G.R. No.

115024

February 7, 1996

MA.
LOURDES
VALENZUELA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-xx
G.R. No. 117944

February 7, 1996

RICHARD
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
VALENZUELA, respondents.

LI, petitioner,
and

LOURDES

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The
facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by
the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasidelict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident.
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At
around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990,
plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along
Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
heading towards the direction of Manila. Before
reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had
a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been
told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that
car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about
1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open
the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the
rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of
the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was
destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left
leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with
only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of
the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh
(above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for
twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the
artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants
from the car insurance.
In her complaint,-[ plaintiff prayed for moral
damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other
medical and related expenses amounting to a total
of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.

He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph;
considering that it was raining, visibility was
affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He
testified that he was driving along the inner portion
of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly
confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction,
travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights".
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see
because it was midnight blue in color, with no
parking lights or early warning device, and the area
was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding
as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the
outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the
testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being
bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right
and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging
that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was
not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who
prepared the vehicular accident report and the
sketch of the three cars involved in the accident,
testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the
sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether
the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did
not notice if there was an early warning device;
there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd.
and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn,
Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez,
testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car
and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car
came approaching very fast ten meters from the
scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of
plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion
of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's
car swerved to the right and hit the parked car on
the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield
of defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed
under the car. He stated that defendant was under
the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very
well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's
submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable
for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the
defendants to jointly and severally pay the following
amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of
her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro
La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month,
as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La
Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date
of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00, a month for
unrealized profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons
from July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;

5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and

6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs.
Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as
depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars,
appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed
an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that
there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the
trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly
parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped
by defendant's car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that
the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the
center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence
which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near
center of the right lane was never presented during the trial
of the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed
that:
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a
safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by
eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was outside
his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A.
Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990
when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady
(referring to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and
opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car
of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters
away from the scene"; defendant's car was
zigzagging", although there were no holes and
hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the
plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of
defendant's care, causing its destruction. He came to
the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from
under defendant's car and was able to say "hurting
words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the
latter was under the influence of liquor, because he
"could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June
17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse
in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know either
plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was
liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of
moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for
exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award
of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's
fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,
dismissed the defendants' counterclaims.3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's
decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not
be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence.
Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it
absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the
owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces
the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the
trial court.4
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby
consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No.
117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in
effect, attempts to have this Court review are factual

findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of

Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the
Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early
morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of
fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was
fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio
Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located
just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified
that he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed,
racing towards the general direction of Araneta
Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that he was standing in
front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from
the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit
Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the
defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell
under the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to the
incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking
with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending
vehicle in order to survey the incident.7 Equally important,
Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk, 8 contrary to Li's
allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the center of the
right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-serving"
asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not
even know the accident victim personally and who
immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his
testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident,
the latter's testimony deserves greater weight. As the court
emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own
examination of the transcript, We are not prepared
to set aside the trial court's reliance on the
testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While
Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of
speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected
to cross-examination and no attempt was made to
question .his competence or the accuracy of his
statement that defendant was driving "very fast".
This was the same statement he gave to the police
investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no compelling
basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony
are not borne out by an examination of the
testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the
accident was across the street where his beerhouse
is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36,
tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in front of his
establishment. The ownership of the Lambingan se
Kambingan is not material; the business is registered
in the name of his mother, but he explained that he
owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his
side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the
accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily
contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that
there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20,
1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez
testified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy
rain and the rain has stopped and he was outside his
establishment at the time the accident transpired
(pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was consistent
with plaintiff's testimony that it was no longer
raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn,
April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that
it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain
why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn,
Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos

that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in

response to a telephone call after the accident had
transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no
substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony
that would impair the essential integrity of his
testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are
compelled to affirm the trial court's acceptance of
the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we
note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the
accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any
and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up
by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a
speed of 55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car".
He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put
on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence
to Li's disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations.
The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no
difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample
time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he
were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions.
Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work,
provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a manner
which would have avoided the accident could therefore have
been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he
was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez;
and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. 12 Either
factor working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would
have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather
than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by
respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the
San Juan Police immediately after the incident, he
said that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of
nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front
of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again,
thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast,
oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of
him, because if he was not, then he could not have
missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car
of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk
which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding
forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then
standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San
Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the
plaintiff's car in front of him, but that it failed as the
road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again,
that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running
very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have
easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding
the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that
the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if,
indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only
about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the
wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting
the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims
during his testimony, which is contrary to what he
told the police immediately after the accident and
is, therefore, more believable, that he did not
actually step on his brakes but simply swerved a
little to the right when he saw the on-coming car

with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction,

in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have
bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly
parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was
not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the
right in order to safely avoid a collision with the oncoming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double
lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted
white paint, and there is plenty of space for both
cars, since her car was running at the right lane
going towards Manila on the on-coming car was also
on its right lane going to Cubao.13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving
his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us
to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty
of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora
Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking
zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. 14 Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according
to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her
own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an
actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held
up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard
of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by
unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan
vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.17
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting
two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc
Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver
therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the
given situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the
"emergency rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of
the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with
an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by
the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled
by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping
at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which
is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to
help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess
the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of
Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a
flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in

danger, she did what was best under the situation. As

narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat
tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the
people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about
1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." 20 In fact,
respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on
the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's car was
parked very close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly
straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance
from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard.
This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness
Rodriguez.22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one
of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is
conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." 23It is
the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss
vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of
care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in
the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly
negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis
that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the
street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record
to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under
these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened.
As Presser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of
an automobile must be prepared for the sudden
appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway,
and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one
who sees a child on the curb may be required to
anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his
failure to act properly when they appear may be
found to amount to negligence.26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation
confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of
his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In denying liability on the
part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held
that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's
testimony, that the visit was in connection with
official matters. His functions as assistant manager
sometimes required him to perform work outside the
office as he has to visit buyers and company clients,
but he admitted that on the night of the accident he
came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have
"business from the company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept.
23, 1991). The use of the company car was partly
required by the nature of his work, but the privilege
of using it for non-official business is a "benefit",
apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching
to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the
negligence of his employees in the discharge of their
respective duties, the basis of which liability is

not respondeat superior, but the relationship

of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of
the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison
Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred
while an employee was in the actual performance of
his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School vs.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an
employer's liability for the acts done within the
scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme
Court has held that this includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage
(Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees the
necessary discipline called for in the performance of
any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial
to their employer" (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain
the trial court's finding that since defendant Li was
authorized by the company to use the company car
"either officially or socially or even bring it home",
he can be considered as using the company car in
the service of his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was not among
his functions as assistant manager; using it for nonofficial purposes would appear to be a fringe
benefit, one of the perks attached to his position.
But to impose liability upon the employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there
must be a showing that the damage was caused by
their employees in the service of the employer or on
the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence
that Richard Li was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of the company's
business or its interests, or at least for its benefit.
The imposition of solidary liability against defendant
Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore
fail.27
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in
question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that
of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon
the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our
agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for
the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals29 upon which respondent court has placed undue
reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teacher's
supervision of students during an extracurricular activity.
These cases now fall under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which
generally encompasses all authorized school activities,
whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept
of pater familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art.
2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is
introduced showing that the employer exercised the required
amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer's burden is overcome. The question of
diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances
of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to

relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation

to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not
expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's
private activities or during the performance of tasks either
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes
of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company
cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the company
itself or are subject to various plans through which employees
eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of
service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies
provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other
employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of
vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to
purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and
maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to
the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned
and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing
vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved
of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide
cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road
worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives.
In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust
the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the
employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said
company car for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When
a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to
its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every
good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees
are given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For
large companies other than those cited in the example of the
preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business
purposes either related to the image of success an entity
intends to present to its clients and to the public in general,
or - for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its
managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to
reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a
company car serves both purposes. Since important business
transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts
of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for
the
unlimited
use
of
a
company
car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial
employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use
of a company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he
admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not
require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly
confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee
tasked with the job of representing his company with its
clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as
work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by
Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as
well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its
clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its

clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of

travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on
the night of the accident because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare
allegation which was never corroborated in the court below.
It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from
his officemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation
that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other
work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to
our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages
awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of
moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said
damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case
we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages
from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the Court
of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the
resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower
extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.
Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the
full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the
use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the
period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will
be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise
due to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of
healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have
to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her
lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for
example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond
to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease
in calcium levels observed in the bones of all postmenopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the
years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented,
are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of
the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a
vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however
technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable
amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of
the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental
and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord

with the extent and nature of the injury - physical and

psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.

Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to

inspect the damaged terrace. Pontiveros submitted a report
enumerating and describing the damages:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the

Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.

(1) The front exterior and the right side concrete

columns of the covered terrace were vertically
displaced from its original position causing exposure
of the vertical reinforcement.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

(3) The 6 CHB walls at [the] right side of the

covered terrace were found with cracks caused by
this accident.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
Pursuant to Article 21801 of the Civil Code that acknowledges
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas, a
person may be held accountable not only for his own direct
culpable act or negligence but also for those of
others albeit predicated on his own supposed failure to
exercise due care in his supervisory authority and functions.
In the case of an employer, that vicarious liability attaches
only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or
is in the course of, his employment. The question to ask
should be whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the
employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
employer or, independently, in that of his own. While an
employer incurs no liability when an employee's conduct, act
or omission is beyond the range of employment, 2 a minor
deviation from the assigned task of an employee, however,
does not affect the liability of an employer.3

G.R. No. 152040

(2) The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls

are found with cracks on top of the displaced
columns.

March 31, 2006

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and

FREDDIE
L.
SUELTO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
and
ERLINDA V.
VALDELLON, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
16739 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-93-42629 and Civil Case No. Q93-16051, where Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in damages to property.
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial
apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The
Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the
owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver
of the bus.2
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving
the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and
struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by
Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. 3 Upon Valdellons
request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior

(4) The front iron grills and concrete balusters were

found totally damaged and the later [sic] beyond
repair.4
He recommended that since the structural members made of
concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be
demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the
safety and stability of the building."5
Photographs6 of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon
commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of
repairs, inclusive of labor and painting, and the latter pegged
the cost at P171,088.46.7
In a letter dated October 19, 1992 addressed to the bus
company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment
of P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover
the cost of the damage to the terrace.8 The bus company and
Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon
refused.9
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property against Suelto. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed
with the RTC of Quezon City. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and/or
person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus bearing Plate No.
NVC-849, did then and there unlawfully, and feloniously
drive, manage, and operate the same along Kamias Road, in
said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent, and imprudent
manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a
speed greater than was reasonable and proper without taking
the necessary precaution to avoid accident to person/s and
damage to property, and considering the condition of the
traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of
his said carelessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of
precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated
by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bump a
commercial apartment belonging to ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
located at No. 31 Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing
damages to said apartment in the total amount
of P171,088.46, Philippine Currency, to her damage and
prejudice in the total amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto
and the bus company for damages. She prayed that after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court

to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the
defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and after trial
on the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the
expenses for the repair of the damaged apartment of
plaintiff, with interests to be charged thereon at the
legal rate from the date of the formal demand until
the whole obligation is fully paid;
b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as
compensatory and exemplary damages;
c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the
sum of P1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiffs
counsel; and costs of suit;

WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y LIWAG

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.
With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff Erlinda Valdellon and against
defendant Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation and
accused Freddie Suelto, where both are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff:
a. the sum of P150,000.00, as reasonable
compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged
apartment;
b. the sum of P20,000.00, as compensatory and
exemplary damages;
c. the sum of P20,000.00, as attorneys fees; and,

PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be just

and equitable in the premises.11

d. the costs of suit.

A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court.12

SO ORDERED.20

The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the

damaged terrace, where defendants offered to have it
repaired and restored to its original state. Valdellon,
however, disagreed because she wanted the building
demolished to give way for the construction of a new one.13

MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to

the CA, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove Sueltos
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the
prosecution merely relied on Valdellon, who testified only on
the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment which
appellants also alleged was excessive. Appellant Suelto
further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal
case for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintained that, in an emergency case,
he was not, in law, negligent. Even if the appellate court
affirmed his conviction, the penalty of imprisonment imposed
on him by the trial court is contrary to law.

