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G.R. No. 71110 November 22, 1988

PAZ, ESTELA, AIDA, HERMINIA, GWENDOLYN, JENSINE and LEONILA
VILLAGONZALO, vs. IAC
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
- February 22, 1961, Juan C. Villagonzalo, the predecessor-in-interest of the parties,
purchased Lot No. 7429 of the Ormoc Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 24611 from the Heirs of Roman Matuguina. Sale and TCT No. 4259
were registered in the name his daughter, defendant Cecilia, single, since he
borrowed from her the sum of P500.00 to complete the full payment of the price
of the lot. 13 years after, the complaint was filed by co-heirs
- Petitioners contention: Registration of the land in her name was not a
repudiation of the implied trust. Difference between extinctive for aquisitive
prescription is good faith.
- Respondents Contention: Upon registration of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4259 and the registration of the sale in her name is a constructive notice that
she thereby excluded herein petitioners from the estate of their deceased
predecessor-in-interest and, consequently, she set up a title to the land adverse
to them, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or trust relationship involved. Action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years counted from the date when adverse title is asserted by the possessor of
the property.
Issue: Prescription as means to acquire title
Ruling:
- Action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust shall
prescribe after ten years counted from the date adverse title to the property is
asserted by the possessor thereof, since it is an action based upon an
obligation created by law.
- Registration constitutes constructive notice
- Evidence of record that in 1961, private respondent refused to give any share in
the produce of the land, 1963 she mortgaged the property and 1969, she leased
the same to one Ramon Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or
retaliatory legal action.
- Affirmed.
[G.R. No. 128102. March 7, 2000]
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, v. CA, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA,
FELOMINO AUGUSTO, FEDERICO ABING, and ROMEO AUGUSTO,
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Facts:
- Lot No. 4399 in Mactan was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta
Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of

Absolute Sale, registered on March 1964. AZNAR entered into a joint venture
with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the
subject lot, consequently demanding the respondents to vacate the land. They
refused. Hence, the filing of unlawful detainer and damages.
Petitioners contention: Respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of
Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the event
that the company would use the property for its purposes.
Respondents contention: They are the successors and descendants of Crisanta
Maloloy-on, registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856.
That the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void
ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent (two of the signatories were not
heirs of the registered owners) and a complaint seeking to nullify it was filed.
Issue: Validity of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
Ruling:
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto except
when the issue of possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue of
ownership, the court may receive evidence upon the question of title to the
property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue of possession
Partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of
the persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to
the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no
evidence of bad faith or fraud
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person
Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As
such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
Under the Notarial Law in forc, only those who had been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents.
The non-annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale in the
reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, the same does not render
the deed legally defective.
Act of registering a document is never necessary to give the conveyance legal
effect as between the parties and the vendors heirs. As between the parties to a
sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. It is only
necessary when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land
described in the conveyance.
The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of
strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the nonregistration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties
thereto of their obligations thereunder.
The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting

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rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on
the clean title of the properties
- The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered on 6 March
1964 under Act No. 3344 on unregistered lands because at the time, no title
was existing it was allegedly lost during the last world war. It was only on 8
August 1988 that the title was reconstituted at the instance of the petitioner.
- Final determination of the issue in the other case for the annulment or
cancellation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
- Granted. RTC decision reinstated.
G.R. No. L-17951
February 28, 1963
CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON, vs. EMILIA E. DE LEGARE
and COURT OF APPEALS
REGALA, J.:
Facts:
- Plaintiff, Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253. She mortgaged it to Tomas Q. Soriano to
secure an 8,000 loan. This deed of mortgage was recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds and annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of
transfer certificate of title No. 21253.
- An unknown man intruded into the room, threatened to kill Emilia if she did not
give him 10,000. John W. Legare, her adopted son, approached the Emilia and
suggested to sign a paper, purportedly an application for payment of
compensation. As plaintiff could not read and write and she had confidence in
John W. Legare, she signed that paper.
- Later, it was revealed that sale was executed by the plaintiff in favor of defendant
John W. Legare and issued in the name of the latter transfer certificate of title
No. 30126 which cancelled transfer certificate of title No. 21253, then the deed
of sale executed by John W. Legare in favor of the spouses Conrado C. Fule and
Lourdes F. Aragon and issued in favor of the latter transfer certificate of title No.
30127 (Exhibit Y-1), which cancelled transfer certificate of title No. 30126, and
then annotated on the memorandum of encumbrances of transfer certificate of
title No. 30127 the deed of mortgage (Exhibit X-1) executed in favor of Tomas Q.
Soriano by said spouses. Once these were accomplished, Elias B. Fermin and
John W. Legare went back to the house of the spouses Conrado C. Fule and
Lourdes P. Aragon and gave the transfer certificate of title No. 30127.
Thereupon said spouses delivered to John W. Legare the balance of the
purchase price of the property after deducting therefrom the amount of the
mortgage constituted thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano, the brokerage fees
and the expenses incident to the execution and registration of said deeds and
issuance of new certificates of title, which amounted to a little P4,000.00.
Issue: petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value of the properties here
contested?
Ruling:

- Petitioners are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.

- A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other persons has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith
consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another
- Nothing in John W. Legare's person or behaviour suggested anything suspicious.
He was the adopted son and had not been known to commit crime or
dishonesty.
- Deed of sale was regular upon its face, and duly acknowledged before a notary
public. Petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents exhibited to them
by John W. Legare, but, on the registerability of those document, satisfying the
measure of good faith contemplated by law.
- Even if the petitioners purchased the properties from John W. Legare, when he
was not yet the registered owner of the same, does not make them in bad faith
since the certificate of title was in the possession of her adopted son, John.
Under Section 55 of Act 496, as amended, John's possession of the certificate
and his subsequent production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a
"conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter
a new certificate." The petitioners required that the registration of the previous
sale (from the respondent to John W. Legare) be first attended to and
completed.
- As a rule, forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. Exception is
where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon
what appeared in the certificate.
- Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates
in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat
his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of
the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be
futile and nugatory. The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation
for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the business
community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.
- Upon issuance by Register of Deeds of a certificate of title in the name of John W.
Legare, and thereafter registered the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third
parties were concerned, acquired a valid title
- Reversed.
G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994
CONSORCIA, ORLANDO, MANUEL, REGINA, TUNAY and MELITON,
OBSEQUIO, vs. CA, EUFRONIO ALIMPOOS, and PONCIANA ALIMPOOS

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REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
- Lot No. 846, Pls-225 was previously covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P1181 registered in the name of herein respondent Eufronio Alimpoos and which
he acquired through a homestead application. The said land is now registered in
the name of herein petitioner, Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, as evidence by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421. Alimpoos mortgaged the land to Deguro
and delivered to the latter the OCT of the land. Without consent and
misrepresentation, the land was conveyed to Deguro. This deed of sale was
annotated at the back of the said certificate of title as Entry No. 16007. Upon
the death of Deguro, the heirs sold it to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio
- Private respondents filed a complaint against herein petitioners Consorcia and
Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession
and ownership on the ground that original certificate of title over the said land
was cancelled by virtue of a forged deed of absolute sale.
- CA ruled that Eufronio Alimpoos was the true and legal owner of the property
Issue: W/N there is valid transfer of title
Ruling:
- An original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer
thereof on the ground of fraud but without prejudice to the rights of any
innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.
- A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property. Petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in good faith.
She has no participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged forgery.
- The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to
real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such further inquiry.
- Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title
thus issued, acquire, rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such
rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. Otherwise, it will impair
public confidence in the certificate of title.
- Forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser
for value intervenes.
- General rule: a deed of sale executed by an impostor without the authority of the
owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not validate what
otherwise is an invalid document.
- Exception: Where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of
the true owner to the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was

subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely
upon what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
An executed document of transfer of registered land placed by the registered
owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third
party that the holder of the document of transfer is authorized to deal with the
land. Further, if indeed there was fraud, as between two innocent persons, one
of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made
it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.
The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against
those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of
damages against the Assurance Fund.
An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name,
which must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such
issuance operates as a constructive notice.
REVERSED
G.R. No. L-42805 August 31, 1987
THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES EDUARDO OCSON and NORA E. OCSON
CRUZ, J.:

Facts:
- Alleged to be Lawaan Lopez offered to sell to the private respondents a parcel of
land. The sale was deferred, because the certificate of title had been burned in
his house in Divisoria. He filed for duplicate of title which was granted. The sale
proceeded, and corresponding transfer certificate of title was subsequently
issued to them after cancellation of the duplicate certificate in the name of
Lawaan Lopez.
- Claiming to be the real Lawaan Lopez, he filed a petition to declare as null and
void the transfer of her land claiming that it had been made by an impostor.
Lower court annulled the DAS and duplicate COT and revalidated his certificate.
- Private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and the
Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages
- Lower court ruled that the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable in case the
judgment could not be enforced against the other defendant who had been
defaulted and could not be located.
Issue: Recovery from the Assurance Fund
Ruling:
- Section 101 of Act No. 496 (before its revision by P.D. No. 1529) - Any person who
without negligence on his part sustains loss or damage through any omission,
mistake or misfeasance of the clerk, or register of deeds, or of any examiner of

titles, or of any deputy or clerk or of the register of deeds in the performance of

their respective duties under the provisions of this Act, and any person who is
wrongfully deprived of any land or any interest therein, without negligence on
his part, through the bringing of the same under the provisions of this Act or by
the registration of any other person as owner of such land, or by any mistake,
omission, or misdescription in any certificate or owner's duplicate, or in any
entry or memorandum in the register or other official book, or by any
cancellation and who by the provisions of this Act is barred or in any way
precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest
therein, or claim upon the same, may bring in any court or competent
jurisdiction an action against the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
Recovery from the Assurance Fund could be demanded by:
1. Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a. That there was no negligence on his part;
b. that the loss or damage was sustained through any omission, mistake, or
misfeasance of the clerk of court, or the register of deeds, his deputy or
clerk, in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of
the land Registration Act,' or
2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or any interest therein under
the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part;
b. that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or
interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or
by the registration by any other persons as owner of such land; or by
mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or owner's duplicate,
or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book, or by
any cancellation; and
c. that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the
recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
Private respondents do not come under either of the two situations above
mentioned.
Private respondents acquired no land or any interest therein as a result of the
invalid sale made to them by the spurious Lawaan Lopez. Such sale conveyed
no title or any interest at all
The real Lawaan Lopez had her own genuine certificate of title all the time and it
remained valid despite the issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of
the private respondents which is null and void ab initio
Private respondents were not exactly diligent in verifying the credentials of the
impostor
Although no collusion between the parties respondents and the vanished vendor,
they cannot claim the status of innocent purchasers of the land for failure to
exercise the necessary diligence in ascertaining the credentials and bona fides
of the false Lawaan Lopez.

