Atty - Europa Pre-Bar Lectures

CRIMINAL
PROCEDU
RE PREBAR
LECTURE
RULES 110 - 127
by Atty. Caesar Europa
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES

JURISDICTION
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES:
a) Territorial Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 Interim Rules)
- The limits of the geographical boundaries of a place within which a court has
jurisdiction to act judicially and outside of which its judicial acts are null and void.
- Jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by (a) the geographical area over
which the court presides and (b) the fact that the crime was committed or any of its
essential elements took place within said area.
NOTE: SC can Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice (Par 4, Section 5, Article 8 of the 87 Const)
Example:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CAMILO PILOTIN, ET AL G.R. NOS. L-35377-78. JULY
31, 1975
Defendant-appellant Vincent Crisologo sought the transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the
municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps
Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas on the ground that if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal
jail during the trial, his life would be in jeopardy.
Finding the motion meritorious and applying Sec. 5(4), Article X of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the transfer of the record of the case to
the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame.
b) Jurisdiction over the subject matter:
- is determined by the allegations of the criminal complaint or information in accordance
with the law in force at the time of the institution of the criminal action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense.
- Essentially it is determined by the penalty provided by law for the offense as that
offense is charged in the complaint or information.
c) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
- conferred upon the court either by the voluntary surrender of the accused or by his
arrest to answer for the crime charged.
- is not lost once acquired.
NOTE : ALL THE THREE ELEMENTS MUST EXIST OTHERWISE THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO TRY AND DECIDE A CRIMINAL CASE.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ET AL VS. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, GR 158763, MARCH 31, 2006

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
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May a court act on a motion to quash the information without the surrender or
arrest of the accused?
What about a petition to be allowed to post bail on non-bailable offenses?
such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody
of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not
have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail
of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in
Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body
of the accused before considering the application for bail.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that "the purpose of
bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to
the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post
his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein
and compliance with the requirements therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative
relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of
the law.
OUTLINE OF THE JURISDICITON OF PHILIPPINE COURTS

Basic
1.
2.
3.
APPELLATE COURTS
Premises:
All appeals from the ca go to the supreme court
All appeals from the Sandiganbayan go to the Suprme Court
All appeals from the MTC, MTCC, MCTC, go to the RTC regardless of the ISSUE
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Conclusion:
The ONLY PROBLEM in appeals is WHERE DO YOU APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE
RTC?
General Rule:
Appeals, by notice of appeal or petition for review, from Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court are appealable to the COURT OF APPEALS
EXCEPTION:
To the Supreme Court directly
1.. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Note: in cases where
the jurisdiction of a court or the constitutionality of a law is in issue, it must be THE
ONLY issue left otherwise the appeal will be a mixed question of fact and law and must
be appealed to the CA.
PROCEDURE IN CASES WHERE PENALTY INVOLVED IS DEATH OR RECLUSION
PERPETUA (as amended due to People vs. Efren G. Mateo (GR 147678-87, July 7,
2004)
Note: the death penalty was abolished by RA 9346 signed into law on June 24, 2006
To the Court of Appeals
1. If Death, appeal is AUTOMATIC to the Court of Appeals;
2. If Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, appeal is to the Court of Appeals but is NOT
AUTOMATIC, a Notice of Appeal must be filed.
AMENDED RULES TO GOVERN REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY CASES
FROM THE RTC
a. If P=Death=Automatic Appeal to CA
If CA affirms it will render judgment but will not enter judgment and will transmit the
case to the SC; Note: if other accused are imposed lesser penalties for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence, all will be
transmitted to the SC
b. If P=Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment=Appeal by Notice of Appeal to CA
If CA affirms or imposes lesser penalty then it will render judgment and enter
judgment. CAs decision can be appealed to the SC via the filing of a notice of appeal
with the CA
Exception:
a) If Penalty imposed by SB is death appeal to SC is automatic (including appeal of
accused imposed lesser penalties for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose of the same occurrence)
b) If Penalty imposed by SB is Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment, appeal to SC
will be via Notice of Appeal filed with the SB. (including appeal of accused imposed
lesser penalties for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose of the
same occurrence)
c) Whenever the SB, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, finds that the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment should be imposed, it shall render
judgment accordingly. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and
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FROM THE SANDIGANBAYAN

GEN. RULE:
Appeals from SB to SC via Rule 45

forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for
review.
APPEAL WHEN RTC DECISION IMPOSES PENALTY OF DEATH, RECLUSION OR LIFE
IMPRISONMENT
Penalty
Appeal to CA
CA Ruling
Action
thru
Death
Automatic review Affirm
Will not render judgment and
transmit the case to SC
Reclusion
Notice of appeal
Affirm or impose
Enter decision & judgment
perpetua or life
lesser penalty
Appeal to SC may be made thru a
imprisonment
notice of appeal
APPEAL WHEN SB DECISION IMPOSES PENALTY OF DEATH, RECLUSION OR LIFE
IMPRISONMENT
Jurisdictio Penalty
SB Action
Appeal to SC thru
n
Original
Death
Will not render judgment Automatic review
and transmit the case to
SC
Reclusion perpetua or life
Enter decision &
Notice of appeal
imprisonment
judgment
Appellate
Death, reclusion perpetua
Refrain from entering
Certification from SB
or life imprisonment
judgment
to elevate the case to
SC
To the Sandiganbayan
All cases decided by the RTC, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction which
would have been within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if any of the accused had been
occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned in the Sandiganbayan law.
RULE OF THUMB IN DETERMINING WHICH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICITON OVER

A CRIMINAL CASE:
Determining the court which has original jurisdiction over a criminal case is a process of
elimination in the following order
1. Sandiganbayan
2. Special Courts:
a. Family Courts
b. Dangerous Drugs Court
c. Intellectual Property Courts
Note: These special courts are all Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme
Court to take cognizance of special cases.
3. Regular Courts in the following order:
a. MTC, MTCC, MCTC
b. RTC
Note: In the process of elimination, the MTC, MTCC, MCTC comes before the RTC
because the RTC is the catch all court meaning if a case does not fall within the
original jurisdiction of any other court, then it is the RTC that will have jurisdiction
over it.
SANDIGANBAYAN
1 + 1 = 2 METHOD
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ORGINAL JURISDICTION

A very good exercise to have familiarity with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is to
prepare TWO COLUMNS, THUS:
1+
IN THE FIRST COLUMN LIST
DOWN ALL THE CRIMES
COVERED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN LAW
1
IN THE SECOND COLUMN LIST
DOWN ALL THE PERSONS
COVERED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN LAW
=2
IF BOTH THE CRIME AND THE
PERSON ARE COVERED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN LAW THEN
SANDIGANBAYAN WILL HAVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE IF NOT THEN THE REGULAR
COURTS WILL HAVE JURISDICTION
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (A) of this section in relation to
their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In relation to their office
The tricky part of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determining whether or not
common crimes and felonies committed by public officials and employees were done in
relation to their office
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Section 4 of RA 8249
" Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:

Guidelines as laid down in People vs. Demosthenes Magallanes (Oct. 11, 1995)
An offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if
a. it cannot exist without the office, or
b. if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code.
c. the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and
d. the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.
Some Cases:
AZARCON VS. SB. 268 SCRA 747 (FEB. 26, 1997)
- The SB does not have jurisdiction over a private individual charged with malversation of
public funds simply because he was designated by the BIR as a custodian of distrained
property. He did not become a public officer thereby.
PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES 249 SCRA 298 (OCT 11, 1995)
- the allegation taking advantage of his position by itself is insufficient to bring the
offense within the purview of offenses committed in relation to public office
LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 301 SCRA 298 (JAN. 20, 1999)
How to allege an offense committed by the accused in relation to his office.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in
relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer "in relation
to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused's official duties.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase "committed
in relation to public office" does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Other notable matters:
1. The Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a case if it has jurisdiction over ANY ONE OF
THE ACCUSED. Example: Janitor charged with Anti-Graft together with a Regional Director.
2. The Sandiganbayan will also have jurisdiction over PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS who are accused
together with public officers over whom and in cases where the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age
but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at
the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty,
the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused
may have incurred. XXXXXXXXXXX
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by
Republic Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
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FAMILY COURT (RA 8369)

1) Women which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to
result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other
forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a
woman's personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and
2) Children which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS COURT
The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Dangerous Drugs Courts
have jurisdiction over ALL VIOLATIONS of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165) except cases
against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES COURT

The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Intellectual Properties Courts
will have jurisdiction over all criminal violations of the Intellectual Property Code and related
laws.
REGULAR COURTS
FROM B.P. 129 and RA 7691, the jurisdiction of regular courts, the RTC and the MTC may be
outlined as follows:
RTC
MTC, MTCC, MCTC
IF PENALTY IS IMPRISONMENT OR PENALTY > 6 years
PENALTY < 6 years
IMPRISONMENT AND FINE
IF PENALTY IS PURELY FINE
FINE is > 4 thousand
FINE is < 4 thousand
Pesos
Pesos
IMPT. ALL cases of reckless imprudence resulting to DAMAGE TO PROPERTY are
cognizable by the MTCC MCTC MTC, REGARDLESS of the amount of the fine (cf RA
7691)
NOTE: JURISDICTION IS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE PENALTY
NOTE2: The General Rules do not apply if the law specifies the court that will have
jurisdiction over the case e.g. Libel (Art. 360 RPC)
AS AMENDED
(RULES 110 - 127, RULES OF COURT)
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1, 2000
RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

WHERE WILL THE CASE BE FILED Section 1 pars. (a) and (b)
GENERAL RULE:
Penalty > 4 YRS 2 mos.
-Preliminary Investigation is required
-file with the Prosecutors Office for PI (MTC NO LONGER ALLOWED TO
CONDUCT PI under NEW RULE 112, as amended by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC)
Penalty < 4YRS 2 mos.
-NO PI is required
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THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

-file directly with MTC for trial, except in chartered cities where it should
be filed with the prosecutor's office unless otherwise provided in the citys
charter
Cognizable by SB.
-OMBUDSMAN or Prosecutors Office but in case of the latter, the

Resolution will be approved by the Ombudsman
"The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws" (Sec.
1, last paragraph)
ISSUE: Will the filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupt the running of the
period of the prescription of the offense charged?
RULE: Prescription will be interrupted unless the special law provides otherwise.
MEANING: If covered by the Revised Penal Code, prescription is interrupted. If under a Special
Law then the provisions of that law on prescription will apply (If the law requires institution of
judicial proceedings then prescription will not be interrupted). Finally, if the Special Law does
not have provisions on prescription, SEC. 2 of ACT NO. 3326 (Dec. 4, 1926) will apply and
prescription will not be interrupted until the information or complaint is filed in court for trial.
Based on: REODICA vs. CA 292 SCRA 87
LLENES vs. DICDICAN 260 SCRA 207 (1996)
BETTY GABIONZA, ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR 161057, SEPTEMBER 12, 2008

It appears that the Court of Appeals was, without saying so, applying the rule in civil
cases that all indispensable parties must be impleaded in a civil action. There is no equivalent
rule in criminal procedure, and certainly the Court of Appeals decision failed to cite any
statute, procedural rule or jurisprudence to support its position that the failure to implead the
traders who directly dealt with petitioners is indeed fatal to the complaint.
Assuming that the traders could be tagged as principals by direct participation in
tandem with Roxas and Nolasco the principals by inducement does it make sense to compel
that they be jointly charged in the same complaint to the extent that the exclusion of one leads
to the dismissal of the complaint? It does not. Unlike in civil cases, where indispensable parties
are required to be impleaded in order to allow for complete relief once the case is adjudicated,
the determination of criminal liability is individual to each of the defendants. Even if the
criminal court fails to acquire jurisdiction over one or some participants to a crime, it still is
able to try those accused over whom it acquired jurisdiction. The criminal court will still be able
to ascertain the individual liability of those accused whom it could try, and hand down
penalties based on the degree of their participation in the crime. The absence of one or some
of the accused may bear impact on the available evidence for the prosecution or defense, but
it does not deprive the trial court to accordingly try the case based on the evidence that is
actually available.
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COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 2)

1. Must be in writing
2. in the name of the People of the Philippines
- a mistake in the complaint or information where it is made in the name of the offended
party (e.g. Maria Dimapasok vs. Juan Dimakatusok for Rape) is only a formal defect.
Though, if raised, the complaint or information can be quashed, it will not invalidate the
complaint or information and it is curable by a formal amendment.
3. against all persons who appear to be responsible
-the public prosecutor has no authority to exclude anybody if there is a showing that
such person appears to be guilty of the offense.
Will the failure of the information to include other persons who also appear to be responsible be
a ground to dismiss the case against those who were included?

Complaint defined. A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. (Sec. 3, R110)
Who can file a complaint?
a. the offended party
b. peace officer
c. other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
What if the complaint is not sworn or signed?
This is a formal defect that can be cured by having the complaint signed and sworn to by
the person who filed it.
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
Examples of these persons are Customs Officials in cases involving violations of the
Customs and Tariff Code, BIR officials in vilations of the NIRC, DENR Officials for violations of
the Forestry Code or environmental laws, SSS officials for violations of the SSS law. etc.
Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (Sec. 4, Rule
110)
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court
An information can be filed only by a public prosecutor and only in court.
The person filing a complaint or information must have authority to do so.
COMPLAINT
INFORMATION
may be signed or subscribed by the offended can only be subscribed by the public
party, a peace officer, or any other public prosecutor
officer charged with the enforcement of the
law violated
may be filed with the public prosecutor or with can only be filed with the proper court for trial
the MTC, in places other than chartered cities, of the accused
for preliminary investigation or it can be filed
with the proper MTC or MCTC, for trial in the
cases where direct filing is allowed by law
Not all complaints require a PI before it could PI is necessary before the case may be filed in
be filed in court.
court
NOTE: Only a complaint filed in court for TRIAL not PI must be subscribed by the offended
party, peace officer or other public officer charged with enforcing the law violated.
EVARLE vs. SUCALDITO 156 SCRA 808
A complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor need
not be filed by the offended party. Such a complaint may be filed by any complainant. The
complaint referred to in Section 3 of Rule 110 is one filed in court and not with the public
prosecutors office in which case it has to be initiated by the aggrieved party.
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CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)

City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire
proceedings will be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.

NOTE: This is because the public prosecutor is authorized by law to investigate any complaint.
If such an investigation leads to a finding of probable cause to hold a respondent for trial, the
public prosecutor can file the proper information in court.
Who must prosecute criminal actions? (Sec. 5, R110)
GEN. RULE: Under the direction or control of the public prosecutor
EXCEPTION: AS AMENDED BY En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2002 A.M. No. 02-207 SC
In case of heavy work schedule of a public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence
of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
BEFORE THE AMENDMENT THE EXCEPTION WAS:
IN CASES BEFORE MTCs, or MCTCs where the prosecutor assigned is NOT available, the
following may prosecute:
a) the offended party
b) peace officer
c) other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
Nota bene: the SC has through circulars explained that there was no intention to remove the
authority of the original exceptions to prosecute the case in the absence of the public
prosecutor
Can the offended party elevate the criminal aspect of a case to the CA or SC without
the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General?
ELVIRA ONG VS. JOSE CASIM GENIO, GR 182336, DECEMBER 23, 2009
This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa
Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T. Buenaflor, Cario v. de Castro, Mobilia Products,
Inc. v. Umezawa, Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., and People v.
Santiago, where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and
the CA.
PRIVATE CRIMES Crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio Based on Art. 344 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Adultery and Concubinage
- the complaint or information must be signed by the offended spouse and must be
against BOTH guilty parties unless one is already dead.
- Consent and pardon are valid defenses in adultery or concubinage.
NOTE:
PP VS. ILARDE 125 SCRA 11
The affidavit complaint began with this statement:
Im formally charging my wife and X and would request this affidavit be considered a
formal complaint against them
The prosecutor phrased the Information, filed after the death of the complainant, in this
manner:
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Exception: there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue
the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process (Merciales v
CA, 429 Phil 70 (2002)).

the undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended husband,
xerox copies of which are hereto attached as annexes A AND B
HELD: The Information sufficiently complies with the requirement that the complaint or
information be signed by the offended party.
Seduction, Abduction and Acts of Lasciviousness
NOTE: Rape has been removed from the coverage of private crimes because under the
new Anti-Rape Law, rape is now a crime against persons rather than chastity. It is no longer a
private crime.
Section 5 provides a list of the people who can file the complaint in cases of seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness. These are the following:
a) The Offended Party, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR.
b) The offended partys parents;
c) The offended partys grandparents;
d) The offended partys guardian; or
e) The State;
As stated in Section 5, from the parents to the State, the list is exclusive and followed in
the order given.
In practical terms this means that if the offended praty, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR, unless
she is incompetent or incapable of filing the complaint for reasons other than minority, if she
wants to file the case, her decision is to be followed regardless of the decision of her parents or
of other people.
As probably discussed in the study of the Revsed Penal Code, the reason for this is the fact
that the offended party may choose to suffer in silence rather than suffer the scandal of a
public trial.
In these cases, even if there is clear evidence that a crime has been committed the public
prosecutor is helpless to do anything unless there is a complaint signed by the offended party.
NOTE: Section 5 DOES NOT APPLY to SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELMER YPARRAGUIRE Y SEPE, G.R. NO.

124391. JULY 5, 2000
Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation
initiated by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the
effect that the offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not determinative of the
jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is governed by the
Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies
and their punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but
a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to
prosecute the guilty parties.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the
offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party.
DEFAMATION: SLANDER OR LIBEL IS NOT A PRIVATE CRIME
EXCEPT IF THE DEFAMATION IMPUTES THE COMMISSION OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE,
SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Notable case:
GONZALES VS. ARCILLA 203 SCRA 629
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If an information in the crimes under Section 5 is filed without a complaint, is the

defect jurisdictional or not?

MANG-AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA is not an imputation of adultery as the elements
are not imputed.
What must a complaint or information contain? (Sec. 6, R110)
a. the name of the accused;
b. the designation of the offense given by the statute;
c. the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
d. the name of the offended party;
e. the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
f. the place where the offense was committed.
Purpose:
PP. VS. ROSALINDO CUTAMORA, ET. AL, G.R. NOS. 133448-53. OCTOBER 6, 2000
The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. Elaborating on the accused's right to be informed, this Court held in Pecho v. People (262
SCRA 518) that the objectives of this right are:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution
for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction if one should be had.
On the Name of the Accused (Sec. 7, R110)
- An Erroneous name is not material it can be cured by amendment for as long as the
identity of the accused is established.
On the Designation of the Offense (Sec. 8., R110)
The rule is that the designation of the offense is not material. What is material are the
averments in the body of the information. Thus, an error in the designation of the offense will
not invalidate the information.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: When the facts appearing in the body of the complaint or information
are AMBIGUOS as to permit two or more interpretations, the designation appearing in the
caption controls.
U.S. VS. TICSON 25 PHIL 67

Early in the morning of October 6, 1911, and on an occasion when Braulio Calang, the
husband of Epifania Cupo, was absent from home and she was asleep with her young child in
her arms, the defendant entered their house, situated in Surigao, by cutting the fastenings of
the door, approached the sleeping woman and raised her skirt.
CRIME DESIGNATED WAS TRESPASS TO DWELLING BUT THE FACTS COULD ALSO CONSTITUTE
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. RULE: FOLLOW THE DESIGNATION
On the Cause of the accusation (Sec. 9, R110)
-recite the elements of the crime but not necessarily in the actual words of the law.
-Other words can be used for as long as the same idea is conveyed
Example:
Intent to kill in homicide can be inferred from the other allegations in the information.
Intent to gain in theft can be presumed from the allegation of appropriating a thing belonging
to another.
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Example:

Must conspiracy be expressly alleged or may it be inferred from the other
allegations in the information?
PEOPLE VS. RONNIE QUITLONG, 292 SCRA 360
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the
evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another
in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same
degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the
indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and
with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the
character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of
the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them."
How should conspiracy be alleged as a mode of committing an offense?
VERY IMPORTANT:
Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules have been amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The said provisions now require that BOTH QUALIFYING AND ORDINARY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST be stated in the Information.
This requirement is MANDATORY and, being favorable to the accused, should be
given retroactive effect. Thus it affects cases filed prior to the effectivity of the Revised
Rules on December 1, 2000.
PP. VS. DANIEL MAURICIO, G.R. NO. 133695. FEBRUARY 28, 2001
The use of the word "must" indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure
to comply with Sec. 4, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not
stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given
retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
Example:
PP. VS. ROGELIO R. MORENO, G.R. NO. 140033. JANUARY 25, 2002
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RENE M. FRANCISCO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 177430, JULY 14, 2009
It is sufficient to allege conspiracy as a mode of the commission of an offense in either
of the following manners: (1) by the use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms,
such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
In the same case, is it sufficient to allege that the aaccused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate the transportation, concealment,
and possession of dutiable electronic equipment and accessories with a domestic market value
of P20,000,000.00 contained in container van no. TTNU9201241, but which were declared in
Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No. 118302 as assorted mens and ladies
accessories?
On this issue the Supreme Court ruled we find the phrase participate in and facilitate
to be a clear and definite allegation of conspiracy sufficient for those being accused to be
competently enter a plea and to make a proper defense.

Nocturnity was not alleged in the information filed prior to December 1, 2000 but it
cannot be appreciated EVEN IF PROVEN because the new rule is MANDATORY and is to be given
retroactive effect.
May an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged in the information be
appreciated in determining CIVIL liability?
PEOPLE VS. SUELA, 373 SCRA 163 (JAN. 15, 2002)
citing People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621
-While, under the new rules, an aggravating circumstance that is NOT alleged in the
information CANNOT be appreciated in determining the criminal liability of the accused, the
rules do not prevent its appreciation for the purpose of determining CIVIL liability.
PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO DALISAY, GR 188106, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

In the instant case, the information for rape was filed in 2003 or after the effectivity of
the Revised Rules. Following the doctrine in the second set of cases, the Court can very well
deny the award of exemplary damages based on Article 2230 because the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship, as mentioned above, were not sufficiently alleged.
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of
exemplary damagestaking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendantassociated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer
and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the
Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in
People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to
protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather
than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio
Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "the
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present
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Are the Suela and Catubig ruling still applicable to cases where the information was
filed after the effectivity of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure?

one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a
public example or correction for the public good."
In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the victim, has shown such an
outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the Court sustains the award
of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior. However, the same is
increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
IMPORTANT ISSUE:
Since both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must now be stated in the
Information, is it necessary to specify which circumstances are alleged as qualifying
and which are alleged as ordinary aggravating circumstances?
PEOPLE VS. RODELIO R. AQUINO, G.R. NOS. 144340-42. AUGUST 6, 2002
Reiterated in PP vs. Rommel dela Cruz, GR 175929, December 16, 2008
xxxxx, the Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. The Court has repeatedly
qualified cases of rape 6 where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been
specifically alleged in the Information even without the use of the descriptive words
"qualifying" or "qualified by."
"The fact that the circumstances were described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying"
does not take the Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 248 does not use the word "qualifying" or "aggravating" in enumerating the
circumstances that raise a killing to the category of murder. Article 248 merely refers to the
enumerated circumstances as the "attendant circumstances."
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the
Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to
qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words
"aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to be considered as qualifying
circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to
apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense,
thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the
Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in
proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty
mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper cases.
In cases of rape, is the allegation in the Information that the accused is the uncle
of the victim or that the latter is his niece sufficient to qualify the offense?
The information:
"That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, with use of a
knife, through force, violence and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy over his twelve (12) year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Cristy T. Balisi against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever amounts may be awarded to
her under provisions of the Civil Code."
Held:
In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the "uncle" of
the victim and the latter is his "niece" is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship under Art. 266-B, supra. In People v. Lachica, we held:
"If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or
common law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the Information
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PEOPLE VS. MARCIAL L. LLANTO, G.R. NO. 146458. JANUARY 20, 2003

that he is 'a relative by consanguinity or affinity as the case may be within the third
civil degree.'" (People v. Libo-on, GR No. 136737, May 23, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.;
People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86, 96, August 25, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J. both citing
People v. Ferolino, 329 SCRA 719, 735, April 5, 2000, per Davide, CJ.) Moreover, even if the
relationship by consanguinity or affinity is alleged in the Information, it is still necessary to
allege further that such relationship is within the third civil degree. . ."
Consequently, because of the defect in the information, the accused can only be held liable
for simple rape.
As applied:
The failure to allege the accuseds lack of a license for a gun in the Information
negates the appreciation of the special aggravating circumstance against him.
PEOPLE VS. JESSIELITO BADAJOS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 139692. JANUARY 15, 2004
Under Republic Act No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed gun to commit homicide is a special
aggravating circumstance. The culprit's lack of a license for the gun is an essential element of
such circumstance, which must be alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, there is no allegation in the
Information that the appellant had no license to possess the firearm he used to kill Donque.
Thus, the appellant's use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered against him.
The allegation in the information that the accused is armed with a knife is
sufficient to comply with the need to allege that the accused was armed with a
deadly weapon to qualify the crime of rape to rape with the use of a deadly
weapon.
PEOPLE VS. JOSEPH ORILLA, G.R. NOS. 148939-40. FEBRUARY 13, 2004
Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information that
he was "armed with a knife" does not comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the Amended Information that the
accused was "armed with a knife" is not in any way equivalent to "use of a deadly weapon."
The "knife" could simply be a "butter knife," a harmless knife. Appellant opines that the
Amended Information should have stated that accused was "armed with a deadly knife, which
is a deadly weapon."
We have held in several cases that the allegation "armed with a knife" is sufficient to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him. 45 The prosecution also proved during
the trial appellant's use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she was not able to shout
because appellant pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.
EXCEPTION: The place must be specific only in cases where it is an essential element of
the offense or necessary for the identification of the offense.
Example: Some Violations of the Omnibus Election Code such as entering a polling place
where the accused is not a voter therein nor an authorized watcher of a candidate or
party.
On the date of the commission of the offense (Sec. 11, R110)
The date or the time of commission need not be specific. The phrase On or about is
sufficient to cover a span of a few months.
EXCEPTION- when the date or time is an essential element of the offense.
Examples: Violation of the liquor ban on the day prior to or on the day of the elections.
Also in the crime of infanticide which must be committed within 72 hours (three days)
from the birth of the child otherwise it would be murder.
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On the place of commission of the offense (Sec. 10, R 110)

-the place need not be specific for as long as it is clear that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court where it was filed.

PEOPLE VS. MELITON T. JALBUENA, GR 171163, JULY 4, 2007
Is an allegation that the offense of statutory rape was committed on or about the
month of august 1996 sufficient?
In rape, the gravamen of the offense being the carnal knowledge of a woman, the date
is not an essential element, hence, the specification of the exact date or time for its
commission is not important.
In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the information alleges
that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal
knowledge of her.
PEOPLE VS. NELSON ARRAZ, GR 163695, OCTOBER 24, 2008
Information for Rape alleges the date of commission as on or about the 20 day of April,
2003 but the testimony showed that the offense was committed in the early morning of April
21, 2003.
The court sustains the lower courts in holding that the date of the commission of the
rape is not an essential element of the crime. Even a variance of a few months between the
time in the information and that established by the evidence during the trial has been held not
to constitute a serious error warranting the reversal of a conviction on that ground (reiterated
in People vs. Gualberto, GR 186460, dec 4, 2009)
On the Name of the Offended Party (Sec. 12, R110)
General Rule: The complaint or information must state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or
any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known.
Examples:
SLANDER
ARTURO BORJAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 126466. JANUARY 14, 1999
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.
citing:
Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922). See also Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr.,
No. L-16969, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 807; People v. Monton, No. L-16772, 30 November 1962, 6
SCRA 801.
STATUTORY RAPE
the victim must be described as being below 12 years of age
PP. VS. RENATO, G.R. NOS. 123156-59. AUGUST 29, 2000
Clearly, conviction of appellant for statutory rape (absent any allegation in the information
that the complainants were below 12 years of age at the time of the rape), and not for rape
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PP VS. JULIANA UBA, 99 PHIL 134

While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the
information the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the
offended party, the mistake thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such
that it necessarily affected the identification of the act charged. The act of insulting X is distinct
from a similar act of insult against Y, even if the insult is preferred by the same person, in the
same language and at about the same time. Note that the pleading that give the court
jurisdiction to try the offense is not the complaint of the offended party, but the information by
the fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting or defamatory language, not the
imputation of an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party.
(People vs. Marquez, 68 Phil., 521; Blanco vs. People, 70 Phil., 735.)

through force or intimidation, which was the method alleged would violate the right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him; which right is granted. by
the Constitution to every accused to the end that he could prepare an adequate defense for
the offenses charged against him. Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged while he is
concentrating his defense against the offense alleged would be unfair and underhanded.
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULEIn offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property
must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
PEOPLE VS. CFI OF QUEZON CITY, G.R. NO. L-41903. JUNE 10, 1992
We rule that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the information. The information was
already sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not
to have alleged the State as the offended party is without merit for in the case of Sayson v.
People, (G.R. No. 51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680) in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110
(now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held
that in offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not
absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information
can be properly identified.
RAMON F. SAYSON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. L-51745. OCTOBER 28, 1988
The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the
information charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America
because the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution show very clearly that the
accused allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate
and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross violation
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the
allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof
does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal." People v. Catli, G.R. No. L-11641,
November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if
there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name Rule
110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the
offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION
The case of U.S. VS. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil., 330, appears to us to be in point and decisive
of the case. The reasons for the decision in that case were, first, because, to convict a person
of robbing X when the person robbed is Y is violative of the principles of pleading and, second,
because then the plea of double jeopardy would be of no avail to an accused. To this same
effect is our decision in People vs. Balboa, 90 Phil., 5. (quoted from the Uba case)
DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 13, R 110)
An information charging more than one offense is called a duplicitous information.
Rule:
PP. VS. MANALILI, G.R. NO. 121671. AUGUST 14, 1998
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ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION

Under the Constitution, an accused has the right to be informed, before trial, of the nature
of the offense with which he or she is charged. Regardless of how conclusive and convincing
the evidence of guilt may be, there can be no conviction, unless the offense is charged (or is
necessarily included) in the complaint or information. On the other hand, an accused, who fails
to object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of
the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of
such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that
an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged.
Does not apply to complex crimes, compound crimes, continued crimes, and special
complex crimes and other instances where only one penalty will be imposed on
several crimes.
Complex Crimes in General
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
1. Delito Complejo (Complex Crimes Proper)
- when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other
Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents
Note: Article 48 also applies to culpable felonies (criminal negligence)
PP VS. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, G.R. NO. 131588. MARCH 27, 2001
In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in
Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of
imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of
Appeals, 29 the accused was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby
drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
2. Delito Compuesto (Compound Crimes)
- a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
e.g. one gunshot hitting and killing two people
Interesting case:
PP. VS. BONIFACIO LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 136861. NOVEMBER 15, 2000
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant was charged with the complex crime of
murder with abortion, not of two independent charges of murder and unintentional abortion. In
a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only
one crime in the eyes of the law. The stabbing and killing of the victim which caused likewise
the death of the fetus arose from the single criminal intent of killing the victim, as shown by
accused-appellant's pursuit of the victim after she was able to escape (People vs. Alacar, 211
SCRA 580 1992).
Effect of Complex Crimes:
In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. As between murder and unintentional abortion,
murder is the more serious crime and the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death.
Death being the maximum or the greater penalty must then be imposed, and since this is an
indivisible penalty, the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is inconsequential.
3. Delito Continuado (Continued Crimes) a.k.a. Single Larceny Doctrine
-a series of acts arising out of a single criminal intent
-not under Article 48 but applied by the Supreme Court in the case of 49 Phil. 437 1926
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Is there such a crime as Murder with Abortion?

APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:
1. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the
same place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 1939).
2. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at
the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 1974).
3. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De
Leon, 49 Phil. 437 1926).
4. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects
veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be
paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 1964). The collections of the
legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services
rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People
v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 1955).
NOT APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:
1. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to
December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113
Phil. 306 1961). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.
2. Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to
conceal the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations
and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 1938).
3. Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector
to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the
pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77
1976).
4. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 1975).
Explained in:
As Applied to Shooting Incidents

-one shot 3 dead= I crime (Pp vs. Hubilo 220 SCRA 389)-compound crime (delito complejo)
-3 shots 3 dead onfiltered= separate crimes (People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1
-single pressing of the trigger of a machine gun resulting to multiple victims
= separate crimes (Pp. vs. Tabaco 270 SCRA 32) as many crimes as there are victims
4. Hernandez Doctrine
99 PHIL 515 AND ENRILE VS. SALAZAR 186 SCRA 217
-The felony of rebellion absorbs all felonies pursuant to its commission, such as murder
or homicide, and crimes penalized by special laws, such as carnapping and illegal
possession of firearms.
5. Special Complex Crimes
-specifically provided for in the Revised Penal Code
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SANTIAGO VS. GARTICHORENA 228 SCRA 214

and made to apply to special laws under Article 10 of the RPC
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under
the law to enjoy such privilege.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended
information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

Examples:
Robbery with Rape Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659
Robbery with Homicide Article 294 does not matter if several homicide is committed it would
still be considered robbery with homicide and not robbery with multiple homicide.
Note: An Information alleging more than one way the same crime was committed IS
NOT DUPLICITOUS
Example:
PEOPLE VS. BUENVIAJE, 47 PHIL. 536
where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law and the information
charged both illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor, it was
held that "the information was not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were merely
different means of committing the same offense, notwithstanding the fact that they are
prohibited by separate sections of the statute
BERNARDO GALLEGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. L-57841. JULY 30, 1982
The chairman and three other members of the Board for Marine Deck Officers in the May,
1979 examinations, two of whom are petitioners, were charged in the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for giving unwarranted
benefits to particular examinees. In the motion to quash the aforesaid information, petitioners
Gallego and Agoncillo claimed, among others, that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act is null and void because it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore cannot be a
basis of any criminal prosecution and that the information charges the accused with three (3)
distinct offenses, to wit: "(a) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality;
(b) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through gross inexcusable negligence" while in the discharge of their
official and/or administrative functions. The motion to quash was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.
The Supreme Court held that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness since the phrases "manifest partiality,''
"evident bad faith'' and "gross inexcusable negligence'' merely describe the different modes by
which the offense penalized in the said section of the statute may be committed, and the use
of all the phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three
distinct offenses.
AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION (Sec. 14, R110)
Exception Introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged or , can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
RULES ON AMENDMENTS AFTER PLEA
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
Requisites:
1. The amendment is merely formal.
2. There must be leave of court.
3. It must not prejudice the rights of the accused.
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RULES ON AMENDMENTS BEFORE PLEA

General Rule: Before the arraignment of the accused, the prosecution may amend the
information whether in form or in substance.

Period
Before arraignment
After
arraignment
before plea
What can be changed

Form or substance
but
After Plea and during trial
Formal or substance
Formal only
Procedure & requisites

No need for motion or leave of
court
Upon motion
With leave of court
With notice to offended party
Provided that it would not
prejudice the rights of the
accused
There must be leave of court
Formal vs. Substantial Amendments

Substantial Amendments
Substantial amendments consists of major or
material changes in the information, such as a
change in the manner of the commission of
the offense, in the date of the commission
over a wide span of time, or change in the
name of the victim or offended party.
Formal Amendments
Formal amendments come in the form of
correcting the spelling or clerical errors or
other minor changes in the information which
merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the
original information, and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged.
Examples of Formal Amendments:

In the case of Dennis T. Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140311. March 30,
2001), the Supreme court said that Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long
as:
1. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription;
2. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged;
3. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to
require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his
defense;
4. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher
penalty;
5. it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment.
Cases:
Vega v. Panis, No. L-40842, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 269.
People v. Casey, No. L-30146, 24 February 1981, 103 SCRA 21
PP. VS. ZULUETA 89 PHIL. 755

The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling
the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the
trial court.
2. An amendment which changes the name of the offended party
PP VS. JULIANA UBA, 99 PHIL 134
An amendment to change the name of the offended party in the information to the name of
the true victim as established by evidence is substantial because defamation against X is
different from defamation against Y.
Do not confuse this with
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Examples of Substantial Amendments:

1. An amendment which changes the manner of the commission of the offense

DANILO BUHAT VS. CA, G.R. NO. 119601. DECEMBER 17, 1996
the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who was
found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the victim
while petitioner was stabbing him, is only a formal amendment and one that does not prejudice
any of the accused's rights. Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the
accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the
accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged
affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of
the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact. In fact, it is to be expected
that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became
known to the public prosecutor.
3. An amendment to change the date of commission of the offense over a wide span
of time.
NOTE:
DENNIS T. GABIONZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 140311. MARCH 30, 2001
The public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, to change
the material dates stated in the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991
to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was
substantial in nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed
of the cause and nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses
that were otherwise available to him.
Held: In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not
of substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless
time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the Information
the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that
the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the Complaint or Information will permit.
Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail
to see how his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the
prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence in
support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his rights.
Note: but if the change is only within a span of a few months such as from June 24, 1981 to
August 28, 1981, the amendment is formal (Pp. vs. Borromeo, 123 SCRA 253) (See also Pp. vs.
Molero 144 SCRA 397)
4. An amendment for the purpose of making the information charge an offense when
the original information does not charge any offense
5. An amendment which changes the fact or ground of responsibility of the accused.
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PEOPLE VS. ALFREDO C. REYES, G.R. NO. L-32557. OCTOBER 23, 1981
In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated for an offense
allegedly committed in August of 1964. Then, he was charged for an offense allegedly
committed in August of 1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires
to put him on trial for the alleged 1964 offense. This cannot legally be done.
While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the
precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this
does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged
crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so
indefinite as to amount to the same thing. The prosecution is given the chance to allege an
approximation of time of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be
stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given
approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

PEOPLE VS. HON. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. L-45772. MARCH 25,
1988
It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of
the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in
the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different
from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the
Court.
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THE

AMENDMENT
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.
(People vs. Hon. Eduardo Montenegro, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-45772. March 25, 1988)
SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO VS. PP, GR 151785, DECEMBER 10, 2007
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment
of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered
her plea, the four Informations could still be amended.
Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Information
only, not four or multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular
word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or
Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have been
intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby two or more
complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more informations.
Rule:
There can be substitution only if the offense charged is WHOLLY DIFFERENT from the
offense proven.
Test to determine identity of offenses:
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or
a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, and offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
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SUBSTITUTION
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (14a)

a part of those constituting the latter (Teehankee, Jr. vs Madayag, et al.,G.R. No. 103102, March
6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 140.)
Does not apply if the offense proven is necessarily included in or necessarily
includes the offense charged
GALVEZ VS. CA 237 SCRA 695
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while
the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the
second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper
offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could
only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in
the offense charged in the original information.
TEEHANKEE, JR. VS MADAYAG, ET AL., G.R. NO. 103102, MARCH 6, 1992, 207 SCRA
134, 140
"It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Except for amendments which downgrade the offense or excludes any of the accused, an
amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must ALWAYS be with leave of court as the original information
has to be dismissed; (as amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure)
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accuse; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or
to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or
is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
"In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph
thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
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DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUBSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT
SUBSTITUTION
Involve either formal or substantial change
Involves only substantial change
GR: amendment before plea can be had even Always with leave of court
without leave of court
Exception: when amendment involves the
downgrading of the offense or the exclusion of
one of the accused
When amendment involves only the form of a New PI must be conducted and there is a need
complaint or information, there is no need for for the retaking of the plea
a new preliminary investigation or re-taking of
the plea
Amended info refers to the same offense New information involves entirely different
charged or to an offense necessarily included offense
in the original charge or necessarily includes
the original charge

the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order."
WHERE SHOULD A CRIMINAL CASE BE INSTITUTED? (Sec. 15, R110)
GENERAL RULE: -shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.
Ratio Legis
What is the reason why the rules provide that the case should be tried in the place where the
crime was committed?
1. The interest of the public requires that to secure the best results and effects in the
punishment of crimes, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very
place or as near as may be where he committed the crime.
2. Insofar as the interest of the accused is concerned, it will be inconvenient for him to
look for witnesses and other evidence in another place.
Exceptions when existing laws provide otherwise:
Examples:
1. Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code on Libel allows the filing of the case (a)
where the libelous matter was printed or first published (b) where the offended party
resides or (c) if he is a public officer, where he holds office at the time of commission.
2. R.A. 8429- Cases covered by the Sandiganbayan Law will be tried in the places
designated by the law
3. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution- The Supreme Court can order a
change of venue in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
What are the types of offenses as to place of commission:
1. Local -refers to an offense where all the elements were committed in the same place
or, in other words, one which was fully consummated in one place.
2. Transitory -refers to a case where the elements of the offense were committed in
several places.
PEOPLE VS. HON NATHANIEL GOROSPE, G.R. NOS. L-74053-54. JANUARY 20, 1988
As to estafa:
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its
basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places (People vs.
Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage
was inflicted in Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See
People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court
or the Pampanga Court. For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was
not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and
delivered. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument
is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725,
cited in People vs. Yabut, supra).
As to B.P. 22
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares
vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law
penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and
issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The
case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining
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Cases on Transitory Offenses:

venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be
within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11,
1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga.
ROBBERY AND ANTI-FENCING LAW
PEOPLE VS. HON JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, G.R. NO. 77368. OCTOBER 5, 1993
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
"Fencing," upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or shall be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The
law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or
theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that
it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken
by means of either robbery of theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is
inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which
presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable
likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted.
Specific rule on offenses committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private
vehicle in the course of its trip
-instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft, or
other vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
Example:
PEOPLE VS. FRANCISCO ZAFRA, OCT. 19, 1994
The accused stole a passenger jeepney and killed the owner in Alabang, Muntinlupa and were
arrested, still riding the stolen jeepney in Calamba, Laguna
Held: As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba while they were in the
carnapped jeepney, the information was validly filed in Calamba.
Venue of a Criminal Case committed aboard a seagoing vessel:

1. First Port of Entry- where the vessel will first dock. Note: does not include place of
departure
2. Any Municipality or Territory through which the vessel passed
Example:
WENEFREDO CALME VS. CA, G.R. NO. 116688. AUGUST 30, 1996
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and
operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on
the night of 12 May 1991. The case was filed in Oroquieta City
Petitioner claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest
filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point,
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Specific rule on offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage
-shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.

Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped
overboard."
The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established.
The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island
when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the
alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was
in transit. "In transit" simply means "on the way or passage; while passing from one
person or place to another. In the course of transportation." Hence, undoubtedly, the
applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 100 which provides that
"(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would
still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue
under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories
through which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any
province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed
shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is
vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through
which the vessel passed during such voyage . . ." This is the applicable provision and since it
does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same.
Specific rule on Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under
- shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)
PRIVATE PROSECUTORS:
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. (Sec. 16, R110)
What are the rights of the offended party in relation to a criminal case?
1. To take part in the prosecution of the offense;
2. To recover civil liabilities arising out of the offense charged.
3. To appeal an adverse judgment or order affecting his claim to such civil liability:
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Principle of Extraterritoriality in the Revised Penal Code

ARTICLE 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also
outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
In these cases, the first court that takes cognizance of the case will have
jurisdiction to try it.
Can an offended party intervene in a case punished under a special law when the
said law does not provide for the civil aspect of the case?
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
CHARMINA BANAL VS. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., 156 SCRA 325, 330 (1987).
-it is the fact of damage or injury to a party that is the basis of civil liability in a criminal case,
thus there can be an award of civil liability in Violations of B.P. 22 even if it is a crime against
public order.
Who can be an offended party?
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 140576-99. DECEMBER 13,
2004
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or
directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity
which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to
recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the
legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil
liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The
interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
RULE 111-- PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Institution of criminal and civil actions (Sec. 1, R. 111)
MAJOR AMENDMENT
Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising out of ALL SOURCES of civil liability was deemed instituted in the criminal case and a
waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others and even the institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
However, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ONLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
OUT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS DEEMED INSTITUTED.
2. The acquittal of the accused in the criminal case or the failure of the judge therein to award
civil liability against the accused will not bar, by res judicata, the filing of a separate civil
action based on quasi delicts. (Jose S. Cancio, Jr. vs. Emerenciana Isip Nov. 12, 2002)
3. The judge in a criminal case MAY NO LONGER APPLY the provisions in the Civil Code on quasidelicts as basis for an award of civil liability. (This is an abandonment of the rulings in the cases
of Maniago vs. CA 253 SCRA 674 and San Idelfonso Lines vs. CA 289 SCRA 568)
4. The pendency of the criminal case will not preclude THE ACCUSED therein from filing a
separate civil action based on quasi-delict against the private complainant. (Casupanan vs.
Laroya, August 26, 2002)
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SOME MAJOR EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT

1. Actions premised on quasi delicts and other independent civil actions may be filed
separately by the complainant/plaintiff WITHOUT ANY RESERVATION OF THE RIGHT TO FILE A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION. (Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26, 2002)

When is the claim for civil liability ARISING out of the offense charged NOT deemed
instituted?
1. The offended party waives the civil action;
2. He reserves the right to institute it separately
3. He institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
4. He institutes the civil action after the criminal action but before presentation of
prosecutions evidence and he duly informs the court where the criminal case is pending
of the institution of the civil action. (Yakult vs. CA 190 SCRA 357)
NOTE: Again, the civil action referred to here is one ARISING OUT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED
DOCKET (FILING) FEES
RULE: There is NO FILING FEE for claims for ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal cases. EXCEPTION:
If the Rules Provide otherwise. Example: B.P. 22 cases. and recently Estafa Cases
Claims for OTHER (moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary) will be assessed filing fees
upon filing of the case in court ONLY when the amounts thereof are specified in the complaint
or information. If the amounts are not specified then the filing fees will be first lien on the
judgment based on whatever is awarded by the court.
Distinguish rules on docket fees in criminal cases from the rules in civil cases.
1. In civil cases, docket fees are levied on ALL FORMS OF DAMAGES while in criminal
cases no docket fees are charged on ACTUAL DAMAGES.
2. In civil cases, the amount of the claims must be stated in the Complaint or
Counterclaim so that the proper docket fees can be computed and paid. In criminal
cases in general, even if the amount of the damages are not stated in the information or
complaint, these can still be proven and the docket fees on these claims will be a lien on
the judgment.
ANOTHER AMENDMENT:
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
- This abandons the Rulings in Shafer vs. RTC of Olongapo (167 SCRA 376) and Javier vs. IAC
(171 SCRA 376)
Interesting Case:
ANITA CHENG VS. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY, GR 174238, JULY 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila
against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie
Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of
Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their
loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed
account.
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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (incorporation of Circ. 57-97 into the rules)

- Exception to the rule that no filing fees are assessed on ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal
cases. In B.P. 22 cases, filing fees are based on the amount of the check which is
considered as the actual damages claimed.
- As to other kinds of damages the applicable rule is the same as in other criminal
cases.
- The rules now require MANDATORY consolidation of the claim for civil
liability in B.P. 22 cases but if the civil case was filed ahead, consolidation will be
done only if the trial of the civil case has not yet commenced and there must be an
application for consolidation in the court trying the criminal case.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against
respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of
the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. On the other hand, the
Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of
the accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature."
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its
Order dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil
liability of accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18,
Manila, a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452)
based on the same loaned amount ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously
subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount
of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of
Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issues:
1. Will Sec. 1 of Rule 111 requiring the mandatory consolidation of the civil aspect of the case
with the bp 22 case be given RETROACTIVE EFFECT such that the failure of the
complainants to appeal the civil aspect of the dismissed BP 22 case will bar them from filing
a separate civil action?
2. Considering that the reason of the dismissal in this case was the failure of the prosecutor to
have the complainant identify the accused in the case and since they were not represented
by a private prosecutor will the negligence for the public prosecutor be binding upon the
complainant?
Held:
On the first issue
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should
not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22
includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be
stressed, that this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact,
the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where
petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP
Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on
account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of
this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not
applicable.
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in
stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be
adhered to in order to attain this objective.
On the Second Issue:
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the
prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount
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loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may
proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to
appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to
recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in
the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.
CRIM ASPECT
BP
22
CASE
CIVIL ASPECT
DISMISSED
NO DECISION OR
DECISION NOT
FAVORABLE TO
COMPLAINANT
END OF CRIM
CASE
APPEAL
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their
counsel. But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels mistake is so great and
serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is
guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law. Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls within the
exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and
to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the Bar. Further, lawyers in the government service are
expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe
utmost fidelity to public service. Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself
with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP
Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the
money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By
this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their
obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation when it dismissed the
estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of
respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner
to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as
they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a
technicality applied against petitioner.
SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION (Sec. 2, R112)

Note: This applies only to the civil aspect arising out of the offense charged (based
on Art. 100 of the RPC and related articles)
-If the offended party reserves the right to file a separate civil action, it cannot be filed
until the criminal case is finished.
-if he filed the separate civil action ahead of the criminal case, then the civil case will be
suspended until the criminal case is finished.
-The prescriptive period of the suspended action will be tolled until there is a final
judgment in the criminal case while the criminal case is still ongoing.
Option:
-The offended party can ask for the consolidation of the separate civil action with the
criminal case only if there has been no judgment yet in the civil case.
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Under OCA Circular 21-03, docket fees are NOW also assessed on estafa cases UPON
filing of the information in court

-In case of such a consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall
be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action but the accused/defense
shall have the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the offended party in the civil
case and both parties may present additional evidence.
Note:
The provision stating without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to crossexamine the witness presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence- MUST BE A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.
This should be without prejudice to the right of the accused/defense to crossexamine the witness presented by the offended party in the civil case.
Otherwise, it would not make sense. Why would the prosecution cross-examine the
witnesses of the offended party when they are on the same side?
If the consolidation cannot be done under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it may
be allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure
NAGUIAT VS. IAC 164 SCRA 505
-Violation of P.D. 957 cannot be consolidated, under Section 2 of Rule 111, with civil action for
specific performance to deliver titles because the civil action did not arise out of the act
complained of in the criminal case
However, consolidation can be done under the Rules of Civil Procedure which allow
consolidation of cases with similar questions of fact and law.
GENERAL RULE:
CONSOLIDATION IS OPTIONAL EXCEPT
1. Article 360 of the RPC.
2. Cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
3. B.P. 22 cases (SC Circ No. 57-97)
These are cases where the law imposes MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
OLD RULEExtinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

(b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature; and. (Even if not expressly declared if based on an exempting
circumstance.)
(c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the
accused is acquitted.
Plus some others based on criminal law:
(d) acquittal is based on an exempting circumstance
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REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMON SUA, G.R. NO.
128927. SEPTEMBER 14, 1999
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where:

NOTE: *IF ACQUITTAL IS BASED ON A JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE except STATE OF NECESSITY
then there is NO CIVIL LIABILITY
PEOPLE VS. SALAO 284 SCRA 493
The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability arising from crime (ex delicto). It
is not the civil liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be brought "separately and
independently" of the criminal action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. The civil liability based on
such cause of action is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Indeed,
because the offended party does not intervene in the criminal prosecution, it is entirely
possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented by
the public prosecutor in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the criminal case
may be acquitted. This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs of Guaring v. Court of
Appeals where, because the only survivor in a motor car accident whose testimony proved to
be pivotal in the civil case was not called to testify in the criminal prosecution of the driver of
the other vehicle, the latter was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS (Sec. 3, R111)
RESERVATION IS NO LONGER REQUIRED IN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. HON. ALEJANDRO VELEZ G.R. NO.
129282. NOVEMBER 29, 2001
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of
the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
NEPLUM, INC., VS. ORBESO, G.R. NO. 141986, JULY 11, 2002 3RD DIVISION
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on
the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved
in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the
same act or omission.
EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY (Sec. 4, R111)
- An entirely new provision inserted that was based on the case of PP. vs. Bayotas. 236 SCRA
239
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
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What are the effects of the removal of the reservation requirement for independent
civil actions?

case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
PP. VS. PEDRO ABUNGAN, SEPT. 28, 2000
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.' "
"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the)
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) delicts
e) Quasi-delicts
"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription."
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Secs. 6 and 7, R110)
MAJOR CHANGE:
NEW ELEMENTS:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Where and when may prejudicial questions be raised?
-During preliminary investigation (whether by a public prosecutor or an MTC) or in court if
the case has already been filed in court. However, the issue must be raised before the
prosecution rests.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. JANIOLA, ET AL., GR 184861, JUNE 30, 2009
Facts:
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OLD ELEMENTS:
a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action;
(b) the resolution of such issue is determinative of whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

Petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
dated July 24, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases
involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In
other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as
against the criminal cases.
The lower court granted the motion hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court committed an error in suspending the proceedings in the
criminal case on the basis of "prejudicial question" in the civil case no?
Held: YES
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions
dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in
Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial
question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was
filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard
against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a
pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
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Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases that the elements of a prejudicial question, as
stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People, are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective
and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now
provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when
the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency
of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to
have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil
case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had." In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted,"
was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation
to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent"
directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil
action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits,
we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending
final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
"previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible
of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or
during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
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Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the
State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation
or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is,
still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between
the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in
consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of
a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as
follows:
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance
of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
BP 22. In Mejia v. People, we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking
communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum.
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(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.

Lee v. Court of Appeals is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of
valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent
indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact
that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the
criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists
and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26,
2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders
dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC,
Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
Some cases:
Isabela Marbella Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis July 31, 2000

- a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for bigamy.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite usually the
marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario
would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
In criminal violations of PD 957 or 1344, is a finding of administrative liability by the
HLURB a condition sine qua non to the assumption of jurisdiction by the prosecution
service in conducting a preliminary investigation?
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ALFREDO CHING VS. COURT OF APPEALS, APRIL 27, 2000

- civil action for nullity of documents is not a PQ in a case for estafa.
Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case
for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the
court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between
the parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still
be established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it
differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto
follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution
and liability.

SPS. CHUA VS ANG, ET AL., GR 156164, SEPT 4, 2009
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURBs jurisdiction over contractual rights and
obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But
hand in hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for
violations of the Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39, heretofore quoted.
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39
criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose
administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:
Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not
exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or
regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of
execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
The Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that "The implementation and payment of
administrative fines shall not preclude criminal prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of
the Decree." Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two
separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically,
the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this case no such
provision applies), the determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal
procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide that
the prerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause lies with the
persons duly authorized by law; as provided in this Rule, they are (a) Provincial or City
Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) other officers as may be
authorized by law.
GOING BACK TO THE GENERAL RULE:
CRIMINAL CASES WILL HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER CIVIL EXCEPT:
1. Independent Civil Actions
2. When the civil action presents a prejudicial question.
3. Where the civil action is consolidated with the criminal action.
4. When the civil action is not one intended to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense.
(Naguiat vs. CA)
RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Preliminary investigation -an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
PI is required if the imposable penalty for the offense exceeds 4 years and 2 months
Note: The 4 y 2 m guideline is a major amendment because the 1985 Rules required PI for
all RTC cases and this was heavily affected when RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the
MTCs. The amendment, restored the situation prior to RA 7691.
PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, (G.R. NO. 126005. JANUARY 21,
1999.)
citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
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NOTE: AMENDED BY AM NO 05-8-26-SC (RE: AMENDMENT OF RULES 114 OF THE

REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY REMOVING THE CONDUCT OF
PRLIMINARY INVESTIGATION FROM JUDGES OF THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS)

The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free the respondent from the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a
formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such
summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense and
effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or
groundless charges.
IS LACK OF PI A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT?
SANCIANGCO, JR. VS. PEOPLE 149 SCRA 1
DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
AS CITED IN PILAPIL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 221 SCRA 349
"The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if
there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite
the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information,
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted . . ."
Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is
waivable. In fact, it is frequently waived
Is a new P.I. required if there is an amendment of the information?
Remember the case of Teehankee vs. Madayag.
If the change in an information is only formal and thereby does not affect the defense of
the accused, a new P.I. is not required.
The test of Probable Cause
Who may
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
conduct Preliminary Investigations? (Sec. 2, R112)

Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
Other officers as may be authorized by law.
What is the scope of their authority?

-all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial
jurisdictions
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TERESITA DOMALANTA, ET AL VS. COMELEC, ET AL G.R. NO. 125586, JUNE 29, 2000
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.

NOTE: MTC, MTCC, CTC Judges cannot conduct preliminary investigations anymore
under the amendments of the rules in AM 05-8-26 which took effect last October 3,
2005.
CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
Other officers :
Criminal Violations of the Omnibus Election Code
-P.I. to be conducted by the COMELEC
Office of the Ombudsman
May the Office of the Ombudsman investigate a public official even if the offense is
not in relation to his public office?
DELOSO VS. DOMINGO G.R. NO. 90591. NOVEMBER 21, 1990
The clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act
or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The reason
for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are
able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or
dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
NATIVIDAD VS. FELIX (G.R. NO. 111616. FEBRUARY 4, 1994)

As we held in Aguinaldo v. Domagas and recently, Sanchez v. Demetriou, such authority of
the Ombudsman "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged," in other words, concurrent with similarly authorized agencies
of the government. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of
such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the Government.
A careful scrutiny of Sec. 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 will reveal that the word
"may" is used in regard to the Ombudsman's assumption of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The word "may," being generally permissive and since it
operates to confer discretion, it follows that the Ombudsman's investigatory powers are but
directory in nature.
IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE PROCEDURE FOR PI (Sec. 3, R112)
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the
evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to
present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying
by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party
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In Relation to Public Office is material in determining the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan but it its NOT a limit to the investigative powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman

This provision came from:
Webb vs. De Leon 247 SCRA 652
We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the
NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during
their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence,
unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the
constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during the
preliminary investigation to a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3)(a) of Rule 112
which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint which shall .
. . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents. . . ."
Will a delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violate the right of the
respondent to speedy disposition of cases?
The Tatad Ruling
(Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70, 82, March 21, 1988)
- The delay of 3 years was already violative of the right of the respondent to speedy
disposition of cases and right to due process in view of the simplicity of the issues in the
cases.
How should the Tatad Doctrine be applied?
BINAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NOS. 120681-83. OCTOBER 1, 1999

In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the
issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The "unexplained
inaction" of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to
speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in
existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting
agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the
lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, (228 SCRA 214)the complexity of the issues and the failure of
the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to
her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator, the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases
("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to
speedy disposition was not violated therein
Will the Tatad Ruling apply even if the respondent did not take actions to accelerate
the disposition of his case?
Elpidio C. Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan May 18, 1999
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SOCRATES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN- G.R. NOS. 116259-60, FEBRUARY 20, 1996

We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the
application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably
clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the length
of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance
and considerations.

It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay
was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
NOTABLE ISSUES ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR AND
ITS REVIEW (Sec. 4, R 112)
Will the lack of certification invalidate an information?
Sec. 4, R112 requires that in preparing the resolution and information when a prosecutor
finds probable cause, he shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by
the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence
ALVIZO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 220 SCRA 45
-The lack of a certification will not invalidate the information because the certification is not an
essential part of the information. It is merely a formal defect.
NOTE:
Resolutions of investigating prosecutors are forwarded for approval, within five
(5) days, to:
Provincial Prosecutor
If PI is conducted by the Provincial
Prosecutors Office or by MTC conducting PI
City Prosecutor
If PI is conducted by the City Prosecutors
Office
Chief State Prosecutor
If PI is conducted by the Regional State
Prosecutors Office
INVESTIGATI
NG
Ombudsman or his Deputy
in cases of offenses cognizable by the
PROSECUTO
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
R
APPEAL
original jurisdiction PROVL
YE
BY
CITY
PROSECUTORS
OFF
ACCUSE
D
CITY
PROSECUTORS
IS THERE
PROBABLE
CAUSE?
IS THERE
PROBABLE
CAUSE?
REGL STATE
PROSECUTOR
REGL STATE
PROSECUTORS
OFF
SANDIGANBAYA
N
PROSECUTOR
APPEAL
BY
OFFEND
ED
PARTY
NO
OMBUDSMAN
OR HIS DEPUTY
SIGMA LEGIS COPY
PROVL
PROSECUTORS
OFF
NO
NO
IS THERE
PROBABLE
CAUSE?
YE
S
DIRECT PROSECUTOR
CONCERNED TO FILE THE
SEC. OF
JUSTICE
APPEAL
BY
ACCUSED
APPEAL
BY
OFFENDE
D PATY
YE
S
45

DIRECT
ANOTHER
PROSECUTOR TO
FILE THE INFO
OR
FILE THE INFO
HIMSELF
WITHOUT
CONDUCTING
ANOTHER PI
Bear in mind that appeal of the investigating prosecutors resolution is an administrative

remedy and not a judicial proceeding
Note: the amendment to include the Ombudsman or his deputy is intended to avoid
conflicts of jurisdiction since the authority of the Office of the Ombdusman to
conduct PIs is concurrent with the prosecutors.
What happens if a resolution of dismissal is disapproved?
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by
himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or
state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
What happens in case a resolution is reversed by the Secretary of Justice?
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu propio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting anther preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to
the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of
the Office of the Ombudsman. (4a)
BY RTC OR MTC UPON FILING OF AN INFORMATION

Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Sec 7
of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from the notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint or information.
CHESTER DE JOYA VS. MARQUEZ, GR 162416, JAN 31, 2006
Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. It bear s remembering that in determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on
the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance. Thus, the
standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for
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ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST

establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie
case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest
against him.
NO WARRANT OF ARREST IS NECESSARY IF:
1. Accused is already in detention due to:
a. Warrantless arrest and subsequent inquest investigation.
b. Accused was already arrested based on a warrant issued by an MTC judge
during preliminary investigation.
2. Cases where the penalty is purely fine.
3. Cases covered by the Summary Rules. Note in cases covered by the Summary rules, a
warrant is issued only if the accused fails to appear during arraignment despite notice.
SOME NOTES:
The requirement that the judge, upon filing of the information, shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and the additional power of the judge
to immediately dismiss a case if he finds that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause or to require the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case he has
doubts as to the existence of probable cause are amendments recognizing jurisprudence
establishing the following:
1. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest on the basis of the records of the preliminary
investigation but he cannot rely on the certification of the prosecutor alone. (Soliven vs.
Makasiar 167 SCRA 393, Lim vs. Felix 194 SCRA 292, Teresa Ho vs. People of the
Philippines 280 SCRA 365).
2. The judge is now clearly empowered to dismiss a case if he finds that the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause or to require the prosecutor to present
additional evidence in case he has doubts as to the existence of probable cause. (This
clarifies some confusion as to what the judge is supposed to do if the prosecutor finds
probable cause to hold the accused for trial but the judge does not find probable cause
to issue a warrant of arrest.
ELVIRA ONG VS JOSE CASIM GENIO, GR 182336, DEC 23, 2009

Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an
Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court
within thirty days from the filing of the information.
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in
this case.
Distinguish probable cause to hold an accused for trial from probable cause to issue
a warrant of arrest.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 126005, JANUARY 21, 1999
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstance that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before
issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
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The SC emphasized the power of a judge to immediately dismiss a case if the

evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty thereof."
On the other hand, probable cause to hold an accused for trial is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does nor mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainly. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial is within the authority of
the prosecutor while the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant is within the
exclusive authority of the judge.
ENRIQUE V VIUDEZ II VS. CA, GR 152889, JUN 5, 2009

The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the
arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of
probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot
be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of
the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. It
must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings
and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and
not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no
contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely
wanted the trial court to defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the
resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for review that he filed citing the following
directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular:
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the
appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant
and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state
that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court
whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest,
upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in
consonance with the earlier ruling of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what
to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised
his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the implementation of the
warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA was correct when it found no whimsicality or
oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in issuing the challenged orders.
CAN THE PROSECUTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE BE ENJOINED?
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438- General rule
Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990)
Deloso v. Desierto, G.R. 129939, September 9, 1999.
Roger Posadas, et al vs. Ombudsman et al, G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000
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If a petition for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is filed with
the DOJ, should the issuance and implementation of a warrant of arrest be
suspended if an information has already been filed in court?

GENERAL RULE: The prosecution of a criminal case MAY NOT be enjoined except in
the following circumstances:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano,
et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R.
No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577);
What happens if a person is arrested without a warrant? (Sec. 7, R112)
If a person is arrested without a warrant, the police have a limited time within which to
FILE A CASE WITH THE COURT because Article 125 requires the delivery of the person
arrested to JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES within the periods provided therein.
If the entire process of a preliminary investigation is utilized, all of our police officers will
end up in jail. (for what offense? Arbitrary detention and/or delay in the delivery of detained
persons. The detention may be valid in the beginning but it becomes
invalid after the lapse of the 12, 18 or 36 hrs and no complaint or
information has yet been filed. Just checking if you still remember
FELONIES & their
your crim 2)
Breakdown of the Process:

1. Arrest
2. Recording at the police station.
3. Inquest Investigation- The fiscal will determine probable
cause on the basis of the affidavit of the arresting officer and
the witnesses, whether by affidavit or examination.
Except if the accused asks for a full preliminary
investigation and executes a waiver of his rights under
Article 125 of the RPC in the presence of his counsel
in which case the normal procedure for a preliminary
investigation will be followed. Note: The waiver of
Article 125 of the RTC must be in the presence of the counsel of the accused due
to Section 2 (e) of R.A. 7438)
4. The prosecutor will file the information in court.
5. Within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, the accused may ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule (People vs. Court of Appeals March 23, 1995- the five day
period is mandatory)
-but a motion for preliminary investigation must be filed before arraignment (Go v.
Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, 153 (1992). The right to a preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea on
arraignment. by her failure to invoke her right to a preliminary investigation, Pria
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allowable detention
period prior to the filing
of a criminal complaint
or info:
12 HRS LIGHT
18 HRS
CORRECTIVE
36 HRS - AFFLICTIVE

forfeited her right to one and she can no longer invoke it for the first time on appeal.
( People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274, 284 (1991).)
DIRECT FILING WITH THE RTC (THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION)
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may
be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
IT SEEMS THAT THE RULES NOW ALLOW A SITUATION WHERE DIRECT FILING WITH
THE RTC IS ALLOWED.
Situation:
1. A person is arrested via warrantless arrest.
2. Inquest prosecutor is absent or unavailable.
3. The complaint can be filed by the offended party or a peace officer on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
WARRANTLE
SS ARREST
SUSPECT MUST EXECUTE
WAIVER OF THE 12, 18 OR
36 HRS ALLOWABLE
DETENTION PERIOD
SUSPECT REQUEST FOR A

FULL PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
RECORDING
IN THE POLICE
STN.
Y
E
S
INQUEST
PROSECUTO
R
AVAILABLE?
INQUEST
INVESTIGATI
ON
SUSPECTS
REMAINS IN
CUSTODY
UNTIL FULL PI
IS
CONDUCTED
FILE CASE IN
COURT BEFORE
LAPSE OF 12, 18
OR 36 HRS
FILE DIRECTLY IN THE PROPER

COURT, EVEN IN CASES WHERE PI
IS MANDATORY (RTC ) BEFORE THE
LAPSE OF 12, 18 OR 36 HRS.
N
O
RELEASE SUSPECT UPON

THE LAPSE OF THE 12, 18
OR 36 HRS
OTHERWISE DETAINING OFFICER

COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND/OR
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF
DETAINED PERSON
1. In cases in municipalities not requiring preliminary investigation, the complaint may be

filed directly with the MTC for trial by the offended party, peace officer, or person charged with
the enforcement of the law violated
2. In cases cognizable by the RTC where the accused was arrested via a warrantless arrest
and no inquest prosecutor is available, the complaint can be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Procedure in cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. (Sec. 9, R112)
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. If the complaint is filed directly with the
prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this
Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten
(10) days from its filing.
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When may a criminal case be filed DIRECTLY with the courts for trial ?

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court If the complaint or information is filed
with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered
by this section, the procedure in section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. If
within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds
no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally
examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however,
require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no
probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from
its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had
already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that
there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons
instead of a warrant of arrest. (9a)
REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
November 15, 1991
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
(6) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the
imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
Thus, the foregoing procedure is generally applicable to cases punishable with a penalty from 6
mos. 1 day to 4yrs. 2 mos.
RULE 113 ARREST
Relevance of the Constitution

Considering that the arrest of a person will necessarily involve a distraint of his personal
liberty, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, particularly on the right of all persons to be secure in
their persons and property will necessarily come into play.
Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Cf. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused:
The Courts will acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused through the arrest or
voluntary submission of the accused.
Rule 113 deals with the provisions or procedure relating to the arrest of persons accused of
criminal offenses.

NORMALLY, a person will be arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. The exceptions are the
cases where warrantless arrests are allowed.
Under the constitution, as we have already discussed, there are requirements for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest
1. Issued by a judge
2. probable cause
3. premised upon the judges personal
evaluation of the affidavits of witnesses
and evidence
4. particularly describing the person to be seized.
PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR (159 SCRA 599, APRIL 14, 1988)
A warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs
long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest
should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards
its unidentified subjects, be voided.
An invalid arrest will mean that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused
However in.
PP. VS. SALVATIERRA 276 SCRA 55
Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never
raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. This is the first time that appellant is
raising this issue as he did not even move for the quashal of the information before the trial
court on the ground of illegal arrest. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if
any, had been cured by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he
entered his plea and participated during the trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and
where the trial was free from error.
What is the lifetime of a warrant of arrest?

MALALOAN VS. CA, MAY 6, 1994
In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return
thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.
PEOPLE VS. CESAR G. GIVERA G.R. NO. 132159. JANUARY 18, 2001
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PP VS. ROLANDO ZASPA SEPTEMBER 21, 2000

any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the
accused to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Execution of a warrant of arrest (Sec 4, R. 113)
The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall
cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days
after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make
a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he
shall state the reason therefore. (4a)

Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4,
1996 was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was
returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be
found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to
make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains
enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in
Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return
to the court.
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (Sec. 5 R113)
When may a person be arrested without a warrant?
Under Section 5 of Rule 113:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
PLUS
(d) If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately
pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines. (Sec. 13, of R113)
(e) For the purpose of surrendering the accused, his bondsmen may arrest him without
a warrant. (Sec. 23, R114)
(f) An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if
he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the
case is pending. (Sec. 23, R114)
OR A PRIVATE PERSON
In the situations covered by Section 5, even a private citizen can cause a CITIZENs
ARREST.
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
PP. VS. SUCRO MARCH 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388

repeated in People vs. Evaristo 216 S 431
as stated in Pp. vs. Joselito del Rosario April 14, 1999
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SP04 De Leon during the police raid
at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro44 G.R. No.
93239, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388. we held that when a police officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on
the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the
accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery
with homicide.
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IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
What is meant by in his presence?

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it -A.K.A. ARREST EFFECTED IN HOT PURSUIT
just been committed
PEOPLE VS. MANLULU, APRIL 22, 1994
-nineteen (19) hours later is no longer just been committed
What is meant by personal knowledge of facts?
PP. VS. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL G.R. NO. 138934-35. JANUARY 16, 2002
POSADAS V. OMBUDSMAN, 341 SCRA 388, 397 CITING PEOPLE V. DORIA, 301 SCRA
668, 709 (1991)
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113
must be based upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officer making the arrest.
Probable Cause to justify a warrantless arrest?
PP. VS. DORIA JANUARY 22, 1999
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest
PP. VS. NASARIO MOLINA, FEBRUARY 19, 2001
-Comprehensive discussion of situations relating to probable cause
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
-no explanation needed
PP. VS. JOSE RAYRAY G.R. NO. 90628. FEBRUARY 1, 1995

We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio
City he could not arrest persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other place,
especially so where he was the intended victim. A policemen cannot callously set aside his
essential duty of apprehending criminal offenders and of keeping peace and order on the
shallow excuse that he is not in his place of assignment. His responsibility to protect the public
by apprehending violators of the law, especially one caught in flagrante delicto is not limited
by territorial constraints. It follows him wherever he goes. Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a
citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Thus, although officially assigned in
Baguio City, Lt. Anchetas act of arresting accused-appellant (after the latter offered to sell him
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Interesting case on the authority of a police officer to effect a warrantless arrest.

marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified not only by his duty as a law enforcer but also
by Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of warrantless or citizens' arrests.
WHEN MAY AN ARREST BE EFFECTED? (Sec. 6, R113)
An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)
-Under present law, there is no prohibition against arrests made on Fridays or weekends or
at night.
In effecting an arrest with a warrant, what must the person to be arrested be
informed of? (Sec. 7, R113)
GEN ERAL RULE: Person to be arrested must be informed:
1. The cause of the arrest.
2. The fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest.
EXCEPT:
1. When the person to be arrested flees
2. He forcibly resists before the arresting officer had opportunity to inform him
3. When giving the information will imperil the arrest.
The officer NEED NOT HAVE THE WARRANT in his possession at the time of the
arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable.
DIOSDADO MALLARI VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 110569. DECEMBER 9, 1996.
At this juncture, the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest
but merely an instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the
warrant in their possession at that precise moment. Finding as it does, this Court deems it
unnecessary to delve into the applicability of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on
the merits of both the petitioner's and the Office of the Solicitor General's arguments with
respect thereto. The applicable provision is not Section 5, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:
"Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest
by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of
the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he
flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the
giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant
in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so
requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable."
In effecting an arrest without warrant by a peace officer, what must the person to be
arrested be informed of? (Sec. 8, R113)
GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:
1. The authority of the person making the arrest
2. The Cause of the arrest.
EXCEPT:
1. When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE
2. He is being pursued immediately after the commission
3. He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;
4. He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him
5. When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
PP. VS. LARRY MAHINAY G.R. NO. 122485. FEBRUARY 1, 1999
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ARREST BY A PEACE OFFICER

It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court
must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and
he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or
messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one
from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of
the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be
warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at
any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning
that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had
not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In effecting an arrest without warrant by a private person, what must the person to
be arrested be informed of? (Sec. 9, R113)
GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:
1. The intention of the private person of arresting him.
2. The Cause of the arrest.
EXCEPT:
1. When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE
2. He is being pursued immediately after the commission
3. He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;
4. He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him
5. When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
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ARREST BY A PRIVATE PERSON

OFFICER MAY SUMMON ASSISTANCE. (Sec. 10, R113)
An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems
necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an
officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance
without detriment to himself. (10a)
History of this provision
U.S. VS. SILVESTRE POMPEYA G.R. NO. 10255. AUGUST 6, 1915
This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good
order of his community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse
comitatus" (power of the county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's
Commentaries, 343; Book 4, 122.) Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or
town who were charged with the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex officio,
to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they might
command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. This power is called "posse
comitatus" (power of the county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No.
1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to
designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may
be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of
peace and good order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state.
When can an officer making an arrest break into any building or enclosure?
(Sec. 11, R113)
1. He has announced his authority to effect the arrest
2. He has announced his purpose in making the arrest
3. He is refused admittance after the foregoing announcements.
Right to break out from building or enclosure. (Sec. 12, R113)
Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding
section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)
Section 2 R.A. 7438 (took effect on July 7, 1992)

f. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits
by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc
or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew
or niece, and guardian or ward.
-NOTE: A fianc or fiance is considered as immediate family
Section 4
SECTION 4. Penalty Clause. a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty
of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating
officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
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Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested (Sec. 14)

Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another
acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or
any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)
This provision should be cross-referenced with RA 7438

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting
upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from
examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day
or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four
(4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
PEOPLE VS. WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ G.R. NO. 129211. OCTOBER 2, 2000
In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we declared as inadmissible the
extrajudicial confession of accused where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and his lawyer
arrived only at 11:00 A.M.. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation
must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case,
Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police for about four days without the
assistance of counsel. In People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, 142 (1995) we held that:
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his
supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus (213 SCRA 345 1992) we said
that admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed
under the Constitution.
So flagrant a violation of the constitutional right to counsel of the accused cannot be
countenanced. In People v. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635, 650 (1998). we explained that:
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb
the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission
of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him."
These constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.
Bail defined. (Sec. 1, R114)

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Constitutional Provision on the Right to Bail
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
The Right to Bail does not apply to military personnel
under Court Martial
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RULE 114 - BAIL

JOSE COMENDADOR VS. RENATO S. DE VILLA G.R. NO. 95020, 20 AUGUST 1991
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied
in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we In this case the proper
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the remedy is to file a
motion to quash the
military where the right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the warrant not to file for
Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from
the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected
from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against
the existing political system.
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990
Order were sustained, on 'provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting.
But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or
things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 (1995)

reiterated in Go, et al. v. Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1464, 26 July
1999
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule
114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in
the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every
accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after
the trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The person seeking to be admitted to bail
must first be in the CUSTODY OF THE LAW
MANIGBAS VS. LUNA, 98 PHIL. 466 1956
NECITO C. HILARIO VS. JULIAN C. OCAMPO III ADM. CASE NO. 3066. DECEMBER 3,
2001
Bail is defined as the "security given for the release of a person in custody of the law." By
its definition, bail requires that a person must first be arrested or deprived of liberty before it
can be availed of: Thus, although the posting thereof is tantamount to submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, it presupposes that the accused is under detention or in the custody of
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Purpose and Nature of Bail

law. Indeed, it would be absurd and incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. In this case,
respondent deemed it appropriate for the accused to file the corresponding bail bonds, even
when the latter had not yet been arrested or placed under custody.
GUILLERMA DELOS SANTOS-REYES VS. JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA ADM. MATTER
NO. RTJ-93-983. AUGUST 7, 1995
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases
before the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to
reduce bail, motion to reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of
arrests before the court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective
service and enforcement of the warrants of arrest or their voluntary surrender, i.e., before they
were placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty. Such being so, the
trial court, initially, denied correctly the petition for grant of bail but subsequently disregarded
law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion to reinstate the petition for grant
of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6 April 1991, directing, for that purpose the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of
the preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty xxxx
THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE CUSTODY
PADERANGA V. COURT OF APPEALS 247 SCRA 741 (1995)

SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ 217 SCRA 633
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a
hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by uneguivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
TYPES OF BAIL
Corporate Surety
Refers to the type of bail, similar to an insurance contract whereby a bonding company will
issue a bond in the amount fixed by the court which will be forfeited if the bonding company
fails in its obligation to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail.
Property Bond
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-an exception to the General Rule that an accused has to be arrested or has to
voluntarily surrender before he can be admitted to bail

Refers to a situation where property is put up by the accused or somebody else to warrant
compliance with the conditions of bail. If such conditions are violated, the said property will be
sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof, up to the amount of bail fixed by the court will
be forfeited in favor of the government.
Cash Bond
Refers to the type of bail whereby the accused or somebody else will actually deposit the
amount fixed by the court as bail to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. If these
conditions are violated, the money can be forefeited.
Recognizance
Refers to the type of bail where a person is released in his own custody or to the custody of
a responsible person. This type of bail is allowable only in the cases when specific provisions of
the law or the rules allow it.
Victory Liner vs. Reynaldo B. Bellosillo A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004
REQUIRING BAIL TO BE POSTED IN CASH AND IN THE AMOUNTS OF P50,000.00 AND
P350,000.00 IN CASES OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL. THE DECISION TO
POST A SURETY BOND OR CASH AS BAIL BELONGS TO THE ACCUSED AND THE COURT
CANNOT REQUIRE HIM TO POST CASH
Conditions of the bail; requirements (Sec. 2, R114)
All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain
in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of
these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due
notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial
may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final
judgment.
Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 149
Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals 195 SCRA 760 (1991);
Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 127 (1995).
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy
Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to
hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding
force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT? (Sec. 4, R114)
1. BEFORE conviction by the MTC
2. AFTER conviction by the MTC
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The Court has the right to restrict the travel of the accused

3. BEFORE conviction by the RTC except if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.
4. BEFORE conviction by the RTC in cases punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where the court has already ruled that the evidence of guilt is NOT
STRONG.
WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF DISCRETION? (Sec. 5, R114)
1. AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty IMPOSED is 6 years or lower.
2. AFTER conviction by the RTC even if the penalty imposed is greater than six years if
none of the conditions under par. 3 of Section 5 are present except if the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
WHEN MUST BAIL BE DENIED (Secs. 5 and 7 R114)
1. BEFORE conviction by the RTC if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.
2. AFTER conviction by the RTC where the penalty imposed is greater than 6 years and
any of the following conditions are present:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
3. AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.
The conviction of the accused rebuts the presumption of innocence
FRANCISCO YAP, JR. VS. CA G.R. NO. 141529. JUNE 6, 2001
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which
may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to
show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.
THE APPLICATION FOR BAIL (Sec. 8, R114)

- Once an application for bail has been filed in cases, punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE shifts to the prosecution to prove that the
evidence of guilt is strong
NOTE: What is discretionary on the part of the court in a hearing under Section 8 is
only the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
IMPORTANT: Where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and the accused files an application for bail, the courts discretion is
limited to determining whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
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CAPITAL OFFENSE- is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (Sec. 6, R114)

If the evidence of guilt is strong the court MUST DENY bail. On the other hand if the
evidence of guilt is not strong the court MUST GRANT bail.
Steps to be taken by the judge when there is an application for bail
BASCO VS. RAPATALO 269 SCRA 220,
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution ;
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
Hearing is MANDATORY
BORINAGA V. TAMIN 26 SCRA 206 (1993);
CARDINES V. ROZETE, 242 SCRA 557 (1995).
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable
time whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution is
denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO VS. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ G.R. NO. 134504. MARCH
17, 2000
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent
such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion -EVEN IF THE PETITION FOR BAIL HAS THE PROSECUTORS CONFORMITY.
PEOPLE VS. CRESENIA C. REYES G.R. NOS. 101127-31. AUGUST 7, 1992
If the accused in a case where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is granted bail pending trial, such will be cancelled, and the accused placed in
confinement upon conviction for the crime charged.
JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR. VS. HON. MELECIO B. BORJA G.R. NO. L-65228. FEBRUARY
18, 1985
Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, a capital offense is "an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death." It his clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the
penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the Constitution or the law
speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently to refers to a finding of innocence or culpability,
regardless of the modifying circumstances.
Where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it
follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower then that prescribed by
law," which effectively rules out the death penalty. The Constitution withholds the guaranty of
bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The
obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been established without
objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
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Modifying Circumstances Shall NOT be considered in determining

the right to bail UNLESS admitted by the prosecution

Can a judge fix the amount of bail upon motion of the accused in a case for murder if
in a prior denial of a demurrer to evidence there was a finding that there was
sufficient evidence to convict for homicide but not for murder?
PP V. LUIS PLAZA, GR 176933, OCT 2, 2009
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was
sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine
whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the
evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.
In the same case, will not Sec 5 of Rule 114 which provides that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court. be violate if bail is fixed?
The Peoples recourse to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section
clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has
already been handed down by the trial court.
COMPLAINT IS FOR
A NON-BAILABLE
OFFENSE (EX.
MURDER)
RTC RENDERS A
DECISION
CONVICTING
ACCUSED FOR
HOMIDICE WHICH IS
BAILABLE
ACCUSED
APPEALS TO CA &
FILES FOR BAIL
CA WILL DECIDE
WHETHER TO
GRANT BAIL OR
NOT
Things to be considered in determining the amount of bail (Sec. 9 R114)

(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
ON RECOGNIZANCE:
ROBERTO ESPIRITU VS. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS OCT. 16, 1997 280 SCRA 579
(a) when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a
criminal offense, the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months
imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036;
(b) where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the
minimum of the imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion,
may allow his release on his own recognizance;
(c) where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no
bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and
(d) in case of a youthful offender, held for physical and mental examination, trial, or
appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in P.D. No.
603, as amended (Art. 191).
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What are the instances when recognizance is allowed by the law and the rules?

R.A. 7610
SECTION 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. Any
child who has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier,
guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family
units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the
community as determined by the court.
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 20-79

R.A. 6036
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be
required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony
and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months
imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both, where said person has established
to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is
unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:
(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagrante;
(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later
repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted
through force or intimidation;
(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or jumped bail;
(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;
(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously
convicted for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;
(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and
(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for
violation of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.
SECTION 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section 1
hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the
community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to
the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its
discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under
the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be
willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a
statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so
appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the
accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons
including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this
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P.D. 603
ARTICLE 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. A youthful offender
held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail,
shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare
or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be
responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of
any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the
provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from
other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of
Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender
on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be
responsible for his appearance whenever required.

sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the
amount forthwith fixed by the Court.
Where a person is charged with any offense contemplated by Republic Act No.
6036 (copy attached), the Judge should as therein provided order the release of the
accused on recognizance instead of requiring bail.
SEC. 16. OF REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
SECTION 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except
for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail
or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.
SEC. 16. OF RULE 114
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)
WHERE SHOULD BAIL BE FILED? (Sec. 17, R114)
GENERAL RULE:
Bail must be filed with the court where the case is pending.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. If the judge of the court where the case is pending is absent or unavailable
bail may be filed with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or
municipality.
2. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court
of said place, of if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
3. Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail
with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held..
If an accused learns of the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, can that
accused post bail with the court where he is at that time even if he has not yet been
arrested?
DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN V. NICASIO BARTOLOME, ET. AL., AM No. MTJ-051588, JUNE 5, 2009
Section 14 of Rule 114 provides
Sec. 14. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge, thereof, with
another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with
any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
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EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:

Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be
released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the
case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal.

The OCAs Report revealed that the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested, the
proper procedure, according to the above-cited rules, would have been to file her bail bond
with the RTC Branch 41, San Fernando City. However, the accused filed her surety bond with
the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was approved by respondent Judge.
Not only did respondent Judge erroneously order the release of the accused, but he also
failed to require the submission of the supporting documents needed in the application for a
bond.
PROCEDURE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF BAIL (Sec. 21, R114)
When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen
shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails
to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do
so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly
and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the
liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. (Sec. 22, R114)
Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be
cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (22a)
Surrender of the accused
Proof of accused
Acquittal
Dismissal
Execution of judgment of conviction
POSTING BAIL IS NOT A WAIVER OF ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST OR LACK OF

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (Sec. 26-NEW PROVISION)
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the
matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)
-This abandons the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Timon 281 SCRA
597 (1997) and similar cases that an application for bail constitutes a waiver of right of the
accused to question whatever irregularities and defects attended the arrest
This principle was reiterated as lately as the case of People vs. Carmen Lacson G.R. No.
126174. August 29, 2000.
RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

On the Presumption of Innocence
The equipoise rule
PEOPLE VS. EDGAR LAGMAY APRIL 21, 1999
where the evidence in a criminal case evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. (People vs.
Benemerito, 264 SCRA 677.)
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

On the right to be informed of the charges against him
Rationale
Inasmuch as `not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is
always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against
them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprises which may be detrimental to their rights
and interests. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to be innocent and has, therefore, no independent
knowledge of the acts that constitute the offense with which he is charged. (Matilde v. Jabson,
68 SCRA 456)
Pp. vs. Artemio Calayca Jan. 20, 1999
Pp. vs. Cesar Larena June 29, 1999
A person charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of qualified forms of rape if the
qualifying circumstances are not stated in the information. Otherwise there will be a violation of
his right to be informed.
On the right of the accused to be present and defended by counsel
PP. VS. RUFINO BERMAS APRIL 21, 1999
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity
to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is
for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to
ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own." Citing Pp. vs. Holgado 85 Phil. 752.
PP. VS. DONATO CONTINENTE AUGUST 25, 2000

The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was
initially accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in
writing and in the presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the constitutional
requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will be tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was
given freely without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, 2
i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at
the beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial
rights do not meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements
that do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his
constitutional rights. We emphasized that when the constitution requires a person under
investigation "to be informed" of his rights to remain silent and to
have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own

Test
of
voluntariness
of extra-judicial
choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
confession:
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
1. Given freely w/o coercion
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. In other
intimidation , inducement or false
words, the right of a person under investigation "to be informed"
promises; and
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator
2. Credible consistent w/ the normal
experience of mankind
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On the right to remain silent

to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of what
is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right.
PP. VS. AYSON JULY 7, 1989
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and
to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is prosecuted.
A pro-forma question and answer form prepared by the police is insufficient to
inform the accused of his rights prior to questioning him under custodial
investigation
PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN SABAYOC G.R. NO. 147201. JANUARY 15, 2004
Citing People vs. Jara 144 SCRA 516,
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it
or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style
does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is
missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should
allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of
these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment
of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the
police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN SABAYOC G.R. NO. 147201. JANUARY 15, 2004 CITING PEOPLE
VS. DENIEGA 321 PHIL. 1028, 1043 (1995)
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory
as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a
confession. Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorney's duty to, first and foremost,
seek the truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the
nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the
need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial
investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any
time.
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A counsel assisting the accused who remains silent throughout the custodial
investigation indicates that the accused was not afforded his constitutional right to
a competent counsel.

On the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
BELTRAN V. SAMSON 53 PHIL. 570 (1929).
the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any
attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. "Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention,"
PP. VS. RADEL GALLARDE FEB. 17, 2000 PURELY MECHANICAL ACTS V. PHYSICAL OR
MORAL COMPULSION
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit
to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine
its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
On the Right to crossexamine the witnesses against him
On the Right to compulsory processes

If the defense believes that there are other witnesses who could have exculpated the accused,
it should have called for them even by compulsory process. (People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263
1987).
On the Right to Speedy Trial
ROQUE VS. DESIERTO MAY 12, 1999
Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the
Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed
against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been
pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials rights. In such
event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.
CANSON VS. GARCHITORENA, JULY 28, 1999
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PP. VS. EDGAR CRISPIN, MARCH 2, 2000

Affidavits cannot be allowed because they cannot be cross-examined.
An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify on it. Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the
person to whom the statement or writing is attributed. The right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be
summarily done away with. Another reason why the right to confrontation is so essential is
because the trial judge's duty to observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met
by his being brought to the witness stand. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the
preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of
the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such
record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take
judicial notice of the same. The prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness,
his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and deserves no consideration at all.

Once again we reiterate that tired old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. It need
not be overemphasized that this oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the
right to a speedy trial, which, as defined is one "conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays." The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It, likewise, is
intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.
BINAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN OCT. 1, 1999
However, the right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such
factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Right to appeal The only right under Rule 115 not found in the constitution
RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking
him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Sec. 1, par (a))
]
Is arraignment mandatory or can it be waived?
What is the effect of arraignment on the right of an accused to preliminary

investigation?
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. (Go v. Court of Appeals, 206
SCRA 138)
Exceptional case:
FRANCISCO LARRANAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCH 13, 1998
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PP VS. DEMETRIO CABALE MAY 8, 1990

In the instant cases, counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his
client, the appellant herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were
being retried after the appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint
manifestation with the prosecution, adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment
of the appellant. There was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has
been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he
was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because
there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver.
Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the
waiver appears to be clear and informed.
Can there be an arraignment of a respondent during a preliminary investigation by a
municipal trial court judge? (REMEMBER MTC JUDGES ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED TO
CONDUCT PI)
WARLITO ALISANGCO VS. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR. (224 SCRA 1)
Considering that the MCTC of Manukan-Jose Dalman only had preliminary jurisdiction over
the case, the respondent judge did not have any authority to set the case for arraignment. All it
could do was to calendar the same for preliminary investigation. There is no law or rule
requiring an arraignment during the preliminary investigation. Under Section 1, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the arraignment must be conducted by the court having jurisdiction to
try the case on its merits. Thus, with respect to the case filed against the complainant, this
would be the proper Regional Trial Court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
case by reason of the prescribed penalty.
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him
PP. VS. ARNEL B. ALICANDO DEC. 12, 1995
PP. VS. MELCHOR ESTOMACA , APRIL 22, 1996
The records of the court must clearly indicate full compliance with Section 1 of Rule 116,
otherwise, the arraignment, and consequently all subsequent proceedings will be declared null
and void.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should
be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation
of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him
to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him. (1a)
What is considered by law to be a proper plea of guilty is an absolute plea of guilt.
If the accused will make a conditional plea, i.e. I am guilty but it was his fault or Opo
sinakal ko sya pero kasi inunahan nya ako or if he refuses to plea at all, the court will enter a
plea of not guilty.
What is deemed admitted when a plea of guilty is entered?
"While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it, at the same time, constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances therein recited (People vs. Egido, 90 Phil. 762; People vs. Santos and Vicente,
105 Phil. 40)
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(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall
not affect the validity of the proceedings.
NO ARRAIGNMENT BY PROXY This is one of the instances when the rules requires the
presence of the accused (cf Bail)
What is then not deemed admitted?

1. Facts and circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information.
2. Conclusions of fact
3. Jurisdiction of the court (conferred by law not by admission)
4. Sufficiency of the Complaint or Information
When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall
be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall se entered for him. (n)
PP. VS PADERNAL 21 SCRA 34 (1967)
Where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete selfdefense. The trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order that a plea
of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits.
When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days
from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned
within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case
shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment.
-This provision is NEW and is meant to ensure compliance with the right of an accused to
speedy trial.
The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for
purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters
requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due
notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial
prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)
This is from Section B par. 1 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. However, there is an
additional proviso that the failure of the private offended party to appear will be a waiver of the
requirement of his consent to a plea bargain.
REQUISITES
1. It must be B4 trial (cf Pp. vs. Martin Villarama)
2. The prosecutor and the offended party must consent except if the offended party
fails to appear during arraignment DESPITE NOTICE in which case the consent of the
prosecutor alone is sufficient.
3. the plea of guilt must be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense
charged.
PP. VS. MARTIN VILLARAMA JUNE 23, 1992
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has
provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83
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Plea of guilty to a lesser offense

At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 2, R116)
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (Pp. vs.
Martin Villarama June 23, 1992)

SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a Plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in
People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the
court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to
murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the
evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now
Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not
have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining."
necessarily included
UNDER THE 1985 RULES
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court
Theoretically, under the 1985 Rules, an accused charged with serious physical injuries
could plead guilty to jaywalking.
This produced too much confusion and the Supreme Court apparently decided to go back to
the language of the 1964.
Thus, the rule under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require that the
plea be made to an offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.
Can a person charged with murder plead guilty to attempted homicide?
PANFILO AMATAN VS. VICENTE AUJERO SEPT. 27, 1995
Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows
the accused in a criminal case to plead guilty "to a lesser offense regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the
accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of
homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death,
attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which
could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a
result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an
amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
PP. VS. JOSEPH LAKINDANUM G.R. NO. 127123. MARCH 10, 1999
People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 reiterated in People vs. Jonathan Besonia G.R. Nos.
151284-85. February 5, 2004 and People vs. Joselito A. Lopit GR 177742, DEC 17,
2008
The rule is that where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is
enjoined to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires
Guidelines on what is covered by the searching inquiry particularly in relation to cases
punishable by death.
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PLEA OF GUILT TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE (Sec. 3, R116)

-Despite a plea of guilt to a capital offense, the Court MUST require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and to determine the precise degree of culpability.

Guidelines on what is covered by the searching inquiry particularly in relation to
cases punishable by death.
PEOPLE VS. JONATHAN BESONIA G.R. NOS. 151284-85. FEBRUARY 5, 2004
A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can
truly be said to be based on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and
fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry, we declared in People v.
Aranzado, 418 Phil. 125 (2001) citing a plethora of cases, that it would be well for the court to
do the following:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he has conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him
to supply missing details of significance.
Moreover, in some cases, we ruled that the trial court should also explain to the accused
the essential elements of the crime charged, as well as the penalty and civil liabilities.
Plea of guilty to non-capital offense (Sec. 4)

-Reception of Evidence is DISCRETIONARY
Please take note of the exceptional case of:
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA 231 SCRA 264
Facts: Accused pleaded guilty to robbery but the court required presentation of
evidence. When the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence, the court acquitted the
accused.
Was the procedure proper?
Held: While the court was correct in acquitting the accused, the proper procedure should
have been to consider the plea of guilt withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered before
acquitting the accused to avoid the absurd situation of an acquittal when the plea was guilty.
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PP. VS. PAULINO SEVILLENO MARCH 29, 1999

Facts: After the accused pleaded guilty to rape with homicide, the judge asked him only
two questions, First, Do you understand your plea of guilt? and second Do you know that
your plea of guilt could bring death penalty?
Held: Only a clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be
accepted by trial courts. There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused
pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should automatically follow. A judge should
always be an embodiment of competence. As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that
the trial judge carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode public confidence in
the judiciary.
The judge was found to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. (Sec. 5, R116)
At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an
improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel (Sec. 6, R116)
Counsel De Parte- engaged by the accused himself
Counsel De Officio- appointed by the court to defend the accused.
What are the steps that a court must take to properly inform the accused of his
right to counsel?
PP. VS. HOLGADO 85 PHIL. 752
(1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned;
(2) after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney;
(3) if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him; and
(4) if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.
The right of an accused to a counsel de parte is not absolute
PP. VS. MARIO SERZO, JR., JUNE 20, 1997
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented
either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte,
however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of
choice against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and
adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte
if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member
of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e. g. conflict of
interest and the like.
Bill of particulars
- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to
plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or
information and the details desired. (Sec.9, R116)
A Bill of Particulars is one of the Modes of Discovery.
CINCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 202 SCRA 726

WEBB VS. DE LEON, ET AL., 247 SCRA 652
-The remedy of a Bill of Particulars is not available in a preliminary investigation
Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.
Procedure:
There must be a motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the
parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration.
Coverage:
The court may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other witnesses in
any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating
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The accused is basically asking the Court to Order the the prosecution to set forth the
details in vague portions of a complaint or information.

officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, object, or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or
under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies.
Purpose:
The purpose of this remedy is to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of
evidence.
When may the arraignment be suspended? (Sec. 11, R116)
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office. (12a)
Effects of insanity:
a. Time of Commission
- Exempting (Art. 12, RPC)
b. Time of Arraignment
- Suspension of Arraignment (11, 116)
c. Time of Trial
- Suspension of Trial
d. Serving Sentence - Suspension of Execution of Sentence (ART. 79 RPC)
RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH

When must a motion to quash be filed:
-BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT because generally, the arraignment of the accused will operate as
a waiver of the defects in the information or preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE V. ALAGAO 16 SCRA 879

JOSE GARCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS JANUARY 27, 1997
The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably
unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, 24 which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule
as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117
viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (k) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section
4, 25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is
equally without merit.
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Is the movant in a motion to quash limited to what is stated in the information?

General Rule:
In resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts alleged in
the complaint or information should be taken as they are.
Exception:
However, the following may be considered in a motion to quash:
a) facts showing the extinction of criminal liability
b) double jeopardy: and
c) facts that have been admitted or are not denied by the prosecution (Edgardo Lopez
vs. Sandiganbayan October, 13, 1995)

It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that
facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case IS CONFERRED BY LAW and
CANNOT BE WAIVED.
Can the judge initiate the consideration of a ground for quashal?
Grounds for a Motion to quash:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. (3a)
This ground simply means that the facts as alleged in the complaint or information do not
charge an offense.
In other words, there is no law penalizing the acts stated in the complaint or
information. NULLUM CRIMEN NULLE POENA SINE LEGE
Example: Than on or about the evening of September 12, 2001, X went inside the
premises of the Hallelujah Massage Parlor and went out one hour later with a big smile on his
face.
Contrary to law
-These facts do not constitute an offense.
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PP. VS. DAVID G. NITAFAN, FEB. 1, 1999

It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates
an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know
on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates
the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes
side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate,
such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges
and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy
disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action.
Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present
arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected
from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without
contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show
cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in
effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two
personalities in one person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of
the accused but also of the prosecution.

PP VS. PEDRO FLORES, DEC 27, 2002
The information
That on the 9 day of December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy.
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually
abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her
will.
HELD:
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The
recital of facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, sexual abuse
not being an essential element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that
matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent which must be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.
This refers to lack of jurisdiction over the
1) person of the accused
2) subject matter of the case; or
3) territory;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
Can the lack of authority on the part of the officer signing the information be cured by
silence, acquiescence or express consent?
CUDIA vs. CA G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
Refer to Rule 110 on the essential requisites of a sufficient complaint or information. If
there is no compliance with these requisites, this is the proper ground for a motion to quash.
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

How is criminal liability extinguished?
ARTICLE 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
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(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
This refers to DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATIONS. Cf. Rule110, Section 13.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
In relation to Libel
DANGUILAN-VITUG VS. CA 232 SCRA 460
Where the complaint or information itself alleged that the averred libelous material was
privileged communication, then this would constitute a legal excuse or justification.
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (3a)
- double jeopardy
PROCEDURE IF GROUND IS CURABLE BY AMENDMENT (Sec. 4, R117)
1. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)
2. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint
or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)
What is the effect if a motion to quash is sustained? (Sec. 5, R. 117)
If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except if it was sustained on the grounds of double jeopardy or
extinction of criminal liability, In such case, the accused, if in custody, shall not be
discharged unless admitted to bail.
-If not, or if the prosecutor fails to comply with the order of the court within the time allowed,
the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge.
NOTE: The quashal of an information will not prevent the refilling of the same case
unless it was quashed due to double jeopardy or extinction of the criminal liability.
(Sec. 6, R117)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Sec. 7 R117)
BASIS: Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
2 Sentence SAME ACT

If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
RULE: Double jeopardy will bar a second prosecution for the SAME ACT only if it is punished by
a national law AND a local ordinance
Example: B.P. 22 and ESTAFA can co-exist because both are punished by national laws. Nierra
vs. Dacuycuy 181 S 1
Where a bank officer borrows money from the bank where there is a failure to
observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed
by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related
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1 Sentence SAME OFFENSE

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

interests in the bank and is also charged with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents can he still be charged with a criminal violation of the
General Banking Act for violation of DOSRI rules?
Hilarion Soriano vs. PP, GR 159517-18, June 30, 2009
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two
or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several
charges against the accused.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the
two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with
procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a
director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval
of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate
records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of
abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the
prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges
against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Elements of Double Jeopardy
PEOPLE V. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238,
PEOPLE V. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202.
(a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
(b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated and
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof
When does the first jeopardy attach?
Will the pendency of another criminal case for the same offense bar subsequent
prosecution by reason of double jeopardy?
This is already clear under the new rules because the phrase previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted under the old Section 3 has been amended to read previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged
The change was based on the ruling in Pp. vs. Pineda which overturned the ruling in
cases like Pp. vs. City Court of Manila 121 S 627 where a contrary rule was espoused.
Later reiterations:
PP. VS. DAVID G. NITAFAN, FEB. 1, 1999
-other pending cases will not amount to double jeopardy
BINAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN OCT. 1, 1999.
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in
the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of
competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered as plea in
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CUDIA V. CA, G.R. NO. 110315, JANUARY 16, 1998;

GUERRERO V. CA, 257 SCRA 703
(1) upon a valid indictment,
(2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the
quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.
Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
EXCEPTIONS UNDER SECTION 7
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the
same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(E.G. TEEHANKEE)
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or
Note: Under the 1985 RULES after filing of the information NEW RULES after a plea
was entered
why?- b4 plea there can be, as yet, no double jeopardy
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of
the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of
Rule 116.
1(f) of Rule 116- If the offended party fails to show up during the arraignment, there can be a
plea to a lesser offense even if only the prosecutor agrees.
DISMISSAL WAS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED
If the accused invokes his right to a speedy trial and the case is dismissed, can the case be
refiled?- NO, it cannot because DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL ATTACH.
If the accused moves for a reinvestigation and, thereafter, the prosecutor moves for
the dismissal of the case, will double jeopardy lie to bar subsequent prosecution?
PEOPLE VS. VERGARA 221 SCRA 960
Filing a Motion for Reinvestigation does not amount to express consent to the dismissal of
the case. Express consent means direct and unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication.
If the acquittal was void, double jeopardy will not lie (Pp. vs. Bagul 131 S 296 Gorion
vs. RTC of Cebu 213 S 138)
TEST TO DETERMINE IDENTITY OF OFFENSES
Can double jeopardy operate to bar a prosecution for falsification of public

documents when there is already a prior acquittal in a case for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019?
Andres S. Suero vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005
Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the
felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code that the offender is a public officer and
that the act is related to the officer's public position. However, the latter offense is not
necessarily inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or
do not form part of those enumerated in the former. For there to be double jeopardy, the
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ANDRES S. SUERO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 156408. JANUARY 31,
2005
The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court

elements of one offense should like the ribs of an umbrella ideally encompass those of
the other. The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those
of falsification of a public document and vice versa. At most, the two offenses may be
considered as two conjoined umbrellas with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does
not include the other.
Provisional dismissal. (NEW, Sec. 8, R117)
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)
THE FAILURE TO RAISE A GROUND IN A MOTION TO QUASH OPERATES AS A WAIVER
OF THE GROUND EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING:
(c) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(d) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (Sec. 9, R 117)
RULE 118 - PRE-TRIAL

PURPOSE OF PRE-TRIAL
Pre-trial agreement. (Sec. 2)

All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule
shall be approved by the court. (from sec. 4 cir. 38-98)
Is the approval by the court of the pre-trial agreement necessary for it to be binding
upon the parties?
BAYAS, ET AL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NOS. 143689-91. NOVEMBER 12,
for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy
conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must
both the accused and their counsel. The court's approval, mentioned
sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the
2002
the following
be signed by
in the last
stipulations
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ABUBAKAR VS. ABUBAKAR OCT 22, 1999

That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly
laid out in Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the
issues to be tackled and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that
there will be fewer points of contention for the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping
with the mandate of the Constitution according every person the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases. If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial hence, the prefix "pre"
the court can later concentrate on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of
pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation. The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally binds the
parties to honor the same.

binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by
the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, VS. CA
G.R. NO. 109595. APRIL 27, 2000
Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty.
While the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the
time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pretrial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in
the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case. The trial court ordered the
parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court. Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public
prosecutor, entered into a pre-trial agreement.
The accused now assails the validity of the proceedings in the criminal case.
HELD: It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective
evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court 17 which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider
"such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance
with Section 4 of Rule 118, 18 reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and
the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement,
and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.
The express admission of the accused during pre-trial that he is the father of the
complainant is inadmissible if he and his counsel did not sign the Stipulation of
Facts.
SEC. 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. If the counsel for the accused or

the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an
acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper
sanctions or penalties. (sec. 5, cir. 38-98)
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such
order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control
the course f the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent
manifest injustice. (3)
RULE 119 TRIAL

Trial is the time allotted by law for the parties to present their evidence in
accordance with the rules of procedure.
SECTION 1. Time to prepare for trial. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. (sec. 6, cir. 3898)
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PEOPLE VS. DIONISIO G.R. NO. 142431. JANUARY 14, 2004

Moreover, the fact that appellant admitted that he is the father of Ginalyn during the pretrial, thus dispensing with the need to present evidence to prove the same, will not justify the
trial court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of relationship. A perusal of the pretrial order would readily show that the said stipulation was not signed by the appellant and his
counsel. Hence, it cannot be used as evidence against him. Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "all agreements or admissions made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused." This requirement is mandatory.
Thus, the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by
the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

- under the old rule (1985 Rules) the time to prepare for trial was only 2 days.
SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial once commenced
shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. (2a)
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set
the case for continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall
not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter
period of trial. (n)
The second and third paragraphs are new provisions that are taken from the Speedy Trial
Act and, more particularly, from Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98
What is important to remember here is to remember that the law now sets or provides for a
time limit of (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the
Supreme Court. for the trial to be terminated.
NOTA BENE:
Sections 3 to 10 ARE ALL NEW PROVISIONS LIFTED FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
AND SC Circular No. 38-98 REVIEW THEM!
SEC. 9 IS VERY IMPORTANT
SEC. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. If
the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g),
Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may
be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy
trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution
shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion
of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on
double jeopardy.
Section 1 (g) Rule 116- accused should be arraigned within 30 days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person excluding the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other grounds for suspending arraignment.
Section 1 Rule 119- trial should begin within (30) days from receipt of pre-trial order (Note pretrial should be conducted within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused Sec. 1 Rule 118)
Extension under Sec. 6- period from arraignment to trial is 80 days (Note: This is because over
three years have already passed since September 15, 1998)
Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. (Sec.
10, R119)
No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be
interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed
by section 14(2), article III, of the 1987 Constitution. (sec. 15, cir. 38-98)
What is the balancing test in applying the time limits imposed in the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998?
FREDERICO MIGUEL OLBES VS. DANILO A. BUEMIO, ET AL., GR 173319, DEC 4, 2009
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NOTE: Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of
the right to dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir. 38-98)

