UNIVERITY OF SAN JOSE- RECOLETOS

School of Law

Compilation of Civil La w
Questions and Suggested Answers
Book 1: Marriage

Submitted by:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Regular and Executive Classes
A.Y. 2016-2017

Submitted to:
ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLO
Civil Law Review Professor

July 16, 2016

Marriage

2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
M

E ....................................... - 5 -

PYSCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ........................................................................................... - 5 EDWARD N. LIM VS. MARIA CHERYL STA CRUZ-LIM .............................................................- 5 JORDAN CHAN PAZ VS. JEANICE PAVON PAZ .......................................................................- 6 AMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO ........................................................................................- 8 NOEL B. BAGTAS VS. HON. RUTH C. SANTOS .......................................................................- 9 ALAIN M. DIO VS. CARIDAD L. DIO .........................................................................................- 10 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR ..................................................................... - 11 OCHOSA vs. BOLANO ..............................................................................................................- 12 YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO ....................................................................................- 14 VALERIO KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ ....................................................................- 15 ROSALINO L. MARABLE VS. MYRNA F. MARABLE ...............................................................- 16 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ............................- 17 ARABELLE J. MENDOZA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ..........................................- 18 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR ENCALAN .....................................................- 19 REPUBLIC VS. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA ..............................................................................- 20 GLENN VIAS VS MARY GRACE PAREL- VIAS ................................................................- 21 VALERIO E. KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ ................................................................- 22 ROBERT F. MALLILIN, PETITIONER, VS.LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN .........................................- 23 -

PATERNITY AND FILIATION ........................................................................................... - 24 BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO V. ARHBENCEL LOPEZ ................................................................- 24 ANTONIO PERLA, VS. MIRASOL BARING ..............................................................................- 25 RODOLFO AGUILAR vs. EDNA SIASAT--25-

JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A PRIOR MARRIAGE FOR

PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ...................................................................................... - 27 ANTONE VS. BERONILLA ........................................................................................................- 27 JARILLO VS PEOPLE ...............................................................................................................- 28 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA .................................- 29 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR ..........................................- 30 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION VS EDNA A. AZOTE ........................................................- 31 -

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FAMILY HOME ................................................................................................................. - 32 RAMOS VS. PANGILINAN.........................................................................................................- 32 SPS. ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA v. SPS. CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. ......................................- 33 -

PROPERTY RELATIONS................................................................................................. - 34 ARTURO SARTE FLORES, vs. SPS ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, ..............- 34 EFREN PANA VS HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR.. .................................................................- 36 FRANCISCO LIM, VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK ........................................................................- 37 JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA V. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA .....................................................................- 38 -

SUPPORT ........................................................................................................................ - 40 SPOUSES LIM V LIM ................................................................................................................- 40 CHARLES GOTARDO VS DIVINA BULING ..............................................................................- 42 -

SOLEMNIZATION ............................................................................................................ - 43 RENE RONULO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ................................................................- 43 BANGAYAN VS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR...........................................................................- 44 -

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES ............................................................................................... - 45 YASUO IWASAWA VS FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN ............................................................- 45 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS ..................................................- 46 SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS.......................................................................- 48 NOLLORA VS. PEOPLE ............................................................................................................- 49 -

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE ......................................................................................... - 50 ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR ..........................................................................................................- 50 FUJIKI VS MARINAY .................................................................................................................- 52 -

LEGAL SEPARATION ...................................................................................................... - 53 BRIGIDO B. QUIAO V. RITA C. QUIAO .....................................................................................- 53 -

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH ................................................................................................... - 55 CELERINA J. SANTOS V. RICARDO T. SANTOS ....................................................................- 55 -

NATIONALITY RULE ....................................................................................................... - 57 LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA ..........................................................................- 57 -

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BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE ................................................................................................. - 59 ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ..................................- 59 -

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST ............................................................................................ - 60 ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC - 60 -

FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE ........................................................................................ - 61 CORPUZ vs. TIROL STO. TOMAS ..........................................................................................- 61 -

FAMILY COURT; JURISDICTION .................................................................................... - 63 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELA TORRE-- 62-

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PYSCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

JOAN RISEL B. ABANGAN (EXECUTIVE)

EDWARD N. LIM VS. MARIA CHERYL STA CRUZ-LIM GR NO.
176464, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
CIVIL LAW
ARTICLE 36- PYSCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:
In 1979, Serena married Tenten. Serena bore Tenten three children. Serena, Tenten
and their children resided at the house of Tenten's grandmother in Forbes Park,
Makati City. Tenten's family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of
P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Serena had no steady source of income. On
14 October 1990, Serena abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her, after a violent confrontation with Tenten whom she caught with
the in-house midwife of Tenten's grandmother in "a very compromising situation".
Tenten filed a petition and sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Serena
on the ground that both of them are suffering from psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. During the trial, offered in evidence the Psychiatric
Report of Dr. Luciana Marchesa who based her report on the interview she
conducted to the parties. The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void as the two were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. Is the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. Dr. Marchesa's global conclusion of both parties personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists
specifically trained in the tests use and interpretation. The supposed personality
disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have
been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of peoples intelligence, thinking, or personality A judge
should not substitute his own psychological assessment of the parties for that of the
psychologist or the psychiatrist. The probative force of the testimony of an expert
does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

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NAME:
CASE:

ISHA B. CORBETA (EXECUTIVE)