During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to

the terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof,
adduced in evidence a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October
20, 1993, issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator
for "carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical [work]." 14
Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that
there was a need to change the column of the terrace, but
that the building should also be demolished because "if
concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot have it restored to its
original position."15
Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction,
declared that he inspected the terrace and estimated the
cost of repairs, including labor, at P171,088.46.
Suelto testified that at 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, he was
driving the bus on its way to Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila. When he reached the corner of K-H Street at Kamias
Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly crossed
from EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied
by the bus. Suelto had to swerve the bus to the right upon
which it hit the side front of the terrace of Valdellons twodoor apartment.16 Based on his estimate, the cost to the
damage on the terrace of the apartment amounted
to P40,000.00.17 On cross-examination, Suelto declared that
he saw the passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from
the bus. Before then, he had seen some passenger jeepneys
on the right trying to overtake one another.18
Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the
repair of the damaged terrace amounted to P55,000.00.19
On April 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding
Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and
Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon,
by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit. The fallo of the decision
reads:

In its Brief for the People of the Philippines, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) submitted that the appealed decision
should be affirmed with modification. On Sueltos claim that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, the OSG
contended that, applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur,
the prosecution was able to prove that he drove the bus with
negligence and recklessness. The OSG averred that the
prosecution was able to prove that Sueltos act of swerving
the bus to the right was the cause of damage to the terrace
of Valdellons apartment, and in the absence of an
explanation to the contrary, the accident was evidently due
to appellants want of care. Consequently, the OSG posited,
the burden was on the appellant to prove that, in swerving
the bus to the right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to
discharge this burden. However, the OSG averred that the
trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a straight penalty
of one year, and recommended a penalty of fine.
On June 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the trial court, but the award for actual damages
was reduced to P100,000.00. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April
28, 1994, rendered by the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as compensation
sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged
apartment
be
reduced
to P100,000.00
without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied the same.22

MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition

reiterating its submissions in the CA: (a) the prosecution
failed to prove the crime charged against petitioner Suelto;
(b) the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that
respondent suffered actual damages in the amount
of P100,000.00; and (c) the trial court erred in sentencing
petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.
On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was
mandated to prove that petitioner Suelto acted with
recklessness in swerving the bus to the right thereby hitting
the terrace of private respondents apartment. However, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden. On the other hand,
petitioner Suelto was able to prove that he acted in an
emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA
towards the direction of the bus overtook another vehicle
and, in the process, intruded into the lane of the bus.
On the second issue, petitioners insist that private
respondent was able to prove only the amount of P35,000.00
by way of actual damages; hence, the award of P100,000.00
is barren of factual basis.
On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight
penalty of imprisonment recommended by the trial court, and
affirmed by the CA, is contrary to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent
People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to
the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the
terrace of private respondents apartment. Although she did
not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner
Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial
court.
Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right
of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of
private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that
the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the
fault of petitioner Suelto.
We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as
ruled by the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners
failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused
by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane
of the bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner
Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he
had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a
passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another
vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden
emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court
of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,

motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the

right side of the road or highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the safety and
the security of life, person or property, or because of
unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith,
every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn
vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting
persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and
when turning to the left in going from one highway to
another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the
center of the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a
motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful
and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable
and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the
highway, and of any other condition then and there existing;
and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway
at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of
any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to
bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead (emphasis supplied).
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code
provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto
violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he
suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing
damage to the property of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos
defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis--vis his
Counter-Affidavit
submitted
during
the
preliminary
investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution
(Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr.
Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being
driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said
damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite
reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the
bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid
the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the
decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA
118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been
taken immediately after the incident. The damages could not
have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused
not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed
and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he
more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident
or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would
have been less severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting
statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in court.
In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to
the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger
jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his
testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger
jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying
his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points
render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his
credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and

prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such

inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the
witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages
sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a
reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not
diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the
accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial
apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full
stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.24
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should
have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the
offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator
thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to
escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil
liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
On the second issue, we agree with the contention of
petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages
to the terrace caused by the incident amounted
to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to
prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were
the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by
the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private
respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry
works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents
failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its fivepage decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual
damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual
basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared
in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum
of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by
plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court,
for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount
of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate
court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they
contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely
demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of
the damages sustained as a result of the accident.
Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00
as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her
damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not
disputed.
Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result
of the accident, the reasonable, and adequate compensation
due is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.25
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages
include all the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of
what a person already possesses (dao emergente) and the
other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated
by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v.
Court of Appeals:26
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a
sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted

and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or

quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one
is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao
emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a
benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante).27
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if
no evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is
to establish ones case by a preponderance of evidence which
means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is
superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not
presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.
Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be
pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere
surmises, speculations or conjectures. As the Court declared:
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover
actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.
He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence
which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages
cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must
point out specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne.28
The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed
by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to
their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally,
the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market
for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper
case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before
replacement.29
While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of
their claims for damages should not be discarded altogether,
however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution.
Their testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants selfinterest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such
assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence. In
the language of the Court:
For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent
incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should
be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because
it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner
of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he
would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its
equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his
self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes
loaded on the vessel should be given credence considering his
familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the
conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo, and
the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. We must,
therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to
support Del Rosarios claim as regards the amount of losses.30
An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:

Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and

competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred.
It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but
must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
Private
respondents
merely
sustained
an estimated
amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject
building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were
caused only by petitioners alleged negligence in the
maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary
wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential question
that remains indeterminable.31
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in
their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private
respondent would amount to P55,000.00.32 Accordingly,
private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages.
We also agree with petitioner Sueltos contention that the
trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty
of one (1) year. This is so because under the third paragraph
of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must
be sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act
shall have only resulted in damage to property. The said
provision reads in full:
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner
Sueltos act was to the terrace of private respondents
apartment, costing P55,000.00. Consequently, petitioners
contention that the CA erred in awarding P100,000.00 by way
of actual damages to private respondent is correct. We agree
that private respondent is entitled to exemplary damages,
and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed
by the CA, is reasonable. Considering the attendant
circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is
entitled to only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioners are ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly
and severally, the total amount of P55,000.00 by way of
actual damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C &
A CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court are the June 14, 2002 decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, in
Civil Case No. 95-75565, and its November 7, 2002
resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A
Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas
Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. [4] The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to
NHA.
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned
and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing
a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of
M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head
operator in Japan[5] that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila[6] in about eight (8) hours. [7] At approximately 8:35 in
the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area
because it was already congested. [8] At 10:00 a.m., Capt.
Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4
miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the
waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep
ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which
was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To
avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.
[9]
He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the
engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full
astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.
[10]
The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.[11]
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from
petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the
damage was caused by a fortuitous event.[12]
On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent
was dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not
guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary
precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the emergency
rule, it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had
no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a
threatening situation. It further held that even if the
maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot
be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by
respondent was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God. [13]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the

trial court was reversed and set aside. [14] It found Capt. Jusep
guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the
North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus
held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending
that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to
the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the
transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought
shelter.[15] It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because
respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner
was negligent in the selection and supervision of its
employees.[16] Granting that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of
negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due
diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly
licensed and competent Master Mariner.[17]

congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other

ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency
rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the danger in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
[27]
Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant
case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself
was caused by his own negligence.
Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously
liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article 2180
of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for
the negligent act of his employee. Thus

The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows

(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes,
whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by
Capt. Jusep?

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is

demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by

act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. The
test for determining the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.[18]

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in

holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer
the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a
report from his radio head operator in Japan [19] that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila[20] after 8 hours.[21] This,
notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of
October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the
North
Harbor,
which
unfortunately
was
already
congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted
upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the
North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not
the speculative success or failure of a decision that
determines the existence of negligence in the present case,
but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action
under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge
that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently
waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the
typhoon might change direction. [22] He cannot claim that he
waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at
midnight immediately after receiving the report because of
the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is
way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as
the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very
cloudy[23] and there was no weather disturbance yet.[24]

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or

injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an
employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. [28]

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding

reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have observed in the same situation.
[25]
Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor
considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was
very near North Harbor.[26] Even if the latter was already

xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

There is no question that petitioner, who is the

owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer
of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within
the scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner was
that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master
Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required
diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not
enough that the employees chosen be competent and
qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to
exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.
In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[29] it was held that due
diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring
of
consistent
compliance
with
the
rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court
stressed that once negligence on the part of the employees is
shown, the burden of proving that he observed the diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the
employer.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no

evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper
performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly
implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to
discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be held
liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis
of respondents failure to allege in its complaint that the
former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc.
v. Delos Santos,[31] it was held that it is not necessary to state
that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection
of its employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by
operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasidelict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[32]
Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages
awarded by the trial court, we find no reason to alter the
same. The
interest
imposed
should,
however, be
modified. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
[33]
it was held that the rate of interest on obligations not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent
(6%) per annum. If the purchase price can be established with
certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six
percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the
complaint was filed until finality of the decision. After the
judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is
satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year,
the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance
of credit.[34]
Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the
respondent shall earn 6% interest per annum from October 3,
1995 until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged
principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid
thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final
and executory until it is fully satisfied.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction,
Inc., damages in the amount of P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00
as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from October 3, 1995, until finality of this
decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on the principal and
interest (or any part thereof) until full payment.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH
TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and
ELIZABETH
KOH
TURLA, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

JAIME

TAYAG

and

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos.
69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its
previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the
Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners'
complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta
Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs.
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo,"
respectively, and granted the private respondents'
counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were
filed as a result of a vehicular accident which led to the
deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and
caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh
McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while
petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R.
No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the
late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon
the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the
cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the
accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January
1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a headon-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by
private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by
Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh,
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh
McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the
mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee.
Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one
and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was
seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front
passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons
were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was
loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about
10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to
San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City
from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10)
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two
(2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and

forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side
or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to
the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched
on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could
do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred
in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station
in Angeles City; consequently, a team of police officers was
forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation.
In the sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the
bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and
fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide seven (7) "footsteps" from
the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both
sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made
of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both
sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right
rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from
the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was
touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed
front side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck
was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the northern
end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36)
"footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by
the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps",
while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured
five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck,
however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers
immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that he was
traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case
No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before
the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled
to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In
the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the
award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh,
P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for
burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00
for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case,
petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in
connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of
P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services,
P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the
case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious
physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for
loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses
up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with
respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious
physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the
following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical
Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center,
P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and
miscellaneous expenses amounting to P5,000.00. They also
sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the
total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with
the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was
filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case

No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same
Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477,
private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car
which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven
by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award
of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and
liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, private
respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure
to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck
driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with
Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same
court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions
were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio
Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer
with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at
fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was
on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic
rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their
counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be determined by the
court after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00
as expenses of litigation.

Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both

cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the
testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal
Case No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which
the court denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to
reconsider
the
order
denying
the
motion
for
consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order
of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case No.
4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of
the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case
No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli
Koh McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo
Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and
offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand,
private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang,
Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag, Dr.
Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr.
Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos,
Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio
Tanhueco, and offered several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon
the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben
Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman
Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision
against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal
case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the information and after applying the
provisions of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code and indeterminate sentence
law, this Court, imposes upon said accused
Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months

of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)

years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum; the
accused is further sentenced to pay and
indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the
amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her
death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida
Bondoc
the
amount
of
P2,000.00
representing the funeral expenses; to pay
the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of
P20,000.00 representing her loss of income;
to indemnify and pay the heirs of the
deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in
the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the
costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17
November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners
filed with Branch III of the court where the two (2) civil
cases were pending a manifestation to that effect and
attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed
the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the
private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of
evidence to be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, these cases are
hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
the plaintiffs. The defendants had proven
their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic)
presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are
hereby awarded moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus
attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and litigation
expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants
is (sic) hereby dismissing for lack of proof to
that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the
petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2
December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third
Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise
separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the
appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were
assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its
decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction
of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong
paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa
kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin
ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by
the respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25
November 1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with
this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion
for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the
Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24

