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Legal Ethics

HELD:

1. CAYETANO VS MONSOD

The very specific and simple definition of the practice of law is embodied below:

FACTS:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the


position of Chairman of the COMELEC to the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Renato L Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
In the Constitution, there shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.'
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1.
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2.
Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held
various positions in various foreign corporations in Costa Rica and Panama and in the World
Bank.
4.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations under the Meralco Group until 1986.
5.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
Cayetano believes that before 1986, while he was holding executive positions in various local
corporations, he cannot be considered in the practice of law. Hence, Monsod failed in the
requirements of the Constitution to be in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE: What constitutes the practice of law?

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Further in Blacks Law Dictionary: It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
Also Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.
HOW DID MONSOD PRACTICE LAW IN THE CORPORATE SETTING?
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),

Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987),
and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
2. People vs Maceda
Facts:
The case stems from the denied motion for reconsideration of the SolGen and a Senior State
Prosecutor in a decision promulgated by the SC on August 13, 1990 holding that Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to Atty
Deogracias del Rosario, the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC during the pendency of
criminal cases charged against Javellana et al for murder, frustrated murder and four counts of
attempted
murder.
At that time, there was sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at
the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for Javellanas
detention at the residence of Atty del Rosario with the condition that he is not allowed liberty
to roam around but was to be held as a detention prisoner in the said residence. However, it
was found out that the court order was not strictly followed because during his detention at
the residence of Atty del Rosario, Javellana continued with his daily and normal activities as

if he were a free man. He even continued to engage in the practice of law.


Held:
In the case at bar, Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of the criminal case against
him. Pursuant to the arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of law. As a matter of law,
when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. The more
important issue is that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence CAN NOT PRACTICE THEIR PROFESSION NOR ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESSOR OCCUPATION, OR HOLD OFFICE, ELECTIV EOR APPOINTIVE,
WHILE IN DETENTION.
3. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Ladaga
FACTS: Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for
authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal
Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. While
respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant
in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator requesting for a
certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the
said criminal case.
Atty. Ladaga admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization for the reason that his cousin who have no means of hiring a lawyer is facing a
member of a powerful family.
The Court denied his request for authorization to appear as counsel and directed the Office of
the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court. the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Lagadas appearance as counsel considered a private practice of law
HELD: Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. It is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private
practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC
of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling.
While respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of
law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department. Atty.
Ladaga was reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.
4. In Re: Almacen, R.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN vs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen was a defense counsel and the trial court rendered
judgment against his client. He filed motion for reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile he moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration. Atty. Almacen filed a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card, however, was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court. The case was elevated to the court of appeals. In denying his
motions, Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. He asserts that "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase,
as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust

judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated. The court required Atty. Almacen to explain. However, his written answer, as
undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. He repeats his lamentations
with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. He refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
HELD: The. Court held that to shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness,
he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this
Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. The court gave this unprecedented
act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration, that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious
case. The right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that "An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to
him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts". The lawyer's duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers. The court was solely concerned to Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in
the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings.. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the

duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen
was suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
5. In Re: Lanuevo

application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury constituting a violation of
Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, requiring candidates for admission
to the bar to be of good moral character. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in
good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due
care.

Facts:
Victorio Lanuevo is a former bar confidant. This case constitutes an administrative
proceeding for disbarment of Lanuevo because of his admission to the allegations of having
brought the five examination notebooks of 1971 bar examinee Ramon E. Galang back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking, emanating from the revelation of one
Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam. The five examiners admitted having
re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and was on the borderline of passing Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam
because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in
(Political,
Civil,
Mercantile,
Criminal
&
Remedial).
*** note Galang flunked in 1969, 1966-76, 1962-64 Bar exam.
Ramon E. Galang has a pending criminal case of Physical Injuries; he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case.
Issues:
WON Lanuevo has authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of
examinees.

Held:
The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to
convince each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him
pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited
only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the examiners
where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for reevaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the
facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang
without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence given to him by
the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang
was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his

6. IN RE: VICENTE CHING


FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father,
was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided
in the Philippines
Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City on
July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination
He was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as
proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified
accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers but he was advised that he needs
to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. He was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a
Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age

of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is
construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).

...the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine
Bar.
7. In Re: Haron Meling (2004)

bar

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the
in
1998
or
14
years
after
reaching
the
age
of
majority

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
RULLING:
Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within
a reasonable time.
The Supreme Court cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.
Fourteen years had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme
Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years.
Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer
serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place.
Further, Ching didnt give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship.The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient.
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

Facts:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez filed a petition before the Office of the Bar Confidant to
disqualify Haron S. Meling from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Sharia Bar. He alleged that Meling did not disclose
that he then had 3 pending criminal cases (two counts of Grave Oral Defamation, one count
of Less Serious Physical Injuries) before the MTCC of Cotabato City, which all arose from an
incident in May 2001 when Meling uttered defamatory words against against Melendrez and
his wife in front of the media and other people, and hit the face of his wife, causing injuries to
her. Also, he had been improperly using the title Attorney in his communications as the
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City.
Meling explained that a retired judge and former professor Judge Moson advised him to settle
the misunderstanding, and he believed in good faith that the cases would be settled due to the
retired judge's moral ascendancy over them. He also denied the charges and posited that
such do not involve moral turpitude. Regarding the use of attorney, he passed on the blame
to his office clerk who typed the title in some of his communications.
Issues:
1. WON Meling should be disqualified for non-disclosure of material facts.
2. WON he should be punished as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court concurred with the findings of the OBC that Meling's reasons ludicrous. He
should have known that only a court
of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge. Pending or otherwise, he was still required to disclose the
existence of
the cases against him to ascertain his moral character.
The merit of the cases against him is
immaterialwhat matters is his act of concealing, which constitutes dishonesty.
His non-disclosure violates Rule 7.01 of the CPR which states that a lawyer is answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in his application for
admission to the Bar. His unauthorized use of the attorney appellation, as held in Bar
Matter 1209, may render him liable for indirect contempt of court.

Meling was disallowed in taking the oath and signing in the roll. However, since he ended up
not passing the Exam anyway, this part was rendered moot and academic.
2. Yes. The Court also concurred with the OBC's recommendation
that
Meling's
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.
Practice of law, whether under regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character.
GMC is not only a precedent to admission; its continued possession is essential in order to
remain in the practice of law.
An applicant must aver that he/she has (1) not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, (2) nor accused or convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude, (3)
nor is there a pending case against him/her. By concealing the existence of the criminal cases,
the applicant already flunked the test of fitness, even if the cases would ultimately be proven
to be insufficient to impugn his/her good moral character.
Moreover, his use of the appellation attorney is improper because members of the Sharia
Bar who may only practice before Sharia courts are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar. Both are considered counselors, but only members of the Philippine Bar are
attorneys. This title is reserved to those who have been admitted to the IBP and remain in
good standing.

Through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa firm. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the
Vice President of NHMFC.
Upon learning of Alauyas letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of attorney, which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically
synonymous with Counselors-at-law; a title to which Sharia lawyers have a rightful claim.
Moreover, he stated that he prefers the title of attorney because counselor is often
mistaken for councilor (konsehal or the Maranao term consial,) connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. He further contended that he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney.
Held:

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court. Those privileged to be part of
the administration of justice must not only be competent and dedicated, but must also have
honesty and integrity, because a public office is a public trust.
8. Alawi v Alauya
Subject: Canon 9 (Unauthorized Practice of Law)
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City.

He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
Persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. While the counselors and lawyers may
both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing.

9. IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee


Facts:
Ramon E. Galang, bar candidate with office code No. 954, is a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%,
68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to
submit their sworn statements regarding the alleged anomaly in the 1971 Bar exam where the
grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Lanuevo admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and
his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Upon investigation, it was found that Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a
student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959,
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with
this information at the hearing, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having
been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention
of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. Howveer, due to the
maneuverings of the Bar COnfidant, he passed the Bar exam at 75%.

HELD:
The court disbarred Lanuevo. A Bar Confidant has no authority to request the examiners to
re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.He does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He does not a
have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.Consequently, Galang was also
disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, candidates for admission
to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical
Injuries, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal
case this resulted him to revoked his license.
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
10. DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent..
FACTS:
1. Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
2. On May 21, 2000, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
3. The charges are:
Unauthorized practice of law = Rana while still not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. He as well filed a pleading to MBEC, where in this pleading
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan.
Violation of law= complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
Grave misconduct and misrepresentation= complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondents
services
4. He admitted that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
He also claimed that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. He as well admitted signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to
the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explained, however, that he did not sign
the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
5. He allegedly submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 and was allegedly accepted on that
day

6. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
Held:
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be
a member of the Philippine Bar
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
11. Five J Taxi v NLRC
Facts:
Guillermo H. Pulia represented the private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon in a labor case against their employer Five J Taxi.
He pleaded for attorneys fees. However, he was a non-lawyer, non-member of a
labor union which the taxi drivers belong to. In addition, he is also not a party directly injured
by the acts of Five J Taxi nor is there anything that shows that he is an interested party in the
said case.
Issue: Whether or not Pulia can collect attorneys fees.

attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.

12.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN


Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less
than 9 years old. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named
Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even
conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal,
however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant therefore
argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of
the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding
the fact that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was
afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records
reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned
lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner."
Issue:
Whether a person not member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines may represent an
accused in a criminal proceeding

Held:
No. As stated in Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1691, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter
only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof.
While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of
private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client a reasonable compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence of an

Held: NO
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to
resolve a similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.[6] In Delgado, petitioner
and two others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her
remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioners
conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that
her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a
new trial, explaining that -

This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a


member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial
Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense
presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills
needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never
be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III, Sections 12 and
14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in
the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory
machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.
The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED
to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C.
Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation
regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action
13. G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE
ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
FACTS:
"PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages
of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18

October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November
1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection
to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he
is not a lawyer.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled. He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the
motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the
petitioner for review.
An agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no
less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well
as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.
ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?

HELD:
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
act or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before
the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of
special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of
the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in
all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

14. PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005


Where the matter referred to in Rule 6.03, in which the lawyer intervened as a government
official in a case is different from the matter or case in which he intervenes either as
incumbent government official or as a former or retired public officer, there is no violation of
Rule 6.03 nor he will be taking inconsistent positions nor will there be representation of
conflict of interests, nor violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law. (General Bank and
Trust Co. vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000; PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 151805, 12 April 2005)
Facts:

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it
was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition
for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended
that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was
belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before
the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If
true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not
brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the
practice of law.

1976: General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent (1977). A public
bidding of Genbanks assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor
General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1: Pres. Cory Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill
gotten wealth.
July 1987: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented
by Mendoza.
Feb 1991: Estelito Mendoza (Former SolGen who has resumed the practice of law) sought to
be disqualified from representing the Lucio Tan group in the 1987 case involving GENBANK
( General Bank and Trust Company) as one of those properties subject to a writ of

sequestration by PCGG being alleged to be ill gotten wealth acquired during the Marcos
Regime.
PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) averred:
there exists an adverse interest on Mendoza because when he was still a SolGen, he was the
one who filed a petition for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of GENBANK
( subsequently owned by Lucio Tan group) when it submitted the winning bid.

1) the word intervene is applicable to both adverse interest conflicts and

congruent interest conflicts, it has been found that neither of these conflicts exists in
the liquidation case and the sequestration case.
.

2) The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the

sequestration cases.The matter where he got himself involved was in informing


Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK through the
courts and in filing the necessary petition in the then Court of First Instance. The

PCGG invokes: PCGG invokes Rule 6.03of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

subject matter of the special proceeding, therefore, is not the same nor is related to

prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in

but is different from the subject matter in the civil case. The civil case involves the

connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of

Sandiganbayan rejects PCGGs motion by: arguing that PCGG failed to prove the existence

GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.

of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General


and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group and that Mendozas
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986.
Issue: WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza
Held:
No, Rule 6.03 of the CPR is inapplicable in the case. The matter, or the act of Mendoza as
Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of
Genbank. This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
The motion for disqualification should be dismissed for the following reasons:

Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from
the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and
officers.
3) Mendozas intervention in the liquidation of Genbank is not substantial and significant to
warrant disqualification.
The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
The Court balanced the two policy considerations of having a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent and the use of former government employment as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel.

Note: Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer
represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed with the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.

respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and,as an elective
official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713.Consequently, for the violation of
the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Respondent was then
recommended for suspension from the practice of law.

Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not
involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if the
interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel. Matter any
discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others


15. WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA

Ruling. Yes.A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time
to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only
with the written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.Notwithstanding all of these,
respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations. For this failure, responded violated his
oath as a lawyer, that is,to obey the laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for not complying with the
ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon 7, CPR.

FACTS:
Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th
District of Manila where Respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been
summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were
issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against
the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided
over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without
bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was
financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) whereafter
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them,

16. FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES vs. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE


FACTS:
In July 1, 1999, spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes, borrowed a sum of P10, 000
from Atty. Victor Deciembre. The spouses then entrusted five blank PNB checks to Atty.
Diciembre to serve as a collateral for the approval of the loan and for any other loan that may
be obtained in the future. More than month later, Lourdes, using one of the entrusted blank
checks, paid the amount of P14,874.37 to Atty. Deciembre for the loan plus surcharges,
penalties and interests. The transaction was recorded in a receipt which was signed by Atty.
Deciembre.
Despite the payment of the loan, Atty. Deciembre filled out the remaining four blank
checks in his possession and wrote an amount of P50,000 on each check. He claims that on
June 15, 1999, he a was approached by the spouses in Cainta Rizal and requested him to give
them P100, 000 cash in exchange of the post-dated check the spouses had which totaled to
P100,000. He further added that in the same day at around 2:00 p.m. in Quezon City, he was
again approached by the spouses again asking him to give them P100,000 cash and issued
him checks which also amounted to P100,000.
The spouses refuted Atty. Deciembres claim stating that they were in the office at the
time of the alleged transaction as shown in their Daily Time Records. They also maintained
that it is physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal and after an
interval of thirty minutes in Quezon City, especially with the heavy traffic conditions in the
place.

Atty. Deciembre filed a case a criminal case against the spouses asserting that
Franklin and Lourdes had deceived him and did not honor their alleged transaction in July 15,
1999. The lawyer asserts that the contended P200,000 transactions were supposed to be
covered by the four checks issued to him by the spouses however he was not able to get his
money back because the PNB account was closed.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby
exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the
criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners
(Franklin) was detained for three months because of the Complaints.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Deciembres narration of events is credible?

Atty. Deciembre was found guilty of gross misconduct, violation of Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Deciembre was indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law.

HELD: Based on the report of the investigating commissioner, Deciembres version of the
facts was not credible. There were inconsistencies in his testimonies. In his affidavitcomplaint, Atty. Deciembre claims that the morning transaction happened in Cainta, Rizal but
during the cross-examination, he says that the morning transaction happened in his office in
Garnet Road, Ortigas Center. Also initially in the cross-examination, he claims that the
morning transaction occurred between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. but in the later part he agrees
that the transaction occurred at 2 a.m.
The investigating commissioner likewise assailed the credibility of Atty. Deciembres
statement pointing that the likelihood of him handing the money out under the circumstances
he described would be low. The only previous transaction between the two parties was the
loaning of the P10,000 and the spouses were not able to pay it on time and thus had to pay
interest. That Atty. Deciembre would trust them once more by giving them another
P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under
the circumstances does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction
and personal circumstances of complainants.
The Court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the investigating
commissioner. In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of
petitioners and found Deciembres testimony untrue. On the pretext that he was not able to
bring the checks with him, he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable
dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard
for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks.
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that
had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.

17. RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,


BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA.
FACTS: The administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator
William C. Ogan which was pending for 13 years. The delay was caused by various
maneuvers Of Atty. Samuel C. Occea.
In the last will and testament of William, his residuary estate was divided among his
seven children. He named Necitas Ogan-Occeas as his executrix of the estate. She retained
the services of her husband, Atty. Samuel Occea, as her lawyer. The estate consists of a bank
deposits, securities, and real estate in Cebu and in Ohio, USA. There are no debts. The
settlement of the estate was unduly prolonged owing to the delaying tactics of Atty. Occea.
Subsequently, there was a decision suspending Atty. Occea from the practice of law
for three years because of the following administrative offenses relating to the settlement of
the estate:
1.
Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office. Six
cases were filed to the CA, and one with the SC, assailing court orders directing Necitas to
determine the assets of the estate in US, to release $1,000 from the estate, and to report the
securities belonging to estate. His actions caused unnecessary delay.
2.
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent
to the same; delayed persons for money or malice. Atty. Occea and his wife filed against
judges of the probate court actions for damages and administrative complaints which were
dismissed for lack of merit, lack of cause of action and failure to substantiate the charge. No
less than 13 cases were filed, most if not all, were without merit. His propensity to file
groundless caused harassment of Judge Ruiz and other judges who handled the case. These
judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby using time which
could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

3.
Disobeying the laws. He disobeyed provisions of Rule 140, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of
Court, entitled Charges Against Judges of First Instance, which reads as follows:
Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential.
He violated said provisions through the following acts by attaching a copy of his
administrative cases against Judge Ruiz to the petitions he filed. The administrative complaint
is not relevant to the questions and issues raised in the petitions.
4.
Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court. Atty. Occea alleged, in
several complaints. That his wife-executrix was held in contempt and censured without any
hearing. However, records show that dates for hearings were set and Atty. Occea and his were
notified but they failed to attend.
The decision to suspend Atty. Occea was restrained due to a motion filed by him. The case
was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation.
ISSUE: WON the decision to suspend Atty. Occea should is proper.
HELD: Decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the
practice of law for a period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C.
Occea be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his oath of office as
attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross
misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to
do so. Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyers
oath.
This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the
purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his
knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the
same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while
he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all
times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with

honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the
legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes
suspension and disbarment.
18. Re: Petition of Al Argosino
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992, Mr, Al Caparros Argosino, along with thirteen (13) others, was charged
with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on
September 8, 1991. Raul Camaligan died due to the infliction of severe physical injuries upon
him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino and seven (7) others initially pleaded not guilty. They continuously bargained with
the prosecution and later on pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The trial court accepted such plea and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years on
February 11, 1993.
Eleven (11) days after, Mr. Argosinos party filed an application for probation with the lower
court. It was granted on June 18, 1993, such with a duration of two years. Less than a month
later, on July 13, 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examination and fortunately, he passed.
However, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a petition to the SC to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, contending that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had already terminated his probation which did not even last for more than (10)
months. Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring Mr.
Argosino to submit to the SC evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. Mr.
Argosino submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others
two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. He
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of
Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether Mr. Al Argosino should be allowed to take the lawyers oath of office, sign
the Roll of Attorneys, and ultimately practice the profession of law.

Pasig City). This was again returned unserved with the notation. Thus, the case was referred
to the IBP Commision on Bar Discipline.

HELD: Yes, Mr. Al Argosino had presented competent proof that he possessed good moral
character as required to take the lawyers oath, and to sign the Roll of Attorneys. The SC
granted his petition because they have recognized that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with
a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The SC is persuaded that he exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.

19. Emilio Grande vs. Atty Evangeline de Silva

HELD:
Yes, the said respondent is guilty. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by her
in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath. Such
act is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

FACTS:
Atty. Evangeline de Silva was charged for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 for issuing a bouncing check to Emilio Grande amounting P 144, 768 drawn from
her account at the Philippine National Bank. The said check serves as a settlement of the civil
aspect of the case against her client, Sergio Natividad, wherein Grande was the private
offended party. At first, Grande refused to accept it but de Silva assured her that as a lawyer,
she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. However, the check was
returned at the the time when it is deposited since the said account was already closed.
Complainant then wrote a letter to respondent demanding her to pay the face value of the
check but his demand was ignored. Because of this, he instituted the abovementioned
criminal complaint.
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers oath. A resolution was
issued on February 2, 1998 which was sent to the respondent's given address, (Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City) asking her to comment on the
complaint within ten days from notice. However, it was returned unserved with the notation
moved. Another resolution was issued on June 20, 2001 and was sent to the latest address of
respondent submitted by the Assistant National Secretary of IBP ( 274 M.H. Del Pilar St.,

Atty. de Silva committed gross misconduct which puts her moral character in serious
doubt and renders her unfit for the practice of law. The loss of moral character shall warrant
her for suspension or disbarment.
Moreover, her attitude in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served stains the
nobility of the legal profession. Her conduct not only underscores her lack of respect for
authority but also questions her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law since she
defied the law, which is the very core of her profession.
Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility
could not be any clearer
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Thus, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for two years.

20.Mercedes Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez vs Judge Gregorio Lantin


FACTS:
Civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to pay
a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was
to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by
Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt.
Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so
he issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos
210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k.
Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the
Perez spouses are without merit, that their numerous petitions for injunction are
contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the
cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said
decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against
their professionalism, that If there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to
be more assertive a quality of the lawyer is not to be condemned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD:
No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must
be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence despite
the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to
advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
21. Obusan vs Obusan Jr. Adm Case No. 1392

FACTS: Atty. Generoso Obusan Jr., then single, had a relationship with one Natividad
Estabillo. In 1972, Estabillo begot a son with Obusan. Obusan later found out that Estabillo
was at the time still validly married with one Tony Garcia. Four days after the birth of his son

with Estabillo, Obusan married Preciosa Razon. The couple lived more than a year together
until one day when Obusan left the conjugal home and never returned.
Preciosa searched for Obusan until she found out that the latter has been living with
Natividad Estabillo. Preciosa then filed a disbarment case against Obusan on the grounds of
gross immorality and adultery. Preciosa presented the testimonies of the neighbors of
Estabillo who all testified that Estabillo and Obusan presented themselves as husband and
wife in their community.

ISSUE: Whether or not Obusan should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. Obusan failed to counter the evidence presented by his wife. He even failed to
file responsive pleadings. Hence, on the strength of the evidence against him, he is guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former
paramour, a married woman, falls within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.
23. JOSEFINA MORTEL vs. ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS
A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1952, Josefina Mortel, then a 21 years old teacher met Atty.
Anacleto Aspiras. Aspiras, introduced himself as a single man (although he was already
married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven children), courted Mortel and
eventually won her affection. On a certain night of November, 1952, Aspiras was invited to
stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m.,
while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after promising
marriage, succeeded in seducing her.
Following the attorneys instructions, Mortel came to Manila so they could get
married. She went on to the Manila City Hall, where for the first time, she met his son Cesar,
who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her bridegroom-to-be. She was again
instructed and filled up the application for marriage and wrote the name of Cesar as her
husband-to-be. Further, in the marriage ceremony, Anacleto made Mortel believe that Cesar

will be his proxy in the wedding. Afterwards, the two contracting parties separated, never to
live together as husband and wife. However, the respondent continued his adulterous relations
with Josefina, resulting to the birth of a baby boy.
On March 17, 1953, Mortel complained before the Court against Aspiras but later
filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her complaint did not
"represent her true sentiments and her marriage to Cesar Aspiras was "without any fraud or
deceit whatsoever".
Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair, but that it affected the legal
profession, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. Unfortunately, for lack of evidence, the
complaint was dismissed.
However, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she had
asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable
settlement with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived
together as husband and wife and that as a result she was on the family way. She also charged
the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live with them for purpose of
"camouflaging their living together".
The Court granted the petition to re-open and referred the papers to the Solicitor
General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and
promised marriage, is confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:
. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you
along with me before the altar of matrimony. (September 22, 1952.)
Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you
will always be the first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only
woman to me as I used to say to you. (November 2, 1952.)
And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with
herein respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother.
The Solicitor General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint praying for
respondents disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of
marriage, and to cover up his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the
said Josefina Mortel; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having
sexual relations with the spouse of his own son.
ISSUE: Whether Aspiras should be disbarred.
HELD:

Supposing that Aspiras conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which
an attorney may be disbarred, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office
on grounds other than those enumerated by the statutes. In the United States wherefrom our
system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . . and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground
for disbarment.
Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this
obliquity became worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of
marriage and/or to cover up his illicit relations. He corrupted his own descendant by turning
him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities.
Granted that the marriage was real, then his moral delinquency becomes all the more
unpardonable: he cohabited with the wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself
arranged and witnessed.
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some
cases hold and on this we do not decide. But respondent's moral delinquency having been
aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of
his minor son or destruction of the latter's honour, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to
continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the bar.
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered
***In connection "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by
respondent to enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully
claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances
who had known her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.
24. TERRE VS. TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with grossly immoral conduct, consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting No judicial action having been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant. Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by
complainant. Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin,
with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage was

void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her
objection, he wrote single as her status. After getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre
abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing
again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE:
1.WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage
2. WON Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious
defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainants evidence as to the basic
fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended
defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior
marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito
being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
2. Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of
their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage
is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for
the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

25. ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR


Facts: A complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Aznar on the ground of gross
immorality.
1) Delos Reyes was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the
Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in
the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San
Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would
sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask
was placed on her mouth and nose
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body.
Held: In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children,
to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
26. Josefina Royong vs Atty. Ariston Oblena
Facts:
Complainant testified that after lunch of August 5, 1958, when she was left by her mother in
their house, the respondent entered into their house and read a newspaper at her back while
she was ironing clothes. Suddenly he covered her mouth and dragged her into the bedroom
and started raping her. The complainant kept quiet about the incident as she was threatened to

be killed by the respondent. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby.
The respondent denied the allegation but admitted to the court that he had an illicit affair with
the complainant. Their relationship started while the complainant was still a minor. In order
for the respondent to avoid criminal liability of seduction, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. After
reaching the age of majority, they had sex every now and then. The respondents relationship
with the complainant happened while he is living with his common law wife, which is the
aunt of the complainant. His relationship with his common law wife is bigamous.
The prosecution also stated that before the respondent took the bar, he concealed the truth
about his bigamous relationship.
Issue:
Whether the respondent can be removed from the roll of attorneys even if he was not
convicted of any crime.
Held:
Yes. Moral character as a requirement in taking the bar examinations cannot just be set aside
when one is already a lawyer. There is no double standards to morality. Acts of a person as an
applicant to the Bar cannot be separated once he is already a member of the Bar. Also, the
Supreme Court said that even if fornication is not a ground for disbarment, it still has the
power to disbar lawyers for their misconducts.

Laguitan then filed a petition for disbarment of Atty. Salvador on account of immorality and
acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
Tinio appeared before the IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit
relationship with Laguitan and his having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the
Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate children but had not lived to his
promise.
Issue: Whether to suspend Tinio from the practice of law
Held: Tinio should be suspended. The Court is in agreement with the Board.
The IBP Board recommends that Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having
cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the
suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but
not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore
him but also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with
complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character
that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.

27 PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.


Facts (Based on the Findings of the IPB Board of Governors):
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time
became lovers. Beginning in 1976, they lived together as husband and wife. They had two
children (Shiela and Benedict).
In the course of this relationship, Laguitan discovered that Tinio, before meeting her, had
contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior marriage was subsisting.
Nonetheless, Tinio continued living in with Laguitan until eventually, ten (10) years later,
Laguitan and her children were abandoned by the Tinio. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she
sought the help from Tinos parents in supporting her children who were then already in
school. They gave P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.

The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the Commission
and to the Court that he is supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate
children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.
28) SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA VS. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA
Facts:
Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The information was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission a revised and verified version of her
long
and
detailed
complaint.

The respondent was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The hearings on the case was rescheduled three times but it
never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set
aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she
and her husband had already "reconciled". The Commission required to appear before it for
confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal
motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded
and
nothing
was
heard
from
either
party
since
then.
The IBP Board of Governors then submitted to the Court its report containing the following
findings:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage,
two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that
year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova
gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought
his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his

legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no
longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the
complainant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Cordova shall be suspended in the practice of law because of the charge filed
against
him
Held:
Yes. The Court agrees that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition
for
membership
in
the
Bar
in
good
standing.
Thus, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and
until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when
respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has
and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral
course
of
conduct
that
he
has
clung
to.

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