JORDAN CHAN PAZ VS. JEANICE PAVON PAZ G.R. NO.
166579 FEBRUARY 18, 2010
SUBJECT:
CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS GROUND FOR NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE (ART. 36 OF THE FC)
Question:
Manilyn and Monroe met sometime in April 2012. Manilyn was only 20 years old
while Monroe was 33 years old. In May 2012 or shortly one month after courting,
Monroe successfully won the heart of Manilyn, and, on August 20, 2013, they were
formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 23 December 2013. Their
marriage was blessed with one daughter, Ayeishaguill, who was born on 29
September 2014. After a big fight, Manilyn left their conjugal home on 14 December
2015.
Following the incident, Manilyn immediately filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Monroe cited Art. 36 of the Family Code. Manilyn alleged
that Monroe was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage. According to Manilyn, Monroes psychological incapacity was manifested
by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as
his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices
were not satisfied. Manilyn further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on
and attached to his mother and oftentimes, forget his responsibility in the family
especially to Ayeisha.
Should the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage be granted based on Art. 36
of the Family Code?
Suggested Answer:
No. the petition should be dismissed. The incidents cited by Manilyn do not show
that Monroe suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Monroe
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity
is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the psychological incapacity as required by Art. 36
of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c)

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incurability. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:
CODE)

2016

COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO (EXECUTIVE)

YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. NO. 184063 JANUARY
24, 2011
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE (DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY

Question:
X, married to Y, after more than 30 years of being married, X filed a petition in court
praying for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to lacked of effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility. Ys refusal to help care for the
children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficult.
Suggested Answer:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

LALAINE GABUYA
NOEL B. BAGTAS VS. HON. RUTH C. SANTOS G.R. NO. 166682
NOVEMBER 27, 2009
CIVIL LAW
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Question:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void based on psychological
incapacity.
Suggested Answer:
YES.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto
repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

LORELIE BELLEZA
ALAIN M. DIO VS. CARIDAD L. DIO GR. NO. 178044 JANUARY 19,
2011
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE)

Question:
James' and Nadine's marriage has been declared by the trial court NULL AND VOID
from the beginning on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. However,
in the dispositive portion, trial court ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Is the trial court correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Thus, the decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

ALBERT BITANGHOL
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE)

Question:
A and B got married. A then filed a petition for annulment of marriage because he
alleged that B is psychologically incapable of carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage based on the following grounds: refused to wake up in the morning to
prepare breakfast, squandered a lot of money, indulge into gambling, falsified the
respondents signature in order to encash a check. As a presiding judge, will you
grant the petition?
Suggested answer:
No. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing
so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

JIGO DACUA
OCHOSA vs. BOLANO G.R. No. 167459
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Jose met Bona. They had sex. They had no offspring. However, they found an
abandoned 1 year child whom they registered as their daughter naming her
Ramona. Bona was unfaithful to Jose. She had illicit relationship with other men
while Jose was out to various place in the Philippines to work. One day, Bona was
caught by Demetrio having sex with Joses driver. This illicit relationship circulated
in the workplace of Jose. Bona admitted her relationship with the driver. Ramona
lived with Jose for that matter. It is Jose who is supporting Ramona. Jose then filed a
Petitioner for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bonas
Psychological Incapacity. Will the petitioner prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at

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such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony and her psychiatric
evaluation report as well as the individual testimonies of Jose and his military aides Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in
this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually
disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed
abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that
the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by
Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her
"defects" were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other
words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of "juridical antecedence."

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO

YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. NO. 184063 JANUARY
24, 2011
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE (DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE)

Question:
X, married to Y, after more than 30 years of being married, X filed a petition in court
praying for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to lacked of effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility. Ys refusal to help care for the
children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty.
Whether or not such behaviors constitute a ground for psychological incapacity?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

CEFERINO ONG
VALERIO KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. NO. 166357
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY LAW

Question:
Tyrone and Malyn were married and had Four (4) children. A few years after the
marriage, Malyn fled the conjugal home leaving Tyrone and their Four (4) children.
Tyrone then filed a case under Article 36 of the Family Code stating that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations for abandoning him
and their children. He alleged that Malyn had an affair with Benjie stating that in one
instance he saw his wife and Benjie in a hotel room half naked. After the incident she
left the household. Malyn however denies the allegations and that she left the home
for her own safety because Tyrone was a physically abusive husband. She does visit
the children on weekends. Can Malyn be considered psychologically incapacitated?
Suggested Answer:
NO. Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground
for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

ROCHE O. TORREJOS
ROSALINO L. MARABLE VS. MYRNA F. MARABLE GR 178741 ,
JANUARY 17, 2011
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE)

Question:
Spouses Rosalino and Myrna Marable got married in December 1970. They were
blessed with 5 children. Frequent verbal and physical quarreling challenged their
marital life which lead petitioner to feel unhappy. The frequency of their quarrel
increased when one of their children committed juvenile misconduct and the other
became pregnant at a tender age. Longing for peace and love, petitioner had a
short-lived relationship with another woman. He severed their marital ties and filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychological
incapacity. An expert concluded that his incapacity to perform his marital obligation
is caused by his Anti-Social Personality Disorder which is characterized by a
pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting
from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed
for needed attention. If you were the judge, should the marriage be declared null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the basis of the findings of the
expert?
Suggested Answer:
NO. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes
a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
In the instant case, there was no established link between petitioners acts to his
alleged psychological incapacity.

