CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

CASE DIGESTS
ala
Chapter 2
Due Process
1. Mortera vs People
Facts: Benancio Mortera joined a drinking spree with his friends, including Alberto Rojas. Mortera tried to hit
Rojas with a Nescafe Mug but failed because the latter was able to run away. While they continued drinking,
Jomer Diaz (brother in law of Alberto Rojas) arrived but he also ran away after Mortera threw a stone at him.
Mortera then left the drinking session, but on his way back, he saw Robelyn Rojas (also known as Tonying).
After chatting for a few minutes, the two shook hands but when Robelyn turned his back, he was stabbed by
Mortera.
Mortera initially pleaded not guilty. However during the trial, he admitted stabbing Rojas in self-defense. In his
version of the story, Mortera said that Alberto Rojas, Jomer Diaz and Robelyn Rojas accosted him and asked
him for liquor money. When he refused, Robelyn used a spray gun causing Mortera to fall down. While down,
he was able to take hold of a knife and stab someone, whom he did not see because of the spray gun fluid in his
eyes.
He was convicted of murder by the trial court judge. He appealed the judgement for having been deprived of
due process because the judge had apparently been acting like a prosecutor when asking questions to Mortera
during the trial. They also claim that the judge gave some comments which do not reflect the cold neutrality of a
judge against the accused such as:
You did more than what Robelyn, did to you. You killed him. Proceed.
You have no right to stab him. Besides, that is not what your witness said even your own witness here is not
supporting your story.
Yes, Denden Macasantos. He did not declare what you are saying now. You are just making a story.
ISSUE: WON the accused was deprived of due process.
DECISION: No, the accused was not deprived of due process. Although the trial judge might have made
improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an
impartial trial. They were not out of context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a
negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept
in the dark as to his intended defense. The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could
have proceeded.[14] As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving his guilt,
when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have been his.[15]
Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted for
having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot
lead us to conclude that the trial judge had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.

2. RODRIGUEZ VS JUDGE BLANCAFLOR, GR. NO. 190171, MARCH 14, 2011

FACTS:
Judge Blancaflor, the Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC of Palawan, Branch 52, found Allen Ross Rodriguez,
the Provincial Prosecutor and Regidor Tulali, also a prosecutor, as both guilty of direct contempt and for
violation of their oath of office as members of the bar and as officer of the court. The two were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and for each to pay the fine of 100, 000
pesos. The two were also further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for their grave offenses and

should they fail to do so, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released until they comply
with the order of the Court.
Prior to the indefinite suspension of Rodriguez and Tulali, an arson case was pending before Judge Blancaflor
which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the arson case, Tulali was implicated in a
controversy involving an alleged bribery to assure the acquittal of Rolly Ami, the accused in the arson case, and
to assure the dismissal of the arson case. To prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion, Tulali filed an
Ex-Parte manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case, a day before the scheduled promulgation of
the decision of the arson case. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of an administrative complaint
against Awayan (driver of Judge Blancaflor who was allegedly involved in the bribery) by his superior,
Rodriguez.
On June 30, 2009 Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
On July 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor issued orders summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose
of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of the ex-parte
manifestation and the administrative complaint against his driver. On Aug 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his motion
for clarification as to the purpose of Blancaflors continued inquiry when the decision for the arson case has
already been promulgated. Five days later, Judge Blancaflor informed Rodriguez and Tulali that he was
proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office based on Tulalis Ex-Parte
Manifestation.
Rodriguez and Tulali then interpose the present special civil action before the Court based on the following
grounds:
Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed decision and order considering that petitioners were denied their right to due process
Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of dis discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed decision and order considering that he grossly violated the rules on contempt
Since the assailed decision and order are void, a writ of prohibition must be issued against respondent judge.
HELD:
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process.
They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. They further argue that the penalty imposed
upon them in the direct contempt proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis.
Their petition is impressed with merit. Although the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in
all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice, judges are
enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or
vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on
the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such
power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the
basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required
to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as
contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore
Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the
accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in
any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act
which was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the
preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the
trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the
Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.

Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was
purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There being no
factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his
discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or
higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the
additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive
and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt
proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as
direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge
and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed
against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009
Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order.
Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to
explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the
proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses testimonies had already been completed.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected
of a magistrate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order are
hereby annulled and set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from implementing
the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory.
2. MORTERA VS PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 188104, APRIL 23, 2010
FACTS:
Benancio Mortera was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for killing Robelyn Rojas by the RTC.
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, but he admitted having stabbed the victim. He also
claimed self-defense. After the trial court rendered its decision, the accused appealed to the CA raising the
issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. The accused claims that the trial court
judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his
prosecutor-like conduct. Still, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that the trial judge did not
transgress the standard of cold neutrality required of magistrate and that the questions the judge propounded
during the trial were substantially clarificatory. Still not satisfied with the CAs decision, he appealed to the SC
seeking for his acquittal and assigning the following errors:
a. There was a denial of his right to due process and of his right to have an impartial trial
b. There was no appreciation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense
c. Assuming that not all the requirements of self-defense are present, there was no appreciation of the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
HELD:
The Court finds no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction or even appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The accuseds claim that he was denied his right to due process and of
his right to have an impartial trial because the trial judge displayed his hostility towards him during the trial is
untenable. The Court held that although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments (as
presented on the transcript), it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial
trial. A perusal of the transcript shows that the remarks made were not reflective of the trial judges partiality.

Wherefore, the CAs decision s affirmed.

3. BILBAO v PEOPLE (July 1, 2015)
FACTS: The petitioner, Nelson Bilbao, assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide which was decided
by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC) wherein the
presiding judge also acted as the public prosecutor in the case before he was appointed. And his conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the accuseds right to due process was violated
HELD: Yes. Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be
expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His
non-disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To restore the
right to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to
be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to the RTC for a partial new trial
to remove any of the prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be
raffled to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court.
4. Tubula vs Sandiganbayan
Facts : Jose Tubula, Jr.was a duly appointed cashier/collecting officer of the National Irrigation System of Iloilo
City and as such was an accountable public officer for public funds. Tubula misappropriated and converted to
his own personal use and benefit the amount of NINETY THREE THOUSAND FIFTY ONE PESOS AND
EIGHTY- EIGHT CENTAVOS P93,051.88 to the damage and prejudice of the government. Sandiganbayan
found him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds.
Tubula, his motion for reconsideration said that his basic constitutional right to due process was violated when
he was presented as a witness.
ISSUE: WON his basic constitunal right to due process was Violated.
HELD: Petitioner`s claim of violation of his right to due process vis--vis, the Sandiganbayan Justices active
participation during the trial fails too. For he has not specified any instance of supposed bias of the Justices, or
cited what questions adversely affected him. The record does not reflect any question or objection raised by
petitioners counsel during the trial to the Justices questions or the tenor or manner they were propounded. Nor
does the record reflect any move to inhibit the Justices if petitioner perceived that they were biased against him.
Chan-Tan vs. Tan
G.R. no. 167139 (February 25, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are spouses. They got married at the Manila Cathedral. Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner,
then filed a case of annulment under FC 36 (psychological incapacity) against Jesse Tan. The parties, thereafter,
submitted a compromise agreement.
July 31, 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment of approval of the said compromise agreement.
On March 2004 trial court declared the marriage null and void, under FC 36, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the main custody of the children claiming that petitioner
brought the kids out of the country w/o his knowledge; that said petitioner failed to settle the balance for the
Megaworld property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to
turn over to him documents and titles in his name.

On May 17, 2004 the trial court awarded respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to
respondent documents and titles in his name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in
Mariposa, QC.
June 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denied due process, was not able
to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said that she was forced out of the country
due to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for an increase in the respondent's
monthly support obligation.
Trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Trial court also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the July 31, 2003
partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution. Court also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly
support obligation, since petitioner was able to enroll the children to another school by herself without
respondent's knowledge.
---November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the October 12, 2004
resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the case would
be in the best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave the parties at
a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.
TC denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had
become final and executory upon lapse of the 15-day reglementary period..
----ISSUE:
whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court giving custody to their
children have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process since she was not present during the
hearing.
HELD:
Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day reglementary period.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at the
hearings for respondents omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children
and the properties in her possession.
Petitioner claims the trial court issued the May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent.
Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus
motion or on petitioners motion to dismiss.
It was ruled that the notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of
the counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latters right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to present
evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court.
Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after
motion.
Contrary to petitioners allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in
pursuing the case was on petitioners end, as may be gleaned from her counsels manifestation dated May 3,
2004.

Tan v Judge Tabin

Facts:
Noryn Tan, resident of QC, filed a complaint against Judge Tabin of MTCC 4 of Baguio City for issuing a
warrant for her arrest. Prior to being served said warrant, Tan said she did not receive any notice for her
arraignment. It was only then that she learned for the first time that a criminal case for violation of BP 22 was
filed against her, thus she prayed that an appropriate investigation be conducted for the undue issuance of said
warrant for arrest.
Judge Tabin contended that she issued the warrant in good faith because 2 months have already lapsed since the
letter was sent to Tan. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the court was entitled to presume that
after the lapse of a little over two months, official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed
and mailed had been received in the regular course of mail.
The OCA found the complaint to be meritless. Tan filed for a Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
WON there was an undue issuance of warrant and violation of Tan's right to liberty.
Held:
Yes. The Court found merit in Tan's Motion.
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order
the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. As stated in the RoC:
"Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance by a responsible
citizen acceptable to the court."
Judge Tabin claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Tan was justified, since she failed to appear
during the arraignment in spite of an order requiring her to do so. Tabin admits, however, that a copy of the
Order dated August 8, 2006, was sent to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City. A
closer scrutiny of the records showed that the Acknowledgment Receipt pertained to the copy of the City
Prosecutor's Office and not that of Tan's.
"While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is that official duty has been
regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole basis of a magistrate in concluding that a person
called to court has failed to appear as required, which in turn justifies the issuance of a warrant for her arrest,
when such notice was not actually addressed to her residence but to the police in her city. So basic and
fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the
presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent, actually served the same on complainant
whose address was not even specified."
Judge Tabin was found guilty of abuse of authority for which she was fined in the sum of P10,000.00.
8. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs JUDGE LANTION and Mark Jimenez
G.R. No. 139465
Right to Due Process in Extradition Proceedings
Facts
By virtue of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government asked for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for
an offense he committed there. Jimenez contended that he should be furnished a copy of the US governments
extradition request while he was under evaluation by the Secretary of Justice. He argued that it is necessary as
part of his right to due process under Section 1, of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The secretary, however,
feared that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee.\
Issue:
Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to a copy of the US extradition request, invoking his right to due process.
Held:

No, he is not entitled, and such will not violate his right to due process.
First, the private respondent is still undergoing evaluation stage of the extradition. Under Section 1, Article 3 the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. It simply involves the ascertainment by the foreign affairs secretary
of whether the extradition request is accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of
the treaty, relating to the identity and the probable location of the fugitive; the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case; provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense charged and
the punishment therefor, etc. Thus, it is clearly ministerial.
Second, nowhere in the RP-US Extradition Treaty or in P.D. No. 1069 can it be found that extradites are
accorded such right.
Third, Assuming that this right is inherent, section 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty states that there are two
occasions wherein the prospective extradite may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest
pending the submission of the extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court. The second instance is not in issue here, because no petition has yet been filed in
court. However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative at all times, and
its enforcement does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings of the
provision itself, there are at least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a corresponding
request (3) which must be made prior to the presentation of the request for extradition. In the instant case, there
appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the extradition of private respondent. Petitioner does not
claim any such urgency. Therefore, again, due process is not denied by denying his demands for the extradition
request.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION
FACTS

On November 18, 1985, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government owned and controlled
corporation, filed with the Office of the Sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of real
and personal properties situated at San Jose del Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan involving several real and/or
chattel mortgages executed by Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws, engaged mainly in the manufacture of cement.
On December 11, 1985, Continental Cement filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan. The suit principally sought to enjoin the then defendants DBP and the Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan
from commencing the foreclosure proceedings on CCCs mortgages which were executed in favor of DBP to
secure various loans obtained by CCC. In addition, CCC also prayed that a new term for its loan obligation be
established, and that the court declare the interest escalation clause contained in DBPs promissory notes as null
and void.
In December 1986, Proclamation No. 50 was promulgated establishing the privatization program of the
National Government and created ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT) as the privatization arm for the
government.
Several non-performing assets of the government financial institutions, including DBP, were transferred to the
National Government, which in turn, designated petitioner APT to act as its trustee over the assets. Hence, the
account of CCC was transferred to the APT. A Trust Agreement was thereafter executed between the National
Government and APT, wherein the latter was to take title to and possession of liabilities and non-performing
assets.
DBP contend (1) that the case has become moot and academic because CCC could no longer secure reliefs from
DBP as a result of the transfer of DBPs claim against CCC to APT; and (2) that the court lost jurisdiction over

the subject matter considering that Section 31 of Proc. No. 50 prohibits the issuance of any restraining order or
injunction against APT in connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it.
In July 1989, the accounting firm of J. C. Laya was designated by the lower court as Commissioner to the
determine the actual arrearages of respondent CCC to petitioner APT and DBP arising from loan
accommodations obtained by CCC from DBP.
During the trial, former Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya and a representative of the Commissioner were
called upon to testify. The parties also had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on matters touched
upon in the report as well as those disregarded by the Commissioner in its report.
After having cross-examined the representative of the Commissioner, the parties were then allowed to submit
their respective Position Papers. Contained in their respective position papers was their own computation of the
outstanding liabilities of CCC. CCCs computation of its exact indebtedness to DBP as of December 1990,
covering the straight peso loans and foreign guarantees stood at P43,601,192.73. The Commissioner reported
that the indebtedness amounted to P61,698,849.00 while DBP and APT computed CCCs total indebtedness in
the sum of P2,656,573,716.11.
A hearing was scheduled for the sole purpose of examining three (3) of CCCs witnesses, namely, Gregorio Lim,
Urbano Cruz and Jessica Alonzo. The cross-examination was to be conducted by APT as DBP had previously
conducted its own cross-examination. The counsel for CCC failed to appear as he was allegedly ill. On that
same date, the court issued an order resetting the cross-examination for CCCs witnesses. Again, the counsel for
APT was not able to attend due to an alleged serious illness (Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever). Also absent during
the hearing was DBPs counsel and DBP/APTs lone witness, Mr. Jaime V. Cruz.
On August 25, 1992, the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for decision. The final
paragraph of the order reads as follows:
In the light of the foregoing developments, and conformably with the agreement entered into much earlier by
the contending parties to the effect that after the affiants to the position papers shall have been cross-examined,
the parties shall dispense with the presentation of further evidence, the case at bar is considered henceforth
submitted for adjudication on the merits.
It is claimed by petitioner APT that when the above-mentioned order was issued, APT did not yet have the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants of respondent CCC; nor did it have the chance to present any of their
affiants to support their allegations as contained in their Joint Position Papers.
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS DECISION, DISREGARDED
THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
HELD:
Petitioner APT insists that the lower court as well as the Court of Appeals disregarded the principles of the due
process clause embodied in the Constitution when it found APT to have waived its right to cross-examine
respondents witnesses. On the other hand, respondent CCC counters that the findings of the lower court may be
attributed to the fault of APTs counsel. CCC alleges that the counsel for APT often absented himself on
scheduled hearing dates, resulting in the failure to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent CCC.
The insistence of the petitioner is without basis.
There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
did not do so.
As shown from the records, the counsel for APT was absent on several occasions, specifically on April 7, May
5, June 2, June 16, August 24 and 25, 1992. Several reasons were raised by APTs counsel to justify his absence,
such as withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations, and serious illness.

