ETHICS CASES

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to
sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who
charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law,
and grave misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election
candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he
took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only
provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant
was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the
meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in
the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that
all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact
that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege
extended to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict
regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he
already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be
a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is

not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

CRUZ VS CABRERA
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on
January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to
ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in
his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the
intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the
manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single
outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents
suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the
course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to
too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x
x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services.
Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in
the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyers
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.

LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO

Facts:

Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and February
1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996.
Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondents role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor
Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No.
6713 (RA 6713).
Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties. A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition not
[to] represent conflicting interests. However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in unlawful x x x
conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.

2. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
practice of law.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk
of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to
be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.
One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:

He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
BANOGON VS ZERNA
154 SCRA 593 Legal Ethics Speedy and Proper Administration of Justice

In 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a cadastral court. In 1957 or thirty
one years later, Banogon filed a motion to amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition was
filed by Zerna in the same year. Banogons counsel repeatedly failed to set for hearing and
in 1971 or fourteen years later, Zerna filed for a motion to dismiss which was granted by
reason of Banogons filing being out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not Banogons suit should prosper.
HELD: No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The Supreme Court also took time
to remind lawyers to judiciously study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of improper
cases such as this case where the filing of motions and pleadings was way out of time. One
reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary. Lawyers do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in
the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is
a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired
of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened
with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section
32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he
did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as
Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76,
February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of
an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is
fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs.
Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)
IN RE EDILLON
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment
of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of
as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of
the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation

and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment,
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay
their annual dues.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

IBP DUTIES
FACTS:

Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of IBP
duties amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted to
the Bar in 1961. He was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986. After that, he
migrated and worked in the USA until 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the above amount because he was working with the Civil Service then,
and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government
service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he was working in the
USA.
IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on the
actual practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the
IBP, and one of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of
such dues has been upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the
Integrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from paying the dues. What was allowed
was the voluntary termination and reinstatement later on of membership. If membership is
terminated, dues wouldnt be assessed.
Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBPs policy of NonExemption in payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive
for one who has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property right without due process.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
he was inactive in the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad?
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar
is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists

for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or
the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could
have been discontinued.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction
the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated
the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Issues:

Held:

W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES

W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level
as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character
and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority
to do so, conditioned on:
the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
the payment of professional tax;
the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
the retaking of the lawyers oath.

PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN
Facts:
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint filed
by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by
members of the PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a
criminal case for carnapping, was lodged at RTC.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the
motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court
issued an Order for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent,
however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the
complaint.
Issue:
On the topic of good moral character
Ruling:
,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits
and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals
and furniture belonging to his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent
was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it
until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping
elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But
whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and
approval of the trial court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers
of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management
of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public
property committed to their charge.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more
particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to

disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.
Father Ranhilio Aquino vs Atty. Edwin Pascua
Facts: Father Aquino as the Academic head of Philippine Judicial Academy, filed a complaint
against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. He
alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents wherein both documents had Doc. No.
1213, Page No. 243. Book III, Series of 1998 and both are dated on December 10, 1998.
It was shown by the Clerk of Court of RTC-Tuguegarao that none of these entries appear in
the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua. In his comment, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized
the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. Complainant maintains that Atty.
Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial Practice Rule.
Ruling: Yes. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of
the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission. Atty.
Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff.
Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his
notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. Furthermore, the claim of
Atty. Pascua of simple inadvertence is untenable. The photocopy of his notarial register
shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200
on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on
December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are correct in maintaining that Atty.
Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear
dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar. A
member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or
private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were
found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties. Atty Pascua is
declared guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission is revoked.

In Re JBC vs. Judge QuitanJBC No. 013 | Aug 22, 2007Facts:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.
Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential
information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service
per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995

In Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC judge quitan declared that there were
5criminal cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, all were dismissed.
No Administrative Case was disclosed by Quitan in his PDS
Deputy Court administrator Christopher Lock requested certified true copies of the criminal
cases relative to the administrative complaints filed against Quitan, particularly
Adminisrative Order 180 which dismissed Quitan from service.
In a letter dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed
dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts
reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses.
The Administrative order stated that Quitan was dismissed from service with forfeiture
of pay and benefits, this was signed by President Ramos himself.
In a letter dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having
committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the
members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by
the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case
simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office
of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
The DCA Lock directed Quitan to explain within 10 days from notice why he did not include
in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), which was sworn before a notary public, the administrative
cases filed against him and the fact that he was dismissed from service. The respondent said
that during the administrative case by the NAPOLCOM one of its members suggested to him
that he will no longer be persecuted if he tendered his resignation from the NAPOLCOM.
The Secretary of the DILG accepted the resignation. Quitan said that he did not
disclosethe administrative charge because he was of the honest belief that he had no more
pending administrative case by reason of his resignation This did not persuade Administrator
Presbitero Velasco and DCA Lock that he should not beheld administratively liable. They
submitted a Memorandu, to then Chief Justice Davide which read:
An examination of the PDS submitted by Quitan with the JBC he concealed material facts
and even committed perjury in having answered yes to question 24, but without disclosing
the fact that he was dismissed from government service.
Question 24: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a
sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal
or any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign
country or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any administrative sanction?
In the Mindanao Times quitan said: I was dismissed from the NAPOLCOM office without due
process
In the Mindanao Daily Inquirer: Quitan vowed to clear his name.
The OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be
docketed as an administrative matter;; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accruedleave credits.
Quitan contended that before he filed his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had
noknowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the
case
was secretly heard and decided.

OCA submitted its Memorandum dated stating therein that it was adopting its earlier
findings contained in its Memorandum. Based on the documents presented, it can not be
denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.
No. 183dismissing him from government service.
Issue:
W/N Judge Quitan concealed his Administrative Charges and Dismissal in the PDS and
filedhis application with knowledge of those preceedingly mentioned.
Held:
Judge Quitan did not comply with the requirements that were set by Article VII Section
7(3)of the constitution.
Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the
service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183, 1995 by no less than the former President
of the Philippines
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitan was
dismissed from public service and that he deliberately withheld this information.
Resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in service.
Netither does his resignation render the administrative case Moot and Academic.
Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave
misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave
misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned
during the pendencyof this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It
appearing that he has yet toapply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the
Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which
Judge Quitain may be entitled to,and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement
and appointment to any branch,instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations

ISMAEL F. MEJIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149937 June 21, 2007
FACTS: Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. was a client of Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, petitioner. Sometime in
January 1985, Bernardo requested petitioner to pay his real estate taxes. Bernardo then
delivered to petitioner a blank check. Petitioner wrote the amount of P27,700.00 with his
name as payee. Thereafter, he encashed the check. On March 14, 1985, petitioner furnished
Bernardo a statement of account showing that only P17,700.00 was actually spent for realty
taxes. Petitioner explained that he spent the remaining P10,000.00 for the hospitalization of
his wife. Both parties treated this amount of P10,000.00 as petitioner's loan. Thereupon,
petitioner requested Bernardo to lend him an additional amount of P40,000.00 as he needed
the money for his wife's medication. Bernardo agreed and gave P40,000.00 more to
petitioner. To secure the payment of his P50,000.00 loan, petitioner issued Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Check No. 156919 dated May 15, 1985 in the amount of P50,000.00 in
favor of Bernardo. Petitioner also handed to Bernardo a Promissory Note, also of the same
date, stating that he will pay the loan on or before May 15, 1985.
When the check became due and demandable, petitioner requested Bernardo not to encash
it until July 15, 1985. But petitioner failed to pay on that day. Instead, he asked Bernardo

again to defer the encashment of the check. On October 8, 1985, Bernardo deposited the
check but it was dishonored by the PNB, the drawee bank, due to petitioner's closed
account. Bernardo then sent petitioner a letter informing him that the check was dishonored
and demanding payment therefor. But petitioner refused to pay. He then delivered a list of
his attorney's fees to Bernardo which the latter did not pay. Thus, the petitioner was charged
with the violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) to which the trial court and the Court of
Appeals held him guilty, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. 22.
HELD: For violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The trial court found that petitioner issued the check as guarantee for his loan obtained from
Bernardo. At the time he issued the check, he knew that his account with the PNB had been
closed. When Bernardo deposited the check, it was dishonored by the PNB, the drawee bank,
for the reason "account closed." Petitioner was duly notified of such dishonor. In fact, he
admitted having received Bernardo's demand letter urging him to make good the check
within five (5) banking days from notice. But petitioner failed to heed such demand.
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade
and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the
mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Good Moral Character
A.C. no. 6697 Velez vs. Atty. De Vera
SC ENBANC Per Curiam

Facts: In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds:
1) Atty. De Veras alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar of California.
2) That the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the
Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that
the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice

law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension.
Atty. De Vera stated in his reply that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint
were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed
and categorically ruled upon by the S.C. in its Decision dated Dec. 11, 2005 in
Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). He prayed
that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
Complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's
moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.
Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money.
Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court
of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant
posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was
one for his disqualification.

Issue: Whether or not ATTY. LEONARD S. DEVERA commited malpractice w/c amounted to
moral turpitude in the STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA and is this applicable to the Philippines for
him to be disbarred.

Held: Yes, there is substantial evidence of malpractice by Atty. De Vera. SC suspended him
for two years.
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's (Julius Willis) allegation in the latter's memorandum
that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes. Atty. De Vera insists that Julius father authorized
him to use the money, and has repayed the fullo amount even before the administrative
case was filed against him.

However, aAside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find

anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to
use the funds of his client.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder
Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's
funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his
client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way
such character was perceived.
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Atty. De Veras actions caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to
which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence.

Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata

AC No. 7204
March 07, 2007
Facts:
The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the
grounds of Gross Immorality.
The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding her collectibles from
Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accounts with the complainant.
Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Travel and Tours was discussed.
After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ride home.
As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek
and embraced her tightly.
Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On the road,
the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondent suddenly stopped the car
in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. This time, the respondent forcefully
held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast. The complainant managed to escape and
decided to hire another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms
where the respondent apologized.

The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that there
was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law
Decision:
The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent, though,
in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be
considered grossly immoral.
The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her. However,
her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor.
The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in
dealing with his clients.

CRUZ VS MINA
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a

written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in
his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar