FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160932

January 14, 2013

SPECIAL
PEOPLE,
INC.
FOUNDATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P.
CERICOS,
Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN
D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR,
AND
NATIONAL
DIRECTOR,
RESPECTIVELY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH THEIR
OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course
of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of
the act to be compelled.
Antecedents
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development
and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the
Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping
and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the
distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and
six other municipalities.
The petitioner applied for a Certificate
1
of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the

requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate

(ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 on the
following justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the
Loboc River, filtering and purifying it, and distributing the same
to the consumers in the covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier
stations, then finally to the consumers households, water flows
through steel pipes;
3) The filtration and purifying process employs the latest
technology"electrocatalytic"internationally accepted for
safety and environment friendliness;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process
dissolves all impurities in the water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the
environment. On the other hand, it is environment friendly.1
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental
impact of the project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief
of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter dated
December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial
Environmental Examination is required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof
of social acceptability should be established. Proper indorsement
from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB should
be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Candas findings to
2
respondent EMB Region
7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD
Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because
the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks

project of the Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.3
On April 3, 2002, RD Lipayon notified the petitioner that its
documents substantially complied with the procedural aspects of
the EMBs review, and that the application was assigned EMBDENR-7 Control No. CNC-02-080 for easy reference in case of
follow-up and submission of additional requirements.4
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial
Environmental Examination document was required for the
project due to its significant impact in the area.5
On August 26, 2002, RD Lipayon required the petitioner to
submit the following documents to enable the EMB to
determine whether the project was within an environmentally
critical area or not, to wit:
1. Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) that it is not within areas
declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
preservation area, sanctuaries and not within the purview of
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS) Act, and other issuances including
international commitments and declarations;
2. Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that]
the areas within the project do not constitute the habitat for any
endangered or threatened species or indigenous wildlife (Flora
and Fauna).
3. Certification from the following:
3.1. Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical
Services Administration (PAGASA) that the area is not
frequently visited or 3hard-hit by typhoons. This shall refer to all
areas where typhoon signal no. 3 not hoisted for at least twice a
year during the last five (5) years prior to the year of reckoning.

Years to be considered shall be from January 1995 to December

2001.
3.2. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
(PHIVOLCS) that the area was not subjected to an earthquake
of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent
and hit by tsunamis during the period of 1638 until the year
2001.
3.3. PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes
of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent
during the period of 1949 until the year 2001.
3.4. PAGASA that the area is not storm surge-prone.
3.5. Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the
area is not located along fault lines or within fault zones and not
located in critical slope.
3.6. City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not
flood prone.
3.7. Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the
Bureau of Soils and Water Management (BSWM) that the area
is not classified as Prime Agricultural Land.
4. Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its
equivalent office that areas in your project are not set-aside as
aesthetic potential tourist spot.
5. Certification from the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) that areas within your project are not recharged areas
of aquifer.
6. Certification from DENR regional Office and/or
Environmental Management Bureau 7 (EMB 7) that Loboc
4
River is not characterized
by one or any combination of the
following conditions:
a. Tapped for domestic purposes;

b. With controlled and/or protected areas declared by

appropriate authorities; and
c. Which support wildlife and fishery activities.
A Certificate of Non-Coverage will duly be issued to your
foundation once all the above mentioned required certifications
are complied with.
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental
Impact System (EIS) Law should not start unless the Project
Proponent should secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), otherwise penalties shall be imposed. 6
(Emphases supplied)
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight
certifications,7 including the certification issued by the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
(PHIVOLCS), as follows:
That the project area, Loboc, Bohol was subjected to an
earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale of IIX last February 8, 1990. The magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8
and the highest intensity reported was VIII, based on the RossiForel Intensity Scale. During the said earthquake, the PMI
Academy Building collapsed while minor cracks were sustained
by the municipal hall, public school, town church and some
other houses in the town. There were reports that immediately
after the earthquake, the force of the incoming waves from the
sea caused Alijuan River in the town of Duero to flow inland.
The report also states that the waves affected 10-50 meters of
the coastal beach of the towns of Jagna, Duero, Guindulman,
Garcia Hernandez and Valencia.8 (Emphases supplied)
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional
Office of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (RO-MGB) to the
5
effect that the project area was not located along a fault
line/fault zone or a critical slope because RO-MGB did not have

the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus had to
forward the petitioners request to the MGB Central Office. 9
Upon the MGBs advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the
required certification from PHIVOLCS, but the certification did
not state whether the project area was within a critical slope.
Instead, the certification stated that the project site was
approximately 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD
Lipayons letter dated February 4, 2003 declared that the project
was within an environmentally critical area, and that the
petitioner was not entitled to the CNC, viz:
After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was
found out that the area was subjected to an earthquake of
Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale wherein the
magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 with the highest intensity
reported of VIII and you fail to support certification that the
project area is not within critical slope. And based on the Water
Usage and Classification per Department Order (DAO) 34
Series of 1990, subject river system was officially classified as
Class B intended for swimming and bathing purposes.
Moreover, one component of your project involves opening of
roadway connected to the barangay road.
Therefore, we reiterate our previous stand that your project is
covered by the EIS System pursuant to P.D. 1586, the
Environmental Impact Statement Law.11
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus
and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay,
Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter
of right after having complied with the certification
requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the
6
DPWH for a similar waterworks
project in the same area.
In the decision dated November 18, 2003,13 the RTC dismissed
the petition for mandamus upon the following considerations,

namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had been
subjected to an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC
issued by the EMB to a similar waterworks project of the
DPWH in the same area was only for the construction of a unit
spring box intake and pump house, and the DENR issued a
cease and desist order relative to the DPWHs additional project
to put up a water filtration plant therein; (3) the determination of
whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that
pertained to the EMB; (4) the assignment of a control number
by the EMB to the petitioners application did not mean that the
application was as good as approved; (5) the RTC would not
interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB to review the
merits of the petitioners application for the CNC; and (6) there
was already a pending appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for
review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONERS DUE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED
BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR
BY PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF
RESPONDENTS,
THROUGH
RESPONDENT
EMB
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER;
B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS EXHAUSTED
AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES THROUGH
AN APPEAL TO RESPONDENT DENR SECRETARY WHO
HAS SAT ON SAID APPEAL UP TO THE PRESENT;
7

C. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO

RECOVER DAMAGES FROM RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PERSONAL CAPACITY.14

The petitioner insists that RD Lipayon already exercised his

discretion by finding that the application substantially complied
with the procedural aspects for review and by assigning Control
No. CNC-02-080 to its application; that after the petitioner
complied with the requirements enumerated in the August 26,
2002 letter of RD Lipayon, the EMB became duty-bound to
issue the CNC to the petitioner; that the EMB issued a CNC to a
similar project of the DPWH in the same area; that it filed an
appeal with the DENR Secretary, but the appeal remained
unresolved; and that it brought the petition for mandamus
precisely as a speedier recourse.
In their comment, RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act
complained of against them involved an exercise of discretion
that could not be compelled by mandamus; that the petitioners
proposed project was located within an environmentally critical
area, and the activities to be done were so significant that they
would create massive earth movement and environmental
degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule against forum
shopping; and that the petitioner had no cause of action against
them for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On his part, the DENR Secretary, through the Solicitor General,
contends that the petition raises questions of fact that are not
proper in a petition for review; that the petitioner should have
appealed to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; that the
grant or denial of a CNC application is discretionary and cannot
be compelled by mandamus; and that the petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether
the appeal directly to this Court from the RTC was proper, and,
secondly, whether the petition for mandamus was the correct
recourse.
8

Ruling

The petition for review is denied for its lack of merit.

