G.R. No.

L-63122, February 20, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, UPFU, VS. UNIVERSITY OF

PANGASINAN AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
UPFU is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent University of Pangasinan.
On December 18, 1981, UPFU, through its President, Miss Consuelo Abad, filed a complaint against
the private respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, Dagupan District Office, Dagupan
City. The complaint seeks: (a) the payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLA) for
November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break; (b) salary increases from the sixty (60%) percent
of the incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for suspended extra
loads.
UPFU's members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers of respondent University. The
teachers in the college level teach for a normal duration of ten (10) months a school year, divided into
two (2) semesters of five (5) months each, excluding the two (2) months summer vacation. These
teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly basis.
In November and December, 1981, UPFU's members were fully paid their regular monthly salaries.
However, from November 7 to December 5, during the semestral break, they were not paid their
ECOLA.
During the same schoolyear (1981-1982), the private respondent was authorized by the Ministry of
Education and Culture to collect, as it did collect, from its students a fifteen (15%) percent increase of
tuition fees. UPFU's members demanded a salary increase effective the first semester of said
schoolyear to be taken from the sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds of the increased tuition fees.
Private respondent refused but while the complaint was pending in the arbitration branch,
the private respondent granted an across-the-board salary increase of 5.86%. Nonetheless,
UPFU is still pursuing full distribution of the 60% of the incremental proceeds as mandated by
Presidential Decree No. 451.

Some of UPFU's members were given extra loads to handle during the same 1981-1982 schoolyear.
Some of them had extra loads to teach on September 21, 1981, but they were unable to teach as classes
in all levels throughout the country were suspended, although said day was proclaimed by the
President of the Philippines as a working holiday. Those with extra loads to teach on said day
claimed they were not paid their salaries for those loads.
"WHETHER OR NOT UPFU'S MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO ECOLA DURING THE
SEMESTRAL BREAK FROM NOVEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 5, 1981 OF THE 1981-82 SCHOOL
YEAR.
Anent the first issue, the various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs to wit: PD's 1614, 1634, 1678 and
1713, provide on "Allowances of Fulltime Employees x x x" that "Employees shall be paid in full the

required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular working days if they incur no
absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the amounts corresponding to the
absences may be deducted from the monthly allowance x x x"; and on "Leave of Absence Without
Pay", that "All covered employees shall be entitled to the allowance provided herein when they are on
leave of absence with pay."
UPFU's members are full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of
the number of working days or teaching hours in a month. But semestral breaks are in

the nature of work interruptions beyond the employees control, varies from year to year
dependent on a variety of circumstances affecting at times only the private respondent but at other
times all educational institutions in the country.
As such, these breaks cannot be considered as absences within the meaning of the law for
which deductions may be made from monthly allowances.
The "No work, no pay" principle does not apply. It contemplates a "no work" situation

where the employees voluntarily absent themselves. UPFUs, in the case at bar, certainly
do not, ad voluntatem, absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are

constrained to take mandatory leave from work. Surely, it was not the intention of the framers
of the law to allow employers to withhold employee benefits by the simple expedient of unilaterally
imposing "no work" days and consequently avoiding compliance with the mandate of the law for those
days.
Look at Implementing Rules and Regulations of Wage Order No. 1 to wit:
SECTION 5. Allowance for Unworked Days. "a) All covered employees whether paid on a monthly or daily basis shall be entitled to their daily
living allowance when they are paid their basic wage."
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xxx

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It is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic

wages. Hence, we have the principle of "No pay, no ECOLA" the converse of which finds application
in the case at bar. UPFU cannot be considered to be on leave without pay so as not to be
entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, UPFUs were paid their wages in full for the

months of November and December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral

break. This, in itself, is a tacit recognition that although said to be on forced leave,

professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened with the task of working during a

period of time supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are papers to correct,
students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods within which to submit grading reports.
Although they may be considered by the respondent to be on leave, the semestral break could not be
used effectively for the teachers' own purposes for the nature of a teacher's job imposes upon him

further duties which must be done during the said period of time. Learning is a never ending
process. Teachers and professors must keep abreast of developments all the time. Teachers cannot
also wait for the opening of the next semester to begin their work. Arduous preparation is necessary
for the delicate task of educating our children. Teaching involves not only an application of skill and
an imparting of knowledge, but a responsibility which entails self-dedication and sacrifice. The task
of teaching ends not with the perceptible efforts of UPFU's members but goes beyond the classroom:
a continuum where only the visible labor is relieved by academic intermissions. It would be most
unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers as employees on leave without pay to suit
its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue availing of their services as they prepare for the
next semester or complete all of the last semester's requirements. Furthermore, we may also by
analogy apply the principle enunciated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code to wit:
Sec. 4 Principles in Determining Hours Worked. - The following general principles shall govern in
determining whether the tine spent by an employee is considered hours worked for purposes of this
Rule:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(d) The time during which an Employee is inactive by reason of interruptions in his work beyond his
control shall be considered time either if the imminence of the resumption of work requires the
employee's presence at the place of work or if the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and
gainfully in the employee's own interest." (Italics ours)
UPFU's members in the case at bar, are exactly in such a situation. The semestral break

scheduled is an interruption beyond UPFU's control and it cannot be used "effectively nor
gainfully in the employee's interest". Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as
"hours worked". For this, the teachers are paid regular salaries and, for this, they should

be entitled to ECOLA. Not only do the teachers continue to work during this short recess

but much less do they cease to live for which the cost of living allowance is intended. The
legal principles of "No work, no pay; No pay, no ECOLA" must necessarily give way to the
purpose of the law to augment the income of employees to enable them to cope with the
harsh living conditions brought about by inflation, and to protect employees and their

wages against the ravages brought by these conditions. Significantly, it is the commitment of
the State to protect labor and to provide means by which the difficulties faced by the working force
may best be alleviated. To submit to the respondents' interpretation of the no work, no pay policy is
to defeat this noble purpose. The Constitution and the law mandate otherwise.
II
True, the whereas clauses of PD 451 provide for salary and or wage increase and other benefits,
however, the same do not delineate the source of such funds and it is only in Section 3 which provides
for the limitations wherein the intention of the framers of the law is clearly outlined. The law is

clear. The sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be
devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary. The

law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above the

basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds
would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law, an increase intended also to
help the teachers and other workers tide themselves and their families over these difficult economic
times.
III
As evidenced by the payrolls submitted by them during the period September 16 to September 30,
1981, the faculty members have been paid for the extra loads. Assuming arguendo, however, that
they have not been paid for these extra loads, they are not entitled to payment following the
principle of "No work, no pay". This time, the rule applies. Involved herein is a matter

different from the payment of ECOLA under the first issue. We are now concerned with
extra, not regular loads for which UPFUs are paid regular salaries every month

regardless of the number of working days or hours in such a month. Extra loads should be
paid for only when actually performed by the employee. Since there was no work on
September 21, 1981, it would now be unfair to grant UPFU's demand for extra wages on that day.

G.R. No. 96078, January 09, 1992

HILARIO RADA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(SECOND DIVISION) AND PHILNOR CONSULTANTS AND PLANNERS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a 'Contract of Employment for a
Definite Period' dated July 7, 1977, as 'Driver' for the construction supervision phase of the Manila
North Expressway Extension, Second Stage (hereinafter referred to as MNEE Stage 2) for a term of
about 24 months effective July 1, 1977.
It is hereby understood that the Employer does not have a continuing need for the services of the
Employee beyond the termination date of this contract and that Employee's services shall

automatically, and without notice, terminate upon the completion of the above specified phase of the
project;
First contract expired on June 30, 1979. Second Contract of Employment for a Definite Period of 10
months, that is, from July 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980 was executed between Petitioner and Respondent
on July 7, 1979. Third contract of employment for a definite period was executed by and between the
Petitioner and the Respondent whereby the Petitioner was again employed as Driver for 19 months,
from May 1, 1980 to November 30, 1981, subsequently extended for a number of times, the last
extension being for a period of 3 months, that is, from October 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985. The last
extension, from October 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985 (Annex E) covered by an Amendment to the
Contract of Employment with a Definite Period, was not extended any further because Petitioner
had no more work to do in the project.
Petitioner applied for Personnel Clearance with Respondent dated December 9, 1985 and

acknowledged having received the amount of P3,796,20 representing conversion to cash of

unused leave credits and financial assistance. Petitioner also released Respondent from
all obligations and/or claims, etc. in a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim"[2]

On May 20, 1987, petitioner filed before the NLRC, a Complaint for non-payment of separation
pay and overtime pay. On July 2, 1987, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint alleging that

he was illegally dismissed and that he was not paid overtime pay although he was made to
render three hours overtime work from Monday to Saturday for a period of three years.

Position Paper: he was illegally dismissed since he was a regular employee entitled to security of
tenure; that he was not a project employee since Philnor is not engaged in the construction business
as to be covered by Policy Instructions No. 20; that the contract of employment for a definite period
executed between him and Philnor is against public policy and a clear circumvention of the law
designed merely to evade any benefits or liabilities under the statute; that his position as driver was
essential, necessary and desirable to the conduct of the business of Philnor; that he rendered

overtime work until 6:00 P.M. daily except Sundays and holidays and, therefore, he was
entitled to overtime pay.
Respondents: petitioner was not a company driver since his job was to drive the employees hired to
work at the MNEE Stage 2 Project to and from the field office at Sto. Domingo Interchange,
Pampanga; that the office hours observed in the project were from 7:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M., Mondays
through Saturdays; that Philnor adopted the policy of allowing certain employees, not necessarily the
project driver, to bring home project vehicles to afford fast and free transportation to and from the
project field office considering the distance between the project site and the employees residences, to
avoid project delays and inefficiency due to employee tardiness caused by transportation problems;
that petitioner was allowed to use a project vehicle which he used to pick up and drop off some ten
employees along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), on his way home to Marikina, Metro Manila;
that when he was absent or on leave, another employee living in Metro Manila used the same vehicle
in transporting the same employees; that the time used by petitioner to and from his

residence to the project site from 5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M., or

about three hours daily, was not overtime work as he was merely enjoying the benefit and
convenience of free transportation provided by Philnor, otherwise without such vehicle
he would have used at least four hours by using public transportation and spent P12.00

daily as fare; that in the case of Quiwa vs. Philnor Consultants and Planners Inc., supra, the NLRC
upheld Philnor's position that Quiwa was a project employee and he was not entitled to termination
pay under Policy Instructions No. 20 since his employment was coterminous with the completion of
the project.
Labor Arbiter ordered reinstatement with full backwages and payment of overtime pay for the three
excess hours of work performed during working days from January 1983 to December 1985; and
NLRC set aside LAs decision.
The petition is devoid of merit.
I
Petitioner postulates that as a regular employee, he is entitled to security of tenure, hence he cannot
be terminated without cause. Private respondent Philnor believes otherwise and asserts that
petitioner is merely a project employee who was terminated upon the completion of the project for
which he was employed.
It must be stressed herein that although petitioner worked with Philnor as a driver for eight
years, the fact that his services were rendered only for a particular project which took
that same period of time to complete categorizes him as a project employee. Petitioner
was employed for one specific project.

It is clear that petitioner is a project employee considering that he does not belong to a "work pool"
from which the company would draw workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion.
Petitioner was utilized only for one particular project, the MNEE Stage 2 Project of respondent
company. Hence, the termination of herein petitioner is valid by reason of the completion of the
project and the expiration of his employment contract.
II
Anent the claim for overtime compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the
same. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along

EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back
from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to

petitioner's job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted,
not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of the employer, herein
private respondent to solve issue of tardiness, which in turn, was aggravated by transportation
problems, which varied in degrees in proportion to the distance between the project site and the
employees residence.

Private respondent does not hesitate to admit that it is usually the project driver who is tasked with
picking up or dropping off his fellow employees. Proof? When petitioner is absent, another driver
is supposed to replace him and drive the vehicle and likewise pick up and/or drop off the

other employees at the designated points on EDSA. If driving these employees to and from the
project site is not really part of petitioner's job, then there would have been no need to find a
replacement driver to fetch these employees.
But since the assigned task of fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently
mandatory, then the time required of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to
the field office and back, that is, from 5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to around

6:00 P.M., which the labor arbiter rounded off as averaging three hours each working day,
should be paid as overtime work. Quintessentially, petitioner should be given overtime pay for the
three excess hours of work performed during working days from January, 1983 to December, 1985.