These flimsy excuses do not warrant consideration from this Court. The withdrawal of APTs previous counsel in
the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such
reason necessitates a duty, an obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next
scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels failure to turn over the records of the case
to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Counsel should
have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous
counsel.
As regards the serious illness suffered by counsel during the trial dates of August 24 and 25, 1992. This Court is
not unmindful of the fact that counsels absence was due to this deadly disease. What baffles this Court is the
reason offered by counsel that although two other APT lawyers were mentioned in the pleadings, only one was
actively involved in the handling of the case.
We cannot understand why it would be difficult for counsel to appraise his two other collaborating counsels.
Counsel himself readily admits that of the two, only one is actively handling the case. It would take a mere
phone call to inform his co-counsels than he would be unable to attend rather than be declared absent during
trial. Yet, counsel failed to do so.
In view of the foregoing, we find the Court of Appeals did not commit error, when it declared that petitioner
waived its right to cross-examine the respondents witnesses. The due process requirement is satisfied where the
parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given
opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered his report.Contained in
their position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties
were also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise
granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APTs case, they were
deemed to have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to support any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side.
10. MATUGUINA V CA, 263 SCRA 452
Due Process Not Being Party to a Case
FACTS:
1. In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina
Logging Enterprises (MLE).
2. Matuguina Integrated Wood Product (MIWPI) was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros
Matuguina became the majority stockholder on Sept.4, 1974.
3. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to Matuguina Integrated Wood Product (MIWPI).
Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the
District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber
concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to
declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources.
4. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found
MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE
and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m 3worth of timbers. The Minister
then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the
writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to

the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution
by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued
patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under the
due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In
the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued
without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance
of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of
DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly
made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and
MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order,
and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs
timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary
fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower
the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned.
11. PEOPLE vs COURT of APPEALS
G.R. No. 118882
Cold impartiality of the judge is a necessary element of procedural due process
Facts
Jane Go was accused of killing her husband Dominador Go. The special civil action against Go landed in the
sala of respondent Judge Pedro Espina. He decided in favor of Go and ordered that the Regional Prosecutor be
enjoined from conducting a preliminary investigation against her. Later on, the heirs of the victim find out that
the Criminal case against Go is also handled by Espina. They asked him to inhibit from the case, stating that it
would be in violation of their right to due process because the judge, having decided the civil case, is not
expected to be impartial when deciding the criminal case. The judge opposed and still continued hearing the
case.
Thus, the heirs went up to the Supreme Court to petition his inhibition from the criminal proceedings.
Issue
Whether Judge Espina may decide the case without violating the right to due process of the victims heirs
Held
No. He cannot decide without violating their right, particularly on procedural due process. One of the essential
requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, can not be considered
to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against
herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's
decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously
doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina
to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the
KBL(under Marcos) with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate
of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, private respondent won the elections. The petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival and complained of massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until
further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.

On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably
made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a
winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor
General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
Issue:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
Held: NO
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only
be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they
can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.
They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to
be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.

AZUL VS CASTRO
FACTS: Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in
the amount of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving about P250k as a balance. She filed a
petition for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar
79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file
for responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that Judge Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by

Judge Aover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But Azul only received the
notice granting such on the 23rd of the same month way passed the 5 day period. On the 17th of April, Tecson
already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azuls 5 day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the
same month, J Castro, the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered Azul to be in
default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of evidence the next day
and of course without Azuls evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J Castro
ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the case appealed to remove his
default status. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the date
of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the
20thof the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered
on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but
surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. Finally, J
Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due
process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain
standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at
all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension
from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first
extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of
the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his
motion would be considered submitted for resolution. Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon
City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at
the very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable
why J Aover, who had not permanently taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule
that only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by
mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a
matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to
declare defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on
April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon City.
Mayor Miguel Paderanga v. Judge Cesar Azura, 136 SCRA 266
FACTS:
Mayor Miguel Paderanga (petitioner) was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental.
He petitioned that Judge Azura inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the
following grounds:
1. Loss of trust and confidence;
2. Entertaining tax suits against the city and issuing TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly
provided for by law (Section 64 of P.D. 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax
3. Bias, oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt in ordering the arrest of
petitioner and the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City; and
4. Issuing of Orders against the interests of the City of Gingoog.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
HELD:
Yes, Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
As decided in Pimentel vs. Salanga, all the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any
to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation; but when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to
act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably

capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self- examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
In this case, Judge Azura failed to maintain his position in such a manner that will beget no suspicion of his
fairness and integrity because of the antagonistic positions taken by the parties in their respective pleadings,
and, particularly, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner, which prompted him and others to file
administrative charges against respondent Judge.
Note: that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge
Cases are hereby transferred to the different Regional Trial Courts of Cagayan de Oro.