- The Government like all governments, and for obvious reasons is not an
insurer of the unwary citizen's property against the chicanery of scoundrels.
- Granted.
G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989
APOLONIO EGAO AND BEATRIZ EGAO, vs. CA, SEVERO DIGNOS AND
SEVERO BONTILAO
PADILLA, J.:
Facts:
- Private respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao, alleging to be the
legitimate owners and possessors, filed complaint for Quieting of Title and/or
Recovery of Possession and Ownership of lot 662 in Bukidnon, against
petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao.
- Certificate of Title have not yet been transferred in favor of Marfori except for the
tax declarations
- Vendors Marfori is in actual, physical, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession
- Respondents contention:
o Claim is based on a deed of absolute sale (1964 and 1965) of such land as
follows:
1. Lot 662 - OCT obtained via Free Patent (1965) registered under Apolonio
Egao married to Beatriz Menosa -> Roberto Marfori-> Respondents (and
made some improvements)
2. Lot 661 - OCT obtained via Free Patent registered under Raulita Conejos
married to Pedro Conejos -> Roberto Marfori-> Respondents
o That the Egaos illegally occupied the portions of land
- Petitioners contention:
o Egao is the registered owner evidenced by OCT, have been in actual, physical,
adverse, open and continuous possession thereof even before the issuance to
him of the free patent;
o that the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against
alienation under CA No. 141 (Public Land Law);
o Fourth in a series of cases filed
- RTC ruled in favor of Egaos but CA reversed holding Marfori and Egao in pari
delicto for violating the 5 year restriction
Ruling:
- All deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five (5) years.
- A notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear unequivocal mariner therein
expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all
these there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.

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- A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse open and
notorious possession or by prescription.
- The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No
one can plead ignorance of the registration.
- Respondents are not innocent purchasers for value since they neglect to make
the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in
his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor.
- Rule of pari delicto does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale void
ab initio
- Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year
period are null and void hence, no title passed from the Egaos to Marfori
consequently to Bontilao and Dignos. (Nobody can dispose of that which does
not belong to him).
- A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain, as only the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. While the government has
not taken steps to revert title to the government, the vendor or his heirs is
better entitled to the possession of the said, the vendee being in no better
situation than any intruder.
- Respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing to
question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title.
- Reversed. Owners certificate to be delivered to Egaos
G.R. No. L-32723 October 28, 1977
JUAN DACASIN, JOSE, MARIA, SORAHAYDA, FLORDELIZA and FILIPINAS
MARAMBA, vs CA FELIPE CAPUA, SINFOROSA PADILLA, GUALBERTO
CALULOT and OLIMPIA LOMIBAO
GUERRERO, J.
Facts:
- Felipe Capua, et al filed a complaint against Juan Dacasin, Jose Maramba and
Filipinos Maramba
- Prior to January 19, 1943, rural land in Pangasinan was being possessed by Jose
Maramba, the same being grabbed by Sabina Capua et al and possessed the
land. Jose Maramba filed Civil Case No. 895 against Sabina Capua for
revindication. Both, however, had their own declaration of land tax
- Sabina sold the property unto Gualberto Calulot on 21 April, 1950, the latter has
no knowledge of the pending case.
- CFI declared Jose Maramba absolute owner. However, the execution has
prescribed (5 years)

- Gualberto sold and transfer possession of the same property unto spouses Felipe
Capua and Sinforosa Padilla;
- Heirs of Maramba sold the property to Juan Dacasin
- Lower court ruled in favor of Juan for acquiring the land in good faith from
unpolluted sources. CA reversed.
- Respondents contention: Possession was exclusive, adverse and continuous, the
said successive possession of, namely Sabina Capua from 1943 to 1950,
Gualberto Calulot from 1950 to 1960 and Felipe Capua herein plaintiff from
1960 up to the institution of the present case was enough to perfect a title of
ownership.
Ruling:
- When Jose Maramba sued Sabina Capua, the pendency of action from September
8, 1944 to September 1, 1952 when judgment was rendered, or a period of
eight (8) years, the possession of Sabina Capua over the land did not run. It
remained interrupted. The land was in custodia legis. Not even intervening
periods of 1943 to 1950 (the possession of Sabina Capua), then from 1950 to
1960 (possession of Gualberto Calulot and from 1960 to 1963 (possession of
Felipe Capua up to the institution of the present suit) cannot tack possession
since judicial summons not only interrupted it but lost in the litigation.
- Gualberto Calulot cannot legally acquire possession during the pendency of the
litigation;
- When possession of the property was taken from Felipe Capua and given to Jose
Maramba on October 4, 1960, Felipe Capua became aware or came to know
that there existed a flaw in his title or mode of acquisition. Felipe Capua may
have acquired the land in good faith on May 27, 1960 when he bought the
property from Gualberto Calulot but his eviction, made him aware that he
possessed the land improperly or wrongfully. Consequently, Felipe Capua cannot
claim good faith as to ripe his possession to acquisitive prescription.
- Deed of sale executed between Jose Maramba as vendee and Emiliana Abad as
vendor in 1958 was duly registered. Such constitutes notice to third persons
and affords protection in favor of him who in good faith relies upon what
appears in the registry.
- The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed
title of the vendor and he who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all
the risks and consequent to such failure.
- Gualberto Calulot had not declared the land in his own name for tax purposes. He
had not sought the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Sabina
Capua to him as the vendee, his possession was not in the concept of owner.
- Reversed.
G.R. No. 138660
February 5, 2004
HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS, vs CA and MAGUESUN
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP
CARPIO, J.:

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Facts:
- Petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan Central Realty
Corporation ("Meycauayan") for defying the final and executory Decision and
Resolution of this Court
- Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas filed action to set aside the decree of registration
over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation ("Maguesun"). Magesun alleged
that it bought the land from Zenaida Melliza, who later found of having no title
to the land. SC granted the petition. Registration of title over the subject parcels
of land, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas
- Meycauayan filed a Petition for Intervention alleging that on 14 May 1992, it
purchased three parcels of land from Maguesun in good faith and for value.
Court denied the intervention. This was denied by SC.
- Land Registration Authority ("LRA") submitted a Report to the RTCt of Tagaytay
City, for cancellation of the decree under the name of Maguesun to enable it to
issue another decree in favor of the heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de
Leon Vda. de Roxas; Order the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. 0-515 and
all its derivative titles; and Order the issuance of the Decree with respect to the
decision of the Supreme Court.
- Roxas heirs filed a Motion for Clarification raising the following issues:
1. Whether it is necessary for the trial court to first order the LRA "to cancel
Decree No. N-197092 in the name of Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation to enable (the LRA) to issue another decree in
favor of the Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas"?
2. Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive portion of the Supreme
Court directing the LRA "to issue with reasonable dispatch the corresponding
decree of registration and certificate of title" in favor of the Roxas heirs?
3. Whether an order from the trial court is necessary for "the Register of Deeds
concerned to cancel OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles"?
4. Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive portion of the Supreme
Court to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title
in favor of the Roxas heirs and necessarily implies that the OCT issued to
Maguesun and its derivative titles shall be canceled
5. Whether an order from the trial court is necessary before the LRA can comply
with the Supreme Court decision
6. Whether the derivative titles from Maguesun Original Certificate of Title No.
0-515 and issued to Meycauayan Central Realty Corp.) should be canceled,
together with Maguesun's certificates of title, so that new decree of
registration and certificate of title can be issued to petitioners
- Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation ("Meycauayan") alleged that it purchased
for value several parcels of real property from private respondent Maguesun.
That prior to it, an investigation was conducted and that the intervenor with the
Office of Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City showed that in all the certified true
copies of the titles to the properties above-mentioned which were registered in
the name of Maguesun, the last entry which appeared was the following. That

only then, after it secured certified true copies of the titles mentioned from the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, did intervenor come to know of
the existence of a case
Meycauayan committed forum-shopping by filing with the trial court a motion for
leave to intervene raising again the issue of its alleged ownership of portions of
the land.
Meycauayan alleges that the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 does not bind
Meycauayan because it was not a party in the case. It can be enforced against
Maguesun but not to Mercauayan, since the latter is a purchaser in good faith
and for value its rights cannot be prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent
acquisition by Maguesun.
Issue: Whether this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 bind
Meycauayan;
Ruling:
Meycauayan's Executive Vice-President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. is guilty of indirect
contempt for defiance of the final and executory Decision and Resolution, filing
of pleadings and Meycauayan committed forum shopping, and thus
Meycauayan and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are guilty of
direct contempt.
Issue of whether the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 binds Meycauayan was already
addressed by this Court when it denied Meycauayan's Petition for Intervention.
Decision binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest" since it was
a successor-in-interest of Maguesun. Meycauayan, however, insists that it was a
purchaser in good faith because it had no knowledge of any pending case since
the trial court had already canceled the notice of lis pendens on the titles when
it purchased the lots from Maguesun.
Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the
purchaser must go beyond the certificates of title and make inquiries
concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Roxas family has been in
possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez, who resided on the property. 19 Meycauayan therefore cannot invoke
the right of a purchaser in good faith and could not have acquired a better right
than its predecessor-in-interest.
Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of
the title of his vendor and of a pending litigation over the property gambles on
the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor.
Meycauayan's act of filing a Complaint for Reconveyance, Quieting of Title and
Damages raising the same issues in its Petition for Intervention, which this
Court had already denied, also constitutes forum shopping.
The filing by Meycauayan of an action to re-litigate the title to the same property,
which this Court had already adjudicated with finality, is an abuse of the court's
processes and constitutes direct contempt.

7
G.R. No. L-42636 August 1, 1985
MARIA LUISA DE LEON ESCALER and ERNESTO ESCALER, CECILIA J.
ROXAS and PEDRO ROXAS, vs. CA, JOSE L. REYNOSO, now deceased, to
be substituted by his heirs or legal representatives and AFRICA V.
REYNOSO
CUEVAS, J.:
Facts:
- On March 7, 1958, the spouses Africa V. Reynoso and Jose L, Reynoso sold to
petitioners several lands in Antipolo. Spouses Reynoso bought the property from
registered owner Angelina Reynoso.
- On April 21, 1961, the Register of Deeds of Rizal and A. Doronilla Resources
Development, Inc. filed Case No. 4252 for the cancellation of OCT No. 1526
issued in the name of Angelina C. Reynoso on the ground that the property
covered by said title is already previously registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42999 issued in the name of A. Doronilla Development, Inc.
- Court ruled against Reynoso holding that the title is null and void.
- Petitioners, spouses Maria de Leon Escaler and Ernesto Escaler and spouses
Cecilia J. Roxas and Pedro Roxas, filed Civil Case No. 9014 against their vendors,
for the recovery of the value of the property sold to them plus damages for
violation of vendors' "warranty against eviction."
- Defendants, alleged that there is no cause of action since plaintiff failed to file a
third-party complaint against defendants."
- Lower court ruled to return to the plaintiffs but CA revered and ruled that
petitioners as vendees had not given private respondents-vendors, formal
notice of the eviction case as mandated by Arts. 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil
Code.
Ruling:
- In order that a vendor's liability for eviction may be enforced, the following
requisites must concur
There must be a final judgment;
Purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold;
Said deprivation was by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor;
The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction
at the instance of the vendee. 6
- In the case at bar, the fourth requisite is not present. All that the petitioners did,
was to furnish respondents, by registered mail, with a copy of the opposition
they (petitioners filed in the eviction suit).
- The term "unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the
vendee" means that the respondents as vendor/s should be made parties to the
suit by way of asking that the former be made a co-defendant or by the filing of
a third-party complaint against said vendors. Nothing of that sort appeared to
have been done by the petitioners in the instant case.
- Affirmed.

G.R. No. L-28740 February 24, 1981

FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR., vs CLARO L. LAURETA,
FERNANDEZ, J.:
Facts:
- On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed an action for nullity, recovery of
ownership and/or reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees against
Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata, Fermin Z. Caram, Jr.
- On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, but
the deed of absolute sale was not registered and not notarized for lack of notary
public. Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the peaceful and lawful possession of
the premises of the land together with Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of
Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax declaration, tax receipts and other papers
related thereto.
- Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is in continuous, adverse
and notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or
stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives.
- May 5, 1947, the same land was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin Z.
Caram, Jr., and the deed of sale was acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo
Aportadera. They filed with the CFI a petition for the issuance of a new Owner's
Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, alleging as ground therefor
the loss of said title. CFI issued an order directing the Register of Deeds to issue
a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 3019 in favor of Marcos Mata
and declaring the lost title as null and void. Second sale between Marcos Mata
and Fermin Caram, Jr. was registered
- Mata admitted the private sale to Claro L. Laureta but alleging that he signed the
same as he was subjected to duress, threat and intimidation for the plaintiff was
the commanding officer of the 10th division USFIP
- Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata denies that he purportedly alienated the property
to Fermin Caram, as his consent was obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation for the defendant Mata is illiterate and ignorant.
- Lower court ruled in favor of Laureta and CA affirmed.
Ruling:
- Record show that Mata, the vendor, and Caram, the second vendee had never
met. Thus, the sale could have only been through Caram's representatives,
Irespe and Aportadera, notary public and attorney-in-fact
- Caram. Jr. was not a purchaser in good faith, since the services of Atty.
Aportadera was availed in the annulment of the sale of his land to Laureta.
When Leaning Mansaca narrated to Atty. Aportadera the circumstances under
which his property had been sold to Laureta, he must have included in the
narration the sale of the land of Mata. Irespe, who was the witness in most of
the cases filed by Atty. Aportadera in his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of Davao
against Laureta, must have known of the purchases of lands made by Laureta

8
- Bad faith is not based solely on the fact that a vendee had knowledge of the
defect. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as
against the true owner of the land as well as one who has knowledge of facts
which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
- At the time of the second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land.
Irespe and Aportadera should have investigated the nature of Laureta's
possession. If they failed to exercise the ordinary care expected of a buyer of
real estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor
requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one
who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses
consequent to such failure.
- Curtain principle cannot apply since the the civil government of Tagum was not
yet established and that there were no officials to ratify contracts of sale and
make them registerable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew that even if
Mata previously had sold, it could not have been registered.
- Art. 1544. Double sale: Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recordered it in the
Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership pertains to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
(1473)
- Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no
registration at all.
- Who was first in possession in good faith? A possessor in good faith is one who is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
- Laureta was first possessor in good faith. Even if it was procured by force, such
defect, however, was cured after the lapse of four years from the time the
intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action. Laureta is
deemed to have discovered the sale to Caram on December 9, 1947, but the
present case was filed on June 29, 1959, plaintiff's cause of action had long
prescribed.
- The first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the sale in favor of Caram.
G.R. Nos. 91383-84
May 31, 1991
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SAN
JOSE, DIANA J. TORRES,
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
- Socorro Costa Crisostomo (Crisostomo for short) was the registered owner of a
residential house and lot No. 6, Block 60, located in Mandaluyong.

- In 1978, Crisostomo agreed to sell the property to Norma San Jose on the
agreement that the payment shall come from the proceeds of the loan applied
for by San Jose to be secured by the property. Pursuant to the agreement,
Crisostomo lent her title to San Jose and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of San Jose. In return, San Jose issued PDCs. A second DAS was executed
on the understanding that said document was for the purpose of reducing San
Jose's registration fees and tax liabilities
- San Jose registered the second deed of absolute sale, TCT of Crisostomo was
cancelled and new one was issued.
- Crisostomo found that the account of the postdated checks issued was already
closed, and that the loan applied by San Jose was never approved.
- The certificate of title was in the possession of Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee
- Lower court ruled in favor of Crisostomo but CA modified in that the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of appellant Diana Torres be noted on the Certificate of
Title which is to be re-issued to the Crisostomo
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Diana Torres is a mortgagee in good
faith.
Ruling:
- Atty. Flor Martinez, the lawyer of Diana J. Torres, knew of the defect of San Jose's
title since Atty. Martinez is a close acquaintance of Norma San Jose. While
feigning ignorance of the owner of subject property, she admitted later on
cross-examination that Socorro Crisostomo was the owner from whom San Jose
allegedly bought the property
- When Atty. Martinez personally inspected the property with San Jose for her client
Torres, she allowed herself to be introduced to Socorro Crisostomo who was
then actually occupying the house, as a Bank Inspector of the Development
Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan from whom the loan was being obtained,
obviously to convince Crisostomo that the procedure is in accordance with her
agreement with San Jose.
- Person dealing with registered land has a right to rely upon the fact of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further inquiries
- Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the circumstances of the sale,
she is bound by the knowledge of Atty. Martinez or by the latter's negligence in
her haphazard investigation because the negligence of her agents is her own
negligence
- Purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.
His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or
mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its

9
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required
of a prudent man in a like situation
- Reversed
G.R. No. 51457 June 27, 1994
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, vs. CA, PACIFICO
CIMAFRANCA, MARCOS SALIMBAGAT, EDA JIMENEZ and SANTIAGO
JIMENEZ,
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
- Lot No. 564 in Dipolog City was originally owned by Juan, Pastor and Matias
Carpitanos and the same was sold to "Srta. LUCIA C. EMBRADO
- The deed was prepared and signed on 2 July 1946, but actually sold to Lucia C.
Embrado April 15, 1941. , the date the lot and its improvements were. In 1943,
Embrado married Oreste Torregiani and by virtue of a court order TCT No. T-99
was canceled and replaced on 19 October 1970 by the phrase "married to
Oreste Torregiani."
- Lucia Embrado Torregiani sold Lot No. 564, described as her "own paraphernal
property," to her adopted daughter, respondent Eda Jimenez. A TCT was issued
upon cancellation of the old TCT.
- Eda Jimenez sold sixty-five (65) square meters of Lot 564 to Marcos Salimbagat
and conveyed 301 square meters of the same lot to Pacifico Cimafranca . Both
sales were duly annotated on TCT No. T-17103.
- On 25 September 1972, the Torregianis instituted action for declaration of nullity
of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the
spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez, Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca
alleging that the sale was void not only for lack of consideration, lack of consent
of Oreste Torregiani as conjugal partner and misled by the fact that the
signature is for the loan which the spouses are applying with First Insular Bank
of Cebu.
- Lower court ruled in favor of Embrado, but CA reversed.
Issue: W/N property was conjugal, and buyers are in good faith
Ruling:
- Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia,
- Ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is
delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any
other manner signifying an agreement. When the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot clearly be inferred."
- Although the sale was initiated prior to marriage, Court held it was conjugal since
part of the dwelling is used as Torregianis conjugal dwelling. Buildings
constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value

of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Therefore,
the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without
awaiting reimbursement
While it is true that a notarized document is admissible in evidence without proof
of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, this
rule is not absolute and may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Eda and
Santiago Jimenez had no sufficient means of livelihood and that they were
totally dependent on their mother Lucia for the support of their family. The price
of the property was fictitious and that Eda Jimenez could not have paid the price
of the property as she was financially incapable to do so.
The sale, without her husbands conformity should be considered void ab initio
being contrary to law since the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law, The issuance
of a certificate of title in favor of Eda Jimenez did not vest upon her ownership
over the property. Neither did it validate the alleged purchase thereof which is
null and void. Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.
Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has.
There being no valid title to the land that Eda Jimenez acquired from Lucia, it
follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the former to
Salimbagat and Cimafranca.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies
upon him who asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to
invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed
to act in good faith. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very
status which must be proved.
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such
defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in the vendors title will not make him an innocent purchaser for
value if afterwards it develops that the title is in fact defective, and it appears
that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he
acted with the measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a
prudent man in like situation.
Cimafranca is a close relative of Santiago Jimenez and at the same time
godfather to one of his children.
Salimbagat, he has been a resident of Dipolog for about thirty (30) years. He has
a daughter renting a portion of the building with her husband for more than a
year prior to the sale by Eda Jimenez to Salimbagat. This means that the lease
of the building by Salimbagats daughter already commenced while Lucia
Torregiani was still the registered owner and this was prior to the alleged sale by
Lucia Torregiani of the property to Eda Jimenez on 1 May 1971. There can be no
doubt that Salimbagats daughter was aware of the factual background of the

10

property and the personal circumstances of the owners thereof especially that
they are all occupying the same building.
Before buying the property, Salimbagat and Cimafranca allegedly inquired from
the office of the Register of Deeds and from the Clerk of Court as to whether the
property was involved in any litigation. However, they failed to inquire from
petitioners as to why they were the ones in actual possession of the property.
Buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons other than the seller
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in
good faith.
When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his first duty is to read the
public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is there upon it, and what are his
rights. A want of caution and diligence which an honest man of ordinary
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in contemplation of
law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the
land sold to him is in the adverse possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith.
Reversed.
G.R. No. L-40399 February 6, 1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, et al vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRESENTACION
AGPOON GASCON, JOAQUIN
G.R. No. L-72255 February 6,1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, et al vs IAC, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON and
JOAQUIN GASCON, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:

Facts:
- The land subject matter was originally covered by Free Patent No. 23263 issued
on April 17, 1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. OCT was issued on May
21, 1937. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land and was
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 on April 6,1960.
- On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioners who obtained possession of the
land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation, taking advantage of
the Japanese occupation.
- Petitioners, Agne alleged that the land was formerly a part of the river bed of the
Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the
said river to change its course and abandon its original bed; That under Spanish
Civil Code, petitioners, by operation of law, became the owners by accession or
accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their
properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied
and exercised dominion openly and adversely, that they have introduced
improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and
agricultural crops thereon and converted the land into a productive area.

- Petitioners, Agne filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and
spouses Agpoon when, under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which Original
Certificate of Title No. 2370 was issued in the latter's name; such null and void
since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and,
therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant.
Issues: Who has the rightful claim?
Ruling:
- The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a
patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the
public domain. If it was a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued
upon the patent are a nullity.
- The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of
one year, after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent
and a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that
they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue
them at all
- Since herein petitioners are in possession of the land in dispute, an action to
quiet title is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a number of
years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her
title.
- The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has
naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their
respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different
owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom.
- Once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian owners become the owners
of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The acquisition of
ownership is automatic. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to
the accessory, as the result of the right of accretion.
- The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion did not divest it of its
character as a private property. An accretion to registered land is not
automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection
of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
- Private respondents claim is not based on acquisitive prescription but is
anchored on a public grant from the Government, which presupposes that it was
inceptively a public land.
- No authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land
and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. Only
public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands.
- The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the land is
not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Since as early as 1920, the
land in dispute was already under the private ownership of herein petitioners
the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. Free Patent

11

No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent
titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible.
Title of the petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the
registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of
petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a
registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.
Land Registration Act does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records
title already existing and vested.
Failure of herein private respondents to assert their claim over the disputed
property for almost thirty 30 years constitute laches
Reversed.
G.R. No. L-47491 May 4, 1989
GALICANO GOLLOY, vs. CA, JOSE VALDEZ, JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ,
LOURDES
VALDEZ,
SOLEDAD
VALDEZ
and
BENNY
MADRIAGA,
respondents
PARAS, J.:

- LAND REGISTRATION; OVERLAPPING OF BOUNDARIES; POSSESSOR OF LAND

DISTURBED HELD RIGHTFUL OWNER. Private respondents and their
predecessor or predecessors never possessed, much less, claimed the
overlapped portions. Petitioner has been always in possession of the same in
the concept of an owner, and his possession was disturbed only in February,
1966, when the private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments
inside his land. It will be recalled that, as per report of Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz
(Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28), private respondents land (TCT 8565 is Lot No. 1,
11-8218) was surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered
on March 1, 1918 in the name of Dominga Balanga. On the other hard,
petitioners land (TCT No. 45764) is Lot-A of Subdivision plan, Psd-14013, a
portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was surveyed on March 18, 1918 and
subsequently titled and registered in the name of Agustin Galloy. The said lands,
having been surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that monuments
were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly
persuasive that private respondents predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing
that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move
to question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected to
the placement and pointed out that the placement of the monuments excluded
the overlapped portions from her property. However, no such objection was
made. These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents
predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal
claim to the overlapped portion.
- ID.; ID.; LONG INACTION AND DELAY IN ASSERTING RIGHT TO DISPUTED LAND;
DEFENSE OF LACHES AVAILABLE. Considering that petitioner and his
predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept
of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August 15, 1919, when the

property was registered, up to February, 1966, when the private respondents

caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they
have any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. Although
the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly,
the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of respondent, still the
petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches
due to respondents failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty two
(32) years
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, vs CA and SALVADOR ESTRADA
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:
- The Disputed Portion is a 3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel of sugar and
coconut land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 63, and includes the
adjoining Lots 2 and 3, issued on 11 September 1947 in the name of Mariano M.
DE VERA, who died, estate administered by respondent Salvador Estrada.
- Petitioner, JULIANA Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA, were first
cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof in the care of a
common aunt."
- During the Special proceedings, it was found that the inventory and title has
discrepancy (5417 vs 8752). The northwestern portion, was occupied by
petitioner-spouses Juliana Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA
demanded that they vacate but petitioners refused claiming that the land
belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's father Juan Caragay.
- ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery and Jualiana
prayed as counterclaim for reconveyance of property in the sense that title be
issued in her favor (based on trust).
- Trial court ordered Juliana to vacate and CA affirmed.
Ruling:
- Disputed Portion was originally possessed openly, continuously and
uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased
father of JULIANA, and had been declared in his name under Tax Declaration.
They had been in actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, until said possession was
disturbed in 1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion
was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name.
- Juliana contended that the inclusion was fraudulent that De Vera borrowed from
her the Tax Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his
loan and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin's assurances, she
acceded to his request and was made to sign some documents
- For twenty (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967
neither De Vera nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay

12

adverse claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty
of laches
Deducting 3,732 sq. ms., the area of the Disputed Portion from 8,752 sq. ms., the
area closely approximates the area of 5,147 sq. ms., indicated in the Inventory
of Property of DE VERA.
Mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens System is not
conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the property described
therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of
the land illegally included.
Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have
never asserted any right of ownership over it.
JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of another,
but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek
its reconveyance.
The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not
to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice
for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages.
No prescription since lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her
cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title, is
imprescriptible, with continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her
own title.
Statutory period of prescription to commence upon serving the adverse claim
Reversed. Court ordered issuance of certificate for both title, one to Juliana for
the disputed portion and the rest to the estate.
G.R. No. L-26083 May 31, 1977
CONSUELO MALALUAN VDA. DE RECINTO, vs. RUPERTO INCIONG and
COURT OF APPEALS,
MARTIN, J.:

Facts:
- Ruperto Inciong is the registered owner of Lot No. 8151 in Batangas, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-379 (T-211) which Inciong acquired by
purchase from Matias Amurao.
- In 1961, after a relocation survey, it was revealed that southern boundary was in
the possession of petitioner, Consuelo Malaluan Vda. de Recinto.
- Petitioners De Recinto alleged that the portion was wrongfully included in the TCT
of Inciong.
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Recinto but CA reversed.
Ruling:

- Petronilo Acar -> sold to spouses Mariano Recinto and Marta Magsumbol (March
11, 1918) -> donation propter nuptias to petitioner Consuelo Malaluan Vda, de
Recinto and her late husband, Juanario Recinto (July 2, 1931) and the latter
since then have been in open, public and continuous possession of the entire
property including that portion now in question which adjoins private
respondent's land on the north.
- The adjoining lands have since then been separated by a fence consisting of
morado, madre cacao, antipolo and other kinds of living trees.
- The land north of the disputed area = Atty. Hernandez acquired from his
predecessor-in-interest -> sold to Matias Amurao -> sold to Inciong.
- Lower courts finding of facts revealed that the coconut trees in the disputed land
is the same as that of the petitioner. Also, the land was erroneously included in
the cadastral survey of Lot No. 8151 and in the original certificate of title
without the knowledge of the, parties concerned. As a result, the private
respondent's predecessors-in-interest and later, private respondent himself,
have all along treated the area in question as belonging to the petitioner.
- The inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No. 8151 is void and of no effect for a
land registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have
put no claim in it and who have never asserted any right of ownership over it.
- The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described
therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of
the land illegally included.
- The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the
decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
- Was private respondent an innocent purchaser for value? At the time he
purchased the land covered by the certificate of title now in his hands he was
aware that the disputed portion was not included in the area conveyed to him
by Matias Amurao.
- The deed of sale executed by Petronilo Acar was not registered and that the
donation propter nuptias was onlyNevertheless, these facts were not alleged in
the lower court hence, improper for CA to have considered them
- Reversed.
G.R. No. L-30240 March 25, 1988
RP as Lessor, ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, ROSENDO
IBANEZ and GUILLERMO MERCADO, as permittees and/or Lessees of
public fishponds, petitioners, vs. CFI, ENRIQUE ZOBEL
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Facts:

13
- This case is about the execution in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the
1965 final and executory judgment of this Court (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia )
1affirming that of the CFI of Batangas in Civil Case No. 373 thereof and to
recover for the Republic what "Ayala y Cia Hacienda de Calatagan and/or
Alfonso Zobel had illegally expanded [in] the original area of their TCT No. 722
(derived from OCT No. 20) from 9,652.583 hectares to about 12,000 hectares
thereby usurping about 2,000 hectares consisting of portions of the territorial
sea, the foreshore, the beach and navigable waters properly belong(ing) to the
public domain."
- It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable
water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by
defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact
that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a
certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the
aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan.
Defendants- appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between
those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan
prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could
have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of
the original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to
defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.
- But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the
fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the
Bureau of Fisheries), were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the
navigable water itself And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas
not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not
convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the
registrant.
Held:
- The Supreme Court directed the Clerk of this Court to issue the corresponding
writ of execution in the case at bar for Civil Case No. 373 of the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas reverting to public dominion and delivering to the duly
authorized representatives of the Republic all public lands and lots, fishponds,
territorial bay waters, rivers, manglares foreshores and beaches, etc. as
delineated in the aforesaid duly approved Re-survey Plan and any supplemental
Re-survey Plan as may be found necessary and duly approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be granted.
- The Court in said 1965 judgment had stressed the elementary rule that the
generally incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens Certificate of
Title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of
registration, as in this case, being part of the sea, beach, foreshore or navigable
water or other public lands incapable of registration. Moreover, as the Court
stressed in the 1965 judgment and time and again in other cases, "it is an
elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration,

their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties
of private ownership or confer title on the registrant."
G.R. No. 96259. September 3, 1996]
HEIRS OF LUIS J. GONZAGA, namely ROMANA, FERNANDO, PAZ, LUISA
and LUIS ANTONIO, all surnamed GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 96274. September 3, 1996]
GUILLERMO Y. MASCARIAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
- Jose Eugenio once had been the registered owner of lot nos. 3619 and 3620 of
the cadastral Survey of Caloocan under TCT no. 17519. Sometime in 1960,
Eugenio sold the said registered lots to Luis Gonzaga, the title of Eugenio was
cancelled and the Registry of deeds for the province of Rizal issued another title
under the name of Luis Gonzaga. On September 1981, Gonzaga sold the lots to
Mascarias, the title of Gonzaga was cancelled and another title was issued
under the name of Mascarias.
- However, According to the record another subsisting Torrens title covered the
same lots under the name of Lilia Sevilla. Lilia Sevilla contends that the lots sold
to her by the heirs of Bartolome as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale.
- The court a quo and the appellate court recognized that the two conflicting title
was derived from one common OCT 994. The court a quo and appellate court
found the title of Gonzaga/Mascarias original registration was made on May
3,1917 but on the other hand the title of Lilia Sevilla original registration was
made on April 19, 1917.
Issue: Between Gonzaga and Sevilla, who has a legal right over the said
registered lots
Ruling:
- The Cadastral court held that the Court has no jurisdiction decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is NULL and VOID.
- Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails
- In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of
a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof.

14
- A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land
had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in
existence. Any subsequent registration of the same land is null and void.
- We empathize with petitioner Mascarias who may be a purchaser for value and in
good faith, but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917, could not possibly be of force and effect more than its
parent title. Certainly the spring cannot rise higher than its source.
- Dismissed
G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY
petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
CORTES, J.:

FARMS,

INC.,

Facts:
- The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land covered by three (3)
distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
o TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21,
1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976,
GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
o TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo,
which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant
to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No.
N-32166.
o TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon
City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931
which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO
Record No. N-31777.
- Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the CFI - Vera Court for "declaration of nullity
of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408 against Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
Macondray Farms, Inc.
- The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it
was derived, is a nullity as the CFI - Reyes Court which issued the order
directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting as a land
registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged
that the original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which
was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or
destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the
Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title.
- Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court was acting as
a court of land registration and in issuing the order, was actually performing a
purely ministerial duty for the registration court

- Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the IAC erred in upholding the
validity of the title in the name of Carpo and declaring null and void the titles in
the names of Realty and of QCDFC.
- Carpo, countered that Reyes Court had no authority to issue the order directing
the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-ininterest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land registration court and also
because the original records of LRC Case No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost
and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution.
Issue: Who has a better title?
Ruling:
- Under Act No. 496, LRA jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to
and was conferred upon the CFI. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, is
acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is
retained up to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a decree of registration
is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as such, does not
constitute a separate proceeding.
- Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of
Realty, originally filed a registration proceeding to confirm his title over parcels
of land. Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao
died. Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with the Reyes Court
alleging that he was the only heir and praying for the issuance of a decree of
registration over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. Dominadors
petition is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but a continuation of,
the original land registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga,
Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. Reyes Court, was continuing in the
exercise of jurisdiction over the case
- The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or
destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the
loss of the records.
- Civil case was pending trial in CFI at the time the record was destroyed or lost the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding age where
records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond
the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice
not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must
again perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and
decide it anew,-all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are
intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
- The parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go
back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration
case itself remained pending and the CFI
- Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an
issue in the trial court.

15
- One is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on the
certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property." He
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates.
- Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, but was only later, on
October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was
transcribed in the Registration Book and that an Original Certificate of Title was
issued. On the same day, the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was
inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was
cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was
issued. Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo
could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for
value. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better
position than his predecessors-in-interest.
G.R. No. L-43679 October 28, 1980
LEONARDO N. AZARCON and ROSA CAJUCOM AZARCON, vs. LEOPOLDO,
LUIS, JULIAN and CORAZON VALLARTA and EMILIO LORENZO
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:,
Facts:
- A parcel of land was previously owned by Dr. Jose V. Cajucom, father of appellant
ROSA Cajucom-Azarcon which was covered by two titles: OCT P-2815 under
Azarcons, and OCT L-3093 under individual names (previously in the names of
the appellees Vallartas)
- March 14, 1932, Dr. Jose V. Cajucom sold to Julian Vallarta Sr., parents of the
Vallartas. Upon resurvey, parents discovered that the land sold, believed to be
only nine hectares, was actually nineteen hectares. Consequently, on October 7,
1960, Dr. Cajucom executed, in favor of Julian Vallarta, Sr., a "Waiver and Quit
claim" over the excess ten hectares
- Appellants Azarcons also show that a year before the aforementioned waiver, Dr.
Cajucom executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" of the same land in favor of the
Azarcons. The property was unregistered land.
- ROSA filed a Free Patent Application over the disputed property approved on
February 26, 1961 and Free Patent Entry No. 18504 was thereafter issued by the
Director of Lands.
- ROD issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2815 in the name of the Azarcons.
Issue: Which of the two titles must prevail, is it Free Patent No. 167690 of the
plaintiffs or Original Certificate of Title No. L-3093 (now Transfer Certificate of
Titles Nos. 67396, 67397, 80934 and 80936) of the defendants?
Ruling:

- A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not
have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee
as against the true owner
- Plaintiffs were fully aware that on February 26, 1961 when their application was
approved, the land in question was not a part of the public domain as to be
disposable by the Director of Lands, because as early as October 20, 1959 they
knew too well that the land of the private ownership of the patentees' father
Jose V. Cajucom from when they allegedly bought the same for P 2,000.00. That
said land was no longer a part of the public domain but of the private ownership
of Jose V. Cajucom
- Where a person, who obtained free patent, knowingly made a false statement of
material and essential facts in his application, by stating that the land applied
for was part of the public domain not occupied or claimed by any other person,
when in fact, the same had formally belonged to another as his private property
from whom he alleged to have acquired it, it was held that null and void.
- Original Certificate of Title No. 3093 was obtained by them in a decision of this
Court without the plaintiffs opposing the registration thereof and with no
opposition on the part of the Director of Lands. Said title is now indefeasible and
incontestable.
- Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same
land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail as between the original
parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is
issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate. This
presupposes, however, that the prior title is a valid one. Where, as in the case
at bar, it is evident that the prior title of the Azarcons suffers from an inherent
informity, such a rule cannot be invoked in their favor.
G.R. No. L-18861
June 30, 1964
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LAZARO MANGAWANG, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts:
- Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the issuance of a
homestead patent, pending of which cadastral proceedings were instituted by
the government. Amposta filed an answer to adjudicate the land in his favor.
The cadastral court granted and later, November 2, 1920, issued Homestead
Patent No. 2388
- On December 20, 1922, the cadastral court issued a decree of registration of the
land in favor of Amposta and or, July 5, 1924, Original Certificate of Title No.
2668 was issued to him
- On November 24, 1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho
- On November 18, 1946, Santos-Camacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho

16
- On June 11, 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and
Arsenio Mangawang, receiving from Amposta the the title that was issued to
latter in the cadastral case. Mangawang took possession
- On April 28, 1948, Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines), and later was
foreclosed, and period of redemption elapsed in favor of the bank. TCT was
issued on June 29, 1957.
- Bank filed action to recover its possession and damages. Lower court ruled in
favor of Mangawang brothers.
- Appellees contention: Certificate of title they are holding is derived from that
issued pursuant to a decision rendered by a cadastral court, compared to the
appellant which is merely based on the title issued in an administrative
proceeding. Judicial title is deemed preferred to one issued administratively.
Since the decision which gave rise to their title was rendered on March 8, 1920,
which became final thirty days thereafter, their right over the land must be
deemed vested on said date
Issue: Who of the two buyers should be considered as the rightful owner of the
land?
Ruling:
- If the two original certificates of title were issued on different occasions to two
different persons, judicial title is deemed preferred over that issued
administratively.
- 2 certificates of title were issued to Gavino Amposta over the same parcel of
land, one under the Homestead Law and another under the Cadastral Act.
Amposta may choose which of them he would prefer. He took advantage of the
situation by selling the land to two different persons
- Amposta first sold the land to Santos Camacho on November 24, 1941, who
registered it and 7 years later, on March 17, 1948, Amposta again sold the land
to the Mangawang brother, who also registered it. When Amposta sold the same
land to the Mangawang brothers he had nothing more to sell and hence the
transaction is legally ineffective.
- Under the rule on double sales, the owner is the purchaser who first registers the
transaction in his name in the registry of property.
- Reversed. Granted to DBP.
G.R. No. L-17955
May 31, 1962
PILAR LAZARO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. SALUD DEL
ROSARIO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-17957
May 31, 1962
SALUD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PILAR
LAZARO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., respondents.
DIZON, J.:
Facts:

- Land subject matter thereof was a portion of a bigger parcel allotted to their
predecessor-in-interest, Melchor Jacinto, Sr., when the estate of the deceased
spouses Andres Jacinto and Maria C. Santos was partitioned, and that Melchor's
surviving brother, Pedro, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, had
succeeded in registering it in his name through fraud and with breach of trust,
to their prejudice.
Issue:
Ruling:
- Even in the absence of fraud in obtaining registration, or even after the lapse of
one year after the issuance of a decree of registration, a co-owner of land who
applied for and secured its adjudication and registration in his name knowing
that it had not been allotted to him in the partition, may be compelled to
convey the same to whoever received it in the apportionment, so long as no
innocent third party had acquired rights therein, in the meantime, for a valuable
consideration. Person guilty of fraud or, it least, of breach of trust, should not be
allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his
wrongdoing.
- An action to enforce a trust is imprescriptible. Consequently, a co-heir who,
through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the
prejudice of his co-heirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter, and
the action by them to recover the property does not prescribe.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
BIDIN, J.:p
Facts:
- Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 an application for registration of title of a parcel
of land and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don
Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954. The amended application prayed
that said parcel of land be ordered registered in the name of Widora. Dolores
Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership
- Petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, the land being
applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the
name of Ortigas
- Court favored Ortigas and held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, though reflecting
their origins as OCT Nos. 337, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No.
351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT
351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of
Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or produced,
does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652
and 77653 was not issued.
- Petitioner argues invalidity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 due to absence of a
supporting decree of registration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT
351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425 which is itself existing and

17

available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face shows that it covers
a parcel of land with an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila while the
parcel of land applied for contains an area of 156 hectares, located at MalitlitUoogong Quezon City, four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila and is
certified by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as alienable and
disposable.
Respondent Ortigas claims that the correction was justified by the fact that the
plan of OCT 351 coincides with the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 77652
and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that OCT
351 is a copy of the Decree itself.
Ruling:
Plan and testimony of its surveyor and OCT 351 to prove the contents of Decree
1425 is merely secondary. Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there
must be:
Proof of the execution of the original writing
That it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in
the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after
reasonable notice
Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration
Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of
title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds
the land. Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said
parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not
make the possessor the true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or
oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does
not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included. Certificate of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of
ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
Set aside.
Exclusion of co-heirs - Vda. De Jacinto v. Vda de Jacinto, 5 SCRA 371 A co-heir
who, through fraud, obtained a certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of
his co-heirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter. The action does not
prescribe
23. Armentia vs Patricia - BALITCHA - Annulment of deed of sale prescribes in four
years on eh ground that the defendant had obtained a certificate of title by
means of fraudulent deed of sale is virtually an action for annulment of the deed
by reason of fraud which action should be filed within a period of four (4) years
from the time the deed of sale was registered at the RoD. From said date, it is
considered as a constructive notice of the existence of the deed of sale

25. Pajarillo vs IAC - BRITANICO - Registration of certificate of title from a

fraudulent conveyance is an implied trust - Civil Code Article 1114 (10 years to
bring action; upon a written contract, obligation created by law and judgements)
(a) Title acquired by fraud creates constructive trust - the legal principle is that if
the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee; and the real owner is thus entitled to file an
action for reconveyance within a period of ten (10) years (Pajarillo vs. IAC); there
is an obligation to reconvey (Caro vs. CA, 180 SCRA 401)
(b) Ten years from the cause of action accrued which is not necessarily the date
of execution of the contact, Naga Telephone Co., Inc. v. cA, 230 SCRA 351)
(c) Action base on Fraud - 10 years from the issuance of title or date of
registration of deed. (Caro v. CA, GR No. 76148, Dec. 201989; Leyson v.
Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005; Casipit v. CA, GR No. 96829, Dec. 9,
1991)
(d) Action base on implied trust - 10 years after issuance of title or date of
registration (Villagonzalo v. IAC, GR No. 71110, Nov. 22, 1988; Amerol v.
Bagumbaran)
(e) Action base on void contract - Imprescriptible (Solid State Multi-Products Corp.
v. CA GR No. 8338, May 6, 1991)
(f) Action based on fictitious deed - imprescriptible (Lacsamana vs. CA, GR No.
121658, March 27, 1988)
(g) Action to quiet title - imprescriptible when in possession (Sapto v. Fabiana, GR
No. L-11285, May 16, 1958; Caragay-Layno v. CA GR No. 52064, Dec. 26, 1984;
Leyson vs. Buntuyan)
(h) Laches - is one of estoppel because it prevents people who have slept on their
rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the
inaction of the original patentee and his successors in interest (Lucas vs.
Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956)
(i) Res Judicata - Court cancels the title (Roxas v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
138660, Feb. 5, 2004)
(j) State not bound by prescription (Republic v. Ruiz, GR No. L-23712, April 29,
1968)
(k) Laches - There is no statutory limit for recovery of a registered land base on
laches. A a long list of cases were decided upholding the doctrine. A word of
caution, however, is necessary because the Supreme Court has decided on a
case by case basis and it has not categorically set a specific time which could
serve as a precedent.
[G.R. No. 72908. August 11, 1989.]
EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA SUTERIO and MARILYN
SUTERIO, Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS, Respondents.
FACTS:

18
In 1945, Perfecta died intestate leaving inter alia a tract of land consisting of
about 28 hectares and covered by TCT No. 4671 in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon Province.
In 1946, Juana and Felipe claiming as Juanas heirs executed a public instrument
entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Perfecta Balane
de Cordero with Deed of Donation in favor of Salud Suterio de Matias, daughter of
Juana.
Salud immediately took possession of the land but failed to registered it under
her own name to accede on her mothers(Juana) request that she be allowed to
possess the land and enjoy its fruits until her death.
In 1951, she transferred the possession of the land to her mother.
In 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to
Claudio(Saluds brother) for the declared consideration of P12,000.00. Two years
later, in 1958, Claudio had the land registered in his name and was issued TCT
No. 32050 in the land records of Quezon Province.
Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private
respondents filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground
that the deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration in his
name was null and void.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the land should be reconveyed to Salud.
HELD:
YES. It is clear that Juana Balane de Suterio had no right to sell the subject land
to Claudio because she was no longer its owner, having previously donated it to
her daughter Salud. Juana herself was holding the land merely as a trustee of
Salud, who had transferred possession to her mother at the old womans request.
The deed of sale was itself vitiated by bad faith as Claudio is presumed to have
known of the previous donation to his sister Salud, whose acceptance of the
donation was formally witnessed by his own wife, the herein principal petitioner.
When Claudio registered the land in his name knowing there was a flaw in his
title, an implied trust was created in favor of Salud as the real owner of the
property in accordance with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, reading as follows: If
the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes. As trustor, Salud had every right to sue for the
recovery of the land in the action for reconveyance against Claudios heirs. An
action for reconveyance of realty, based upon a constructive or implied trust
resulting from fraud, may be barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is
reckoned from the issuance of the title which operates as a constructive notice.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribe in 10 years from
registration of the property, private respondents right commenced from actual
discovery of petitioners act of defraudation.
The record shows that while the land was registered in the name of Claudio
Suterio, Sr. in 1958, the complaint for reconveyance was filed by the petitioners
in 1965, or still within the ten-year prescriptive perio

Leyson vs Bontuyan
GR No. 156357
Feb 18, 2005
Facts:
Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Adlawon, Mabolo
City. The said property was divided into two parcels of land because of a
construction of a provincial road. He later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of spouses Protacio Tabal and Vivencia Bontuyan, the spouses then sold the
two lots to Lourdes V. Leyson as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Despite the knowledge of Gregorio Bontuyan that said property has been sold to
his son-in-law and daughter, spouses Noval, he filed an application with the
Bureau of Lands over Lot no 17,150 alleging that the property was public land
and was neither claimed nor occupied by any person and that he first entered
upon and began cultivating the same in his favor. Thus, he has obtained a Free
Patent on the said lot and another parcel of land, lot no 13,272, was also
registered under his name.
Meanwhile, Gregorio again executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the two lots in
favor of Naciansino Bontuyan. He then executed a Real Estate Mortgage over lot
no 17,150 in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a security for
a loan. Shortly thereafter, Naciansino and spouse has left the Philippines and
resided in the US.
When the spouses arrived in the Philippines to redeem their property from DBP,
they later on discovered that it was tenanted by Engr. Leyson, on of the late
Lourdes Leysons children.
Issue:
Whether or not Gregorio Bontuyan acted in bad faith when he applied for free
patent for the same parcels of land.
Ruling:
Yes, record show that at the time when Gregorio applied for free patent, he was
living with his daughter, Vivencia. Thus, Gregorio must have known that at the
time when he applied, the subject lots were already sold by his daughter.
Furthermore, records also show that he sold twice the lot no 17,150 to plaintiff
appellants. The first was in 1976 and the other was in 1980. Plaintiff-appellants
offered no reasonable explanation why Gregorio have to sell it twice. These are
badges of bad faith which affect the validity of the title of Gregorio over the
subject lots.
29. Casipit vs CA
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Fraud:

19
EMILIANO S. CASIPIT and ANTONIA C. CASIPIT VDA. DE BEATO vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS et. al.
G.R. No. 96829 December 9, 1991
Facts: On April 1987, a complaint was filed by herein petitioners against private
respondents mainly for the recovery of a property, alleging that Emiliano Casipit
is the true and lawful owner of the questioned property located at Sinalhan, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna by virtue of continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful, open and public
possession in the concept of owner since 1930; that they were deprived of
ownership thereof by the Beatos through Narciso Beato, who filed a Petition for
Reconstitution of Titles in the name of Gabriel Beato, using fictitious documents.
Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT and other succeeding titles be cancelled, as
well as the tax declarations; that the questioned property be reconveyed to
them; that the document entitled, "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati,"
insofar as it included the questioned property be rescinded; and that private
respondents be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees.
The lower court dismissed the petition, holding that the defendants have a better
right than the plaintiffs, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs being based on
fraud, has prescribed for it must be filed within 4 years after the cause of action
arose. The issuance of the reconstituted title over the subject lot and its
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, in 1963 is the
starling date for the prescriptive period to commence. The respondent court
affirmed the said decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence, this petition.
Petitioners Contention: pursuant to the Certification issued by the Bureau of
Lands that Patent over the questioned property has not been issued to Gabriel
Beato, the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati" is therefore a void contract.
This being the case, the action taken by petitioners is imprescriptible. Private
respondents Diaz spouses were buyers in bad faith because they had full
knowledge that Emiliano Casipit has been in actual possession in the concept of
owner of the questioned property and paid the real property taxes thereon.
Issue: Whether petitioners action already prescribed
Held: Yes

There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void

contract is imprescriptible. However, this is not the case at bar.

The action filed by petitioner before the trial court was 1) for
reconveyance based on fraud since the ownership of private respondents over
the questioned property was allegedly established on "false assertions,
misrepresentations and deceptive allegations"; and 2) for rescission of the
"Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati. Thus, the action for reconveyance
based on fraud filed by petitioners before the trial court is subject to prescription.

Based on jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of

fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title.
o
Conformably with these settled jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for
petitioners' action for reconveyance is 10 years from August 30, 1963, the date
of the issuance of TCT in favor of Beato. Obviously, the discussion on this subject
matter is not beneficial to petitioners because they filed the action for
reconveyance only on April 27, 1987.

Hence, petition was dismissed.

30. Amerol vs Bagumbaran
G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB AMEROL, DIBARATUN AMEROL,
DIBARATUN, MATABALAO, MINDALANO DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and
MANUCAO MORO, petitioners,
vs.
MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent.
Facts:
A tract of land alleged by the plaintiff to have been forcibly entered into by the
defendants and which plaintiff now w&s to recover possession thereof. It has also
been proven that the same lot was covered by two free patent applications: (l)
that of defendant Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed Amerol) which he
filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and (2) that of Molok Bagumbaran
which was filed on December 27, 1954. plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran was given
due course as a result of which Free Patent No. V-19050 was issued on August
16,1955 whereupon Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly issued,
owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished the herein plaintiff.
The court is also inclined to believe that defendant Liwalug Datomanong had
never known of plaintiff's free patent application on the land in question nor was
he ever notified or participated in the administrative proceedings relative to
plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime, since the date he purchased
the land from Mandal Tondo, said defendant has been and up to the present in
continuous occupation and cultivation of the same. His co-defendants named in
the complaint are merely his tenants.
It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did not take appropriate action
to annul the patent and title of the plaintiff within one year from issuance thereof
and that the first step taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal
protest dated April 24, 1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of
Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The
second step he took was his counterclaim contained in his answer to the
complaint in the above entitled case, which answer was filed with this court on
December 4, 1964.

20
Issue: What is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real
property arising from an implied or constructive trust and, corrolarily reference
Ruling:
the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and
occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate
of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied trust in favor of the actual
possessor of the said property.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's name
by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in
question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong. Bagumbaran
falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free patent over the land
but there was Liwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok
Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and for the
benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of
the Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he, even being already
the registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the
law to reconvey the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the
Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed
fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary to
the erroneous claim of the respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set
aside and put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In
an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this
case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, 10 or to one with a better
right. That is what reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is
not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must

perforce prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter
being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an
action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner
Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim interposed in his
Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of possession
instituted by the respondent, has not yet prescribed. Between August 16, 1955,
the date of reference, being the date of the issuance of the Original Certificate of
Title in the name of the respondent, and December 4, 1964, when the period of
prescription was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less
than ten years.
31. Solid State Multi-products Corp. vs CA - PASION
32. Lacsamana vs CA - AGUAS
VICENTE SAPTO, LAUREANA SAPTO and DORA (BAGONA), plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. APOLONIO FABIANA,
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible.
FACTS:
Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) was the registered owner of the
registered land covered by TCT No. T-5701 located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City.
He died and left the said property to his three sons Samuel, Constancio, and
Ramon. Ramon later also died leaving no heirs. On 1931, Samuel and Constancio
executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour of Apolonio
Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of
Davao but was never registered. However, although the said sale was never
registered, the possession of said property was transferred to Fabiana
immediately after the sale on 1931 up to present (the filing of the case on 1954).
Constancio then died with no heirs. Later, Samuel married Dora Bagona and had
two children:Vicente and Laureana Sapto. Upon the death of Samuel, his widow
and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land against
Fabiana.
The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was
never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the parties and the
vendors heirs and ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in favour of the defendant.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:

21
1)
Whether or not the sale was binding to the heirs though never
registered.--YES
2)
Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was
valid. -YES
RATIO:
1)
Yes. The sale was valid and binding upon the heirs although not
registered.
In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have consistently
interpreted Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no deed . . . shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds
to make registration" in the sense that as between the parties to a sale
registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is
equivalent to registration.
As between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to
land not so registered. Registration is intended to protect the buyer against
claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is
certainly not necessary to give effect as between the parties to their deed of
sale. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of
strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the nonregistration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties
thereto of their obligations thereunder.
No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in
question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the
possession of the vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee.
2)
Yes. The order of CFI for execution of deed of conveyance in favour of
Fabiana was valid and not barred by prescription.
The contention that the order for execution of conveyance in favor Fabiana has
prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the original sale must be
overruled, being predicated on the assumption that the reconveyance is sought
by way of performance of the contract of sale entered into in 1931.
No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession
of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser.
The said action for conveyance was actually an action to quiet title, i.e., to
remove the cloud cast upon Fabianas ownership by the refusal of the appellants
to recognize the sale made by their predecessors.
This action accrued only when appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in
1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence, actions to
quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
DOCTRINE:
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted,
as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred
while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming
to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee
continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has

a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title
can only be invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. One who claims
property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy
within the statutory period.
34. Lucas vs Gamponia
CONCORDIA MEJIA DE
Defendant-Appellant.

LUCAS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ANDRES

GAMPONIA,

On March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land in the name of
Domingo Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the
name of Domingo Mejia. On March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but
before the registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to
Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and enjoyed its fruits.
Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and
adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Sanchez sold the land on January 21, 1940 to
Andres Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment
of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the time
he sold it to Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property
from the time he bought it to date.
Domingo Mejia, died and left his only surviving kin Pedro Mejia, his brother. Pedro
is survived by his daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas, Plaintiff herein. Upon the
above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar
is null and void, as the sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent
in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further held
that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant Andres Gamponia.
ISSUE
Whether Gamponias defense is tenable - YES
HELD
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained
to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one
lies in favor of the Defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold
that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of
the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable
defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not be
considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long
continued possession for 37 years, the original owners right to recover back the
possession of the property and the title thereto from the Defendant has, by the

22
long period of 37 years and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted
into a stale demand.
It is to be noted that all the above complications would never had been
occasioned had the original patentee and his successors in interest not slept on
their rights for more than a generation. Add to this the fact that the original
conveyance made by the patentee is not absolutely null and void. The prohibition
against the sale of free patents is for a period of seven years (Section 35, Act No.
926); cafter that period of time a patentee would be free to dispose of the land.
Within seven years from the conveyance the original patentee could have
brought an action to recover back his property. Since nothing of this sort was
done by him, it was certainly natural for the purchase to have assumed that the
original patentee gave up his right to recover back the property and acquiesced
in vendees right and title. The successor in interest of the original purchaser
must also have believed in good faith that the patentee and his successors in
interest were reconciled to the idea of allowing the property to stay in the hands
of the successors in interest. By this inaction for a period of 37 years to the
consequent prejudice that annulment of the original sale would entail upon so
many successive owners, the equitable principle now stands up as a bar.
In effect, the principle is one of estoppel because it prevents people who have
slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed
reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his successors in interest.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RAMONA RUIZ, ET AL. (G.R. No. L-23712)
Facts:

Cayetano Pinto, a registered land owner in which he acquired the land

through homestead patent.

Four (4) years after the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT),
Cayetano together with her wife Ramona Ruiz sold the portion of the land in favor
of Jacobo Pinto.

The Deed of Sale executed by the deceased Cayetano Pinto in favor of

Jacobo Pinto was never registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Isabela, nor annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title.

Later, Ramona Ruiz and her children executed an extrajudicial partition of

the entire land (included the portion of the land sold to Jacobo) which was
registered, reason for the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

The widow Herminia Tinonas and heirs of the late Jacobo Pinto filed an
action against the widow Ramona Ruiz and heirs of the late Cayetano Pinto for
the conveyance of the portion of 3 hectares, sold and conveyed by the late
Cayetano Pinto in favor of the late Jacobo Pinto.

Supreme Court rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and declaring

that the Deed of Sale executed by the deceased Cayetano Pinto in favor of the

late Jacobo Pinto null and void ab initio, for being in violation of Section 116 of
the Public Land Law.

(Before the appeal of the heirs of Jacobo Pinto has been perfected and the
record elevated to the Supreme Court,) The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES filed
the instant action against the widow and heirs of the late Cayetano Pinto for
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and Transfer Certificate of Title and
the reversion of the land covered by the said titles to the State.
On the grounds that the homesteader Cayetano Pinto violates the
condition provided in Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 which produced the
effect of annulling and cancelling the said patent and thus caused the reversion
to the State of the property thereby covered.
ISSUE:
W/N can the government may bring a proper action for reversion against the
grantee, by that the grantee sold the land within the prohibitive period of 5 years
from the issuance of patent?
HELD:
YES.
By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, any transfer or
alienation of a homestead grant within five years from the issuance of the patent
is forbidden, making said alienation null and void, and constituting a cause for
reversion of the homestead to the State. In other words, it was the transgression
of the law that nullifies and renders the deed of conveyance null and void and
without effect. The prohibitory provision against any alienation or encumbrance
of the land grant is not only mandatory, but is considered a condition attached to
the approval of every application.
The CFI committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant
involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate title based
on the patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of
the grantee's heirs.
In relation to the topic under the Discussion guide: STATE NOT BOUND BY
PRESCRIPTION.
Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the
land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the
court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property
has already been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. And, this
right of the government to bring an appropriate action for reconveyance (or
reversion) is not barred by the lapse of time; the Statute of Limitations does not
run against the State.
37. Republic vs CA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE L.
YUPANGCO, JR.
G.R. No. 128531. October 26, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a condominium unit,
evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 7648, which could not be located. Hence, he

23
filed, on January 28, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati, a
petition for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost
copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). The trial
court ordered the Register of Deeds of Makati to comment on the petition and
thereafter set the case for initial hearing.
On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a manifestation that
she had no objection to the petition. After hearing private respondents evidence,
the trial court rendered, on December 15, 1995, its decision granting the petition,
declaring as invalid the missing copy of the certificate of title, and ordering the
Registrar of Deeds of Makati to issue a new owners duplicate certificate of title in
the name of private respondent. A copy of this decision was furnished the
Solicitor General.
On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the trial
courts decision on the ground that no copy of private respondents petition or
notice thereof had been given to him.
ISSUE:
Whether in a proceeding for the issuance of an owners duplicate
certificate of title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that failure
to give such notice would render the proceedings void.
HELD: NO. It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be
notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owners duplicate certificate of title.
Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the government in land registration and related proceedings. Even so,
however, the request for representation should have come from the Registrar of
Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Here, there is no dispute
that the Registrar of Deeds of Makati was notified of private respondents petition,
but she manifested that her office had no objection thereto. The Solicitor General
does not question the propriety of the action and manifestation of the Registrar
of Deeds, nor does he give any reason why private respondents petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title should be denied. Instead,
he claims that the fact that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission
that he is entitled to be notified of all incidents relating to the proceedings.
This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose such notice
requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate
of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of
Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.
This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration cases
and original land registration proceedings which require that the Solicitor General
be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining the
timeliness of the appeal filed by the government, the date of his receipt of the
decisions therein and not that of the Director of Lands or of his other
representatives. The issue and the applicable laws in those cases are different.
The important role of the Office of the solicitor General as the governments law
office cannot be overemphasized. Its powers and functions, however, should not
be rigidly applied in such a manner that innocuous omissions, as in the case at

bar, should be visited with so grave a consequence as the nullification of

proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the government has been shown.
38. Acap vs CA
Teodoro Acap vs CA & Edy Delos Reyes
Facts:
Lot 1130 was originally owned by spouses Vasquez and later inherited by their
son, Felixberto. Teodoro Acap was the registered tenant thereto. In 1975, the lot
was conveyed by Felixberto to Cosme Pido. The lot remained under the name of
original owner spouses. When Pido died, the heirs (wife and children) conveyed
the property to Edy Delos Reyes by executing Notarized Declaration of heirship &
waiver of rights. Delos Reyes also filed with ROD Notice of Adverse claim in the
OCT. Acap did not pay the rent since he refused to belief Edy to be the owner
since no proof of ownership was presented to him. Acap contended that the
notice of adverse claim, and the Notarized Declaration of heirship & waiver of
rights do not convey ownership. Edy filed complaint for recovery of possession.
Issue: W/N lower court is correct in ruling that Acap has no basis to pay rent to
Delos Reyes.
Ruling:
Acaps non-payment was justified since there was no proof of transfer of
ownership. Asserted Real right (notice of adverse claim) over the thing arising
from juridical act, however justified is not per se sufficient to give rise to
ownership. The right/title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions of the
law
Notice of adverse claim is a mere notice, the validity of which is yet to be
establish by the court (expires within 30 days)
39. Garbin vs CA
G.R. No. 107653. February 5, 1996]
FELIPA GARBIN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
TENTH DIVISION) and SPOUSES ANTONIO JULIAN and CASIMIRA GARBIN,
respondents.
Facts:
Pablo Garbin is the original owner of Lot 12712, Camiling, Tarlac.
On October 31, 1955, Pablo Garbin and his wife Leoncia executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Estate purportedly conveying to private respondent
Casimira Garbin the undivided northern half of the said lot. Casimira then
registered an adverse claim over the property.
Pablo Garbin sold the entire Lot 12712, including the northern portion, to
petitioner Felipa by virtue of a Deed of Sale. . Consequently, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 88932 was issued in favor of Felipa. On July 29, 1974, Felipa and Pablo
Garbin filed an ejectment case against private respondent spouses.

24
On March 1, 1982, before judgment could become final in the ejectment
case, private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale, partition and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint. Private respondents went to the Court of
Appeals
The issue presented therein was whether or not private respondents, as
the alleged first vendees in a double sale, (who annotated the same as an
adverse claim on the covering title) have a superior right over petitioner, the
subsequent vendee (who received a transfer certificate of title for the entire lot
despite prior inscription of the adverse claim).
The the Court of Appeals said, , the inscription of the adverse claim of
plaintiffs-appellants on vendor Pablo Garbins OCT No. 33251 did constitute a
sufficient notice to the whole world, defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin included, that the northern half of subject Lot 12712 was deeded out by the registered
owner to plaintiffs-appellants. Therefore, defendant-appellee is a buyer in bad
faith, with full awareness of the prior sale of the northern half of Lot 12712 to her
sister Casimira Garbin.
Issue: Whether the registration of the said adverse claim by private respondents
prevail over the title of petitioner which was registered subsequent to the
adverse claim?
Held:
It is undisputed that the adverse claim of private respondents was
registered pursuant to Sec. 110 of Act No. 496, the same having been
accomplished by the filing of a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the
province where the property was located. However, what was registered was
merely the adverse claim and not the Deed of Sale, which supposedly conveyed
the northern half portion of the subject property. Therefore, there is still need to
resolve the validity of the adverse claim in separate proceedings, as there is an
absence of registration of the actual conveyance of the portion of land herein
claimed by private respondents.
From the provisions of the law, it is clear that mere registration of an adverse
claim does not make such claim valid, nor is it permanent in character.
More importantly, such registration does not confer instant title of ownership
since judicial determination on the issue of the ownership is still necessary.
40. Carantes vs CA
Carantes vs. CA
GR No. L-3360 (April 25, 1977)
Facts:
Maximino Carrantes, et. al were heirs of Mateo Carantes who died leaving a
parcel of land.
Some portion of the said land were expropriated by the Government to be used
for landing field.

To minimize expenses and facilitate the expropriation, the other heirs executed a
deed denominated as Assignment of Right to Inheritance in favor to Maximino.
The said deed was registered by Maximino on March 16, 1940 and the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title for the unsold portion of the said land
was issued in his name.
It was only on February 18, 1958, when the other heirs came to know that the
deed purported to assign in favor of Maximino their rights to inheritance from
Mateo Carantes. Hence, on September 4, 1958 the other heirs filed a complaint
against Maximino praying that the Assignment of Right to Inheritance be
declared null and void and the corresponding TCT be partitioned among them.
Maximino moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
The complaint is anchored on the constructive trust created in favor to the other
heirs. The fraud committed by Maximino makes the deed null and void, hence the
action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.
Issue:
WON the action for reconveyance due to fraud is imprescritiple?
Ruling:
In any event, it is now settled that an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust is prescriptible it prescribes in ten years. In this case the tenyear prescriptive period began on March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered
the deed of "Assignment of Right to Inheritance" and secured the cancellation of
the certificate of title in the joint names of the heirs of Mateo Carantes, and, in
lieu thereof, the issuance of a new title exclusively in his name. 14 Since the
present action was commenced only on September 4, 1958, it is clear that the
same is barred by extinctive prescription.
The weight of authorities is to the effect that the registration of an instrument in
the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world, and, therefore, discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time of the registration
It was also held by the respondent court that the petitioner was merely holding
the property in trust for the benefit of his co-heirs as administrator, hence, there
was a continuing and subsisting trust, and pursuant to section 38 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the provisions of the said Code on prescription (Secs. 40-41) do
not apply. It is our view, however, that there was no continuing and subsisting
trust.
From March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered the deed of assignment and
had the Certificate of title in the names of the heirs cancelled and a new

25
certificate of title issued in his own name, he began to hold the property in open
and clear repudiation of any trust. 15
41. Republic vs De Guzman
Republic of the Philippines vs Spouses De Guzman
G.R. No. 105630
February 23, 2000
Facts:
Lot 5249-Ts-217, a public land, was awarded to Eusebio Diones by the Board of
Liquidators. He later sold his rights to Enrique P. de Guzman. The lot was claimed
by Lucena Ong Ante who authorized Carmen Ty, in 1963 to possess the same up
to the filing of the present controversy. Despite the occupancy of Carmen Ty, a
miscellaneous sales patent was awarded to de Guzman to whom a corresponding
original certificate of title was issued. The lot was subsequently sold by de
Guzman to his daughter, Carolina and her husband, Rio Rivera, and was issued a
transfer certificate of title containing the adverse claim of Lucena Ong Ante. The
spouses also did not possess the land. Title to the land was mortgaged by the
spouses to respondent Hoechst Phils., Inc. The same was foreclosed and a
certificate of sale was issued in its name. However, the mortgage and the
certificate of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds. In 1981,
petitioner moved for reversion of the lot on the ground that the same was
obtained by means of fraud. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner, ordered the reversion of the land and the cancellation of the sales
patent and the derivative titles issued in connection therewith. On appeal, the
assailed decision was reversed. The Court of Appeals ruled that when the land
ceased to be part of the public domain by the issuance of the original title, the
Director of Lands lost control and jurisdiction over the land and title became
indefeasible one year after its issuance. It, however, sustained the finding of the
trial court that de Guzman did not possess the property and misrepresented facts
in his application. It also held that the spouses Rivera were innocent purchasers
for value. Hence, this petition by the Republic.
The Court ruled that one of the legal requirements in an application for sales
application is actual possession of the land. The issuance of the patent and its
derivative titles in violation thereof is null and void; that indefeasibility of title is
not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands for the reversion of the land
where such title was acquired by fraud; that indefeasibility of title does not attach
to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser/mortgagor in good faith and for
value lies upon him who asserts that status who must be wary and should

investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the
buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Director of Lands loses authority over the land the
moment an original certificate of title is issued covering the same. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the issuance of the original certificate of title converted the lot
into a private land, thereby placing it beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands
2.
Whether or not Enrique P. de Guzman validly obtained the sales patent
and the original certificate of title.
3.
Whether or not the validity of the patent and the original certificate of title
can still be assailed after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the disputed
title.
4.

Whether the spouses Rivera are innocent purchasers for value.

HELD:
1.
We disagree. The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts
over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public Land Act. In fact, it is
not merely his right but his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged
fraud in securing patents and the corresponding titles thereto. While title issued
on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such
indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how
such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine
whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
2.
We rule in the negative. There is no question that de Guzman was not in
possession of the property. Hence, de Guzman misrepresented facts in his
application for sales patent. Even the Court of Appeals sustained the factual
finding of the trial court on this point. However, the Court of Appeals held that an
action for cancellation of patent or title could not be maintained after the lapse of
one year from the date of issuance thereof. As heretofore stated, the ruling is
erroneous.
3.
We rule that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued by the
Director of Lands. "Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud
and misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after
the lapse of one year." "The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation."

26
4.
We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not innocent
purchasers for value. Spouses Rivera are related by consanguinity and affinity to
Enrique P. de Guzman knew that de Guzman was not in possession of the land. In
fact, Rio Rivera testified that his father-in-law was not in possession of the lot in
question. Carmen Ty was in possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real
estate taxes thereon. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the
presumption of a buyer in good faith must prevail. "The burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that

status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke

presumption of good faith." The rule is settled that a buyer of
which is in the possession of persons other than the seller must
should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith."

the ordinary
real property
be wary and
without such