G.R. No. 173648, January 16, 2012

ABDULJUAHID R. PIGCAULAN,* PETITIONER, VS. SECURITY AND CREDIT
INVESTIGATION, INC. AND/OR RENE AMBY REYES , RESPONDENTS.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled by law. Rather, it is on
the employer that the burden of proving payment of these claims rests.
Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned
to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor

Arbiter separate complaints for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime,

holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. (presented DTRs and itemized
lists of claims for corresponding periods served)
Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other
benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and
the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators
(PADPAO) for security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the computation of
their monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic
salary whenever they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on
holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years
1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of payroll listings and lists of employees who received their
13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to November 1998 and December 1998 to November

1999[9] were presented. In addition, respondents contended that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary
claims should only be limited to the past three years of employment pursuant to the rule on
prescription of claims.
Labor Arbiter gave credence to the itemized computations and representative daily time records
submitted by Canoy and Pigcaulan and awarded them their monetary claims. The payroll listings
presented by the respondents did not prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan were duly paid as same were
not signed by the latter or by any SCII officer. The 13th month payroll was, however, acknowledged as
sufficient proof of payment, for it bears Canoys and Pigcaulans signatures.
NLRC dismissed appeal, held that the evidence show underpayment of salaries as well as nonpayment of service incentive leave benefit.
CA reversed LA, NLRC:
1. The Labor Arbiter disregarded the NLRC rule that, in cases involving money awards and at
all events, as far as practicable, the decision shall embody the detailed and full amount
awarded.
2. The Labor Arbiter found that the payrolls submitted by SCII have no probative value for
being unsigned by Canoy, when, in fact, said payrolls, particularly the payrolls from
1998 to 1999 indicate the individual signatures of Canoy.

3. The Labor Arbiter did not state in his decision the substance of the evidence adduced by
Pigcaulan and Canoy as well as the laws or jurisprudence that would show that the two are
indeed entitled to the salary differential and incentive leave pays.
4. The Labor Arbiter held Reyes liable together with SCII for the payment of the claimed
salaries and benefits despite the absence of proof that Reyes deliberately or maliciously
designed to evade SCIIs alleged financial obligation; hence the Labor Arbiter ignored that
SCII has a corporate personality separate and distinct from Reyes. To justify solidary
liability, there must be an allegation and showing that the officers of the corporation
deliberately or maliciously designed to evade the financial obligation of the corporation.[18]
It is well to note that while the caption of the petition reflects both the names of Canoy and Pigcaulan
as petitioners, it appears from its body that it is being filed solely by Pigcaulan. In fact, the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Pigcaulan alone.
Pigcaulan: His and Canoys claims were supported by substantial evidence in the form of the
handwritten detailed computations which the Labor Arbiter termed as representative daily time
records, showing that they were not properly compensated for work rendered.
Respondents: They were able to present sufficient evidence to prove payment of just salaries and
benefits, which bits of evidence were unfortunately ignored by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
The assailed CA Decision is considered final as to Canoy.

There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of overtime pay.

We find that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten
itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain
the grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and

unauthenticated as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten

entries stated therein. Nothing in the records which could substantially support Pigcaulans
contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to entitle him to overtime pay and
during Sundays to entitle him to restday pay.
In the absence of any concrete proof that additional service beyond the normal working hours and
days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to Pigcaulan.
Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13th
month pay for year 2000.

ART. 94. RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10)
workers;
ART. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE. (a) Every employee who has rendered at least
one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive of five days with pay.
Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if he does not work.
[30] Likewise, express provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he
rendered service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under Presidential Decree No. 851,[31]
he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid
these benefits to its employees.[32]
Even when the plaintiff alleges non-payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. Since SCII failed to
provide convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday
pay, service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.
The CA erred in dismissing the claims instead of remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter
for a detailed computation of the judgment award.

Indeed, the Labor Arbiter failed to provide sufficient basis for the monetary awards granted. Such
failure, however, should not result in prejudice to the substantial rights of the party. While we
disallow the grant of overtime pay and restday pay in favor of Pigcaulan, he is nevertheless entitled,
as a matter of right, to his holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for year 2000.
Hence, the CA is not correct in dismissing Pigcaulans claims in its entirety.

Consistent with the rule that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall
be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, Pigcaulan can only demand the
amounts due him for the period within three years preceding the filing of the complaint in 2000.
Furthermore, since the records are insufficient to use as bases to properly compute Pigcaulans claims,
the case should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the monetary benefits
due to him.
February 24, 2006 and Resolution dated June 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
85515 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan is hereby declared
ENTITLED to holiday pay and service incentive leave pay for the years 1997-2000 and proportionate
13th month pay for the year 2000.
The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the exact amount
and to make a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan which
Security and Credit Investigation Inc. should pay without delay.

G.R. No. 161713, August 20, 2008

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. LEPANTO LOCAL
STAFF UNION, RESPONDENT.
CARPIO, J.:
On 28 November 1998, petitioner and respondent entered into their fourth Collective Bargaining
Agreement (4th CBA) for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2000. The 4th CBA provides:
ARTICLE VIII - NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL
Section 3. Night Differential pay. - The Company shall continue to pay nightshift differential for
work during the first and third shifts to all covered employees within the bargaining unit
as follows:

For the First Shift (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), the differential pay will be 20% of the basic rate.
For the Third Shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), the differential pay will be 15% of the basic
rate.

However, for overtime work, which extends beyond the regular day shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00
p.m.), there [will] be no night differential pay added before the overtime pay is calculated.
ARTICLE XII - RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND OTHER BENEFITS

Section 9. Longevity pay - The company shall grant longevity pay of P30.00 per month effective July
1, 1998 and every year thereafter.[5]
Respondent filed a complaint alleging that petitioner failed to pay the night shift

differential and longevity pay of respondent's members as provided in the 4th CBA.
Petitioner and respondent failed to amicably settle the dispute.
Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of respondents.
That surface workers on the second shift who performed work after 3:00 p.m. should be given an
additional night shift differential pay equivalent to 15% of their basic rate. Interpreting paragraph 3,
Section 3, Article VIII of the 4th CBA, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that it only meant that an
employee who extends work beyond the second shift shall receive overtime pay which shall be
computed before the night shift differential pay. In other words, it excludes the night shift differential
in the computation of overtime pay.
That the inclusion of paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII of the 4th CBA disclosed the intent of the
parties to grant night shift differential benefits to employees who rendered work beyond the regular
day shift.
CA affirmed.
That paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII was clear and unequivocal. It grants night shift differential
pay to employees of the second shift for work rendered beyond their regular day shift. However, the
night shift differential was excluded in the computation of the overtime pay.
That during the effectivity of the 4th CBA, petitioner voluntarily complied with paragraph 3, Section
3, Article VIII by paying night shift differential to employees for hours worked beyond 3:00 p.m.
Petitioner's act disclosed the parties' intent to include employees in the second shift in the payment
of night shift differential AND still continued to pay night shift differential for hours worked beyond
3:00 p.m. after the Voluntary Arbitrators Decision so petitioner is estopped from claiming erroneous
payment.
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Voluntary
Arbitrator's interpretation of the 4th CBA that the employees in the second shift are
entitled to night shift differential. - NO

The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties.
If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail.
There is no question that workers are entitled to night shift differential of 20% of the basic
rate for work performed during the first shift from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Workers are also
entitled to night shift differential of 15% of the basic rate for work performed during the

third shift from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The issue is whether workers are entitled to night

shift differential for work performed beyond the regular day shift, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00
p.m.
The first paragraph of Section 3 provides that petitioner shall continue to pay night shift differential
to workers of the first and third shifts. It does not provide that workers who performed work beyond
the second shift shall not be entitled to night shift differential. The inclusion of the third
paragraph is not intended to exclude the regular day shift workers from receiving night

shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It only provides that the night shift
differential pay shall be excluded in the computation of the overtime pay.
Look at contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court
of Appeals both found that the provision in question was contained in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
CBAs between petitioner and respondent. During the effectivity of the first three CBAs,

petitioner paid night shift differentials to other workers who were members of respondent
for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. Petitioner also paid night shift differential for work
beyond 3:00 p.m. during the effectivity of the 4th CBA.

Also, petitioner failed to present any convincing evidence to prove that the payment was
erroneous on the part of the accounting department. In fact, while the case was pending

appeal, petitioner still paid night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It
affirms the intention of the parties to the CBA to grant night shift differential for work performed
beyond 3:00 p.m.