On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as

the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its
consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and
69041, 25 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it
hereby reversed and set aside and another
one is rendered, ordering defendantsappellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as
follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral
damages
P 12,000.00 as death
indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot
and tomb (Exhs. U and U1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for
holding a wake (p. 9, tsn
April
19,
1979)
P 950.00 for the casket
(Exh.
M)
P 375.00 for the vault
services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 50,000.00 as moral
damages
P 12,000.00 as death
indemnity
P
1,000.00
for
the
purchase of the burial lot
(Exh.
M)
P 950.00 for funeral
services
(Exh.
M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services
(Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George
Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral
damages
P 672.00 for Clark Field
Hospital
(Exh.
E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles
Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D1
and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St.
Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli
Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral
damages
P 1,055.00 paid to St.
Francis Medical Center
(Exhs.
G
and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis
Medical Center (Exhs. G-2
and
G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite
General Hospital (Exh. F)

P 114.20 to Muoz Clinic

(Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries
Christopher Koh McKee:

suffered

truck driver, to slow down

to give us the right of way
to come back to our right
lane.

by

Q Did
down?

P 10,000.00 as moral
damages
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis
Medical Center (Exhs. L
and
L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A.
Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)

A After avoiding the two

(2) boys, the car tried to
go back to the right lane
since the truck is (sic)
coming,
my
father
stepped on the brakes and
all what (sic) I heard is
the sound of impact (sic),
sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22,
1977); or (Exhibit "O" in
these Civil Cases).

26

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mrs. how did you know
that the truck driven by
the herein accused, Ruben
Galang did not reduce its
speed before the actual
impact of collision (sic) as
you narrated in this
Exhibit "1," how did you
know (sic)?

In the face of these diametrically opposed

judicial positions, the determinative issue
in this appeal is posited in the fourth
assigned error as follows:

A It just kept on coming,

sir. If only he reduced his
speed, we could have got
(sic) back to our right lane
on side (sic) of the
highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 3334 July 22, 1977) or
(Exhibit "O" in these Civil
Cases)
(pp.
30-31,
Appellants' Brief).

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE
(sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS
TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS
HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO
THE RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh
McKee testified thus:
Q What happened after
that, as you approached
the bridge?
A
When
we
were
approaching the bridge,
two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right
side of the highway going
to San Fernando. My
father, who is (sic) the
driver of the car tried to
avoid the two (2) boys
who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved
to the left to avoid hitting
the two (2) boys. We
noticed the truck, he
switched
on
the
headlights to warn the

slow

Q What happened after

that?

No pronouncement as to costs.

The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's

findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court
further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants (private respondents), as employers of
Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was
further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their
Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee. 27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based
on the following findings of fact:

truck

A No, sir, it did not, just

(sic) continued on its way.

In addition, We award P10,000.00 as

counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and
another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in
Civil Case No. 4478.

SO ORDERED.

the

Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our

satisfaction by the following facts and circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap,
Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck
stopped only when it had already collided
with the car:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony
during the hearing in the criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an
accommodation witness because he was one
of the first to arrive at the scene of the
accident. As a matter of fact, he brought
one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.

We are not prepared to accord faith and

credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida
Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and
Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across
the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown
that in the ordinary course of events people
usually take the side of the person with
whom they are associated at the time of
the accident, because, as a general rule,
they do not wish to be identified with the
person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary
bond is unconsciously created among the
several persons within the same group
(People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR,
Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help
suspecting
(sic)
that
he
is
an
accommodation witness. He did not go to
the succor of the injured persons. He said
he wanted to call the police authorities
about the mishap, but his phone had no dial
tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court
in the criminal case acted correctly in
refusing to believe Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does
not include the claim that Galang stopped
his truck at a safe distance from the car,
according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants'
Brief). This contention of appellants was
completely passed sub-silencio or was not
refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2
is one of the exhibits not included in the
record. According to the Table of Contents
submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2
was not submitted by defendants-appellees.
In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise
that Galang's claim that he stopped was an
eleventh-hour
desperate
attempt
to
exculpate himself from imprisonment and
damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after
seeing the car about 10 meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from
your
testimony
that
inspite of the fact that
you admitted that the
road is straight and you
may be able to (sic) see
500-1000 meters away
from you any vehicle, you
first saw that car only
about ten (10) meters
away from you for the
first time?
xxx xxx xxx
A I noticed it, sir, that it
was about ten (10) meters
away.
ATTY. SOTTO:

Q So, for clarification, you

clarify and state under
your oath that you have
(sic) not noticed it before
that ten (10) meters? (Tsn.
3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979).
(p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony
substantiate (sic)
Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped
only because of the impact. At ten (10)
meters away, with the truck running at 30
miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's
affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it
is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision
on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the
collision, and not because he waited for
Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The
police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag,
stated that he found skid marks under the
truck but there were not (sic) skid marks
behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3,
1978). The presence of skid marks show
(sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the
skid marks were found under the truck and
none were found at the rear of the truck,
the reasonable conclusion is that the skid
marks under the truck were caused by the
truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic)
suddenly stopped seconds before the
mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same.
But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at
barely 10 meters away, a very short
distance to avoid a collision, and in his
futile endeavor to avoid the collision he
abruptly stepped on his brakes but the
smashup happened just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence of Galang, the law presumes
negligence on the part of the defendants in
the selection of their driver or in the
supervision over him. Appellees did not
allege such defense of having exercised the
duties of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees
in their answers. They did not even adduce
evidence that they did in fact have methods
of selection and programs of supervision.
The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang
was the proximate cause of the mishap. If
Galang's attention was on the highway, he
would have sighted the car earlier or at a
very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He
proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to
stop when a collision was already
inevitable, because at the time that he
entered the bridge his attention was not
riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of
appellants were amply proven, but the
items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation
of the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on
the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3
April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983
decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12

November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was

denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984. 30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE
ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS
DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A
MERE
"PRESUMPTION,"
TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS,
WHO
EXCLUSIVELY
COMMITTED
THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic),
FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE
RECORDS;
THEREFORE,
RESPONDENT
COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B,
PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS,
PURELY
BASED
ON
SPECULATIONS,
CONJECTURES
AND
WITHOUT
SURE
FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE
FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE
WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING
PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS
THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS
(APPELLEES
WRONGLY
MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE
THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic)
ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE
WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE
CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN
THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE
CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI

. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID
AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE
CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY
SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES
TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private
respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said
Comment 33 was
filed,
petitioners
submitted
a
Reply 34 thereto; this Court then gave due course to the
instant petitions and required petitioners to file their
Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main
task of dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments,
some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these
cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery
of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead
of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch
III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt
on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably
concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case
No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may
have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no
specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly
allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil
action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177
of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot
be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such
consolidation could have been farthest from their minds as
Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may,
there was then no legal impediment against such
consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice
with the least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have
easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the
unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges
appreciating, according to their respective orientation,
perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same
facts differently, and
thereafter
rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in
this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the
recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court
held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil
action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under
Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal
action subject, however, to the condition that no final
judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.

Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal

Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence,
although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than
this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent
Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
relevance or importance to this case.

material facts which would have led to a conclusion different

from what was stated in its judgment. 43The same is true
where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely
on conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the
conclusions of the lower courts are based on a
misapprehension of facts. 45

As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility

arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely
stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in
the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil
Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil
action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this
Court stated:

It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case

qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent
Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the
evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the
inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The
respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the
correct findings of fact.

. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to

conclude that the civil actions mentioned in
Article 33, permitted in the same manner to
be filed separately from the criminal case,
may proceed similarly regardless of the
result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil
case related to a criminal case, to be filed
separately and to proceed independently
even during the pendency of the latter
case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no
effect whatsoever on the separate civil
case. This must be so because the offenses
specified in Article 33 are of such a nature,
unlike other offenses not mentioned, that
they may be made the subject of a separate
civil action because of the distinct
separability of their respective juridical
cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to
why the decision in the criminal case should not be
considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents
were not parties therein. It would have been entirely
different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages
arising from a delict, in which case private respondents'
liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the
judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the
subsidiary liability of the private respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal
issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent
Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by
evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and
presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier
of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received
with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions.
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals
may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the
evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the

In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the

fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and
that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the
road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As
testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
Q What happened after
that, as you approached
the bridge?
A
When
we
were
approaching the bridge,
two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right
side of the highway going
to San Fernando. My
father, who is (sic) the
driver of the car tried to
avoid the two (2) boys
who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved
to the left to avoid hitting
the two (2) boys. We
noticed the truck, he
switched
on
the
headlights to warn the
truck driver, to slow down
to give us the right of way
to come back to our right
lane.
Q Did
down?

the

truck

slow

A No sir, it did not, just

(sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after
that?
A After avoiding the two
(2) boys, the car tried to
go back to the right lane
since the truck is (sic)
coming,
my
father
stepped on the brakes and
all what (sic) I heard is

the sound of impact (sic),

sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during
cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck
was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that
time, a greater peril death or injury to the two (2) boys.
Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court
in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do
(Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930),
or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure
to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." (Cooley on
Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813),
decided more than seventy years ago but
still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to
determine the existence
of
negligence
in
a
particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use
that (reasonable care and
caution
which
an
ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the
same situation?) If not,
then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here
in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary
conduct
of
the
discreet paterfamilias of
the
Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required
by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its
application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance
which
the
circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is
great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
(citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35
Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest
that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any

reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to

avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to
the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the
emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the
lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best
means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them.
Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not
guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of
the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would
not
have
occurred.
And
more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that
the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in
the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused
the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of
a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry
of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted
in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the
proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The
truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of
the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car
measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width.
This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by
side
with
a
clearance
of
3.661
meters
to
spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which
could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable
man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to
avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He

himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48
kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per
hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence
to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the
translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's
response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in
kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that
official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is
proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant
case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established
through the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of
Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know
that the truck driven by
the herein accused, Ruben
Galang did not reduce its
speed before the actual
impact of collision as you
narrated in this Exhibit
"1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming,
sir. If only he reduced his
speed, we could have got
(sic) back to our right lane
on side (sic) of the
highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 3334, July 22, 1977) or
(Exhibit; "O" in these Civil
Cases)
(pp.
30-31,
Appellants' Brief) 54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the
truck, how was it moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60
kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you
saw this truck, do you
know what happened?
A I saw the truck and a car
collided (sic), sir, and I
went to the place to help
the victims. (tsn. 28, April
19, 1979)

A I saw it stopped (sic)

when it has (sic) already
collided with the car and
it was already motionless.
(tsn. 31, April 19, 1979;
Emphasis Supplied). (p.
27, Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly,
therefore,
it
was
the
truck
driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures
and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was
the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last
clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a
doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof. 56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals,

57

We held:

The respondent court adopted the doctrine

of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for
the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. In other words, the doctrine of
last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery (sic).
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person
who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed
to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the
accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th
Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that
a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff
who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in
the reasonable exercise of due care, had in
fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur.,
2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa,

xxx xxx xxx

Q From the time you saw
the truck to the time of
the impact, will you tell
us if the said truck ever
stopped?

58

We ruled:

The doctrine of last clear chance was

defined by this Court in the case of Ong v.
Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397
(1958), in this wise:
The doctrine of the last
clear
chance
simply,

means that the negligence

of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for
the
negligence
of
defendant
where
it
appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have
avoided
injurious
consequences to claimant
notwithstanding
his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the
accident
notwithstanding
the
prior
negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,
37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber
and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de
Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18,
1989]. The subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the
accident which intervenes between the
accident and the more remote negligence
of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable
to
the
plaintiff
[Picart
v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is
invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as
We now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in
failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was,
in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of
the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article

shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 60The
answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477
and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29
November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court
which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed
Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual
moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity
for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET
ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV
Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that
the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
McKee.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO
REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of
the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed
MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS
(Second Division), Respondents.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story
house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on
Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media
agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media
agua was just below the window of the third story.
Standing on said media agua, Magno received from
his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in
doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company (later referred to as the Company) strung
parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet
from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow
and children fled suit to recover damages from the
company. After hearing, the trial court rendered
judgment in their favor P10,000 as compensatory
damages;
P784 as actual damages;
P2,000 as
moral and exemplary damages;
and P3,000 as
attorneys fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight
modification by reducing the attorneys fees from
P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has
appealed said decision to us.
chan

roblesvir tualawlibr ar y

chan

chan

roblesvir tualawlibr ar y

roblesvir tualawlibr ar y

The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals

which are conclusive are stated in the following
portions of its decision which we reproduce below:
chanr ob lesvirtuallawlibr ary

The electric wire in question was an exposed,

uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on
the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was
installed there some two years before Pealozas house
was constructed. The record shows that during the
construction of said house a similar incident took
place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic
consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was
holding happened to come in contact with the same
wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house
forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger
which
the
wire
presented,
and
as
a
result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther
from the house by means of a brace, but left the other
end where it was.
At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of
the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance
from the electric wire to the edge of the media agua
on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30
inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila
required that all wires be kept three feet from the
building. Appellant contends that in applying said
regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not
be from the edge of the media agua but from the side
of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was
almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed.
This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is
a media agua an integral part of the building to which
it is attached but to exclude it in measuring the
distance would defeat the purpose of the
regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that
even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of
the city regulations, should be measured from the edge
of the media agua, the fact that in the case of the
house involved herein such distance was actually less
than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said
house, because the city authorities gave him a permit
to construct a media agua only one meter or 39 1/2
inches wide, but instead he built one having a width of
65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width
permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the
distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed
minimum of 3 feet.
It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the
limit fixed in the permit given to him by the city
authorities for the construction of the media agua,
and that if he had not done so Appellants wire would
have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required
distance of three feet from the edge of the media
agua. It is also a fact, however, that after the media
agua was constructed the owner was given a final
permit of occupancy of the house .
cr alaw

The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying

a load of 3,600 volts. There was, according
to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, first, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire;
and secondly,
because the only insulation material that may be
effective is still in the experimental stage of
development and, anyway, its costs would be
prohibitive
cr alaw

chan

roblesvir tualawlibr ar y

The theory followed by the appellate court in finding

for the Plaintiff is that although the owner of the
house in constructing the media agua in question
exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after
making that media agua, its construction though
illegal, was finally approved because he was given a
final permit to occupy the house;
that it was the
company that was at fault and was guilty of negligence
because although the electric wire in question had
chan

r ob lesvirtualawlibr ary

been installed long before the construction of the

house and in accordance with the ordinance fixing a
minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the
regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due
diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other
precautionary measures as may be warranted;
that
negligence cannot be determined by a simple matter of
inches;
that all that the city did was to prescribe
certain minimum conditions and that just because the
ordinance required that primary electric wires should
be not less than 3 feet from any house, the obligation
of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such wires at
a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other
factors. The appellate court, however, refrained from
stating or suggesting what other precautionary
measures could and should have been adopted.
chan

chan

roblesvir tualawlibr ar y

r ob lesvirtualawlibr ary

After a careful study and discussion of the case and the

circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to
agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the
death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close
proximity of the media agua or rather its edge to the
electric wire of the company by reason of the violation
of the original permit given by the city and the
subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
media agua. We fail to see how the Company could
be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a
distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there
was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of
the wires from the side of the house of Pealoza. Even
considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as
referring not to the side of a building, but to any
projecting part thereof, such as a media agua, had
the house owner followed the terms of the permit
given him by the city for the construction of his media
agua, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the
distance from the wires to the edge of said media
agua would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In
fixing said one meter width for the media agua the
city authorities must have wanted to preserve the
distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the
house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the
one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and
leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the
Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric
wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the
house owner, was its approval by the city through its
agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these
serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the
door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any
ordinance or regulation. The Company cannot be
expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its
wires and said construction, and after finding that said
distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the
stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve
said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or
rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see
to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house
owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal
constructions. Of course, in the present case, the
violation of the permit for the construction of the
media agua was not the direct cause of the accident.
It merely contributed to it. Had said media agua
been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit,
Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed
closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to
keep a safe margin between the edge of the media
agua and the yawning 2-story distance or height from
the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the
fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet
and the wires.

We realize that the presence of the wires in question

quite close to the house or its media agua was always
a source of danger considering their high voltage and
uninsulated as they were, but the claim of the
company and the reasons given by it for not insulating
said wires were unrefuted as we gather from the
findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to
accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not
hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in
due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to
their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that
distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by
the technical men of the city such as its electrician or
engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or
12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but
other factors had to be considered such as that the
wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them
could not be located too far toward the middle of the
street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death
was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the
media agua just below the third story window, it is to
be presumed that due to his age and experience he was
qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job.
So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to
electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and
experience failed him, and forgetting where he was
standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands
and at arms length, evidently without looking, and
throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he
turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his
body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
In support of its theory and holding that DefendantAppellant was liable for damages the Court of Appeals
cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55
Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly
applicable. There, the premises involved was that
elevated portion or top of the walls of Intramuros,
Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of
the Court, it was a public place where persons come
to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves. The electric
company was clearly negligent in placing its wires so
near the place that without much difficulty or exertion,
a person by stretching his hand out could touch them. A
boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection,
reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and
was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case
was a boy who was in no position to realize the danger.
In the present case, however, the wires were well high
over the street where there was no possible danger to
pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons
standing on the media agua, but a media agua can
hardly be considered a public place where persons
usually gather. Moreover, a person standing on the
media agua could not have reached the wires with
his hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno
to hold something long enough to reach the wire.
Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person
immature but the father of a family, supposedly a
tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of
galvanized iron roofs and media agua. Moreover, in
that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.,
supra, the court said that although it is a wellestablished rule that the liability of electric companies
for damages or personal injuries is governed by the
rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are
not insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts
of the present case the Defendant electric company
could be considered negligent in installing its electric
wires so close to the house and media agua in
question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires

(although according to the unrefuted claim of said

company it was impossible to make the insulation of
that
kind
of
wire),
nevertheless
to
hold
the Defendant liable in damages for the death of
Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must
have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around
and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands
was the proximate and principal cause of the
electrocution, then his heirs may not recover. Such was
the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs. Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that
case, the electric company was found negligent in
leaving scattered on its premises fulminating caps
which Taylor, a 15- year old boy found and carried
home. In the course of experimenting with said
fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it out
with his hands while another boy applied a lighted
match to it, causing it to explode and injure one of his
eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this
Tribunal in denying recovery for the injury:
chanr oblesvir tuallawlibr ar y

, so that while it may be true that these injuries

would not have been incurred but for the negligent act
of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless Plaintiffs own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
cr alaw

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause

of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any
precaution, such as looking back toward the street and
at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a better
understanding of the rule on remote and proximate
cause with respect to injuries, we find the following
citation helpful:
chanr oblesvir tuallawlibr ar y

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of

an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high
voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close to
houses is a constant source of danger, even death,
especially to persons who having occasion to be near
said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But
may be, the City of Manila authorities and the electric
company could get together and devise means of
minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the
establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares
may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because
drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow
down or even stop and take other necessary precaution
upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may
possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires
cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost,
they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of
the city where there are few houses and few
pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where
the wires carrying the same to the city could be

properly insulated for the better protection of the

public.
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
complaint filed against the Company is hereby
dismissed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33380

December 17, 1930

TEODORA
ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. for
appellant.
Vicente Sotto and Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Diaz
Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he
placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric
light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the
City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased
instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
secure from the Manila Electric Company damages in the
amount of P30,000. The answer of the company set up as
special defenses that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was
due solely to his negligence and lack of care, and that the
company had employed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the injury. After trial, which included an
ocular inspection of the place where the fatality occurred,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant for the sum of P15,000, and costs.
As is well known, a wall surrounds the District of Intramuros,
in the City of Manila. At intervals, gates for the ingress and
egress of pedestrians and vehicles penetrate the wall. One of
these openings toward Manila Bay is known as the Santa Lucia
Gate. Above this gate and between the wall and a street of
Intramuros is a considerable space sodded with grass with the
portion directly over the gate paved with stone. Adjoining
this place in Intramuros are the buildings of the Ateneo de
Manila, the Agustinian Convent, the Bureau of Public Works,
and the Santa Lucia Barracks. The proximity to these
structures and to the congested district in the Walled City has
made this a public place where persons come to stroll, to
rest, and to enjoy themselves. An employee of the City of
Manila, a number of years ago, put up some wire to keep
persons from dirtying the premises, but this wire has fallen
down and is no obstacle to those desiring to make use of the
place. No prohibitory signs have been posted.
Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an electric light
pole with the corresponding wires. The pole presumably was
located by the municipal authorities and conforms in height
to the requirements of the franchise of the Manila Electric
Company. The feeder wires are of the insulated type, known
as triple braid weather proof, required by the franchise. The
pole, with its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last
inspected by the City Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole
was located close enough to the public place here described,
so that a person, by reaching his arm out the full length,
would be able to take hold of one of the wires. It would
appear, according to the City Electrician, that even a wire of

the triple braid weather proof type, if touched by a person,

would endanger the life of that person by electrocution.
About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a group of
boys or young men came to this public place. Two of them
named Juan Diaz Astudillo and Alejo Ponsoy sauntered over to
where the electric post was situated. They were there
looking out towards Intramuros. For exactly what reason, no
one will ever know, but Juan Diaz Astudillo, placing one foot
on a projection, reached out and grasped a charged electric
wire. Death resulted almost instantly.
The matter principally discussed is the question of the
defendant company's liability under the circumstances stated.
It is well established that the liability of electric light
companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by
the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not
insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of
care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising
this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be. The poles must be so
erected and the wires and appliances must be so located the
persons rightfully near the place will not be injured.
Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires and
appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of
human contact therewith. (20 C. J., pp. 320 et seq.; San Juan
Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena [1912], 224 U. S., 89.)
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric
Company in the lower court to the effect that the death of
Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to his negligence. He
only did the natural thing to be expected of one not familiar
with the danger arising from touching an electric wire, and
was wholly unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused
the death of this young man, it would undoubtedly have been
only a question of time when someone else, like a playful
boy, would have been induced to take hold of the wire, with
fatal results. The cause of the injury was one which could
have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence
came from the act of the Manila Electric Company in so
placing its pole and wires as to be within proximity to a place
frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present
of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a
highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
As we understand the position of the Manila Electric Company
on appeal, its principal defense now is that it has fully
complied with the provisions of its franchise and of the
ordinances of the City of Manila. It is undeniable that the
violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute might
constitute negligence. But the converse is not necessarily
true, and compliance with a franchise, an ordinance, or a
statute is not conclusive proof that there was no negligence.
The franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the
minimum conditions. The fulfillment of these conditions does
not render unnecessary other precautions required by
ordinary care. (Moore vs. Hart [1916], 171 Ky., 725;
Oliver vs. Weaver [1923], 72 Colo., 540; Caldwell vs. New
Jersey Steamboat Co. [1872], 47 N. Y., 282; Consolidated
Electric Light & Power Co. vs. Healy [1902], 65 Kan., 798.)
The company further defends in this court on the ground that
it has not been proven that the deceased is an acknowledged
natural child of the plaintiff mother. Technically this is
correct. (Civil Code, art. 944). At the same time, it should
first of all be mentioned that, so far as we know, this point
was not raised in the lower court. Further, while the mother
may thus be precluded from succeeding to the estate of the
son, yet we know of no reason why she cannot be permitted

to secure damages from the company when the negligence of

this company resulted in the death of her child.
lawphi1>net

We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to

damages. But the evidence indicative of the true measure of
those damages is sadly deficient. All that we know certainly is
that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a student,
and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we
are not told. We are also shown that approximately P200 was
needed to defray the travel and funeral expenses. As would
happen in the case of a jury who have before them one of the
parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the child,
varying opinions, have been disclosed in the court regarding
the estimate of the damages with reference to the next of
kin. Various sums have been suggested, beginning as low as
P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A majority of the
court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate
damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the
P1,000 which have been allowed in other cases for the death

of young children without there having been tendered any

special proof of the amount of damages suffered, in
connection with which should be taken into account the more
mature age of the boy in the case at bar, together with the
particular expenses caused by his death. (Manzanares vs
Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and Enverso vs. House
and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327;
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.)
In the light of the foregoing, the various errors assigned by
the appellant will in the main be overruled, but as above
indicated, the judgment will be modified by allowing the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P1,500,
and the costs of both instances.