ANITA U. LORENZANA vs. POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
Anita Lorenzana owned a quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate (corner of C.M. Recto St. and
Quezpn Blvd., Manila, adjacent to the Bilibid Compound). She initially leased the property from Manila
Railroad Company but subsequently bought the property. Lorenzana leased her property. Polly Cayetano, on the
other hand, was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the
same from the Bureau of Lands.
In 1958, Lorenzana filed ejectment cases her tenants for non-payment of rentals. Lorenzanas petition
was granted and the Court ordered the defendants-tenants to vacate the premises leased. Since the tenants
refused to vacate the premises, the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20, 1959, a writ
of demolition was issued, which specifically commanded the Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the premises
subject of the above-name cases."
In execution of the writ of demolition, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo and
Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered the premises of the Cayetano and in spite of her protests that
she was not a party to the ejectment cases in which the demolition order was secured and that her premises was
not subject of said ejectment cases, they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots trellises and electric
installations and carted away the materials thereof and built another fence 5 meters into the premises of the
respondent, boring holes into the cemented garden or patio of her house.
Cayetano appealed to the lower court that her property to be not touched. The lower court denied
Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored Cayetano.
ISSUE: WON Cayetano was afforded due process.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the respondent was awarded due process of law because she was duly
heard by the Court. It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process were sufficiently
complied with because the respondent had been duly heard.
The requirements of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present namely:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceedings:
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Indeed, respondent was heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural
due process in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her property, the
Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the property of the respondent because the premises of the
respondent was not included in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property,
much less demolish the same. The respondent remained a stranger to the case and she cannot be bound by the

judgment rendered therein, nor by the writs of execution and demolition issued in pursuance to said judgment.
Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being wrongly demolished merely to oppose such order
of demolition upon learning that the said order was directed against premises not her own, is not the same as
being a party to the suit to the extent of being bound by the judgment in the case where such order of demolition
was issued. Furthermore, it must be noted that said petitions were filed after the promulgation of the decision in
the ejectment cases and while in the process of execution. It is not proper to speak of an intention in a case
already terminated by final judgment.
Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs Jose Robles
FACTS: Zambales Chromite Mining Company filed a case in the Justice of Peace of Court (now trial court)
against Jose Robles for an order against the defendant to vacate immediately certain mines and mineral claims
in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They also filed a claim for the following:
Claims of the Company against Robles
Particulars

Amount

Rentals

425,573.75

Monthly royalties

12,000

Attorneys fees

(to be determined)

Robles only made verbal denials of the allegations instead of filing a written answer. Judgement was rendered in
favor of the Company. Robles appealed the decision in the Court of First Instance. In the said appeal, he filed
answer containing the material allegations and the following counterclaim:
Claims of Robles against the Company
Particulars

Amount

Sums overpaid for royalties

19,832.69

Cash bond put by defendant in favor of plaintiff (reimbursable to

defendant)

5,000

Damages caused by strike

150,000

Profits which could have been earned from a cancelled Japanese

contract (cancelled because of misrepresentation of the Company)

1,250,000

Profits which could have been earned from sale of chrome ore
under the Japanese contract

500,000

Moral damages

250,000

Attorneys fees

25,000

ISSUE: WON Robles could raise counterclaims in the Court of First Instance considering that they were not
raised in the Justice of the Peace of Court.
HELD: He cannot file any pleading which raises questions essentially distinct from those lawfully and duly
raised in the Court of origin. The proper remedy is to file a separate and distinct case.
The rules, which have the force of law, provide the manner and occasion when issues are to be raised for
adjudication. If the rules were to be ignored and we permit litigants to raise issues without order and regulation,
confusion would arise. This would certainly happen were we to allow the issues the defendant has raised in his
answer in the court of first instance. The defendant-appellant is not precluded from raising his counterclaims in
a separate action if he decides to do so. But in view of the fact that the trial in the court of first instance in an
appeal is merely a trial de novo, we are constrained to dismiss the counterclaims in pursuance of the dictates
and mandate of the rules.

Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio Aquilizan et al

Due Process Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and
caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs
and the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed
them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the
borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his
dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to
continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three
months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due
process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already
become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that
a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment
is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.
18. FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner, vs. JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and as Presidential Executive Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON, respondents.
FACTS: This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the
Medical Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST).
The position became vacant when Dr. Quintin Kintanar became the Director of the Biological Research Center.
Dr. Kintanar recommended Dr. Eulalia Venzon to be appointed to his previous position. Dr. Felicidad Anzaldo
protested against such recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and
meritorious. However, it was not resolved by the committee so the position remained vacant. Both Dr. Venzon,
48 years old, and Dr. Anzaldo, 55 years old, worked in the Medical Research Department holding similar
positions. Both of them were next- in-rank to the vacant position.
When Dr. Pedro Afable became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST, he appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the vacant
position, and it was approved by the Civil Service Commission. Dr. Afable, in his letter, explained that the
appointment was made after a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and
Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor
Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon.
Dr. Venzon elevated the issue to the Office of the President. Jacobo Clave was then the Presidential Executive
Assistant (PEA) and the Chairman of the CSC. Concurrently holding both positions, Jacobo Clave and
Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the
contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was
duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission. Dr. Anzaldo filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution but it was denied.
Dr. Anzaldo also appealed to the Office of the President but what happened is that Clave as the PEA, just
affirmed his own decision as the Chairman of the CSC. In this sense, Clave was only concurring with himself.
ISSUE: Whether there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: Evidently, Dr. Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. The case of Zambales
Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals was cited in the decision where it was held that the decision of
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining
case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery
of administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II,
should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. The SC held that Clave committed a grave abuse of
discretion.

19. Singson vs. NLRC

GR. No. 122389. June 19, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Miguel Singson was employed by private respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc (PAL) as Traffic
Representative Passenger in the Handling Division. His duty was to check-in passengers and their baggage for a
specific flight. On June 7, 1991, he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of Japan Air Lines (JAL) and one
of the passengers checked-in by him was Ms. Lolita Kondo who was bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in,
Kondo complained that the petitioner required her to pay $ 200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing
any receipt. The said dollars were not found on Singson's possession but when the lower panel of the counter he
was
checking-in
was
searched,
an
amount
of
$
265.00
was
found
therein.
The investigation committee found the petitioner guilty of the offense charged and recommended his dismissal.
PAL adopted the committee's recommendation and dismissed him from service effective June 7, 1991.
On September 12, 1991, a complaint was filed against PAL before NLRC-NCR for illegal dismissal, attorney's
fees and due damages. The case was raffled of to Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who found PAL's evidence in
terminating the petitioner as insufficient. He declared the petitioner's dismissal as illegal and ordered his
reinstatement
with
backwages.
PAL appealed the said decision. On May 19, 1995, the second division of NLRC, composed of Commissioners
Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and Raul Aquino as presiding commissioner, reversed the decision and
dismissed
the
complaint
against
PAL.
On June 5, 1995, petitioner filed for a MR but Calaycay and Rayala denied the motion. (Two commissioners
only
took
part)
Petitioner then filed a certiorari assailing that Aquino's participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his
own
decision
as
labor
arbiter
amounts
to
a
denial
of
due
process.
Issue:
Whether or not there is denial of due process when Aquino participated in reviewing and reversing on appeal his
own
decision.
Held:
Yes. There is denial of due process in the case at bar. It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer
who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review.
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, we laid down the requisites of procedural due process
in
administrative
proceedings,
to
wit:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2)
the
tribunal
must
consider
the
evidence
presented;
(3)
the
decision
must
have
something
to
support
itself;
(4)
the
evidence
must
be
substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of
the
controversy,
and
not
simply
accept
the
views
of
a
subordinate;

(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
In addition, administrative due process includes (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as
to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a
finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least
ascertained
in
the
records
or
disclosed
to
the
parties.
Further, Rule VII, Section 2 (b) New Rules of Procedure of NLRC states that, each Division shall consist of
one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the
workers and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation
and impartiality among its members. Therefore, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners
who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from
any
participation
in
this
case.
Thus, the petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal.
The
decision
on
May
19,
1995
was
set
aside.

20.MAYOR ALONTE VS JUDGE SAVELLANO

FACTS: Mayor Bayani Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change
of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under Judge Savellano. Savellano later found
probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. The prosecution presented Juvie and had
attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of
her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity
between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires
that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case
is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
22. Lynvil Fishing vs Ariola
Lynvil Fishing Enterprises is a company engaged in deep sea fishing, operating along the shore of Palawan. The
company is managed by Rosendo De Borja.
On August 1998, the company received a report from an employee that while aboard the vessel, the captain of
the ship along with several other employees conspired to deliver 8 tubs of pampano and tanguige fish to another
vessel. The manager then summoned the respondents and furnished them a notice stating that they should
explain the incident within five days and explain why they should not be terminated. The employees failed to
do so and was terminated. The employer then filed a criminal complaint before the office of the city prosecutor

of Malabon. The employees filed illegal dismissal case.

Issue: WON the respondents were given due process before getting terminated.
Held: No. The respondents were not given due process before being terminated. It is required that the employer
furnish the employee with two written notices. 1) written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds
for termination and giving reasonable opportunity within which to explain 2) written notice of termination
served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination the twin element of due process which is notice and hearing is needed to
accommodate both sides. Notice to inform the employee the grounds which he/she is being accused for and
hearing to defend/explain his/her actions. In the case at bar, Lynvil failed to serve the second notice before the
employees and thus violating the right to due process.
Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines (June 8, 2011)
FACTS:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named
Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered
the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale
was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. On May 15, 1954, Hilaria
died. Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of
title over the subject property. The decision stated that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late
spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property
to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the coowners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the
subject property was placed under the said program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them
that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to
due process of law was violated. Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by the
ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heirs due process.
HELD:
The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program
cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due
process of law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and
declare the issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case
were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. The same holds true with respect to
the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should
the CLTs on which they were grounded are void.

23. FLORES VS MONTEMAYOR

FACTS:
Atty. Antonio F. Montemayors then Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV,
in San Fernando, Pampanga, was found administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002
Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars (Ford Expedition and 1997 Toyota Land
Cruiser) registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8
(A) of R.A. No. 6713.The Office of the President adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on
respondent, with all accessory penalties.
ISSUES:
1) W Respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently resulting in
violation of his constitutional right against "double jeopardy"
2) W Respondents constitutional right to due process was violated.
HELD:
1) Montemayor states that since the PAGC charge involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was
already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained
wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating the rule on double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of these
requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal
offense against the respondent public officer. The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not
constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.
2) Records bear out that he was given several opportunities to answer the charge against him and present
evidence on his defense, which he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit the
required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting evidence shall be construed as waiver on
his part of the right to do so.
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due
process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the
opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process. Having persisted in his
refusal to file his pleadings and evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due
process was violated.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the
cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the decision be
rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative
decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual
and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
24. MONICO IMPERIAL V GSIS
FACTS:
In the petition before us, the petitioner argues that he was denied due process when the August 17, 2006
pre-hearing conference was conducted in his absence without prior notice of the August 11, 2006 order denying
the motion for reconsideration of the order of change of venue, since Atty. Molina received by registered mail a
copy of the August 11, 2006 order only on August 18, 2006, or a day after the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing
conference. The petitioner pleads good faith in approving the loans based on an existing GSIS Board Resolution
which authorizes branch managers to approve loans for meritorious and special reasons; the loans were cleared
by the Commission on Audit and settled by the borrowers. He contends that the penalty of dismissal is too
severe in the absence of any wrongful intent and given his 40 years of government service.
The GSIS submits that the petitioner was not denied due process because Atty. Molina received onAugust
14, 2006a fax copy of theAugust 11, 2006order. On the merits of the case, the GSIS maintains that the evidence
on record duly established the petitioners administrative culpability for acts inimical to the interest of the
public, warranting his dismissal from the service; the penalty of dismissal was warranted since this was the
petitioners second administrative offense.
ISSUE:
The issues are: (1) whether the petitioner was denied due process, and (2) whether there was substantial
evidence to support petitioners dismissal from the service.
HELD:
SC PARTIALLY GRANT the petition and modify the findings of the CA pertaining to the petitioners
administrative liability. Petitioner Monico K. Imperial, Jr. is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the time the preventive suspension that GSIS imposed lapsed, up to the finality of
this Decision.
Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be
given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary.
In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference
(despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order), Garcias decision of February
21, 2007 duly considered and discussed the defenses raised in Atty. Molinas pleadings, although the answer
was ordered expunged from the records because it was unverified and because Atty. Molina failed to submit a
letter of authority to represent the petitioner.
What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured
whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case Again,
Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he rendered
the June 6, 2007 resolution. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.
No doubt exists in our mind that the petitioner committed misconduct in this case. The records clearly show
that the petitioner committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight
GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-99.
After a careful review of the records, however, we disagree with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA
that the petitioners acts constituted grave misconduct. While we accord great respect to the factual findings of
administrative agencies that misconduct was committed, we cannot characterize the offense committed as grave.
No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave.

We are aware that to the CSC, the mere act of approving the loan applications on several occasions proves the
element of flagrant disregard of established rules to constitute grave misconduct. Thus, it said:
The act of the appellant in approving salary loan applications of his subordinates over and above the
prescribed rates under the GSIS policy, not only once but several times, indicates his flagrant and wanton
transgression of the said policy. He, in fact, abused his authority in doing so.
Thus, the petitioners liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As Branch Manager of
the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies, guidelines and procedures in carrying
out the agencys mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications of eight GSIS Naga Field Office
employees who did not fully meet the required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of judgment
sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.
25. Central Mindanao University vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, The Honorable Secretary Of
The Department Of Environment And Natural Resources, The Chairperson And Commissioners Of The
National Commission On Indigenous Peoples, And The Lead Convenor Of The National Anti-Poverty
Commission
G.R. No. 184869
Facts: Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by
the State.
In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public
domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU.
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous people and
cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, et al., seeking to stop the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.
The RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that
the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.
Issue: a) Whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action.
b) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.
Ruling of the Court:
A) The CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case
based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points
out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard.
Procedural due process requisites (TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635):

the right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence;

the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

the decision must have something to support itself;

the evidence must be substantial;

the decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing;

the tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law or facts;

the board or body shall in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceedings can know the various issues involved.
B) In making the decision for the case at bar, the Court cited the case of CMU v. Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking both
privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the
segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court nullified the DARAB action considering
the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural
educational institution. When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act
8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral domains already exist in
and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject

lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous
peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.
Presidential Proclamation 310 is declared null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government
socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Thus, the lands by their character
have become INALIENABLE from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific
and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands through a
valid act of reclassification.
26. Atty. Romeo Erece vs Lyn B Macalingay et. al.,
Facts: That on several dates as per stated in the affidavit of the respondents, Petitioner Atty. Romeo Erece
denied the staff, the use of government vehicle of the Region I Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The
petitioner is regularly receiving a Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of 4,000
pesos. Also, the government vehicle issued to Region I CHR was under his name. That despite the regular
release of RATA, he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle to the detriment of public office. The
complaint filed by the respondents were all denied by the petitioner in his affidavit. After a fact-finding
investigation, the Civil Service Commission charged the petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for
using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the monthly RATA. Petitioner filed a petition for review in
CA. His petition was denied. He then escalated his petition to the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due process
Held: Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain one side. As held in Velez v De Vera, due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with
judicial process for a trial court is not always essential to due process. The right to cross examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process. Thus, petition is denied.
JOSE CATACUTAN VS PEOPLE
FACTS : Jose Catacutan is the principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao
City. Two faculty members of SNSAT, Georgito Posesano Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 and Magdalena
Divinagracia Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, were promoted by CHED as Vocational
Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18.
Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to assume their new position
since Principal Catacutan made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not
implement them despite written orders from CHED.
Catacutan admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants
because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. He
alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad
faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the
preparation of appointment papers.
A case for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) was filed against
Catacutan and RTC ruled against him. Sandigangbayan upheld the decision of RTC.
Catacutan invoked that he was denied due process of law when he was not allowed to to controvert the findings
of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to
implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
ISSUE: WON Catacutan was Denied due process of law.
HELD:
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.

There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the courts discretion to reject the
presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.
This is especially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case,
concerns an administrative matter.

DATU PAX PAKUNG S. MANGUDADATU, petitioner,

vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELO O. MONTILLA,
respondents.
Facts: Datu Pax and Angelo O. Montilla (private respondent) were congressional candidates for the First
District of Sultan Kudarat during the May 14, 2007 national elections. Datu Pax won (17,451 votes) and was
proclaimed as the duly elected Representative. Montilla filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest contesting the
results of the elections and the proclamation. The service of summons upon Datu Pax was sent through
registered mail at Purok Losaria,6 Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat (this is his provincial
residence), requiring him to file an Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On July 11,
2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card, showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas received
the summons. The HRET issued a resolution (No. 07-179) considering that Datu Pax failed to file an answer in
accordance with Rule 2710 of the 2004 HRET Rules since 43 days had passed since Baldenas received the
summons. The HRET considered him to have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest.
Meanwhile, petitioner informally learned of respondents protest. Datu Pax filed a Motion to Reconsider
Resolution No. 07-179 and Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest. He alleged that he never received
the summons issued by the HRET. He denied that Baldenas was a member of his household or his employee. He
further claimed that she was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to him.The HRET
denied both motions.
Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the HRET. Petitioner contended that there was no valid service of summons. He argued that a substitute
service of summons is made only when the defendant cannot be served personally at a reasonable time after
efforts to locate him have failed. In his case, the substituted service was improper and invalid since there was
no showing of the impossibility of personal service. He further contends that there is nothing in the 2004 HRET
Rules that allows service of summons by registered mail and strongly asserts that service of summons by
registered mail is susceptible to fraud and manipulation.
Issue: Whether there is violation of the right to due process of law if a party is declared as having waived the
right to file his answer despite improper service of summons.
HELD: Yes. Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, state:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served handling a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. SEC. 7.
Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which is not among the
allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Election cases (which involve public interest and
the will of the electorate) must strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of
Court.
There is no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its own process servers to personally serve the summons,
or alternatively, delegate the matter to the process server of a court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of
residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case. Considering that the proper service of summons on

the respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional requirement and goes to heart of due process, we cannot allow
service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court.

39) DEPED VS CUANAN, December 16, 2008

Facts:
On March 11, 1996, mothers of minors Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints for
Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Godofredo Cuanan, then Principal of
Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma Labrador constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of
three DepEd officials from the province, to conduct a formal investigation. The Committee found Cuanan guilty
of sexual harassment and recommended his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. RD Labrador
concurred and DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the Decision.
Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. The CSC issued a resolution on January 20, 2003 which set aside the
Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment.
On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a Petition for Review/ Reconsideration
with the CSC. Another Supplemental Petition for Review/ Reconsideration reiterating the prayer for reversal of
the resolution was filed by the secretary in July 2003. No copy of both pleadings was served upon Cuanan.
Subsequently, Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal effective April 30, 2003.
However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 041147 setting aside its previous decision and
found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan
received a copy of the Resolution on November 9, 2004.
Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to
annul Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/
reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that
the petition for review/ reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the
pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process.
On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC
Resolution No. 041147. The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review were
available remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted, since the act complained of was
patently illegal; that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/ reconsideration
filed by the DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not duly notified
of the petition for review/ reconsideration, nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon, much
less, given a copy of the said petition; that the DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and
executory when it filed its petition for review/ reconsideration.
ISSUES:
a)
Whether the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan
b)
Whether Cuanans right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed
by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon
HELD:
a.) CSC Resolution No. 021600 allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an
erring employee, thus:

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in
an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
Hence, Cuanan's exoneration may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which, as the
appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest.
b.) Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the
proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed
by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments
thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as
mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the CSC.