People vs Ferrer Case Digest

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972

FACTS:
Separate criminal complaints for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act or R.A. no. 1700 were
filed against Feliciano Co who feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, and Nilo Tayag and 5 others who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized,
joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700.
The Anti-Subversion Act or R. A. No. 1700 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and
other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive"
organization
Feliciano CO and Nilo Tayag moved to quash the case filed against them, challenging the validity of the
Anti-Subversion Act on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is
a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused.
The Government appealed.
ISSUE:Whether the Anti-Subversion Act is considered as a Bill of Attainder.
HELD:
No. The Anti-Subversion Act is not a Bill of Attainder.
Article III, section 22 of the Constitution states that No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution
of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves
to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it
will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership
in the outlawed organization. The term Communist Party of the Philippines issued solely for definitional
purposes. In fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors. Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct. Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the
Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power.

WRIGHT VS CA
FACTS:
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in
the suppression of crime, the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons. . . wanted for prosecution of the
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." In defining
the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting
States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty."
On 1993, Assistant Secretary Hidalgo of the DFA indorsed to the DOJ Diplomatic Note from the
Government of Australia to the DOJ through Atty. General Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal
request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable
crimes: (1)Wright/Orr Matter- one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of
the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and (2) Wright/Cracker Matter -Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining
Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of
attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958;
and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958.
The trial court granted petition for extradition, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian
Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which
the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the
Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in
that country "which can legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retroactive application of the Treaty violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws.
HELD:
Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether
civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S.
state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal
statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act
punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not
creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that
the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." This
being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court
sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's
coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense
or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified."