Serrano v NLRC

Facts: Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to
apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. 1 Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on
contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he
became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent.
Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire
security section and engage the services of an independent security agency. Because of the
retrenchment program of the company, petitioner was terminated as the head of the Security
Section.
The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff,
unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay.
Thereafter, the case was heard. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been
illegally dismissed. He ruled that private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord
due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be terminated; that private respondent had not shown that
petitioner and other employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their
replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-saving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to
monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags on the merchandise" could not have been
employed; instead, the day after petitioner's dismissal, private respondent employed a safety and
security supervisor with duties and functions similar to those of petitioner.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution of March 30, 1994; reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one
month pay for every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondent's security section and the hiring of an
independent security agency constituted an exercise by private respondent of "[a] legitimate
business decision whose wisdom we do not intend to inquire into and for which we cannot substitute
our judgment"; that the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and the
employment of cost-saving devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor Code was insignificant because the
company official who wrote the dismissal letter apparently used the term "retrenchment" in its "plain
and ordinary sense: to layoff or remove from one's job, regardless of the reason therefor"; that the
rule of "reasonable criteria" in the selection of the employees to be retrenched did not apply because
all positions in the security section had been abolished; and that the appointment of a safety and
security supervisor referred to by petitioner to prove bad faith on private respondent's part was of no
moment because the position had long been in existence and was separate from petitioner's position
as head of the Security Checkers Section.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner is not with due process.
Ruling:

Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process

The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer, however, to the denial of due process by
the State, which is not the case here. There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by
the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It
does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the
Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the
State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due

Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the
power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of
termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is
not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The
purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an
opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his
employment.
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is
not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the
trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due
process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an
employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal. As Art.
277(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission."
The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but a regulatory measure, the purpose
of which was to give the employer the opportunity to find a replacement or substitute, and the
employee the equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment. Where the
termination of employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to be given to the,
employee.
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of
the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial
judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art.
282 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the
employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer,
commission of crime against the employer or the latter's immediate family or duly authorized
representatives, or other analogous cases).
-------------------In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is shown that the
termination of employment was due to an authorized cause, then the employee concerned should not
be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement.
Instead, he must be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. 283.

On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the
employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in accordance
with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just
cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was
terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final.

members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation
of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which
should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials
who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter
of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of
the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,
[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
Accountability of Public Officers:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the
title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it
would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether
an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed
limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same
case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal
the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.

Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take
effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.

He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is
an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily,
there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a
limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes, Petition granted

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been
shown in this case.

ISAE v Quisimbing

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
et.al

Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared
to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible
for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires
certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals
under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on
leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions mfr.

Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress
to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter promises Fair wages and
equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid
with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting
foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed
by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not
appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires
were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group the power to
exercise bargaining rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.