1.
Petitioners appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of
Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires that the petition shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Yet, the petitioner hereby raises a question of fact whose
resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns
whether or not the petitioner established that its project was not
located in an environmentally critical area. For this reason, the
Court is constrained to deny due course to the petition for
review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies
on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial
court, and accepts such findings as conclusive and binding
unless any of the following exceptions obtains, namely: (a)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings
of fact are premised 9on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court
of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly

considered, would justify a different conclusion. 15 However,

none of the aforementioned exceptions applies herein.
2.
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to
exhaust the available administrative remedies, and because it
failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the
performance of the act by the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the
intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern
should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by
administrative processes. The issues that an administrative
agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving
the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due
deliberation.16 The court of law must allow the administrative
agency to carry out its functions and discharge its
responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence. 17
This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular
expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their
resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance
to do so.18
The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies. At the time RD Lipayon
denied the petitioners application for the CNC, Administrative
Order No. 42 dated November 2, 200219 had just vested the
authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in the
Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding
the lack of a specific implementing guideline to what office the
10
ruling of the EMB Regional
Director was to be appealed, the
petitioner could have been easily guided in that regard by the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the Director
of a line bureau, such as the EMB, 20 shall have supervision and

control over all division and other units, including regional

offices, under the bureau.21 Verily, supervision and control
include the power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units." 22 Accordingly,
the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional
Directors decision to the EMB Director, who exercised
supervision and control over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated
Administrative Order No. 2003-3023 in order to define where
appeals should be taken, providing as follows:
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC
applications may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision,
file an appeal on the following grounds:
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding
authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution
procedures as a means to settle grievances between proponents
and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action.
Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the
following:

1wphi1
Deciding Authority

Where to file the

appeal

EMB Regional Office

Director
11

Office of the EMB

Director

EMB Central Office

Director

Office of the DENR

Secretary

Office of the
President
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a
pending appeal with the DENR Secretary.1wphi1 However, the
records reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner was
an undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region
VII, denying its application for the CNC,24 not the decision of
RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending
appeal with the DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayons
decision, the petitioner should still have waited for the DENR
Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so
rendered its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The
omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.25
DENR Secretary

Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the
petitioner did not establish that the grant of its application for
the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD
Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a
project is not covered by the Environmental Impact Statement
System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not
required to secure an ECC.26 The EIS System was established by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required
all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a
significant effect on the environment, thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the
above enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including
government-owned or12controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in
every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects
the quality of the environment a detailed statement on

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or

undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of
the environment are consistent with the maintenance and
enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding must be made that such use and
commitment are warranted.
xxxx
P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the
projects and areas not declared by the President of the
Philippines as environmentally critical,27 thus:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other
projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the Presidents
as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical
and shall not be required to submit an environmental impact
statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru
the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require noncritical projects and undertakings to provide additional
environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.
On December 14, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No.
2146 declaring areas and types of projects as environmentally
critical and within the scope of the EIS System, as follows:
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
13

I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries

b. Iron and steel mills

c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
d. Smelting plants
II. Resource Extractive Industries
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private
forests
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
1. Dikes for fishpond development projects
III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled,
hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
14
d. Major roads and bridges.

B. Environmentally Critical Areas

1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed

reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or
threatened species of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and
fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific
interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural
communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities
(geologic hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the
following conditions;
a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by
appropriate authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of
the following conditions:
15 and dense young growth;
a. with primary pristine

b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;

c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing

grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong
winds and storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the
following conditions:
a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;
b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were
considered non-critical to the environment and were entitled to
the CNC.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of
an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely
ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional
Director, who must determine whether the project or project area
is classified as critical to the environment based on the
documents to be submitted by the applicant.
The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his
discretion in its case when he made his finding that the
application substantially complied with the procedural
requirements for review. As such, he was then obliged to issue
the CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required
certifications.
The petitioner errs on16two grounds.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion
with regard to the CNC application when he made his finding. It

is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements

for review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect
of the application, that is, whether the project and the project
area were considered critical to the environment. In fact, this
was the reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to
submit certifications from the various government agencies
concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere
formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his
decision on whether to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner
satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit the
needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to
the effect that the project site was not within a critical slope.
Also, the PHIVOLCSs certification showed that the project site
had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that
sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently
visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the
petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be
issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its
application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner
grossly misunderstood the nature of the remedy of mandamus.
To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a
short exposition on the nature and office of the remedy is now
appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It
is believed that the writ was originally part of the class of writs
or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his
subjects to perform a particular act or duty.28 The earliest writs
were in the form of letters missive, and were mere personal
commands. The command was a law in itself, from which there
was no appeal. The writ
of mandamus was not only declaratory
17
of a duty under an existing law, but was a law in itself that
imposed the duty, the performance of which it commanded. 29
The King was considered as the fountain and source of justice,

and when the law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms
of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were
invoked in aid of the ordinary powers of the courts.30
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the Kings name out of
the court of Kings Bench that had a general supervisory power
over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted
the old personal command of the sovereign. 31 The court of
Kings Bench, acting as the general guardian of public rights
and in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ, rendered the
writ of mandamus the suppletory means of substantial justice in
every case where there was no other specific legal remedy for a
legal right, and ensured that all official duties were fulfilled
whenever the subject-matter was properly within its control. 32
Early on, the writ of mandamus was particularly used to compel
public authorities to return the petitioners to public offices from
which they had been unlawfully removed.33
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ
emanating from the King himself, superintending the police and
preserving the peace within the realm.34 It was allowed only in
cases affecting the sovereign, or the interest of the public at
large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the necessity to
compel the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial
powers invested in them by restraining their excesses,
preventing their negligence and restraining their denial of
justice.36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly
prerogative features and has been assimilated to the nature of an
ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an
extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in
extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes of
proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress
to a party aggrieved, 18
and where without its aid there would be a
37
failure of justice.

The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature

that sets it apart from the other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used
merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a preexisting duty.38 In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act
sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative
duty to perform the same.39 The petitioner bears the burden to
show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of
the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act.40
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for
mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary.41 A purely ministerial act or duty is
one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental
requisites for mandamus rendered its petition in the RTC
untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS
Associate Justice

P.
19

BERSAMIN

G.R. No. 178312

January 30, 2013

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO AND
MAGIN
SORIANO,
NAMELY:
MARIVEL
S.
CARANDANG AND JOSEPH SORIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this appeal via petition for review -on certiorari, Land Bank
of the Philippines (Land Bank) seeks the review and reversal of
the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
January 18, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91192, affirming the
judgment rendered on January 31, 2005 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), ordering Land Bank
to pay to the respondents as the landowners just compensation
amounting to P1,227,571.10 for the properties covered by TCT
No. NT-146092(2839) situated in Poblacion/Talabutab, Gen.
Natividad, Nueva Ecija with an area of 10.9635 hectares, and by
TCT No. NT-61608 situated in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija
with an area of 4.1224 hectares, plus 6% per annum legal
interest from date of taking (which the RTC determined to be
October 25, 1999) until fully paid.
Antecedents
The respondents are the children of the late Spouses Jorja RigorSoriano and Magin Soriano, the owners of the two parcels of
land covered by TCT No. NT 146092 (2839) and TCT NO. NT61608, both of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, containing
an area of 10.9635 hectares located in Poblacion/Talabutab,
Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija and 4.1224 hectares located in
Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, respectively.

The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer

(OLT) and were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending,
however, that such valuation was too low compared to existing
valuations of agricultural lands, the respondents commenced this
action for just compensation, claiming that the properties were
irrigated lands that usually yielded 150 cavans per hectare per
season at a minimum of two seasons per year. They asked that a
final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00,
based on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and
Republic Act No. 6657.2
Land Bank disagreed, insisting that Presidential Decree No. 27
and Executive Order No. 228 governed the fixing of just
compensation for the properties; that the Government, through
the DAR as the lead agency in the implementation of all
agrarian laws, had taken the properties in 1972 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, and had since then redistributed the
properties to farmer-beneficiaries; and that in all cases under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228, its
participation was only to pay the landowners accepting the
valuations fixed by the DAR, upon the latters direction and in
the amounts the DAR determined. It prayed that the
valuation by the DAR be retained or that a valuation be made
judicially.3
Ruling of the RTC as SAC
After trial, on January 31, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision,
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to
pay petitioner Manolo Goduco the total amount of One Million
Two Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventy
One & 10/100 (P1,227,571.10), Philippine Currency,
representing the just compensation of the properties covered by
TCT No. NT-146092 (2839), situated at Poblacion/Talabutab,

Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija x x x with an area of 10.9635

hectares, and TCT No. NT-61608, situated at Macabucod,
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 4.1224 hectares, with 6%
legal interest per annum from date of taking (which the Court
determines to be October 25, 1999) until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.4
Land Bank and the respondents filed separate motions for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motions on August 4,
2005. It should be mentioned that the clerical error appearing in
the dispositive portion of the decision as to the name of the
landowner was corrected from "Manolo Goduco" to "Marivel S.
Carandang" and "Joseph Soriano." 5
Ruling of the CA
Land Bank appealed the decision dated January 31, 2005 to the
CA, which sustained the RTC through the decision promulgated
on January 18, 2007,6 pertinently holding and disposing as
follows:
The petition is unimpressed with merit.
xxxx
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid
has yet to be settled. As mentioned earlier, the court a quo set
the date of taking on 25 October 1999. During this time,
Republic Act No. 6657 which took effect on 15 June 1988 was
already operational. Thus, the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, supra, is highly
relevant thus:
Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)
before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said

law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO

228 having only
suppletory effect, conformably without our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche.
xxxx
A perusal of the records, however, disclosed that in the valuation
of the subject properties, the court a quo utilized the formula:
LV = Average Gross Production (AGP) x 2.5 x the
Government Support Price (GSP)
xxxx
Under Section 17 of RA No. 6657, infra, the Congress
enumerated certain factors to be considered in ascertaining just
compensation of properties covered under the CARP. x x x.
Significantly, the court a quos valuation of the properties in
question finds support under Section 17 of RA 6657, thus:
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the
property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution shall be considered
additional factors to determine its valuation.
In the case at bar, as can be gleaned from the recorded evidence,
hearings were had and there were presentation of the parties
evidence. Hence, it can be safely assumed that the court a quo
has aptly considered the factors provided under Section 17,
supra, in its determination of just compensation.

