Book Reviews

ITSBRAIN
By Sir Karl Popper and Sir John Eccles.
Kegan Paul, 1977, $14.95 paperback.

THESELFAND

Routledge

and

In the last three decades we have seen the pendulum of scientific fashion
rapidly swinging away from the austere tenents of behaviorist doctrines and
back towards the legitimization of the inner life of the mind. In its wake it
has brought with it both a renewed interest in innate knowledge-ranging
from the linguistics of Noam Chomsky to the sociobiological theorizing of
E. 0. Wilson-and
an exploding science of cognition-ranging
from the
developmental psychology of Jean Piaget to the serious consideration of
animal thinking by Donald Griffin. This revolution is also cross-pollinated
by the all-pervading growth of the information sciences, especially by research in artificial intelligence. As a result whole realms of investigation
which hitherto have been only the province of philosophers are now becoming serious concerns of scientists in many fields. In this context a book
by two of the most influential scholars of our time purporting to provide a
new approach to the relationship between the mind and brain should be
greeted with great excitement.
Sir Karl Popper and Sir John Eccles, each of whom is without peer in
their respective fields (the philosophy of science and neurophysiology,
respectively), bring into focus the most central and least understood problem
in the study of cognition: the nature of the self. To this problem they each
bring their enormous talents and complementary backgrounds, as well as
providing their readers with a glimpse of their lively conversations on the
topic. Here is an opportunity to observe two great minds at work critically
reviewing the many philosophical perspectives and neuropsychological findings bearing on the problem. They have brought together a wealth of information from two very different disciplines and have made them accessible
to a wide audience. Both writers have approached their subject with a sense
of perspective and reflection that provides a rich sense of their personal
involvement with the problem. Both have the gift of writing in a casual and
nontechnical style, often rapidly summarizing complex topics in a few paragraphs, without completely sacrificing the subtlety of the arguments or losing
the narrative flow amidst a flurry of technical jargon. Unfortunately, those
readers who are looking for a fresh and powerful new vision of this question
will be disappointed at yet another footnote to Plato and Descartes dressed
up in antireductionist and neurophysiological terminology.
The book is organized into three distinct sections. The first section, by
Popper, presents his theory of mind-body interactionism, including an explanation of his three-world system and a critical survey of the mind-body
Ethology
and Sociobiology
10: 467-473 (1989)
0 Elsevier Science Publishing
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468

Book Reviews

problem spanning from ancient times to contemporary

theories. The second
part, by Eccles, reviews a variety of selected topics in neurophysiology
in
the process of constructing
his own theory of mind-body
interaction,
which
in part incorporates
some of Poppers views, but goes further in its attempt
to discuss the mechanism
of this interaction
within the brain. The third
section includes a series of I2 dialogues between the two authors in which
the reader is given a glimpse of some of the subtle disagreements
and differences between their two theories as well as some of the less clearly formulated ideas and beliefs that haunt the background
of their thoughts on the
subject.
In the first part of the book Popper provides an explanation
of his three
worlds
and their interactions
as a tentative
solution to the mind-body
problem.
World 1 includes
the familiar world of physical entities and the
processes,
forces, and physical laws which affect them. World 2 consists of
the world of mental states and dispositions,
as experienced
or contributing
to the experience
of self. World 3 consists of the products
of the human
mind including theories, beliefs, ideas, and even physical creations
such as
the contents of books or the logic or plan of some tool or device (each taken
independently
of its world I embodiment).
In many ways world 3 resembles
a kind of Platonic world of essences or ideas, though Poppers view of this
world lacks the ineffable perfection
and immutability
of Platos ideal forms.
Poppers
world 3 is brought into being by human reasoning
through the
course of human evolution.
With the evolution
of the human mind world 3
emerges from the mental states of world 2 (which we share in common with
many higher animals). Poppers argument is clearly antireductionist.
World
3 is not reducible to combinations
of world 2 entities, which are not reducible
to world I entities, yet each world evolves out of the one below.
It is
not clear where in this scheme the laws of evolutionary
processes themselves
fit. One suspects that each world
must have its own form of evolutionary
laws, although such details are not pursued. There seems to be a very clear
parallel with the many current theories of biocultural
coevolution,
especially
those emphasizing
independent
evolutionary
processes
in the cultural realm
(e.g., Dawkins
meme evolutil;:i
or Lumsden
and Wilsons culturgen
coevolution).
Interaction
involving the influence of world 3 on world 1 (or 2) is charAs an example, Popper discusses what
acterized as downward
causation.
has come to be called the Baldwin
effect after one of its early proponents.
J. M. Baldwin. It refers to the influence
that the behavioral
flexibility of an
animal can have on the future evolution
of its progeny, by altering the environmental
conditions
that affect natural selection.
Popper appears to be
suggesting that a similar argument
can be made that explains the ability of
reasoning
and self-consciousness
to regulate behavior
and thus alter the
world of physical cause and effect. Unfortunately
he provides
us with no
examples in following the details of this process in willed behavior.
Turning to Eccles part of the book, I must admit to being further disappointed.
He describes an interesting
body of neuropsychological
evidence

Book

Reviews

469

in order to support his contention that the locus of the interaction between
the self-conscious
mind and the brain is within certain open cortical
modules (cortical columns) in the left hemisphere. These are located within
a few focal regions of cortex in association areas, and language specialized
zones, which, taken together, he calls the liason brain. An open module
is to be likened to a radio transmitter-receiver
unit open to interaction
with the self-conscious
mind of world 2. Closed modules, in contrast,
merely function in more or less input-output processes of various levels of
complexity, but because of their connection with open modules of the liason
brain their information can be scanned or probed or their activity recruited in service of the self-conscious mind.
Despite the neurophysiological
details, this view ultimately seems to
invoke the presence of a ghostly homunculus that analyzes the encoded brain
processes and directs their activity but is itself not embodied in any brain
process. This ghost in the machine view is explicitly defended in dialogue
VI. Where I had hoped to be presented with a theory of the neurobiological
processes that constitute self-conscious awareness that might once and for
all rid us of the fallacy of the homunculus, I instead have found an argument
that effectively denies that such a theory can be formulated. The physiological processes taking place in the brain are seen as being insufficient to
constitute consciousness, though necessary for input, output, and memory
functions, whereas the self-conscious mind is described as reading out,
scanning, affecting, or influencing the open modules. I have the
sense that the buck has been passed! In Descartes theory the pineal was
pushed in order to effect the interaction between mind and brain. Eccles
has replaced the pineal with cortical columns and the push with more
computerlike jargon.
I was also perplexed and intrigued by Eccles dismissal of the right
cerebral hemisphere. In Eccles view only the left hemisphere partakes of
self-consciousness,
the right hemisphere is said to lack open modules and
thus includes no part of the liason brain. He argues that it is dependent on
the left hemispheres liason with the self-conscious mind, though he notes
that the self-conscious mind might periodically be able to sneak over to
the minor hemisphere and have a look there. One implication is that the
right hemisphere of split-brain patients is somehow unconscious and selfless
(a testable hypothesis). This view seems at odds with reports of disturbances
of conscious attention such as neglect syndromes after right-hemisphere
lesions, and with more recent findings that such lesions may result in subtle
but significant impairment of the comprehension of metaphors, jokes, or
thematic context-each
of which involves some degree of higher-order
self-reflective reasoning.
Perhaps the most notable omission from the entire text is any discussion
of computers, information processing, or artificial intelligence theories. Although admittedly outside the perview of either author, the possibility or
impossibility of machine intelligence, machine consciousness, or the demonstrated ability to embody logical inference and hypothesis generation
in the activities of an electronic device, each of these facets of artificial

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Book

Reviews

intelligence
offers insistent
questions
for Popper and Eccles perspective.
The entire realm is cast aside by the comment that computers
are little more
than glorified
pencils.
Perhaps this book will appeal to biologists because of the central role
ascribed to evolution,
and the multitiered
system may find some kinship
among theories of supragenic
evolutionary
processes.
The authors point out
important philosophical
and neurobiological
perspectives
that are lacking in
current gene-culture
coevolution
theories. In this comparison
they have-also
contributed
the interesting
suggestion that evolutionary
processes are threetiered rather than two: now including:
biological
evolution
(of all living
things). bio-social
(Baldwinian)
coevolution
(of self-conscious
organisms).
and bio-socio-symbolic
coevolution
(of humans only). The book will no
doubt also continue
to fuel the controversy
regarding
animal thinking.
1
suspect,
however,
that the antireductionistic
tone and the corresponding
vagueness of their descriptions
of the interactions
between worlds
may
well deny it any serious scientific consideration.
In any case it should bring
to the attention
of behavioral
biologists,
cognitive
scientists,
and neurobiologists.
among others. the crude state of our present understanding
of
self-consciousness
and the brain, and may even prompt others into considering this topic worthy of scientific attention.

ANXIOUS PLEASURES: THE SEXUAL LIVES OF AN AMAZONIAN

PEOPLE

By Thomas Gregor. Chicago: University

1985, 223 pp., $19.95 hard cover.

of Chicago

Press,

Gregor presents a symbolic and Freudian

account of the sexual behavior
of the Mehinaku
Indians, one of the several upper Xingu (Brazil) groups
known to have an institutionalized
system of extramarital
sex coupled
with a more common Amazonian
practice whereby men compensate
women for sexual favors with fish and game. Gregor describes
male
Mehinaku
sexual behavior,
the psychology
of sex, and the development
of sexual attitudes and beliefs. relying heavily on Freudian developmental
concepts as well as Freudian
and symbolic analysis of dreams. ritual, and
myth. On a broader scale Gregor hopes to contribute
to an understanding