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NAME:

MARCELO, CORNELIO C.

CASE:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., G.R. NO. 159594,
NOVEMBER 12, 2012

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

FAMILY LAW PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:
A filed a petition for nullity of marriage alleging psychological incapacity of his wife
B. Petitioner A presented a report made by psychologist who rendered an opinion
that B has a Borderline Personality Disorder i.e. that she is immature and childish
which render her incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. The OSG
alleged that the report alone of the psychiatrist is not sufficient to declare B
psychologically incapacitated.
What are the requisites of Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code?
Suggested Answer:
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations,
and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to
meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

CLAROS, STEPHANIE A.
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 157649, NOVEMBER 12, 2012
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY LAW, MARRIAGE, PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:
Arrah married Dominic. Sick of Dominics immaturity after he was charged with
estafa, Arrah filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage. Arrah called
on Dr. Samson as expert witness to testify on Dominics psychological incapacity. Dr.
Samson made her psychiatric report based from interviews with Arrah and her
other witnesses. But Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.
The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed. Was the reversal proper?
Suggested Answer:
YES
Opinions of expert witnesses are accorded great weight. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

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NAME:

MICHELLE JOSEPHINE EDEN M. SILVA

CASE:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR ENCALAN, G.R. NO.

170022, JANUARY 9, 2013
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

SUBJECT:
TOPIC:
Question:

Problem: Cesar and Lolita got married and bore two children. To support the family,
Cesar flew and worked in Saudi Arabia. It was later found out that Lolita had been
having an illicit relationship with Alvin. Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against
Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity. He alleges that Lolita is psychologically incapacitated since
psychological evaluation report found that Lolitas "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."
Is there sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
Suggested Answer:
No.
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
In the case, Cesar failed to prove that Lolita was psychologically incapacitated. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No
evidence on record exists. Further, the psychological evaluation showed that Lolita
did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
12, 2014
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

LORENZ MARTIN M. LERIN

REPUBLIC VS. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, G.R. 171557, FEBRUARY
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Ace and Bea were married. Ace filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that Bea sold their conjugal home, cohabited and sired a child with Xavier,
and married a second time with York. Ace and Bea submitted to a psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Zero. Zero reports that both Ace and Bea were
psychologically incapacitated because both were emotionally immature and that
their mental condition was present at the time of contracting of marriage, even if it
was shown after its celebration. The RTC declared their marriage void due to
psychological incapacity.
Will the emotional immaturity of one of the parties serve as a sufficient ground to
declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No.
As a rule, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity
that cause a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The law confines
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to marriage.
Under jurisprudence, it was held that emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes a party completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations.
In this case, there is lack of factual or legal basis to conclude that Beas emotional
immaturity can be equated with psychological incapacity. Hence, emotional
immaturity is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage void due to psychological
incapacity.

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2016

NAME:
CASE:

CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ
GLENN VIAS VS MARY GRACE PAREL- VIAS GR. NO. 208790

SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Petitioner Glenn and respondent Mary Grace got married in civil rites. Respondent
was already pregnant then. However the infant died and the alleged cause of death
was by respondents heavy drinking and smoking during pregnancy. Afterwards,
respondent left home and went to work in Dubai. Petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with respondent. Petitioner alleged that
respondent was not able to fulfill her marital obligations in the family life. Petitioner
sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation
by a clinical psychologist Dr. Tayag, in which petitioner was found normal. On the
other hand, respondent was diagnosed to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits based on the data and testimonies given by
petitioner and Rodelito Mayo, a cousin of petitioner. Respondent, however, was not
physically examined by Dr. Tayag. Is lack of personal examination by psychologist
on one spouse fatal to the declaration of nullity of marriage?
Suggested Answer:
NO. The lack of personal or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
The cumulative testimonies of petitioner, Dr. Tayag and Mayo and the documentary
evidence do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
respondents condition that would warrant the nullity of their marriage.
The respondent was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater
burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the formers condition. Rodelito, on the other hand,
is a blood relative of petitioner. Both testimonies are wanting in material details.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

YVONNE NICOLE C. GARBANZOS

VALERIO E. KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ (GR NO. 166357;
JANUARY 14, 2015)
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:
Valerio Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez were married in Hong Kong. They had 4
children. After the birth of their 4th child, Valerio had and extra marital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano with whom he had three children. Valerio migrated to the US with
Jocelyn. When they returned to the Philippines, Valerio filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their
children during their co-habitation by playing mahjong all day and partying with male
friends. To support his claim, he presented Dr. Gates who explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD).
Did Valerio sufficiently prove Malyns psychological incapacity?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her
actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or
her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of a supposed expert witness who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. The grounds stated by petitioner per se is a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

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2016

NAME:

BARRY RAZA

CASE:

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, PETITIONER, VS.LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192718 FEBRUARY
18, 2015

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

MARRIAGE; Pychological Incapacity

Question:
X is married to Y and had 3 children. X filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage alleging that Y is suffering from psychological and mental incapacity. X
claimed that Y had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the
room because Y did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who
prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because
she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took
care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror;
(4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received
anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not
home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Z slept in their house when he
was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge. Decide.
Suggested Answer:
No psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The alleged failure of Y
to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage.

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2016

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

NAME:
CASE:

AIRENE C. EDAO (EXECUTIVE)

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO V. ARHBENCEL LOPEZ G.R. NO. 181258,
MARCH 18, 2010

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Question:
Maria gave birth to a baby boy named Juan. Since the birth of Juan, Pedro has been
supporting the needs of baby Juan. He even wrote Maria a letter promising her to
always provide the needs of Juan. During the baptism and birthdays of Juan, Pedro
always had portraits of him cuddling baby Juan. Based on these facts, Maria filed a
petition before the RTC for recognition of baby Juan as the child of Pedro. Does
Maria have enough bases for filing the petition of recognition?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
The law provides that a notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures
are sufficient to establish filiation.
In this case, the bases of Maria to prove filiation are only the private handwritten
letter of Pedro promising to always provide the needs of Juan and the pictures of
Pedro cuddling Juan during the latters baptism and birthdays. Since the letter did
not expressly state that Pedro recognized Juan as his child and it being not
notarized, then it cannot suffice as evidence to prove filiation. The pictures alone
will also not prove filiation to the child. Hence, the petition of Maria has no leg to
stand on.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

DESCALLAR, ROWELLA L.
ANTONIO PERLA, PETITIONER, VS. MIRASOL BARING AND RANDY
PERLA, (G.R. NO. 172471, NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE, FILIATION

Question:
Myra and John filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Jojo. Myra
claimed that she and Jojo had a common law relationship and that John was the
result of their affair. However, Jojo abandoned them and failed to give any support to
his son. As proof of filiation, Myra presented Johns Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Jojo as parents of the child and testified that
she and Jojo supplied the information in the said certificates. John testified that he
called Joho "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him. John asked Jojo
for support and was promised that he would be given support.
The RTC ruled that Myra and John are entitled to the relief sought since Jojo himself
admitted that he had sex with Myra. The CA upheld Johns illegitimate filiation based
on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate
identifying Antonio as his father. Did the respondents succeed in establishing
Johnss illegitimate filiation to Jojo?
Suggested Answer:
No.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. To prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
The single instance that Jojo allegedly hugged John and promised to support him
cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The
respondents failed to establish Johnss illegitimate filiation to Jojo. Hence, the order
for Jojo to support John has no basis.

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Marriage

Name:
Case:
2015
Subject:
Topic:

2016

Frances May C. Realino

Rodolfo S. Aguilar vs. Edna Siasat, GR No. 200169, January 28,
Civil Law
Marriage; Filiation

Question:
Rodolfo, in proving his filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses presented
the SSS Form E-1 of his father. According to him it is a declaration under oath by his
father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter's son and it satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship under Article 172 of the Family
Code. Is the contention correct?
Suggested Answer:
YES. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.

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2016

JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A PRIOR

MARRIAGE FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

ANNE VERNADICE AREA (EXECUTIVE)

ANTONE VS. BERONILLA G.R. NO. 183824, DECEMBER 8, 2010
CIVIL LAW
ARTICLE 40- JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A PRIOR
MARRIAGE FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE

Question:
W executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against H before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had
not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one
M in 1991. H informed the court that his marriage with W was declared null and
void by the Regional Trial Court in April 2007; that the decision became final and
executory on 15 May 200[7]; and that such decree has already been registered with
the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had
been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage
to speak of Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute the crime of bigamy.
Is Hs argument tenable?
Suggested Answer:
NO. Hs argument is not tenable.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such marriage void. Hence, a subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a
person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

MICHELLE MABANO (EXECUTIVE)

JARILLO VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 164435, JUNE 29, 2010
CIVIL LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW: ART. 40, FAMILY CODE

Question:
Vicky was charged for Bigamy for contracting a subsequent marriage without
seeking a final judgment for the absolute nullity of her previous marriage. Her
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. On her motion for reconsideration,
she alleged that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be applied on her case as both
her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code. Rule on
the petitioners motion.
Suggested Answer:
Petitioners motion is without merit. Article 40 is a rule of procedure which should
be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that
said Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it dies not prejudice vested or
acquired
rights.
Petitioner cannot just disregard Art. 40 by alleging retroactive application of the law
which will render the provision on bigamy nugatory.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

CABUENAS, MARIA CLEA B.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA,
G.R. NO. 187512, JUNE 13, 2012
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY CODE

Question:
X met Y at a company were both were working. The two eventually got married and
had a son. When the company closed down, X decided to go to Taiwan to seek
employment. From that time, Y had not received any communication from X and had
no idea of the latters whereabouts, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. After 9
years of waiting, Y filed a Petition to have X declared presumptively dead. The RTC
granted the Petition. On Appeal, Y moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the judgment is immediately final and executory, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, hence, not subject to appeal. Is Y correct?
Suggested Answer:
Yes.
The law provides, For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
In this case, since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is immediately final and executory.
Therefore, the decision is not subject to ordinary appeal.

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2016

ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

CULTURA, FAITH (EXECUTIVE)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR
G.R. NO. 199194, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
CIVIL LAW
ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE

Question:
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They
later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at
the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month
only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from
Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried
to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired
from Netchie's relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his
wife was indeed already dead. Is the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO. Mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack
of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee
spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code
[would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional
and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be
discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

FERNANDEZ, MAE CLAIRE C.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION VS EDNA A. AZOTE
G.R. NO. 209741 APRIL 15, 2015
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
In 1992 Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System (SSS),
were married in civil rites. Their union produced six children born from 1985 to
1999. Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their children as
designated beneficiaries. In 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna
filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted
another Form E-4 in 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie
Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as dependent. SSC
dismissed Ednas petition for lack of merit. It opined that Edgardos marriage to
Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been
annulled or dissolved. Does SSC have the authority to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage?
Suggested Answer:
No. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity
of marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available
statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful
beneficiaries.
The second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when
the Family Code was already in force. Using the parameters outlined in Article 41,
Edna, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was
already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. She could
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not
able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not
qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.

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2016

FAMILY HOME
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

KEISHA ROJAS (EXECUTIVE)

RAMOS VS. PANGILINAN GR NO. 185920 JULY 20 ,2010
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY HOME

Question:
Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioner Ramos. The Labor
Arbiter then ruled in favor of the respondents and issued a writ of execution against
the property of Ramos located at Pandacan, Manila (Padacan Property). Petitioner
moved to quash the said writ alleging that the Pandacan Property is a family home,
hence, exempt from execution. Petitioners also claim that at the time Pandacan
property was constituted as family home in 1944, its value was below P300,000.00;
and that Art. 153 of the Family Code is applicable. However, respondents countered
that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home and in fact served as the
companys business address as borne by the companys letterhead. Is the contention
of the petitioners correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the
Civil Code. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. In both rules,
it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. Such claim of exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted
prior to August 3, 1988, they must comply with the procedure mandated under the
Civil Code. Having no absolute proof that the Pandacan property was judicially
and/or extrajudicially constituted as Ramos family home, the laws protective
mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.

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Marriage

Name:
Case:
Subject:
Topic:

2016

TANO, April Jay E.

SPS. ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA, et al. v. SPS. CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR.
et al., G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY LAW FAMILY HOME

Question:
Spouses Sweet obtained a loan from Spouses Bitter . When Spouses Bitter failed to
pay the loan, the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses Sweet was the
highest bidder. Thereafter, respondent-Spouses Sweet leased the subject property
to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to
collect the rentals due, Spouses Sweet filed a complaint for ejectment against
Spouses Bitter.
On the other hand, Spouses Bitter filed a complaint with the RTC, seeking to nullify
the title of Spouses Sweet on the basis that the subject property is a family home
which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. Is the
contention of Spouses Bitter correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and
prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their
right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have
abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke
and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

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2016

PROPERTY RELATIONS
NAME :
CASE:
SUBJECT :
TOPIC:

DARYL ANDREW C. MONTECLAR

ARTURO SARTE FLORES, vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and
EDNA C. LINDO, G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (MARRIAGE)

Question:
Lor obtained a loan from Jigo amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 2015
with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment.
To secure the loan, Lor executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property
in the name of Lor and her husband Christian. Lor also signed a Promissory
Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Lor issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored
for insufficiency of funds, prompting Jigo to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of
Mortgage with Damages against respondents.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. The court found that the Deed was executed by Lor without the consent
and authority of Christian. The court noted that the Deed was executed on 31
October 2015 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was
only dated 4 November 2015.
Whether or not the court is correct in denying the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage?
Suggested Answer:
YES, the court is correct denying the judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides that the administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.

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The real estate mortgage executed by Lor over their conjugal property is
undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her husband
Christian to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the
authority
or
consent
of
the
husband,
is
necessarily
void.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

SUAL, JECAR
EFREN PANA, PETITIONER, VS HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. AND
JOSE HUANITE, JR., GR NO. 164201 DECEMBER 10, 2012]
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY CODE

Question:
Spouses A and B were married in 1970 without making a prenuptial agreement. A
was convicted of murder and was ordered to pay P50, 000 as way of damages. After
finality of the decision, the court then issued a writ of execution to levy on the
conjugal properties of the spouses.
a) What is the property relation of the Spouses?
b) Can the conjugal properties of the Spouses be levied upon?
Suggested Answer:
a) The property relations of the Spouses A and B is Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
The Family Code took effect on August 3 1988. The governing law during the time
the Spouses were married was the Civil Code which provides the Conjugal
Partnership as the default regime.
b) Yes. Though the property regime of the Spouses is determined by the Civil Code,
the property relation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains is now governed by the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256 of the Family Code.
Article 122 of the said law provides that fines and indemnities of contracted by either spouse may be
charged to the conjugal assets, even if there is no liquidation, if the said spouse has no exclusive
property and the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the said law are covered.

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Marriage

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

GLEN MARVIN Y. TIU

FRANCISCO LIM, VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, 713 SCRA 555
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE (PROPERTY REGIME TRANSACTIONS)

Question:
X executed a SPA in favour of Y, his brother, to have his share of the property co
owned by the siblings, to be mortgaged. Y was granted loan from A Bank and B bank.
The loan amount in A bank has been paid while in B bank defaulted. B Bank
foreclosed the property prompting X to file a case with a prayer for TRO. The trial
court ruled in favour of X but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
X asserted that the bank should have been prompted by the fact that the subject
mortgage contract was executed without the consent of his wife. Is Xs assertion
tenable?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is
owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that is, presumption is not overcome
by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife
alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property
may be mortgaged. This presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

IMEE HIYAS
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA V. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA (GR NO. 193038;
MARCH 11, 2015)
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
X AND Y during their marriage on September 1, 1990 obtained house and lot. While
X returned to Israel to work as a domestic helper, Y cohabited with another woman
Z. This prompts X to file a case for legal separation. While the case is pending, Y sold
the house and lot to A without obtaining the consent of X. A claiming to be a
purchaser in good faith states as a defense that she only rely on the TCT which
stated that the subject properties were registered only in Ys name. The lower court
however only nullifies the portion of the subject properties in so far as this
represents Xs share.
RULE ON THIS MATTER.
Suggested Answer:
Lower courts decision should be nullified.
Since X and Y were married when the Family Code took effect, in the absence of
stipulation on their property regime, the absolute community of property shall
govern. Hence, under Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements,
the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
(except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass
of the couple's properties.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided
in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only the husbands
name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the

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spouses

Shirley

and

2016

Rogelio.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in

the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
If the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property,
such sale is void. The consent of both the husband and the wife is required and the
absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void including the
portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant who contracted the sale with
another.

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SUPPORT
NAME:

KIMBERLY DY (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
SUBJECT:

SPOUSES LIM V LIM ( OCT 30, 2009)

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

SUPPORT

Question:
X is the wife of Y, who is the son of A and B. The former have 4 children, L, M, N, O.
Several years after they were married, X left the marital home with the children in
tow after a violent confrontation with Y. X subsequently sued for herself and her
children an action for support against Y and A & B. Can A&B be made concurrently
liable with Y to provide support for X and the children (L,M, N, O)?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, but only to their grandchildren. In the case of Spouses Lim v. Lim GR 163209,
the SC ruled that although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from
spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains
to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the
obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of
the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
Bar Question:
Petitioner Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of their granddaughter, Maryl
Joy, from Spouses Bagtas whom their daughter relinquished her rights over. The
latter refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a
petition for habeas corpus. RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the deputy
sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Spouses Bagtas to explain why
they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy.
The Spouses Gallardo &, Bagtas entered into a compromise agreement. The latter
learned that the former brought Maryl Joy to Samar. In their motion, Spouses Bagtas
prayed that the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC,
that they be directed to explain why they violated the RTCs Order, and that they be
cited in contempt. The RTC dismissed the action for having become moot since the
person subject of the petition has already produced [sic] to this court and has been

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2016

turned over to the petitioners, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus is now
moot and academic without prejudice to the filing of the proper action to determine
as to the rightful custody over the minor child. Rule on the matter.
Suggested answer:
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
persons entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for
habeas corpus is not limited to the production of the child before the court. The
main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful
custody over the child.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be
in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of
liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.
Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a
child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after
Maryl Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to
determine who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the
RTC, in effect, granted the petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of
Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient basis.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

AUGUSTO, MEL JASON T.

CHARLES GOTARDO VS DIVINA BULING
CIVIL LAW
FILIATION; SUPPORT

Question:
Z filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, for the
reason that the X denied the imputed paternity of M, child of Z. It was shown that Z
and X are sweet hearts. From then on, X started intimate sexual relations with Z. The
sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent until X found
out that Z was pregnant. During the hearing, Z testified for herself and brought G
(her uncle) as her witness. However, Z blatantly denied the imputed paternity,
contending that M could not be his child. Is Xs contention correct?
Suggested Answer:
Xs contention is incorrect.
It is well-settled rule that that there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares
supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative
father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.
In the instant case, Z established a prima facie case that the X is the putative father
of M through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man (X)
at the time of her conception. G corroborated her testimony that X and Z had
intimate relationship.

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2016

SOLEMNIZATION
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

ROSLYN D. CORTES
RENE RONULO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 182438, JULY 02, 2014
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE, SOLEMNIZATION

Question:
JU and CB were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church. The church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage
because of lack of a marriage license. With the couple and the guests already dressed
for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, RR,
conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as
husband and wife in front of the guests. Did RR violate Article 352 of the RPC?
Suggested Answer:
YES.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2.

his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since RR he has authority to solemnize a marriage. The
second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by RR is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However,
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer; and
2.
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present. The second requirement is likewise present since
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife. RR is guilty of violating Article 352.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

JESON PAGAPONG
BANGAYAN VS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. G.R. NO. 201061 JULY 3,
2013
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
X was a married man. However, while his wife is abroad, he developed a romantic
relationship with Z over the objection of Zs father. To appease Zs father, Z
convinced X to execute a simulated marriage contract. The marriage between X and
Z did not end up well resulting to X filling a declaration of nullity of their marriage.
He alleges that the marriage is void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. Is the marriage void?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning." In this case, the marriage between X and Z was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between X and Z was also non-existent. Applying the general
rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."

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2016

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

ANNA BEATRICE QUIJANO

YASUO IWASAWA VS FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, GR 204169, SEPT 11,
2013
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Saitama, a Japanese national, met Josefina in one of his visits to the Philippines.
Josefina introduced herself as single and never married before. As their
relationship progressed, they both decided to tie the knot and resided in Japan after
their marriage. Josefina later on confessed to Saitama that she received news that
her previous husband passed away. This prompted Saitama to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to Josefina as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. During trial, aside from his testimony, Saitama also offered in
evidence the Certificate of Marriage between Josefina and Pedro issued by the
National Statistics Office (NSO). The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence
to prove Josefinas prior existing valid marriage to another man because he did not
present the records custodian of the NSO. Is the ruling of the court tenable?
Suggested Answer:
No, the ruling of the court is untenable. There is no question that the documentary
evidence submitted by Saitama is a public document.
As provided in the Civil Code, Article 410: The books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of
their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the court erred when it disregarded said
documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records
custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary.
Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.

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NAME :
CASE :
SUBJECT:
TOPIC :

2016

ANNA DANESSA VALDEZ

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS G.R. NO.
198780 , OCTOBER 16, 2013
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios, a Filipina were married before MeTC Judge
Calo. Subsequently, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio. a) Is a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent? b) Can the marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud
under Article 45(3) of the Family Code?
Suggested Answer:
a) No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected
by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
In the case at bar, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between

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them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
b) No. Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud
under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article
46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

ROUNALD A. SITOY
SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R. NO. 183896
JANUARY 30, 2013
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Mr. Aa Pakistani national married Ms. B a Filipina. The marriage was solemnized
without marriage license and such is not under the exceptions provided by law to be
exempt from such license. Was there a valid marriage?
Suggested Answer:
No, the marriage is void ab initio.
A marriage license in needed to have a valid marriage. Article 3 of the Family Code
states that a valid marriage license is one of the formal requisite of celebration of
marriage. Article 4 of the Family Code states that the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio except as stated in
Article 35 (2)
In the case at bar, the absence of marriage license during the celebration of marriage
makes the marriage void ab initio. Furthermore, the case is not one of the exceptions
provided by law to have a valid marriage notwithstanding the absence of valid
marriage license

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NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

2016

STEPHEN ESPARAGOSA
NOLLORA VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 191425 SEPT 7, 2011
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
X and Y got married here in the Philippines. Y, the wife went to saudi arabia to work
as a nurse. While Y was in saudi Arabia, X married Z. Y, upon knowing that her
husband got married , she went home and discover it herself that X indeed
contracted a second marriage to Z. Y sued X for bigamy. X made a defense that his
marriage with Z is valid since he is already muslim before he contracted marriage
with Y and Z. The documents show that X married Y as a roman catholic and X
subsequently married Z without disclosing to Z that X is a muslim because he is
afraid that Z might runaway from her. Is the second marriage between X and Z
valid?.
Answer:
No, the second marriage is Bigamous.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines, No marriage shall be valid,
unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer.
In the case at bar X clearly has no legal capacity to contract a marriage to Z due to
the fact that a previous marriage exist. In case of a marriage between a muslim and a
Non-muslim, solemnized not in accordance with muslim law, the family code should
govern. The respondent did not declare his true religion in the marriage certificates,
such omissions are sufficient proof that X is liable for bigamy.

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ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
NAME:

KAREN ABEGAIL S. MONTERON (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR; G.R. NO. 174451; OCTOBER 13, 2009

CIVIL LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

Question:
Mhai and Rey got married in Cebu City. After their wedding, they lived in the house
of Reys parents in Cebu City. After a few days, they returned to Tondo, Manila, where
Mhai has a house. However, Rey did not live with Mhai. Subsequently, Rey then left
for Riyadh where he works. Since he left, Rey never contacted his wife and refused to
answer Mhais calls whenever she tries to call him. About a year and a half, Mhai was
informed that her husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go
directly to her in Tondo but to his parents house in Cebu City instead. Thus,
petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. During the trial, Mhai
presented a psychologist who testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Hence, it recommended the nullity of marriage between Mhai
and Rey. However, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Is the Regional Trial Court correct in dismissing the complaint on the basis
that Rey is not psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
under Article 45(5) of the Family Code.
Suggested Answer:
YES.

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following

causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on
the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural
defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and
inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It
may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has

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the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted that she and respondent had been living as husband and wife after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners
marriage to respondent. Therefore the court was correct in dismissing the case and
maintaining that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is valid.

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NAME:

REYNOLD JOHN F. GIME

CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

FUJIKI VS MARINAY G.R. NO. 196049, JUNE 26, 2013

CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

2016

Question:
Mr. X is a Japanese citizen married Ms. Y a Filipino citizen in the Philippines.
However the marriage was not approve by the parents of X. As a result X cannot
bring Y to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.Y
met another Japanese Mr. Z. Without dissolving the first marriage Y and Z got
married in the Philippines. Y was brought to japan by Z to live with him. Allegedly Y
suffered physical abuse from Z. Eventually, Y separated from Z and begun contacting
X.
Y and X begun to rekindle their love. Y obtained a judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage between Y and Z void on the ground of bigamy. X
filed a petition in the RTC praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
QUESTION: Is X correct on filing the petition?
Suggested Answer:
No
In Juliano-Llave v. Republic,this Court held that the rule that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court

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2016

LEGAL SEPARATION
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

DENILA, JUN MARLON L.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO V. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.
QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER
RITA QUIAO, G.R. NO. 176556, JULY 4, 2012
CIVIL LAW
FAMILY CODE

Question:
Problem: X and Y contracted marriage in 1977. In 2000, Y filed a complaint against X
for legal separation. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation of the parties. The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided
equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however,
Xs share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in
favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code. After
more than 9 months later, X filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts. X claims that his vested right over half of the
common properties of the conjugal partnership was violated when the trial court
forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the
Family Code. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation. He insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's
vested right. Is X correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
The law provides that In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his
or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage.
However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the
work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate
property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In this case, the X's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be

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forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after
the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested
right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found
him the guilty party.

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PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
NAME:
RALPH KEVIN H. SANTILLAN
CASE:
CELERINA J. SANTOS, PETITIONER, V. RICARDO T. SANTOS,
RESPONDENT.
SUBJECT:
CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:
MARRIAGE; PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
Question:
X filed a petition with the RTC for declaration of presumptive death of her spouse
who has allegedly been absent for 12 years for the purpose of remarrying. RTC
declared Y as presumptively dead. Y, the wife, upon knowing the said petition, filed
an action for annulment of judgment with CA stating that she has never been absent
and it was X who left the conjugal dwelling to live with another woman. CA
dismissed Ys petition for being a wrong remedy, stating further that Y shouldve
filed a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Y argued that filing an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy
because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her
presumptive death. However CA stated that the Family Code provides the
presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance. Is CA correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. CA is not correct.
Under the law, termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
the following conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
In the case at bar, Y is correct in her remedy of annulment of judgment since what is

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sought by Y is to nullify not only the subsequent marriage which CA argued that a
mere affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code can terminate
said marriage, but also the effects of the declaration of presumptive.

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NATIONALITY RULE
NAME:
CASE:
23, 2014
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

RAMON MIKHAIL DUYONGCO

LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, G.R. NO. 171914, JULY
CIVIL LAW
NATIONALITY RULE

Question:
LUNA was first married to EUGENIA (BOTH FILIPINOS). After two decades, they
agreed to live apart from each other and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property. Years later, LUNA obtained divorce in Dominican Republic
and subsequently married SOLEDAD. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and thus the former established a law firm named LUPSICON. LUPSICON
through ATTY. LUNA purchased condominium unit and was registered bearing the
name"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage.
1. Did the divorce between Luna and EUGENIA validly dissolved their marriage?
NO.
The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case considering that
both parties to the first marriage are both Filipinos and that the non-recognition of
absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity
of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy
on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2. Granting that the second marriage between LUNA and SOLEDAD was bigamous,
what rule governs their properties acquired during their marriage?

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The marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by
virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:Article 144. When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

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BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

KIRBY BRAGAT
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, G.R. No. 169766, March 30,
2011
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
MARRIAGE

Question:
A married B twice, first, according to Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993,
and subsequently under a civil ceremony on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, As civil status was indicated as divorced.
C and her son D, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of A and B,
holding that the marriage between the two was bigamous, because the marriage
between her officiated in civil rights in 1958, was still valid and subsisting; that the
prior marriage was governed by the New Civil Code; the deceased never divorced
her during his lifetime, and he could not have done so because divorce is not allowed
under the New Civil Code. He could also not divorce her because their marriage was
not governed by PD 1083, the Code Of Muslim Personal Laws.
B affirmed her belief that her marriage with A was valid. B is also steadfast in her
belief that her marriage with A is valid as the latter was already divorced under the
Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically
applies to the marriage of C and the deceased.
Is the marriage between A and B bigamous?
Suggested Answer:
The marriage between A and B was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions
of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of A and C.
In view of As prior marriage which subsisted at the time B married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

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REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

NAME:
CASE:
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

SHEENA LLEVA (EXECUTIVE)

ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC GR NO. 158298 AUGUST 11, 2010
CIVIL LAW
MARRIAGE

Question:
Cresenciano and Leonila got married on Dec. 26, 1949. On Oct. 17, 2000, Ablaza, the
brother of Cresenciano filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage. Is Ablaza a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his brother?
Suggested answer:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited by the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Ablaza has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like petitioner although not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession,
has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions
stated in articles 1001 & 1003 of the civil code.

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FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE

Name: Riza Mae G. Omega (Executive)
Case: Corpuz vs. Tirol Sto. Tomas GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Subject: Civil Law
Question:
A naturalized Canadian citizen married a Filipino but subsequently filed for divorce
in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two
years later, the naturalized Canadian fell in love with another Filipina; he then went
to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his
marriage certificate with his former Filipino spouse. However, despite the
registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial
recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of
NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the
RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. Is the contention of the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
However, in the case of Corpuz vs. Tirol Sto. Tomas, the Honorable Supreme
Court qualify the above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss alien's petition before the RTC.
In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip an alien of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of an alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Further, direct involvement or being the
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite

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interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, SC have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained
by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is
valid according to his or her national law.

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FAMILY COURT; JURISDICTION

Name:

Klenzene O. Cacho

Case:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA

TORRE- YADAO G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13, 2012

Subject:

Civil Law

Topic:

Family Courts, Jurisdiction

Question:
A murder case was filed against Ping and his friends for the death of 5 suspected
members of Kurakot Gang. The court provisionally dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause. The prosecution sought to revive the case which found Ping and his
friends principally liable for the murder case. Meanwhile, the parents of the 2
victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors. The prosecution
amended the informations to show such minority and asked Judge Pong to re-raffle
the case to a family court. Judge Pong denied the request contending that Section 5
of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. Judge Pong dismissed the cases against
the respondents.
Was Judge Pongs contention correct?
Suggested Answer:
Yes.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in
family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder
cases where the victim is a minor.
In vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interest. When
the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule.
In this case, there is no living minor in the murder case that requires the special
attention and protection of a family court. The minors are represented by their
parents who became the real private offended parties. Hence, Judge Pongs
contention is correct.

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