xxxx
In sum, We find that the just compensation which the court a
quo fixed is within the bounds of what the law considers as full
and fair equivalent of the properties taken.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant Petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision of the court a quo dated 31
January 2005 is AFFIRMED.7
On June 8, 2007, the CA denied Land Banks motion for
reconsideration.8
Issues
Hence, Land Bank appeals via petition for review on certiorari,
assailing the decision of the CA upon the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN THE FOLLOWING INSTANCES: (A)
THE QUESTIONED DECISION DISREGARDS [SIC] THE
SUPREME COURT RULING ON THE DATE OF TAKING OF
LANDS UNDER P.D. NO. 27/ E.O. NO. 228 WHICH WAS
ENUNCIATED IN G.R. NO. 148223 TITLED "FERNANDO
GABATIN, ET AL., VS. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES" (25 NOVEMBER 2005); (B) THE
QUESTIONED
DECISION
DISREGARDED
THE
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT PRICE (GSP) FOR PALAY
PRESCRIBED IN P.D. NO. 27/E.O. NO. 228 AMOUNTING
TO THIRTY FIVE PESOS (PHP35.00), WHICH AMOUNT IS
SUBJECT TO MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER PD NO. 27, THE LANDS
WERE DEEMED TAKEN BY OPERATION OF LAW ON 21

OCTOBER 1972, THE DATE OF EFFECTIVITY OF SAID

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT PRICE
(GSP) FOR PALAY PRESCRIBED IN P.D. NO. 27/E.O. NO.
228 AMOUNTING TO PHP35 IS SUBJECT TO
MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE.9
Ruling
On February 29, 2012, Land Bank submitted to the Court a socalled Joint Manifestation and Motion (Re: Unconditional
Acceptance of Revaluation) dated February 9, 2012, stating that
the approval by Land Banks responsible officers of the
revaluation of the properties pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 1 dated February 18, 2010, Series of 2010, as
follows:
(a) P229,799.42, for the acquired area consisting of 2.3539
hectares located in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija and
covered by TCT No. NT 61608; and
(b) P2,260,725.87 for the acquired area consisting of 10.4795
hectares located in Talubatab, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija and
covered by TCT No. NT-146092,
was communicated to the respondents for their unconditional
acceptance. It prayed that the appeal be now resolved on the
basis of the acceptance of payment by the respondents.10
Under the resolution dated March 12, 2012, the Court required
the respondents to comment on Land Banks submission of the
Joint Manifestation and Motion (Re: Unconditional Acceptance
of Revaluation) dated February 29, 2012; directed the parties to
submit their formal written agreement within 15 days from
notice; and deferred action on the Joint Manifestation and

Motion (Re: Unconditional Acceptance of Revaluation) dated

February 29, 2012 pending compliance by the parties.11
On December 4, 2012, Land Bank submitted a Manifestation, 12
informing the Court that the parties had filed by registered mail
their Joint Motion to Approve the Attached Agreement,
submitting therewith their Agreement dated November 29, 2012.
On December 7, 2012, the Court received the Joint Motion to
Approve the Attached Agreement13 and the Agreement dated
November 29, 2012.14 Thereby, the parties prayed that the Court
consider and approve the Agreement as its disposition of the
petition for review on certiorari, and render its judgment in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
The Agreement is reproduced in full below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF MANILA
) S.S.
AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This agreement made and executed by and
between:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, with
principal place of business at 1598 M.H.
del Pilar cor. Quintos Sts., Malate,
Manila, hereinafter called the "First
Party," and
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO and
MAGIN
SORIANO,
NAMELY:
MARIVEL
S.
CARANDANG and JOSEPH SORIANO, hereinafter
called the "Second Party,"
WITNESSETH:
1. That the First Party, in a Memorandum
from Lily M. San Luis, Officer-in Charge,

AOC III-A, Land Bank of the Philippines,

City of San Fernando, Pampanga, revalued
the acquired area belonging to the Second
Party, consisting of 2.3539 hectares
located at Macabucad, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija,
covered by TCT No. NT - 61608 pursuant to
DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2010, in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty
Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Nine
Pesos & 42/100 (Php 229,799.42).
2. That on 04 August 2011, the abovestated revaluation for subject property
was duly approved by the First Partys
approving authorities, as indicated in the
Memorandum and thereafter communicated to
the
Second
Party
for
unconditional
acceptance.
3. That the First Party, in a subsequent
Memorandum from Lily M. San Luis, Officerin-Charge, AOC III-A, Land Bank of the
Philippines,
City
of
San
Fernando,
Pampanga, revalued another acquired area
belonging to the Second Party, consisting
of 10.4795 hectares located at Talubatab,
Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, covered by
TCT No. NT - 146092 pursuant to the abovestated DAR Administrative Order in the
amount of Two Million Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Five Pesos &
87 (Php 2,260,725.87).
4. That on 18 January 2011, the abovestated
revaluation
for
the
subject
property was duly approved by the First
Partys
approving
authorities
as
indicated in the Memorandum and thereafter
communicated to the Second party for
unconditional acceptance.1wphi1

5. That for the above-stated claims, the

amounts of Php 210,884.03 for TCT No. NT
61608 and Php 2,073,339.00 for TCT No.
NT-146092, representing the increase in
valuation are due to the Second Party,
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
6. That the above-stated revalued amounts,
which the Second Party have received, are
completely satisfactory to the Second
Party
who
manifest
unconditional
acceptance thereof, representing as they
do, the fair, full and just compensation
for subject properties.
7. That in view of the Second Partys
unconditional or absolute acceptance and
full receipt of the foregoing amounts as
just compensation for subject properties
the First Party and the Second Party
hereby consider the case titled "Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses
Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin Soriano,
namely: Marivel S. Carandang and Joseph
Soriano (G.R. No. 178312) pending before
the Supreme Court, closed and terminated.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto
have hereunto set their hands this NOV 29
2012 day of November, 2012, in CITY OF
MANILA, Philippines.
FIRST PARTY:
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES

SECOND PARTY:
(Sgd.)
MARIVEL S.
CARANDANG
(Sgd.)
JOSEPH SORIANO

REPRESENTED/ASSISTED BY:

ASSISTED BY:

NOEL B. MARQUEZ
VP - Head, CLSD/Counsel

(Sgd.)
FELIPE R. DE BELEN
Counsel

(Sgd.)
MYLENE R. PACASUM/
Counsel

(Sgd.)
JOSE M. A. QUIMBOY
Counsel

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
SYLVIA M. EUSEBIO
RENAN B. UMALI
There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a
compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into
for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is
to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the
objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is
perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise,
while immediately binding between the parties upon its
execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and
reduced to a judgment.15 The validity of a compromise is
dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles
of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order.16
A review of the terms of the Agreement, particularly paragraph
6 and paragraph 7, indicates that it is a judicial compromise
because the parties intended it to terminate their pending
litigation by fully settling their dispute. Indeed, with the
respondents thereby expressly signifying their "unconditional or
absolute acceptance and full receipt of the foregoing amounts as
just compensation for subject properties the First Party and the
Second Party hereby consider the case titled "Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin
Soriano, namely: Marivel S. Carandang and Joseph Soriano

(G.R. No. 178312) pending before the Supreme Court, closed

and terminated," the ultimate objective of the action to
determine just compensation for the landowners was achieved.
WHEREFORE, finding the Agreement to have been validly and
voluntarily executed by the parties in compliance with the
requirements of law, the Court hereby APPROVES it.
Considering that the Agreement shows that the payment of just
compensation was already fully executed, and that the affected
properties were already delivered to Land Bank of the
Philippines, thereby leaving nothing further to be complied with
by the parties, the Court declares this appeal CLOSED and
TERMINATED, without pronouncements as to costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 188635

January 29, 2013

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,

DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G.
ESPINO,
JR.,
(COMMISSIONERS
OF
THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK,
Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.1 A violation of this
constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment.
However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit
granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving
official and of the recipient.
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its
being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009
by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045
entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director,
Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX,
Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15,
2005 and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May
12, 2006 on disallowances of subsistence, laundry, hazard and
other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2 affirming
the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit
Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga

City against the payment of benefits to covered officials and

employees of the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the
DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare
the decision dated June 4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for
the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for
CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439
(R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and
Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for
short), and on the strength of the Memorandum of Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing
the use of the savings for the purpose.
Antecedents
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to
address the policy of the State to provide a program for human
resources development in science and technology in order to
achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and
technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the
following additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta
benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST, to
wit:
(a) Honorarium. - S & T personnel who rendered services
beyond the established irregular workload of scientists,
technologists, researchers and technicians whose broad and
superior knowledge, expertise or professional standing in a
specific field contributes to productivity and innovativeness
shall be entitled to receive honorarium subject to rules to be set
by the Department;
(b) Share in royalties. - S & T scientists, engineers, researchers
and other S & T personnel shall be entitled to receive share in
royalties subject to guidelines of the Department. The share in

royalties shall be on a sixty percent-forty percent (60%-40%)

basis in favor of the Government and the personnel involved in
the technology/ activity which has been produced or undertaken
during the regular performance of their functions. For the
purpose of this Act, share in royalties shall be defined as a share
in the proceeds of royalty payments arising from patents,
copyrights and other intellectual property rights;
If the researcher works with a private company and the program
of activities to be undertaken has been mutually agreed upon by
the parties concerned, any royalty arising therefrom shall be
divided according to the equity share in the research project;
(c) Hazard allowance. - S & T personnel involved in hazardous
undertakings or assigned in hazardous workplaces, shall be paid
hazard allowances ranging from ten (10%) to thirty (30%)
percent of their monthly basic salary depending on the nature
and extent of the hazard involved. The following shall be
considered hazardous workplaces:
(1) Radiation-exposed laboratories and service workshops;
(2) Remote/depressed areas;
(3) Areas declared under a state of calamity or emergency;
(4) Strife-torn or embattled areas;
(5) Laboratories and other disease-infested areas.
(d) Subsistence allowance. - S & T personnel shall be entitled to
full subsistence allowance equivalent to three (3) meals a day,
which may be computed and implemented in accordance with
the criteria to be provided in the implementing rules and
regulations. Those assigned out of their regular work stations
shall be entitled to per diem in place of the allowance;
(e) Laundry allowance. - S & T personnel who are required to
wear a prescribed uniform during office hours shall be entitled

to a laundry allowance of not less than One hundred fifty pesos

(P150.00) a month;
(f) Housing and quarter allowance. - S & T personnel who are
on duty in laboratories, research and development centers and
other government facilities shall be entitled to free living
quarters within the government facility where they are stationed:
Provided, That the personnel have their residence outside of the
fifty (50)-kilometer radius from such government facility;
(g) Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five
percent (5%) of the monthly basic salary shall be paid to S & T
personnel for every five (5) years of continuous and meritorious
service as determined by the Secretary of the Department; and
(h) Medical examination. - During the tenure of their
employment, S & T personnel shall be given a compulsory free
medical examination once a year and immunization as the case
may warrant. The medical examination shall include:
(1) Complete physical examination;
(2) Routine laboratory, Chest X-ray and ECG;
(3) Psychometric examination;
(4) Dental examination;
(5) Other indicated examination.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment
of R.A. No. 8439.4
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released
the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees
commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific
appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,
following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor

Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20,
2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and
October 17, 2001, several NDs were issued disapproving the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The justifications for the
disallowance were stated in the post-audit report, as follows:
a) ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-105-101 (98) Payment of
Subsistence and Laundry Allowances and Hazard Pay for the
months of February-November 1998 The State Auditor claims
that no funds were appropriated in the 1998 General
Appropriations Act for the said purpose notwithstanding the
effectivity of the Magna Carta, providing for payment of
allowances and benefits, among others, to Science and
Technology Personnel in the Government;
b) ND Nos. 2000-101-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99) Payment
of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances and Hazard Pay for the
months of January-June 1999 The State Auditor claims that no
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Civil
Service Commission (CSC) guidelines were issued by the said
Departments on the payment thereof;
c) ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) Payment
of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances, Hazard Pay and Health
Care Program for the month of October 1999 and JanuarySeptember 2000 The State Auditor claims that there was no
basis for the payment of the said allowances because the
President vetoed provisions of the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) regarding the use of savings for the payment of benefits;
d) ND Nos. 2001-014-101(00) to 2001-025-101 (00) Payment of
Subsistence and Laundry Allowances, Hazard Pay and Medical
Benefits for the months of January-October 2001 The
provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) was vetoed by the
President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the
aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the State Auditor.5

The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary

Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President
(OP) through his
Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use
Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided
for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings
to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of the
Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in
the following manner:
x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full
implementation had not been provided in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts effectivity, the
Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current
years savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC
benefits were likewise sourced from the years savings as
authorized in the 1999 GAA.
The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The
Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST
personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys favorable
consideration for the payment of said MC benefits, being part of
the administrations 10-point action program to quote "I will
order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta
for Science and Technology Personnel in Government)" as
published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President,
approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.,7 viz:
With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000
requesting authority to use savings from the appropriations of
that Department and its agencies for the payment of Magna
Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed
that the said request is hereby approved.

On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST

Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA
Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period
covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She
anchored her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of
Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA
of 1998,8 to wit:
Section 56. Priority in the Use of Savings. In the use of
savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of the
amounts set aside for compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity,
terminal leave, old age pension of veterans and other personnel
benefits authorized by law and those expenditure items
authorized in agency Special Provisions and in Sec. 16 and in
other sections of the General Provisions of this Act.9
In support of her appeal, the petitioner contended that the DOST
Regional Office had "considered the subsistence and laundry
allowance as falling into the category other personnel benefits
authorized by law, hence the payment of such allowances were
charged to account 100-900 for Other Benefits (Honoraria),
which was declared to be the savings of our Office." 10 She
argued that the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive
Secretary Zamora not only ratified the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits out of the savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and
allowed the use of the savings for CY 2000, but also operated as
a continuing endorsement of the use of savings to cover the
Magna Carta benefits in succeeding calendar years.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication
Director (RLAD), COA Regional Office IX in Zamboanga City,
which denied the appeal and affirmed the grounds stated in the
NDs.
Not satisfied with the result, the petitioner elevated the matter to
the COA Legal and Adjudication Office in Quezon City

On September 15, 2005, respondent Director Khem N. Inok of

the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision in
LAO-N-2005-308,11 denying the petitioners appeal with the
modification that only the NDs covering the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2000 were to be set aside in view of the
authorization under the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 issued
by Executive Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President.
The decision explained itself as follows:
In resolving the case, the following issues should first be
resolved:
1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive
Secretary on April 12, 2000 on the request for authority to use
savings of the agency to pay the benefits, was valid; and
2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the
agency using its savings for the years 1998 and 1999 based on
Section 56 of RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998
[GAA]) were legal and valid.
Anent the first issue, the law in point is Article VI, Section 25(5)
of the 1987 Constitution, which aptly provides that:
"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations."
Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to
augment savings from one item to another in the budget of
administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This
is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the
department heads to use savings to augment other items of
appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such power could
well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under
the "doctrine of qualified political agency" enunciated by the

Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA

154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a
Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case,
the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary,
being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid
but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the year 2000
only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority
granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the
succeeding year.
On the second issue, the payments of benefits made by the
agency in 1998 and 1999 were admittedly premised on the
provisions of the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) for CY
1998 and 1999 regarding the use of savings which states that:
"In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the
augmentation of the amount set aside for compensation, bonus,
retirement gratuity, terminal leave, old age pensions of veterans
and other personal benefits x x x." (Underscoring ours.)
It can be noted, however, that augmentation was likewise a
requisite to make payments for such benefits which means that
Presidential approval was necessary in accordance with the
above-cited provision of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the
acts of the agency in using its savings to pay the said benefits
without the said presidential approval were illegal considering
that during those years there was no appropriations provided in
the GAA to pay such benefits.
Further, COA Decision Nos. 2003-060 dated March 18, 2003
and 2002-022 dated January 11, 2002, where this Commission
lifted the DOST disallowance on the payments of similar
benefits in 1992 to 1995, can not be applied in the instant case.
The disallowances therein dealt more on the classification of the
agency as health related or not while the instant case deals
mainly on the availability of appropriated funds for the benefits
under RA 8439 and the guidelines for their payments.

Likewise, the certification of the DOST Secretary declaring

work areas of S and T personnel as hazardous for purposes of
entitlement to hazard allowance is not valid and may be
considered as self-serving. Under RA 7305 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulation[s] (Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers), the determination which agencies are
considered health-related establishments is within the
competence of the Secretary of Health which was used by this
Commission in COA Decision No. 2003-060, supra, to wit:
xxxx
"It bears emphasis to state herein that it is within the
competence of the Secretary of Health as mandated by RA 7305
and its IRR to determine which agencies are health-related
establishments. Corollary thereto, the certifications dated
October 10, 1994 issued by then DOH Secretary Juan M. Flavier
that certain DOST personnel identified by DOST Secretary
Padolina in his letter dated September 29, 1994 to be engaged in
health and health-related work and that of Secretary Hilarion J.
Ramiro dated December 12, 1996 confirming the staff and
personnel of the DOST and its attached agencies to be engaged
in health-related work and further certified to be a health-related
establishment were sufficient basis for reconsideration of the
disallowance on subsistence and laundry allowances paid for
1992, 1993 and 1995."
xxxx
Assuming that the situation in the DOST and its attached
agencies did not change as to consider it health-related
establishment for its entitlement to magna carta benefits, still the
payments of the benefits cannot be sustained in audit not only
for lack of said certification from the Secretary of Department of
Health for the years 1998 and 1999 but more importantly, for
lack of funding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Appeal is
DENIED with modification. NDs Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to

2001-013-101 (00) issued for the payments of benefits for CY

2000 are hereby SET ASIDE while NDs pertaining to benefits
paid for CY 1998, 1999 and 2001 shall STAY.
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration in the COA Legal and Adjudication OfficeNational in Quezon City.
By resolution dated May 12, 2006,12 the COA Legal and
Adjudication Office-National denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Thence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA
Head Office, insisting that the payment of Magna Carta benefits
to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX officials and
employees had been allowed under R.A. No. 8349.
On June 4, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision,
further modifying the decision of respondent Director Inok by
also lifting and setting aside the NDs covering the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999 for the same reason
applicable to the lifting of the NDs for CY 2000, but
maintaining the disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001 on the
ground that they were not covered by the authorization granted
by the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 of Executive Secretary
Zamora.
The pertinent portions of the decision are quoted below, to wit:
Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the
main argument that the payment of Magna Carta benefits to
qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX employees is allowed
pursuant to RA No. 8439.
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the payment of
Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and
legal.

DISCUSSION
It is clear that the funds utilized for the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits came from the savings of the agency. The
approval by the Executive Secretary of the request for authority
to use the said savings for payments of the benefits was an
affirmation that the payments were authorized. The
Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 of the DOST Secretary
requested for the approval of the payment out of savings of the
CY 2000 benefits. Likewise, the same Memorandum mentioned
the 1998 Magna Carta benefits which were paid out of its
current years savings as provided for in the budget issuances of
the DBM and the 1999 Magna Carta benefits which were
sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA.
When such memorandum request was approved by the
Executive Secretary in a Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, it
was clear that the approval covered the periods stated in the
request, which were the 1998, 1999 and 2000 Magna Carta
benefits.
Thus, this Commission hereby affirms LAO-National Decision
No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 which lifted ND Nos.
2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) for the payments of
Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 and which sustained the NDs
for payments in 2001. However, for the disallowances covering
payments in 1998 and 1999, this Commission is inclined to lift
the same. This is in view of the approval made by the Executive
Secretary for the agency to use its savings to pay the benefits for
the years covered. Thus, when the Executive Secretary granted
the request of the DOST Secretary for the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits to its qualified personnel, the said payments
became lawful for the periods covered in the request, that is,
CYs 1998, 1999 and 2000. Since the Magna Carta benefits paid
in 2001 were not covered by the approval, the same were
correctly disallowed in audit.
In a previous COA Decision-No. 2006-015 dated January 31,
2006, the payment of hazard, subsistence and laundry

allowances given to personnel of the DOST, Regional Office

No. VI, Iloilo City, was granted. The same decision also stated
that in (sic) no doubt the DOST personnel, who are qualified,
are entitled to receive the Magna Carta benefits. The 1999 GAA
did not prohibit the grant of these benefits but merely
emphasized the discretion of the agency head, upon authority of
the President, to use savings from the Departments
appropriation, to implement the payment of benefits pursuant to
the DOST Charter.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal on the
payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998 and 1999 which
were disallowed in ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-015-101
(98) and 2000-001-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99), is hereby
GRANTED. Likewise, the lifting of ND Nos. 2001-001-101
(00) to 2001-013-101 (00) as embodied in LAO-National
Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 is hereby
CONFIRMED. While the disallowances on the payment of said
benefits for 2001 as covered by ND Nos. 2001-014-101 (01) to
2001-032-101 (01) are hereby AFFIRMED.
Issues
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner
insisting that the COA gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of
R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12,
2000 did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for
CY 2001.
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND
No. 2001-014-101(01) to ND No. 2001-032-101(01)?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

R. A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the States

recognition of science and technology as an essential component
for the attainment of national development and progress. The
law offers a program of human resources development in
science and technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient
pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the initiative for
total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this
objective, the law not only ensures scholarship programs and
improved science and engineering education, but also affords
incentives for those pursuing careers in science and technology.
Moreover, the salary scale of science and technology personnel
is differentiated by R. A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of
government employees under the existing law.
As earlier mentioned, Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the
Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional allowances and
benefits to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium,
share in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and
quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical examination. But
the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper benefits
without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA.
The petitioner urges the Court to treat the authority granted in
the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora
as a continuing authorization to use the DOSTs savings to pay
the Magna Carta benefits.
We cannot agree with the petitioner.
The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority
from the OP to pay the benefits out of the DOSTs savings.
Although the Memorandum was silent as to the period covered
by the request for authority to use the DOSTs savings, it was
clear just the same that the Memorandum encompassed only CY
1998, CY 1999 and CY 2000. The limitation of its applicability
to those calendar years was based on the tenor of the request of
Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to the effect that the DOST had previously
used its savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits in CY 1998 and

CY 1999; that the 2000 GAA did not provide for the use of
savings; and that the DOST personnel were looking forward to
the Presidents favorable consideration. The Memorandum could
only be read as an authority covering the limited period until
and inclusive of CY 2000. The text of the Memorandum was
also bereft of any indication that the authorization was to be
indefinitely extended to any calendar year beyond CY 2000.
As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand.
Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly
declares that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This
constitutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful,
deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As
such, the requirement under Section 2013 of R.A. No. 8439 that
the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be
appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be
purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA.
The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize
as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must
initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the
concerned agency for submission to and consideration by
Congress. That process is what complies with the constitutional
edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the
benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law
that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to note
that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the
appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
would not have needed to request the OP for the express
authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the
general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained
in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine
as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent
agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),14 Article
VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of

Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices from the savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. The plain language of the
constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioners
posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high
officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment
another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as
exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:15
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the
application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where
the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none
but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that
an express exception excludes all others, although it is always
proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt
something from the scope of the general words of a statute,
which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such
general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a
statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases
not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the
general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal
construction of a statute will seem to require in many
circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the

statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted

construction.
The claim of the petitioner that the payment of the 2001 Magna
Carta benefits was upon the authorization extended by the OP
through the 12 April 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary
Zamora was outrightly bereft of legal basis. In so saying, she
inexplicably, but self-servingly, ignored the important provisions
in the 2000 GAA on the use of savings, to wit:
Sec. 54. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman and the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Sec. 55. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to
portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this
Act free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after
the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is
authorized, or arising from unpaid compensation and related
costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item,
project, activity or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is
determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a nonexistent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure
be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of
appropriations authorized otherwise in this Act. (Bold emphases
added)
Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President
was subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of

appropriation from the agencys savings would be validly

effected. The first required that there must be savings from the
authorized appropriation of the agency. The second demanded
that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or
object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings
would be transferred for augmentation purposes only.
At any rate, the proposition of the petitioner that savings could
and should be presumed from the mere transfer of funds is
plainly incompatible with the doctrine laid down in Demetria v.
Alba,16 in which the petition challenged the constitutionality of
paragraph 1 of Section 4417 of Presidential Decree No. 1177
(Budget Reform Decree of 1977) in view of the express
prohibition contained in Section 16(5)18 of Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution against the transfer of appropriations except
to augment out of savings,19 with the Court declaring the
questioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 1177 "null and
void for being unconstitutional" upon the following reasoning,
to wit:
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer
may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another
item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends
the privilege granted under said Section 16(5). It empowers the

President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one

department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project, or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of
appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or
provision in the GAA and without due authority from the
President to utilize the DOSTs savings in other items for the
purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and
the re-enacted GAA for 2001.
The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were
utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended by
law. The "Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public
funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining
to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations".20
Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the
exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine

and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which

are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the
Court has sustained the decisions of administrative authorities
like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the
recognition that such administrative authorities held the
expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce. 21 The
Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their
findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion.22
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a
petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. 23 Section 1 of
Rule 65,24 Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must
show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA gravely
abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 25 Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.26

The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden.1wphi1

We conclude and declare, therefore, that the COAs assailed
decision was issued in steadfast compliance of its duty under the
Constitution and in the judicious exercise of its general audit
power conferred to it by the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who
caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered
officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief
that there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits.
Evincing their good faith even after receiving the NDs from the
COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the
OP for the authorization to use the DOSTs savings to pay the
Magna Carta benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials
and employees received the benefits because they considered
themselves rightfully deserving of the benefits under the longawaited law.
The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits
received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the
Government. This accords with consistent pronouncements of
the Court, like that issued in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 27
to wit:
Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala 28
supports petitioners position on the refund of the benefits they
received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies were paid incentive
benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited
payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA
on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good
faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive
benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have
already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected
under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and

chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in

the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the
recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners
here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good
faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No.
313 authorized such payment. At the time pet1t10ners received
the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet
decided Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.29
Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without
legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not
refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed
by the COA.
Also, in Veloso v. Commission on Audit30 the Court, relying on a
slew of jurisprudence31 ruled that the recipients of the
disallowed retirement and gratuity pay remuneration need not
refund whatever they had received:
x x x because all the parties acted in good faith. In this case, the
questioned disbursement was made pursuant to an ordinance
enacted as early as December 7, 2000 although deemed
approved only on August 22, 2002. The city officials disbursed
the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest belief
that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter
accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly
deserve such reward.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision issued on June 4, 2009
by the Commission Proper of the Commission on Audit in COA
Case No. 2009-045; and DECLARES that the covered officials
and employees of the Department of Science and Technology
who received the Magna Carta benefits for calendar year 2001
are not required to refund the disallowed benefits received.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 188056

January 8, 2013

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.

DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were
among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their
investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges
for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6,
2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and
Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all
Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy
Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the
National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre

Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the

Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel members,
per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr.
et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices
with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City
which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should
be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room
149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper
disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to
the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come
to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave
abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO
No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy
disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of
DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the
coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa
already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO

No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays
that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
violate petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being
bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of
courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners
the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 4 An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion, 5
we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with

causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why
the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writs procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for
strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There,
noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers
to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs,
and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the
Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct
resort to the highest tribunal, viz:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from
the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this
Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to
be filed with it.1wphi1
xxxx

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for
the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not
only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not
the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective
redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last
resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who
brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly
defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court,
viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal
or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively
with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.6

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners direct resort

to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be
dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 "The sole office of the
writ of certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on
petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the

requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary
of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was
an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead,
the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates
efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v.
Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court,
for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have
characterized the public prosecutors power to conduct a

preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this

characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court
of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a
quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial
body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a
legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory
functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect
as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the
effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a
criminal information against a person properly charged with the
offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutors orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for
prohibition. However, we do not see how that can be. They have
not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the
Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the
other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not
infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant
omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved

thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging

the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the
petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy
available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective of
mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on
the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of
mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, 13 which, it quickly
seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not
indicated how and where the Secretary of Justices assailed
issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong
presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v.
Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity
to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued
by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to

enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such
rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.
As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84
that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the
performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title
III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive
Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the
questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to
prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing
that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the
Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating
that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They
must further show that the performance of the DOJs functions
under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws
did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed
issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not
deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress
for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group.
Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and
others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the
law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the creation
of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution
attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive
preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby,
the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively
against petitioners.

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the

consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or
pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional
guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for
syndicated estafa were filed with your office against officers of
the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of
the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is
hereby exempted from the directive previously issued by the
undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records
of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task
Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy
Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to
file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to
prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners attack deserves no consideration. The equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. 18 Hence, the
Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long
as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice
took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro,
where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided,
and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be

conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that

the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutors Office
of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the
considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de
Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding
the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO
No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the
Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners
could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon
the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them
would cause them some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right
to the speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the
Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay
in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a
flagrant transgression of petitioners constitutional rights to
speedy disposition of their cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that
although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and
taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and
secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the
concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the

parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the
cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with
during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice
rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most
feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources
and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there
would be more cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those
already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays
in petitioners cases occasioned by such other and subsequent
cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In
fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right
of petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should
cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not
those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No.
182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing
laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners assertion is baseless.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a
law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure
does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of
already existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested
right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO

No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the
Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters
involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of
offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the
Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all
the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has
broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJs functions; and
administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by
promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives,
policies and functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts
beyond the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or
whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel
to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no
right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the
Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

EN BANC
G.R. No. 170634

January 8, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case tells the revolting story of a lecherous father who made two of his very
young daughters his sex slaves for several years right in the family home. The
trial court convicted him and prescribed the death penalty for each of the two
counts of rape. There would be no hesitation to affirm the penalty, but the
intervening passage of the law prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty
now spares him from the supreme penalty.
Under final review is the Decision promulgated on April 27, 2005, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the May 5, 2003 judgment
rendered in Criminal Case No. 912-V-99 and Criminal Case No. 974-V-99by the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 171)in Valenzuela City (RTC),2 finding Pedro
BuadoyCipriano Jr. guilty of two counts of rape committed against his two minor
daughters.
Antecedents
The amended informationsalleged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 912-V-99
That sometime April 1999, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust,
force,threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 his daughter, a ten (10) year
old minor, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever
amounts may be awarded her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 974-V-99

That on or about November 10, 1999 in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously he and have
sexual intercourse with one BBB, 8 years old, his daughter.
Contrary to Law.4
The accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pled not guilty to each of the
amended informations.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The Prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: victims AAA and BBB; their
mother CCC and older sister DDD; Dr. Ida de Perio-Daniel; Dr.Mariella S.
Castillo; PO2 Luisito M. Dela Cruz; and Rosalina E. Chiong.
The accused and CCC were legally married, and used to live together in F.
Bautista Street at Marulas, Valenzuela City with their 13 children, eight of whom
are girls. Among their children were AAA and BBB. AAA was born on February
13, 1989,5 and BBB on October 11, 1990.6
A.
The rape of AAA
On April 13, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., CCC and her children were attending a
get-together party in the adjacent house of DDD, then already married. The
accused summoned AAA home from the party. Upon AAA getting home, he
ordered her to enter the bedroom, and once she was inside, he undressed her and
inserted his finger in her vagina.7He then went on top of her and inserted his
penis in her vagina, giving vent to his lust. 8 AAA could only cry while he was
forcing himself on her.9
Missing AAA at the party, CCC returned to the house and saw that her husband
was there. He cursed her many times, but she simply ignored him and went
upstairs, where she found AAA crying. AAA told her mother that her father had
just molested her. AAA further told her mother that he had done the same thing to
her several times in the past,10 starting when she was still in Grade I. At the time,
AAA was already in Grade 4. AAA told her mother that he had also raped her
several times in the past only when CCC was not home, but that she had kept
silent about the rapes because she had been too afraid of him to complain.
Besides, AAA also knew that he kepta gun at home and had a violent temper,

having frequently beaten his wife and children for no apparent reason. AAA
explained in court that she finally revealed her ordeals to her mother because her
sufferings had become unbearable,11 saying: Nahihirapan po ako.12
It was not until June 9, 1999, however, that CCC and AAA mustered the courage
to leave home and denounce the fathers crimes. They hastened to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to finally lodge a complaint against him. AAA was
examined by Dr. Ida Perio-Daniel, who incorporated her findings in Living Case
No. MG-99-537,13 to wit:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 123.0 cms. Weight: 44 lbs
Fairly nourished conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breast
infantile. Areola, light brown, 1.4 cm, in diameter, Nipples light brown, flat 0.3
cm. In diameter.
No extragenital physical injury noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
tense.Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, with old healed complete
laceration at 6 o'clock position corresponding to the face of a watch, edges
rounded non-coaptable. Hymenalorifice, admits a tube 2.0 in diameter. Vaginal
walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
***
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury present on the body of the
subject at the time of the examination.
2. Old healed hymenal laceration present.
Afterwards, CCC and AAA, still in fear of the accused, did not want to return
home. Hence, the NBI referred them for temporary shelter to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Haven in Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
The rest of the unmarried children, including the then 9-year old BBB, continued
to live with their father.

B.
The rape of BBB
The rape of BBB was committed a few months later. At 6:00 a.m. of November
10, 1999, the accused commanded BBB, who was then in the kitchen of their
house, to undress and lie down on a piece of plywood laid out on the ground. 14
Already naked from the waist down, he pushed her down to the floor, and
lubricated his penis and BBBs vagina with cooking oil.15
He next went on top of her, inserted his penis into her genitalia, and made
pumping motions.16 He ignored all her pleas for him to stop. 17 She stated that he
had also raped her many times previously but that she had kept silent about the
rapes out of fear of him. 18 But she could not anymore bear her pain that last time;
hence, she went to her older sister DDDs house and finally reported the rape to
DDD.19 When BBB was narrating about her last rape, DDD could only embrace
her young sister and cry.
Later on, DDD called up their mother who was then staying at the DSWD Haven
in Alabang to tell her about what the accused had just committed against BBB.
CCC advised DDD to bring BBB to the DSWD office in Valenzuela. The DSWD
office endorsed BBB to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), where Dr. Mariella S. Castillo examined the child. The findings
were initially reflected in a provisional medical certificate on November 10,
1999,20 and ultimately in a final medical certificate issued on the same date, 21 to
wit:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
External Genitalia: normal
Hymen: crescentic, (+) absent hymenal tissue at 6 o'clock, (+) attenuation from 2
o'clock to 6 o'clock, no hematoma, no laceration, no discharge
Anus: Normal
LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
Vaginal swab smear: no spermatozoa seen.
IMPRESSION:
Disclosure of physical and sexual abuse.

Multiple hematomas on chest and lower extremities.

Hematomas on chest and extremities are consistent with the patient's disclosure
Genital finding of absent posterior hymen and is indicative of prior penetration
injury that has healed.
Armed with the provisional medical certificate issued by Dr. Castillo, DDD
brought BBB to the Valenzuela Police Station to charge the accused with rape. A
police team was immediately dispatched to the house of the accused to invite him
for investigation. After the accused was brought in to the station, BBB and her
elder sister gave their respective written statements. 22 On that occasion, BBB
positively pointed to her father as the rapist.23
Version of the Defense
The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping AAA and BBB. 24 He
justified the medico-legal findings on BBB by shifting the blame on his drug
addict son EEE, stating that in May 1999, BBB had told him about EEE raping
her;25 that BBB even showed him a plastic sachet containing small white granules
that EEE had supposedly dropped when he raped her;26 that he hit EEE upon
learning about the rape; that he wanted to charge EEE but his wife prevented him
from doing so in order to avoid embarrassment to the family; and that after CCC
left home, he planned on reporting the rape to the police authorities, but EEE
became aware of his plan and quickly left home and stayed away.
The accused testified that he was a shoemaker earning an average of
P15,000.00/month; that although he thought that his income sufficed for him and
his family, CCC felt differently, because she was envious of their rich neighbors;
that CCC suggested that he change his livelihood and deal in prohibited drugs;
that because he refused, CCC became angry and caused AAA and BBB to bring
the false charges against him;27 that CCC also wanted to reconcile with her
former live-in partner with whom she had cohabited prior to their marriage; that
he could not understand why she wanted to do that, but there was nothing he
could do about it; that in May 1999, CCC left their conjugal home along with
their two youngest daughters; that he had no idea about where they had gone to
until he learned that they were sheltered in the DSWD Haven in Alabang; and
that they returned home after six months only when he was already in detention.28
The accused said that he had disciplined his children either verbally or physically
(i.e., by hitting them with his bare hands or with a piece of wood). 29 In that

regard, he admitted having been charged with child abuse in 1999 for spanking
FFF, another son, but he insisted that the charge had been dismissed.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, the Court finds accused PEDRO
BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
two (2) counts of Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer in each
case the death penalty and to pay in each case the victims the following sums:
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Pursuant to the Constitution, let the entire records of these cases be forwarded to
the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.30
Ruling of the CA
Elevated to the Court on automatic appeal, the records were transferred to the CA
for intermediate review pursuant to People v. Mateo.31
In due course, on April 27, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, but reduced the
death penalty to reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 912-V-99,32 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of Branch 171, Regional Trial
Court, Valenzuela City, dated May 5, 2003, is MODIFIED relative to Criminal
Case No. 912-V-99 wherein the penalty imposed is reduced to Reclusion
Perpetua and the civil liability ex delito is reduced to P50,000.00. The award of
moral and exemplary damages is AFFIRMED.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 974-V-99, the penalty of death and the award of
civil liability ex delito of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are
AFFIRMED. The award of moral damages is hereby INCREASED to
P75,000.00
SO ORDERED.
Issues

Hence, this appeal upon the following errors, namely:33

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE SPECIAL QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF RELATIONSHIP AND MINORITY.
The accused continues to assail the credibility of AAA and BBB, stressing that
their testimonies were replete with incredulous statements, and insisting that they
were motivated by anger and revenge rather than by a sincere call for justice.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
In reviewing rape convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles,
namely: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for
the complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving
only two persons, the rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the
Prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the Defense.34
Ultimately and frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges on the
credibility of the victims testimony. The Court has consistently relied on the
assessment of such credibility by the trial court, because the factual findings of
the trial court, particularly those bearing on such assessment, are the product of
the trial judges peculiar opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of
the witnesses while they personally appear and testify during the trial, as
contrasted with the dependence by the appellate courts on the mute pages of the
records of the trial.35 This consistent reliance proceeds from the reality that the
trial judge is in the best position to detect that frequently thin line between truth
and prevarication that determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 36 Thus,

an appellate court will not disturb the credence the trial court accorded to the
testimonies of the witnesses unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked or
arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance in the correct
resolution of the case.37
Here, the RTC as the trial court and the CA as the intermediately reviewing
tribunal did not overlook or disregard any fact or circumstance of significance.
Instead, they correctly appreciated the evidence, and rightly concluded that the
accused committed the rapes of his own daughters. They regarded and accepted
AAA and BBB as credible witnesses whose recollections about their fathers
lecherous acts deserved the fullest faith and credence.
The trial records entirely supported the lower courts findings in favor of the
credibility of AAA and BBBs recollections. Indeed, AAA and BBB deserved the
credence accorded to them, for they were reliable in their recollection of their
ordeals at the hands of the accused.
AAA narrated the rape in sufficient detail and candor during her direct
examination, viz:
xxxx
ATTY. VINARAO
Q. Now, will you please tell this Court what if anything happened to you on that
date, April 13, 1999?
A. I was called by my father to go to the bedroom, maam.
Q. And what happened if any inside the room?
A. He removed my clothes and he placed his fingers to my vagina and he placed
his penis into my vagina, maam.
Q. What was your reaction if any when your father was committing those sexual
acts?
A. I was crying, maam.
Q. Is that the only time the sexual acts was committed to you by your father?
A. No maam, several times.

Q. When you mentioned the words "several times", can you please give us the
numerical value of such word?
A. More than ten (10) times, maam, but I cannot remember the exact date but it
started when I was in Grade I.
Q. And what grade were you when your father raped you last April 13, 1999?
A. When I was going to Grade 4, sir.
Q. On what occasion does this sexual act occurred?
A. Everytime my mother is not in the house, ma'am.
Q. And what did you do if any after the last incident on April 13, 1999?
A. I reported it to my mother, maam.
Q. Why did you not tell your mother or any other person regarding the incident
on April 13, 1999?
A. Because I was threatened by my father that he will kill me if I will report the
matter to my mother, maam.
Q. And what made you decide to tell your mother finally about the incident on
April 13, 1999?
A. Because I was suffering, maam. (Nahihirapanpoako).38
xxxx
On her part, BBB directly and candidly reported the details of the rape, to wit:
xxxx
Q. Do you recall the 10th of November, 1999?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Where were you on that day?
A. I was in our house, maam.39
xxxx

Q. Now, will you please tell this Court what if anything happened to you on that
day?
A. At 6: 00 a.m., I was in our kitchen and I was instructed by my father to
undress and lie on a plywood. He placed a cooking oil in my crotch and he
inserted it in my crotch.
Q. When you mentioned the word "Singit", what part of your body are you
referring to?
A. In my vagina, maam. (Witness pointing to her vagina)
Q. And when you mentioned the word "Singit", what part of your father's body
were you referring to?
A. His penis, maam.
Q. So what was your reaction when your father was committing those sexual acts
on you?
A. I was pleading on him and told him to stop, maam.
Q: Was that the only time that your father committed sexual acts on you?
A: No, maam.40
xxxx
Q: So what did you do after that incident on November 10, 1999?
A: I told my DDD about that incident, maam.
Q: Why did you not tell your mother or other persons about that incident on
November 10, 1999?
A: Because I was afraid of my father. He always maul us, maam.
Q: And what made you decide to tell your sister DDD about the November
10,1999 incident?
A:Because I can no longer bear anymore the things my father was doing to me,
maam.41
xxxx