The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To the Court, the reasons for
the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not
unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of
the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned
by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the
prosecutions case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the
arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had
been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
Reiterating the Courts pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that "speedy
trial" is a relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a
delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the
one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the
other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account
several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accuseds assertion or nonassertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
INTERESTING CASE ON THE ORDER OF TRIAL (SEC 11)
Sec 11 (e) of Rule 119 provides:
When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Is this MANDATORY or DISCRETIONARY?
-VERY IMPORTANT
SEC. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. When
the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with
notice to the other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The
motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of
his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable
ground for believing tha the will not be able to attend the trial, or resides more than
one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the
same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or
prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit
of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require. (4a)
SEC. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made. If the court is satisfied
that the examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order shall be
made directing that the witness be examined at a specific date, time and place and
that a copy of the order be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before
the scheduled examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the
order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior
court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed notwithstanding the
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PP VS. MARIO MARCIAL, ET AL, GR 152864-65, SEP 27, 2006

Modifying the Order of Trial is within the sound discretion of the court. Sec 11 (e) uses
the phrase the order of trial MAY be modified, Sec 7 of RA 8493 (Speedy Trial Act) uses the
phrase MAY modify the order of trial and Sec 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-39 uses the
SAME phrase.
Thus, even if an accused raises justifying circumstances or some other lawful defense
while admitting the act or omission charged in the information, the court may still deny a
motion to reverse the order of trial.

absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A written
record of the testimony shall be taken. (5a)
SEC. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. When the court is
satisfied, upon proof of oath, that a material witness will not testify when required,
it may, UPON MOTION OF EITHER PARTY, order the witness to post bail in such sum
as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to
prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.
(6a)
-applies to witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
Cross reference with WITNESS PROTECTION LAW (R.A. 6981) to protect witnesses who do
not want to testify by reason of fear.
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it is satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, of has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused
to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)
Distinguish Section 13 and 15
Sec 13
Defense Witness
Examination may be made before any
member of the bar in good standing or the
judge of an inferior court designated by the
judge of the court where the case is pending.
Sec 15
Prosecution Witness
Examination may be made only before the
judge or the court where the case is pending.
Why? Because the prosecution (the State) is presumed to have all the resources of the
government available to it to cause the production of its witnesses.
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA DE MANGUERRA AND THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR.,
VS. RAUL RISOS, ET AL.
GR 152643, AUGUST 28, 2008
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the
instant case, we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to
propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
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Can the prosecution conduct a deposition of a prosecution witness in a place other

than the place of the court where the case is pending by invoking the rules on
deposition under Rule 23?
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination
of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who,
according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15
of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of
Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same
provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the
witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her
deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required
that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his
right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules
mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in
actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the
negative. The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made
before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of
the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good
standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of
superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a
witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is pending."
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness
shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention,
there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he
is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions
or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on
civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
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the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of
taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is
made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the
witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to prove
its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls
for a strict construction of the rules.
SEC. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons
are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused
to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of
the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (9a)
Important principles:
1. Since the discharge of the accused operates as an acquittal, (SEC. 18) regardless of
whether or not his testimony is used by the prosecution.
2. Even if the judge erred in granting the discharge (e.g. the accused was not the least
guilty) this will not affect the validity of the discharge or the admissibility of the
testimony of the witness but judges are warned in these instances to take the said
testimony with a grain of salt. ( GOCO CASE 209 scra 329)
3. The term does not appear to be the most guilty refers to degree of actual
participation and not to the imposable penalty which would be equal if there is
conspiracy (Pp. Vs. Sumail 212 SCRA 626)
4. The witness who is an accused may be discharged AFTER he testifies (for as long as
the prosecution has not yet rested upon motion of the prosecution before resting
its case (Sec 17) ) Rosales vs. CA 215 SCRA 102)
5. The fiscal has no right to omit the inclusion of any of the accused from the
information even if he intends to use him as a state witness (because under Rule 110
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SEC. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the
preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall
be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge. (10a)

Sec. 2 the information is supposed to be filed against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved) and it is the judge who is trying the case who
has the authority, under Sec. 17, to order the discharge of the accused.
6. For this same reason, an MTC JUDGE who is conducting a preliminaryi nvestigation in
a crim case cognizable by the RTC cannot order the discharge of an accused since he is
not the judge trying the case.
7. What is meant by the requirement of a hearing in support of the discharge? It
is the hearing where the affidavit of the witness who is proposed to be discharged is
presented to the court and the other accused are given an opportunity to oppose the
motion to discharge him. The witness is not actually required to testify during that same
hearing (Pp. Vs. CA and Jose Pring 223 SCRA 479)
Note: The requirement of the submission of an affidavit of the proposed witness was introduced
in the 1985 Rules so that the judge would have an idea as to what this witness will be testifying
on. (This inadequacy in the old law was noted by the SC in the case of Flores vs. SB
124 scra 109)
Is it necessary for the testimony of a proposed state witness to be corroborated by
other witnesses?
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA VS. PP, GR 143093, MAY 21, 2007
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin
and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there
must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence required by
the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the
proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of
veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly
infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is enough that the testimony of a
co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest."
Cf with last par of Sec. 14, R. 110

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)
Also Secs. 4 and 5 of R117
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)
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SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall
commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. (11a)

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint
or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)
SEC. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6
of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless
admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within
the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good
cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another
charge. (5a)
Exclusion of the public. (Sec. 21, R119)
The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the
evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He
may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties. (13a)
The right of the accused to a public trial is not absolute. The public may be excluded if the
evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals.
Examples of instances when the public or some of the public may be excluded:
1. The evidence to be presented is of such character as to be offensive to public morals.
2. When the accused requests it.
3. To prevent disorder in the court.
4. To prevent the embarrasment of a witness.
5. To limit the attendance to seating capacity.
Consolidation of trials of related offenses. (SEC. 22, R119)
Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of
offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (14a)
Cf: Section 2, R 111- TAKE NOTE that R111 refers to consolidation of the civil aspect with
the criminal in case where a separate civil action was filed..
Section 22 refers to consolidation of trials of related cases.
SOME PRINCIPLES RELATING TO DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE:

1. After the prosecution rests, the court motu propio can dismiss the case due to
insufficiency of evidence without the accused filing a demurrer to evidence. However,
the judge must give the prosecution an opportunity to be heard before he can dismiss
the case.
2. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case and the
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from
its receipt.
3. If a demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court, the accused can present
evidence if it is denied. However, if it is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives the right to present evidence.
4. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
5. If the court grants a demurrer to evidence and thus, dismisses the case, this amounts
to an acquittal. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAN ARISE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
DEMURRER WAS FILED BY THE ACCUSED. (i.e., filing a demurrer to evidence does
not amount to the express consent of the accused to the dismissal)
Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear on the fact that if
an accused files a Demurrer to Evidence WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT, he WAIVES the
right to present evidence if it is DENIED.
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DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. DOMINADOR CACHOLA G.R. NOS. 148712-15. JANUARY 21, 2004
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of
court was a clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that
they had been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would
have exculpated them would be to allow them to wager on the outcome of judicial
proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
REOPENING (SEC. 24, R119)
. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu
proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid
a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days
from the order granting it. (n)
Cross-reference Rule 119 with
RA 4908
- SPEEDY TRIAL OF CASES WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS ABOUT TO LEAVE THE
PHILS WITH NO DEFINITE DATE OF RETURN.
RA 6033
- PREFERRENCE OF CASES INVOLVING INDIGENTS
RA 6034 -TRANSPORT AND ALLOWANCES FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS
RA 6035
- FREE TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS
RULE 120 JUDGMENT

Judgment; definition and form.
Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon
which it is based. (1a)
ABAY, SR. VS. GARCIA 162 SCRA 665

MARCELINO RIVERA, JR. VS. PP AUGUST 30, 1990
"Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of
dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether
based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a
judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory.
However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120,
section 2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely
dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal
was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a
judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and
enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case."
What must a judgment contain? (Sec. 2 R120)
IF FOR CONVICTION:
(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
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JUDGMENT MUST BE IN WRITING

(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
PP VS. MARCELINO A. BUGARIN JUNE 13, 1997
PP. VS. ELEGIO NADERA FEB. 2, 2000
ELIGIO MADRID VS. CA MAY 31, 2000
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a
summary of the testimonies of the complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped?
The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.
Does this comply with the required contents of a judgment?
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it
does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal
questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's
testimony credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could
not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped. It does not explain why
accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not
another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in
November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December
23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her
private part, for which reason six informations were filed against him, but the decision found
the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court erroneously said
three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant
was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it
finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set
forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many
functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for
the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding
of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the
judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse
by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment
on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power
of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the
trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
ONG CHIU KWAN VS. CA, NOV. 23, 2000

The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals
affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:
"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding
memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.
"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and
exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated
decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto."
The Constitution requires that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
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These requirements are applicable even on appealed cases

contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and
the law upon which the judgment is based."
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely
refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make
a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its own.
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity.
IF FOR ACQUITTAL
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (2a)
Judgment for two or more offenses. (Sec. 3, R120)
Considering that it has already been settled that while under Rule 110, an information or
complaint should only charge one offense and that this is a ground for quashal under Rule 117,
this defect is waivable.
Thus, if it is waived, the accused can be convicted of as many crimes as there are charged
in the information or complaint.
PEOPLE VS. CONDE RAPISORA JANUARY 25, 2001
The information against the accused has charged him with multiple rape, at least six
times according to the trial court in its findings. Section 3, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
provides that "when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information,
and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of
them . . ." Rapisora can thus be held responsible for as many rapes as might have been
committed by him which are duly proven at the trial.
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. (Sec. 4, R120)
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a)
The accused can be convicted of an offense necessarily included in
the offense charged but he can NEVER be convicted of a higher offense
e.g. Charged with murder. If only homicide is proven he can be convicted
of homicide.
But if charged with homicide, even if murder is proven, he can only be
convicted of homicide.
When does an offense include and when is it included in another offense?

(Sec. 5, R120)
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
IMPT: If the offense proven is not necessarily included or does not necessarily include the
offense charged then follow the rule on mistake in charging the offense. This is because, in this
situation, the offense proven it is clearly a WHOLLY DIFFERENT OFFENSE from the offense
charged.
Can a municipal mayor charged with UNLAWFUL INTERVENTION in the issuance of a
cockpit license be convicted of POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTEREST of the same
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SIMPLE PRINCIPLE:

cockpit when the latter offense is not included in the information but was proven
during the trial?
EDGAR TEVES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (EN BANC) G.R. NO. 154182. DECEMBER 17, 2004
The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4,
in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.,
Can a person accused of murder as a principal be convicted of murder as an
accessory?
LITO VINO VS. CA OCT. 19, 1989
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The
commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the
offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the
petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced,
however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater
responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an
accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
Is Malversation included in Technical Malversation?
Rape and Qualified Seduction

PP. VS. SERVILLANO VELASQUEZ 205 PHIL 741
Assuming it to be a fact that the appellant may be considered a "domestic" within the
meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code a point disputed by the appellant who
claimed that he was not staying in the house of his sister but only operated a radio repair shop
in the ground floor of said house still, no conviction for qualified seduction may be decreed
against the appellant. This is because there is no allegation in the information filed against him
of two of the essential elements of the crime of qualified seduction, to wit: virginity of the
offended party, and that the latter is over 12 but under 18 years of age. In the event of a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved or
established by the evidence, the accused may only be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
The view that conviction for qualified seduction may not be had on a charge of rape had
already been expounded by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Ramires, 69 SCRA
144. For similar reasons, neither may the appellant be validly convicted of the crime of simple
seduction. As may be noted from the information filed against the appellant, there is likewise
no allegation therein of the elements of the good reputation of the offended party and of the
latter being over 12 but under 18 years of age, which are essential for the commission of the
crime simple seduction.
PP. VS. NAPOLEON SUBINGSUBING NOV. 25, 1993
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OSCAR PARUNGAO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN MAY 15, 1991

A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and
different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public
funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his
administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for
which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not
included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in
the information. Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not
alleged in the information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included
in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical
malversation.

The verified complainant for rape contains allegations, sans averment on the use of force,
which impute the crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by
the supporting affidavit, where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing,
her uncle, who was living in the same house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with
her. The accused took advantage of his moral ascendancy if not dominance over the
complainant. She was presumably a virgin. As already stated, the accused was a domestic in
relation to the complainant within the meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code.
APOLINARIO GONZALES VS. CA MAY 31, 1994
Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. The elements of rape (1) that
the offender has had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is accomplished (a)
by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the woman is under twelve (12) years of age substantially differ
from the elements of qualified seduction. The latter requires (1) that the offended party is a
virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation; (2) that she must be over
twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age; (3) that the offender has sexual intercourse
with her; and (4) that there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the
offender. While the two felonies have one common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a
woman, they significantly vary in all other respects. Contrary to the assertion of accusedpetitioner, the case of People vs. Samillano (56 SCRA 573), did not hold that qualified seduction
is necessarily included in rape; what this Court has said is that one who is charged with rape
may be found guilty of qualified seduction when the "verified complaint for rape contains
allegations which aver the crime of seduction."
PP. VS. BENJAMIN ORTEGA JULY 24, 1997
-Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning under an information
that charges murder by means of stabbing.
ODON PECHO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN NOV. 14, 1994
There is no such thing as attempted violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
These stages apply only to felonies under the RPC.
PP. VS. EUTIQUIA CARMEN, ET. AL. G.R. NO. 137268. MARCH 26, 2001
The parents of a young boy, believing that their son is possessed brought him to a
healer who said she could exorcise the bad spirit. However the process of exorcism done
through immersing the boy head first into a drum of water resulted to his death. The accused,
the healer and her assistants, were charged with murder.
HELD:
In United States v. Divino, the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to
cure the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in
petroleum around the victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to
the victim. The Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries. It was noted that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy
the victim's ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez, the Court ruled that the proper charge to file
against a non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was
homicide through reckless imprudence.
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in
itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
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Can an accused held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide if the
information charges murder?

The fact that the information odes not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him
In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the
trial court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal
intent.
Can an information charging the accused with having sexually abused the victim
be sufficient to justify a conviction for rape?
PEOPLE VS. PEDRO FLORES DECEMBER 27, 2002
HELD
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital
of facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not
being an essential element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for
that matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent which must be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), accused-appellant cannot be held
liable.
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases 40 , issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610, defines "sexual
abuse" by inclusion as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or 2) the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. (Emphasis supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse"
in the criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint
must contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the
phrase "sexual abuse" is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an
altogether separate offense. above-quoted Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts
that must be alleged in the complaint or information to hold an accused liable, none of which is
reflected, in the complaints at bar charging accused-appellant.
-The Supreme Court found the information to be VOID and DISMISSED the case.
Can an accused be convicted of illegal discharge of firearm if the charge is murder?
PEOPLE VS. GERONIMO DADO NOV. 18, 2002
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The information:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old
and daughter of the herein accused with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all
against her will

In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the
victim's right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond
moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioner's .45 caliber
pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of
the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had
animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see
whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from
the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus interficendi must be
established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the
crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable
for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another
person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. Though the information
charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of
firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person.
In case of an acquittal may the accused be found CIVILLY LIABLE in the same
criminal case?
ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 151931, SEPT. 23, 2003
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him
What are light felonies?

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided.
What about if the judgment is for acquittal?
MYLA PAREDES ET. AL. VS. JUDGE JACINTO MANALO MAY 10, 1995
The delay in the promulgation of the decision in Crim. Case No. 1603 was ironically caused
by respondent Judge. We find that he acquitted complainants in the case. Such being the case,
the presence of accused was not necessary as the judgment was one of acquittal. Moreover,
Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that if the accused fails to appear, the
promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy
thereof served upon his counsel.
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On PROMULGATION
In the presence of the accused
Promulgation of judgment is one of the instances where the presence of the accused is
required.
As provided, one of the exceptions is when the conviction is for a light offense.

YOLANDA CRUZ VS. FILOMENO PASCUAL, MAY 12, 1995
With regard to the absence of the accused during the promulgation of the judgment, we
hold that respondent Judge did not administratively err in proceeding with the promulgation. In
a verdict of acquittal, the presence of the accused is not indispensable since no appeal is
necessary and the judgment become final and executory immediately after promulgation. The
reading of the sentence in open court to counsel for the accused or giving a copy of the
decision to the accused or his counsel is sufficient promulgation.
Is it necessary for the offended party to be notified?
ABRAHAM RAMIREZ VS. ANTONIA CORPUZ- MACANDONG SEPT. 26, 1986
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of
the promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to
notify the offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do
so.
The last paragraph was taken from the case of Pp. vs. Omar Mapalao May 14, 1991
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)
The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders
or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.
NOTE: THE JUDGEMENT MUST BE PROMULGATED DURING THE INCUMBENCY OF THE
JUDGE RENDERING THE DECISION
OTHERWISE IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A
DECISION PENNED PERSONALLY AND DIRECLY BY THE JUDGE.
TYPES OF PROMULGATION (Sec. 6)

1. ORDINARY PROMULGATION- reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered.
2. PROMULGATION OF CONVICTION IN A LIGHT FELONY- the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
3. PROMULGATION BY CLERK OF COURT- When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
4. PROMULGATION BY EXEC. JUDGE- If the accused is confined or detained in
another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive
judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment.
5. PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIA- In case the accused fails to appear at the
scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
Essential requisites of promulgation in absentia:
(a) that the accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation
(b) that despite such notice, he failed to appear;
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Pp. vs. CFI of QUEZON CITY 227 SCRA 457

Judge who penned the decision detailed to another branch of the RTC OF QC
- No violation because he belongs to the same court even if different branch.

(c) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and
(d) that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.
If the accused fails to appear during promulgation despite notice and the judgment
is read in the presence of her counsel, will the failure of the recording of the
judgment in the criminal docket affect the validity of the promulgation?
MARILYN C. PASCUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS DECEMBER 14, 2000
In the absence of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket, there can be NO
VALID PROMULGATION.
In the same case, will the fact that the accused subsequently received a copy of the
decision cause the 15 day period to appeal to begin to run?
We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does
not in any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the
criminal docket later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May
5, 1998 promulgation which was invalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in
the provision of both requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means that they
indeed must concur.
If the accused jumps bail, it amounts to an abandonment of his appeal and the
judgment immediately becomes final and executory.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO.
147703. APRIL 14, 2004
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
PP VS. JOVEN DE GRANO, GR 167710, JUNE 5, 2009

The RTC should have considered the joint motion to have been filed solely by the
accused who was present as the other accused had lost all remedies against the judgment.
If in the same case, the judge ACQUITED two of the accused on the basis of the
motion for reconsideration, can these two claim double jeopardy if the case against
them is reinstated?
No, the court had no jurisdiction or authority to take cognizance of the motion for
reconsideration as to the accused who were at large, thus their acquittal upon action on the
motion for reconsideration was void. They cannot thus claim double jeopardy on the basis of a
VOID order.
Modification of judgment. (Sec. 7)
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before
it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
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If there is more than one accused and, durint the promulgation, only one of the
accused was present and the others jumped bail, can the court take cognizance of a
joint motion for reconsideration?

sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)
NOTE: Prosecution cannot move for modification.
PP. VS. ELADIO VIERNES, G.R. NOS. 136733-35. DECEMBER 13, 2001
In 1985, Section 7 of Rule 120 was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the
accused" effectively resurrecting the Ang Cho Kio ruling (95 Phil. 475) prohibiting the
prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction.
Under this Rule, a judgment of conviction, before it became final, could be modified or set
aside upon motion of the accused. It obviously aims to protect the accused from being put
anew to defend himself from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the
court may have overlooked in the original trial. It does not however bar him from seeking or
receiving more favorable modifications.
Significantly, the present Rules, as amended last year, retained the phrase "upon motion of
the accused,"
NOTE: EVEN IF FINALITY OF THE CRIM ASPECT IS ACCELERATED, THE CIVIL ASPECT
WILL BECOME FINAL ONLY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 15 DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL.
PP. VS. PEDRO SANTIAGO JUNE 20, 1989
Reiterated in
Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30, 1998
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
RULE 121 - NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final

1. This Rule applies only to judgments of conviction- an acquittal is immediately final
and executory.
2. Within fifteen days from the date of promulgation the accused can appeal. The period
to appeal is interrupted by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
New Trial. The period will continue to run again from notice of the denial of the Motion.
3. If the accused files a Motion for New Trial or a Motion for Reconsideration, he waives
the right against double jeopardy. This means that the court can modify the judgment to
a graver offense. E.G. Charged with Murder Convicted of Homicide, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, judge modified the judgment to murder.
4. Distinctions between Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and Modification of
judgment.
BOTH can affect only judgments of conviction.
a) Modification of judgment can be had only upon motion of the accused while
Recon and New Trial can also be at the courts own instance with the consent of
the accused.
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New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes

final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of
the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (Sec. 1, R 121)

b) In modification of judgment the original judgment stands while in a Motion for
Recon or New Trial, if it is granted, there will be an entirely new judgment.
Grounds for a new trial. (Sec. 2, R121)
That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial
This refers to instances where there was a serious breach of procedure that prejudiced the
substantial rights of the accused. Examples:
1. The accused was forced to go into trial without counsel;
2. The counsel for the accused turned out to be a fraud who is not actually a lawyer.
3. A material witness for the accused was not allowed to testify on the basis on an
erroneous application of the rules.
4. The court erroneously refused to issue subpoena to compel the attendance of a
material witness for the accused.
newly discovered evidence
Requisites:
PP. VS. ALBERTO TIRONA DEC. 22, 1998
For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial under paragraph (b) above, it is
required that
i) the evidence is discovered after trial;
ii) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
iii) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and
of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. There is nothing
on record to indicate that these requisites have at all been met.
GOMEZ VS. IAC 135 SCRA 6

PP VS. EDUARDO GARCIA MARCH 31, 1998
When confronted with an affidavit of recantation, courts are called upon to weigh
countervailing values in our legal and judicial system. A recantation, as a general rule, is not
sufficient to warrant a new trial. If it were otherwise, a new trial would be granted whenever an
interested party succeeds in intimidating or inducing any or some of the witnesses to retract
after trial their testimony, thus, opening the door to endless litigation. It is also injudicious to
reject a testimony solely on the basis of such recantation, which may later be repudiated, as
this "will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses."
To warrant a new trial, Joylyn's affidavit of desistance must constitute a recantation and not
a mere withdrawal from the prosecution of the case. The Court en banc in Alonte, speaking
through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the complainant's affidavit of desistance did not
constitute a recantation, because she did not deny the truth of her complaint but merely
sought to "be allowed to withdraw" and "discontinue" the case because she wished "to start
life anew and live normally again." She never absolved or exculpated the accused. In other
words, a recantation of a prior statement or testimony must necessarily renounce the said
statement or testimony and withdraw it formally and publicly
Ground for reconsideration (Sec. 3, R121)
errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings
What are the grounds?
1. court made a mistake in arriving at its decision
2. decision is not in accordance with the law.
3. decision not in accordance with the evidence.
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Will the recantation of a witness through an affidavit of desistance be sufficient a

new trial?

Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. (SEC. 6, R121)
The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence
affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the
interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence,
the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such
other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already
in the record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the
original judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered
accordingly. (6a)
RULE 122 - APPEAL

Who may appeal?( Sec. 1, R122)
. Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy. (2a)
1. Prosecution for as long as the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy.
GEN RULE: PROS. CANNOT APPEAL BECAUSE THE ACCUSED WILL BE PLACED IN
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
EXCEPTION E.G. - ACCUSED FILED MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION GRANTED BY COURT, PROS CAN APPEAL, NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SINCE IT WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ACCUSED.
2. The accused. (An appeal by the accused waives double jeopardy. Thus, if he was
convicted for homicide under a charge of murder and he appeals, the appellate court
can convict him for murder)
PP. VS. MADALI JAN 16, 2001

Rule 122, 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
"(a)ny party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will
be placed in double jeopardy." It has been held that the word "party" in the
provision in question includes not only the government and the accused but
other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an interest
in the civil liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has reserved to
bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability. Hence, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is that of a witness for the
prosecution. Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves as parties only the
accused, as appellants, and the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would
be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of a
judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General takes
a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the
accused, the complainant's right to be heard on the question of award of
indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of justice and equity and to
provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby allows in this
case the memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of
the records of this appeal.
4. bondsmen of the accused in relation to liability on the bond.
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3. Offended party insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. (Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30, 1998)

5. employer in relation to subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC
If the employee absconds or jumps bail and there is a judgment for civil liability, can
the employer appeal?
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO.
147703. APRIL 14, 2004
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes
final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice
of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability.
Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee
does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary.
Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the
employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the
legal requirements must be strictly complied with
What is the remedy of the offended party if the court grants an accuseds motion to
withdraw the information?
First Womens Credit Corp. vs. Hon. Rommel Baybay, GR 166888, Jan 31, 2007
Withdrawal of appeal (Sec. 12 R122)

- Notwithstanding perfection of the appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal before the record has been
forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper appellate court as provided in section 8, in which
case the judgment shall become final. The Regional Trial Court may also, in its discretion, allw
the appellant from the judgment of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court to withdraw his appeal, provided a motion
to that effect is filed before rendition of the judgment in the case on appeal, in which case the
judgment of the court of origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to the latter
court for execution of the judgment. (12a)
PEOPLE VS. RICARDO RIO G.R. NO. 90294 SEPT. 24, 1991
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Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (Sec. 11, R122)

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.
(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal
aspect of the judgment or order appealed from.
(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order
appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party. (11a)

This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial
court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de
oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the
one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is
required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite
such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should
never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor
one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court)
so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
SEC. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal - It shall be the
duty of the clerk of court of the trial court, upon filing of a notice of appeal to
ascertain from the appellant, if confined in prison, whether he desies the Regional
Trial Court, Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel de oficio to
defend him and to transmit with the record on a form to be prepared by the clerk of
court of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the
response of the appellate to his inquiry. (13a)
RULE 123 - PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

SECTION 1. Uniform Procedure. The procedure to be observed in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except where a particular provision
applies only to either of said courts and in criminal cases governed by the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. (1a)
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the
same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a
criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal
case subject to the ordinary procedure.
Section 15 2 Par.
Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit
was previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.
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1991 RULES OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Coverage as to Criminal Cases (Sec. 1 B)

ATTY. HUGOLINO V. BALAYON, JR., VS. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO O. OCAMPO, JANUARY 29,
1993
In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute Resolution that even if a
witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection
with a specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical
certificate is among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also applies to a
Register of Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official documents issued by his
office.
RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This Rule speaks of searches where a warrant is issued.
Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search
and seizure may be effected, to wit:
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES:
From the concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban
In the case of PEOPLE VS. FLORENCIO DORIA JANUARY 22, 1999
1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a
warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense.
Such incidental search is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the
apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or made in a place other than the place of the
arrest.
3. Search of Moving Vehicles

The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is
justified by practicability, viz.:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to
standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains,
they furnish for successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and
swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their
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2. The "Plain View" Doctrine

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior
justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a
piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item
he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.

police control and reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious question far
deeper and broader than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is
no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency to
robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a
condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether
search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a
search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made."
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even
without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the
need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to
"enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board;or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law."
6. "Stop and Frisk"

The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being
Terry v. Ohio. The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and
making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict
manner in which this notion should be applied has been laid down as follows:
". . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a
crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine
reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about
him.
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals and in
Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had
red eyes and was walking in a wobbly manner along the city cemetery which, according to
police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police experience, such
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5. Search with Consent

Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized
exception to the rule against a warrantless search. The consent to the search, however, must
be express, knowing and voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescence is not
valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the constitutional guarantee, but only
a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances.
In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of
appellant's plastic bag was validated by the express consent of appellant himself, who was
observed to be "urbanized in mannerism and speech," and who moreover stated that he had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.

suspicious behavior was characteristic of persons who were "high" on drugs. The Court held
that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to
stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they
found in the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Some cases where tipped information was sufficient to justify warrantless
searches
From People vs. Samuel Valdez March 3, 1999
In People v. Tangliben, two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga
against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in
the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. An informer pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when
the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
Hence, faced with such on-the-spot tip, the police officers acted quickly as there was not
enough time to secure a search warrant.
In People v. Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional
Unit of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize
vehicles on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential
report by informers that Maspil and Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the
checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a
jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers
stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round
tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be
marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and
confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana
leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to lawful
warrantless arrest and declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting prohibited drugs. LLphil
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information
they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that
of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable
cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon
reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be
"high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what
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In People v. Malmstedt, Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain

Province in view of reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana.
They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the
identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. Accused's actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus. The Court held that in light
of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly,
including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in
law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant
to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with
the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts
What is the extent of an allowable routine search at police or military checkpoints
(part of Search of Moving Vehicles) ?
RUDY CABALLES VS. COURT OF APPEALS JANUARY 15, 2002
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and
(6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
Examples of valid warrantless searches with consent:
Also from Rudy Caballes vs. Court of Appeals January 15, 2002
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave
his consent to said search.
In People vs. Lacerna, the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In
upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was
"urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as
he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
In People vs. Cuizon, the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating
that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they
were carrying shabu.
In People vs. Montilla, it was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative
acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
SECTION 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing

issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed
to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court. (1)
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
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In People vs. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you
can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION
Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the
warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.
ELIZALDE MALALOAN, ET AL, VS. CA G.R. NO. 104879. MAY 6, 1994
Application for search warrant was filed with RTC of Caloocan and enforced/implemented in
Quezon City
HELD:
No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no
such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the
American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be
enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest,
and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return
thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime
of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days but there is no provision as
to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and
within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN MALALOAN
In relation to the authority of courts to issue warrants of arrest
1. The Court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to
issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for
a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which
may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the
justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
thereover.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for
the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal
property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court
wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation
therefor.
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2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to
the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing
court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall
be deemed waived.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is
charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. When the issue of which court
will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with
primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal
case.
TAKE NOTE OF SPECIAL EXCEPTION UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. 99-10-09SC
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA VS. PP, GR 158467, OCTOBER 16, 2009
It may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive
Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms
on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be
filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for
compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
Requisites for issuing a search warrant
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 255 SCRA 438. MARCH 29, 1996.
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined
by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized
ADD
(6) the warrant is in connection with one specific offense
BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, 133 SCRA

QUINTERO VS. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ET AL., JUNE 23, 1988, 162
SCRA 467
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched
2. Determined Personally by the judge
ABDULA VS. GUIANI FEB. 18, 2000
Similar to the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest where jurisprudence
clearly explains that What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
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1 Probable Cause is present

3. the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHIL. VS. ASUNCION MAY 19, 1999
Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint
Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary information
and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and
Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the
trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod and it turned out that even Bacolod
testified only that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the
subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on
his personal knowledge, not belief.
HELD:
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause,
to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false.
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive not merely routinary
or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application
4. The Applicant and the Witnesses Testify on Facts Personally Known to Them;
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHIL. VS. ASUNCION, MAY 19, 1999
-affidavits and hearsay testimony is not sufficient
5 The Warrant Specifically Describes the Place to be Searched and the Things to be
Seized
As to place
Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes
St., Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St.,
Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of
petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to
it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan, where the search
warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead
of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not
of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the
premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified
the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant's
invalidation in this case.
As to things to be seized
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents
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FRANK UY, ET. AL, VS. BIR G.R. NO. 129651. OCTOBER 20, 2000

from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the
terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register
books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts," "production record
books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and
"bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances
of this case.
As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales
invoices," however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial
markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely
because they are unregistered. 36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as
this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the
articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. 37 Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents
were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the
latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest
detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render
the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants
remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may
be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.
6. In Connection With One Specific Offense
GENERAL WARRANT OR SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT
SHOTGUN WARRANT
TAMBASAN VS. PEOPLE, 246 SCRA 184, JULY 14 1995
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The
caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the AntiSubversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null
and void.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHIL. VS. ASUNCION MAY 19, 1999
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary
in order that Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to
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KENNETH ROY SAVAGE VS. APRONIANO TAYPIN, ET. AL MAY 11, 2000
Search warrant issued in relation to alleged unfair competition (Intellectual Properties
case)
No such crime under the Intellectual Properties Code that should be given retroactive effect
to benefit the accused.
No basis for the issuance of a warrant.

liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein.
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
QUINTERO VS. NBI 162 SCRA 467
NBI agents, armed with a search warrant, raided a house. There was a witness but the NBI
agents searched different rooms simultaneously.
This cannot be allowed because it defeats the purpose of having a witness. The witness
cannot be in all the places being searched at the same time.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS DEC. 8, 2000
But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search
notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of
his household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:
"SECTION 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses.
No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality."
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the
searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after
respondent's wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the
"Certification of Orderly Search" and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondent's
wife.
We find merit in the petitioner's argument that private respondent's wife had no justifiable
reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot
hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises
or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made "in the
presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." There
was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque court and the
barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow
lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS DEC. 8, 2000

The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the
rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when
the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In
the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant
and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent's
residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the
applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The
rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the
time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the
maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search
warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and find that both
satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion
is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a
search "at any reasonable hour of the day or night." Absent such abuse of discretion, a search
conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.
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SEC. 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served
in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person
or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)

MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA 257 SCRA 430
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on
4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any
time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the
same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search
under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the
following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
Validity of search warrant.
A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall
be void. (Sec. 10 R126)
-Unlike a warrant of arrest, a search warrant has a DEFINITE LIFETIME.
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS:
1. How should an accused challenge the admissibility of evidence derived from the
implementation of a search warrant?
2. WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where
the court that issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence
of the service of the warrant?
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal
action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (Sec. 14, R
126)
SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORP. THE SHERIFF OF RTC QC, ET AL NOVEMBER 23, 2001
Petitioners also argue that Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, supra, while intended "to resolve conflicts of responsibility between courts," "does
not expressly cover the situation where the criminal complaint is pending with the prosecutor."
In such a case, petitioners submit, the public prosecutor should be allowed to resolve the
question of whether or not probable cause exists.
The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers
situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search
warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by
the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued
the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence
only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to
be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the
warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is
ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized
by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are
subject of a preliminary investigation
RULE 127 - PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES

115
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Can the court that issued the warrant entertain a motion to quash the warrant if the
case is still pending preliminary investigation?

SECTION 1. Availability of provisional remedies. The provisional remedies in
civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. (1a)
SEC. 2. Attachment. When the civil action is properly instituted in the
criminal action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of
the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered from the accused in the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused
who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or
is about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (2a)
What are the provisional remedies?
1. Preliminary Attachment- Rule 57
2. Preliminary Injunction- Rule 58
3. Receivership- Rule 59
4. Replevin- Rule 60
5. Support Pendente Lite Rule 61
Very Important
Court MUST have jurisdiction over the person of the accused for it to act on
applications for provisional remedies.
Section 5 of Rule 57 provides, in part thus:
xxxx No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall be
enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant's affidavit
and bond, and the order and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines.
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where
the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts,
116
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GROUNDS FOR ATTACHMENT IN CIVIL CASES:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract,
delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an
attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by
any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken,
detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt
or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is
about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
or on whom summons may be served by publication. (1a)

or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant
is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem. (5a)
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
History
Originally covered by P.D. 1508 Katarungang Pambarangay Law replaced by Secs. 399422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160 The Local
Government Code
Guidelines:
Guidelines in the implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay system were given by
the Supreme Court in Administrative Circular No. 14-93, dated July 15, 1993.
Procedure:
(a) Who may initiate proceeding Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any
individual who has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the
barangay.
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall
within the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for
them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If
he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties
before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter.
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Applicability to Criminal Cases:

Applicable to all Criminal Cases Except:
1. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only
individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants
or respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
2. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
Lupon;
3. Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (See Sec. 412 (b)
(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law);
Venue:
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling
thereon shall be binding. (Section 409, RA 7160)

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under
existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay. The
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complainant or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the
filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification The pangkat shall convene
not later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon
chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities
for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal
appearance of parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify any
member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest, or any other similar grounds
discovered after the constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative
vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be
decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
e) Period to arrive at a settlement The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or resolution
of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance with this section.
This period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall
not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious cases. (Section 410, RA 7160)
SIGMA LEGIS COPY
Can the absence of a prior referral to Barangay Conciliation be raised after

arraignment? Is it jurisdictional?
BAARES II VS. BALISING G.R. NO. 132624. MARCH 13, 2000
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the
municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under
the Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the
accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required
under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners could have
invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to
submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the
complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing
thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no
longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become final and
executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by
the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
118

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