and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipinos a fact the Solicitor General does
not dispute.

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76371 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She
alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application
for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands
and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim
that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1
sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and
denied petitioners motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA
regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were
appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was
ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent
with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no
longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were
erroneously included in the respondents land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1
excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin
Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion
for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the
decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved
they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the
oppositors filed a motion for review.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1 including
those owned by the oppositors?
Ruling: The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant
who must show he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Because the land
registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the court binds the whole
world except those appearing in court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus,
the oppositors are exempted from the general default order by the court. On the respondents motion for
writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and Partolan, the court finds no merit in granting their
motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful claim over these land areas. Although
Partolan was excluded in the general default issued by the court while Baltar did not appeal on the trial
courts decision, respondent is still required to prove and establish her registrable rights over the land
even in the absence of opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-interest is not sufficient
evidence to prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the land in
dispute with the boundaries comprising it. What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in
its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. The writ of
possesion sought by the private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim
of ownership and their possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore,
the land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited only to certain areas in the sketch that is
annexed to the Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the
excluded areas.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, vs.GERARDO SODSOD,
G.R. No. 116426 April 12, 2000
Facts: Sometime prior to July 1973, the Director of Lands filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay,
Ligao cadastral proceedings for the coverage under the Torrens system of the lands in OasCadastre,
Oas, Albay. On July 19, 1973, spouses Gerardo Sodsod and FelicidadRellores filed an answer to the
petition, claiming ownership of Lot No. 10367, OasCadastre, consisting of 52,847 square meters,
located at Tablon, Oas, Albay, by virtue of their more than thirty (30) years possession including that of
their predecessor-in-interest. During the cadastral hearings, the lot was uncontested. The evidence
showed that respondent Sodsod and his predecessor-in-interest occupied and possessed the lot in
question in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since
1929, or for more than thirty (30) years. On July 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which is that the Lot No. 10367 of the Cadastral Survey of Oas, Albay more
particularly described in the plan and technical description thereof is hereby ordered registered and
confirmed in the names of the SPOUSES GERARDO SODSOD and FELICIANO RELLORES, Filipinos,
of legal ages, and residents of Tablon, Oas, Albay. Once the decision becomes final, the decree and
original certificate of title be issued in their favor.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent and his predecessor-in-interest can possessed the land in
question for more than thirty years sufficient to vest in him registrable title over the same.
Ruling: In the case at bar the respondent has fully complied with the requirements under Section 48 (b),
C. A. No. 141 for confirmation of title over the lot in question. Ipso jure, respondent has acquired private
ownership of the land by mere possession and occupation for more than thirty (30) years under claim of
ownership. Since 1929 up to the filing of the cadastral case, respondent and his predecessor had been
in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the lot
involved in the concept of owners. Hence, they have acquired private ownership of the land, and are
entitled to confirmation of registrable title.

LUCENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999
Facts: Petitioners obtained a loan from private respondent Rural Bank of Najuan, Inc. inthe amount of
P3,000 secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on their parcel of land.After the loan had matured,
they were able to pay the Bank the sum of P2,000, therebyleaving a balance of P1,000.After previous
demand by the rural bank for the petitioners to settle the balance of their matured loan went unheeded,
the subject property was extra judicially foreclosed and sold at public auction where the rural bank as
the highest bidder acquired the property. Prior to the auction sale, notice of foreclosure were post in at
least 3 conspicuous public places in the municipality where the subject property was located. No notices
were postedin the barrio where the property was located, nor were any published in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Certificate of Sale was subsequently issued and registered.
Issue: Was there a valid foreclosure sale of the subject property?
Held: No. Failure to comply with statutory requirements as to publication of notice of auction sale
constitutes a jurisdictional error which invalidates the sale. Even the slight deviations there from are not
allowed. RA 5939, Sec. 5 provides:The foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks
shall be exempt from the publication in newspapers were the total amount of the loan, including interests
due and unpaid, does not exceed three thousand pesos. It shall be sufficient publication in such cases if
the notices of foreclosure are posted in at least three of the most conspicuous places in the municipality
and barrio where the land mortgaged is situated during the period of sixty days immediately preceding
the public auction.In the case at bar, the affidavit of posting executed by the sheriff states that notices of
public auction sale were posted in three conspicuous public places in the municipality such as 1) the
bulletin board of the Municipal Building; 2)the Public Market; 3) the Bus Station. There is no indication
that notices were posted in the barrio where the subject property lies. Clearly, there was a failure to
publish the notice of auction sale as required by law. Further, there was a failure on the part of the
private respondents to publish notices of foreclosure sale in a newspaper of general circulation. Sec. 5
provides that such foreclosure is exempt from the publication requirement when the total amount of the
loan including interests due and unpaid does not exceed three thousand pesos. The law clearly refers to
the total amount of the loan along with interests and not merely the balancethereof, as stressed by the
word total.

HEIRS OF BRUSAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126875 August 26, 1999
FACTS: The case revolves around the dispute over a 19-hectare land located in San Francisco, Baao,
Camarines Sur. Petitioners heirs of Juan, Mariano, Tarcela and JosefaBrusas claimed that said property,
formerly a public land, was part of the 33 hectare land in the actual physical possession of their
grandfather SixtoBrusas who have inherited the same from their great grandfather. On July 1968 Ines
Brusas applied and was granted free a patent over lots 1 and 2 of said land. Thus when mariano and
josefaBrusas filed their sworn statements of landholdings in 1973 they discovered that their properties
were already titled in the name of their sister Ines. Which then made siblings mariano and josefabrusas
filed a petition for reconveyance of said property.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of said property?
RULING: Ines Brusas is the lawful owner of the property as it is a fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as an evidence of incontrovertible title of the property in favor
of the person whose name appears therein. And the primary purpose of the Torrens System was to quiet
the title and to prevent forever the questions of its legality. And a title once registered in the Torrens
system can no longer be defeated by actual, open or notorious possession or even by prescription.
While it is correct that the siblings Mariano and JosefaBrusas ask for reconveyance it cannot be granted
as there was no preponderant proof of fraud on the part of Ines Brusas which could have warranted the
transfer of ownership over the property unless it has come into the possession of an innocent purchaser.

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