ATTY. CRISOSTOMO
Q: This oil, lets be specific about this oil. What is this oil you are speaking of?
A: The one used in frying fish, sir.
Q: Did you follow your fathers order for you to apply oil in your crotch?
A: No. sir.
Q: So you did not apply oil in your crotch?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about his order for you to lie down on the plywood, did you heed his
order?
A: He made me to lie down, sir.
Q: How did he make lie down?
A: He made me lie down; and he suddenly pushed me, sir.
Q: After that what happened?
A: He placed an edible oil on his crotch sir.
Q: How did he do it?
A: He got some cooking oil and placed it on his crotch, sir.
Q: Not on your crotch?
A: Also on my crotch, sir.42
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO
Q: Was he naked at the time he applied oil on his crotch or (was) he still wearing
his pants?
A: He was already naked, sir.
Q: Naked from the waist down only?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after he applied oil on his crotch, you said he placed his penis between
your thighs, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, for clarity, what he did was to, what he did, in Tagalog,
"IPINAIPIT NIYA ANG ARI NIYA SA HITA MO", ganyan ba ang ginawa nya?
A: Yes, sir.43
Q: What did you feel when your father inserted his penis between your tightly
closed thighs?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: What part of your body was aching?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina)
Q: Not your thighs?
A: My vagina, sir. PEPE
Q: Did you bleed when your father did what you just described, to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All this time that your father was doing the alleged act which according to you
lasted for two (2) hours, what are you doing or how were you reacting? What is
your reaction?
A: I was pleading to him, sir.44
xxxx
On the other hand, the accused did not bring to the Courts attention any facts
and circumstances of weight that, if properly considered, would change the result
into one favorable to him. He did not also submit to us any argument that would
lead us to doubt the findings of the RTC and the CA on the credibility of AAA
and BBB.
Although the accused would discredit AAA by harping on her failure to
immediately report the rape and to denounce him sooner to the proper authorities,
the Court cannot but reject his attempt to discredit AAAs accusation. The

attempt would rest on drawing an inference of estoppel against AAA, in that

AAA would have denounced him sooner if he had truly ravished her. However,
the inference of estoppel could be properly drawn against AAA only if the trial
records did not plausibly explain the cause of delay. We find that his frequent acts
of domestic violence against even the young members of his family caused AAA
and her mother to fear him. He justified his violent tendencies by describing
himself as a strict disciplinarian at home. His justification was implausible,
however, considering that his having been once charged with child abuse in
which the victim had been one of his own sons confirmed that his chastisement
had exceeded the tolerable limits of parental discipline. Moreover, AAA knew
that he had kept a gun at home. This, coupled by his childrens undue fear of him,
cowed AAA into silence about her great sufferings for a long period of time, and
explained why she came out into the open to denounce him only on June 9, 1999.
By then, his unabated lecherousness towards AAA had become unbearable.
Under the circumstances, the delay in reporting him to the proper authorities is
not a factor in determining the credibility of the charge against him of his own
daughter.45 To a child of very tender years like AAA, the threats of actual
physical harm would definitely instill a fear overwhelming enough to force her to
suffer her ordeals in silence for a period of time.
Verily, there has never been any uniformity or consistency of behavior to be
expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. 46 The
Court has pointed out that some of them have found the courage early on to
publicly denounce the abuses they experienced, but that there were others who
have opted to initially keep their harrowing ordeals to themselves and to just
move on with their lives as if nothing had happened,47 until the limits of their
tolerance were reached. AAA belonged to the latter group of victims, as her
honest declarations to the trial court revealed. Also, we cannot expect from the
immature and inexperienced AAA to measure up to the same standard of conduct
and reaction that we would expect from adults whose maturity in age and
experience could have brought them to stand up more quickly to their interest.
Lastly, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape to the proper
authorities have not always been considered as an indication of a false
accusation.48
The ill motive that supposedly impelled AAA and BBB to initiate the charges
against their own father (i.e., they hated him because of the physical abuse he had
inflicted on them and on their mother)is unworthy of serious consideration. To
start with, the imputation of ill motive, being out rightly speculative, was
unreliable. Moreover, the imputed ill motive, even assuming it to be true, did not
necessarily mean that the very serious charges of rape were fabricated only to get

back at him. And, finally, the Court has not been deterred from affirming the
conviction in incestuous rape by rejecting the lecherous father simputation of ill
motive based on alleged familial discord and undue influence, hostility or
revenge,49or on parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement.50
The accused argues that the findings of old healed vaginal lacerations during the
physical examinations disproved the charges against him, stressing that the old
healed lacerations, being indicative of the lapse of three months from the time of
the alleged sexual assault to the time of the medical examination, belied AAAs
claim of being raped on April 13, 1999, which was but only two months prior to
the medical examination. He insists that the finding that her genitalia showed no
fresh laceration or hymenal injury suffered in the previous seven days was
inconsistent with BBBs claim about being raped nine hours prior to her physical
examination.
The arguments of the accused are unwarranted. The essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or
without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).51
Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having bodily connections
with a female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or laceration in the
genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has been committed or
not.52 Such injury or laceration is material only if force or intimidation is an
element of the rape charged; otherwise, it is merely circumstantial evidence of
the commission of the rape. Verily, a medical examination and a medical
certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable
to a successful prosecution for rape. 53 The accused may then be convicted solely
on the basis of the victims credible, natural and convincing testimony.54 This is
no less true when the rape victim testifies against her own father; unquestionably,
there would be reason to give her testimony greater weight than usual.55
In fine, the proof of guilt adduced against the accused for each of the rapes
charged was beyond reasonable doubt if all he could assert in his defense was a
mere denial of the positive declarations of his two minor daughters. He now
deserves to the fullest extent the condign penalties the law sets for his crimes.
We next deal with the penalty to be properly meted on the accused.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if
the rape is committed with the attendance of any "aggravating/ qualifying
circumstances." One of such "aggravating/qualifying circumstances" is "when the

victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." Both minority
and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; otherwise, conviction for
rape in its qualified form will be barred.56
To establish the age of the minor victim, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, the Court has set the guidelines in People v. Pruna, 57 as
follows:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases,
we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.58
In Criminal Case No. 912-V-99, the amended information alleged that AAA was
only ten years old when the rape was committed in April 1999 and that she was
the daughter of the accused. During the trial, however, the Prosecution adduced
no evidence to establish her minority save her testimony and that of her
mothers.59 In the absence of proof of AAAs minority in accordance with the
guidelines set in People v. Pruna, we concur with the CAs conclusion that he
could not be properly found guilty of qualified rape. Indeed, his substantial right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be
nullified otherwise. Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua
as the penalty.
On the other hand, the amended information in Criminal Case No. 974-V-99
sufficiently stated the minority of BBB and her being the daughter of the
accused. Further, the Prosecution established that BBB was only nine years old at
the time of the rape on November 10, 1999 through her certificate of live birth. In
addition, her own mother and older sister DDD both attested that she was the
legitimate daughter of the accused.60 In fact, even the accused himself admitted
his legitimate paternity of BBB.61 Considering that the Prosecution duly proved
BBBs minority and her relationship with the accused, the CA correctly affirmed
the penalty of death meted by the RTC.
With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No.
9346,62however, the imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. The
retroactive application to Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 of the prohibition against
the death penalty must be made here because it is favorable to the accused. 63
Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for parole, because Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9346 expressly provides that persons "whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.
We uphold the award by the CA of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, but raise the amount of exemplary damages in Criminal Case
No. 912-V-99 to P30,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

In Criminal Case No. 974-V-99, the CA sustained the P75,000.00 granted as civil
indemnity, increased the moral damages to P75,000.00, and retained P25,000.00
as exemplary damages. Instructive on the civil liabilities to be imposed in
Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 is People v. Antonio,64where the Court held that
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited only the imposition of the death penalty and
did not affect the corresponding pecuniary or civil liabilities. Based on the
pronouncement in People v. Bejic65 to the effect that the civil indemnity should
be in the amount of P75,000.00 if the crime is qualified by circumstances that
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the Court affirms the separate
amounts of P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and moral damages, without need of
any pleading and proof, but raises the amount of exemplary damages from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.66
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on April 27, 2005
in all respects, subject to the MODIFICATION that: (a) the penalty in Criminal
Case No. 974-V -99 is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole; (b) the
amount of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 912-V-99 and Criminal
Case No. 974-V-99 is raised to P30,000.00 each; and (c) all the items of civil
liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision
until full payment.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice