ONRECENT CASES

Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:

1.

Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was the Ombudsmans plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy;

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) has subject matter jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition;

3.

Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI)
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension issued by
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;

4.

Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO
and WPI; and

5.

Whether the CAs directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.s
petition for contempt was improper or illegal.
In dispensing the First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsmans petition falls
under the exceptions that a prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing
the case of Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which held as
follows:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. (Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied on by the SC in this case,
in ruling that no motion for reconsideration was needed.)

s to the Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly
its 2nd Paragraph states:

Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague,
unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case of
Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th
Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing
theappellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence, inviolation
of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. This tells us that lawyers should
always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has affected it so much
maybe its time to update it.
Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the exchanges between
Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali
Gonzales, which merely led the SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators
were talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or some other provision. In other words,
while the throwback was appreciated by the SC, the discussions were not really
useful in this case.
Regardless, the SC still ruled that the remedy of Binay, Jr. the filing of petition
for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the
Ombudsmans preventive suspension order was valid, citing the cases of Office
of the Ombudsman v. Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and
Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November
2013. Its just sad that the sorry end of Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770
came as collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking up this issue on
its own motion, or ex mero motu, which it can rightfully do, since it is, after all,
the SC.
The Third Issue is where it starts to become more interesting. Here, the
Ombudsmans history was discussed, citing heavily from the case of Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014
(hereinafter referred to as Gonzales). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling
from ear to ear while reading this portion, but this form of flattery should lead
one to be suspicious.
What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the
Ombudsmans independence covers the following:

(1) it is the creation of the Constitution;

(2) it enjoys fiscal autonomy; and
(3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control.
On this basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected from
political harassment and pressure, to free it from the insidious tentacles of
politics. (Oh, what imagery does this give?) Since the SC is a political, then
Gonzales should not be interpreted to shield the Ombudsman from the judicial
review power of the courts. After all, there is no politics in the judiciary, right?
After the Ombudsman, it is now the SCs turn to give an exhaustive recap of its
own history. Starting from the definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on the
discuss its expanded scope of judicial review enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran,
G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, then the evolution of its rule-making
authority in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC
pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no authority to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
rules allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of the courts inherent
power, which (now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish its
constitutionally mandated functions.
The SC ruled that Congress passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770,
which prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an encroachment of the SCs
rule-making authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and
auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not
consented to this as it has not issued rules of procedure through an
administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, Until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefore.
Abangan ang susunod na kabanata.
Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second
Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now
deemed ineffective. As such, the CA was held to have correctly issued the
injunctive relief in enjoining the preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. To go right
at it, the SC abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not
act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case
law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a
jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was
decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal
precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities.
The SC stated what appears the sole basis for the condonation doctrine in
Pascual, to wit:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the
condonation doctrine, except that it seems to incline towards American
authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found that
there was really no established weight of authorities in the United States (US).
In fact, 17 States in the US have already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as
pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the findings of the
Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat that said cases are merely
guides of interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine
jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-reaching,
since we now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective
case laws. For this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:

Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as

espoused in Pascual,and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against
prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this
Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare
decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the
Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, temporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society
within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, [w]hat we
can decide, we can undecide.'

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the
plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascuals judicious re-examination.

The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable
cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the 1987
Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there exists
legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
Civil Service. The SC ruled:

"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads
this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local officials administrative liability
for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses
may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative
offenses: xxx "

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the
condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-times used by
elected officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made mention of the data
brought forward by the Ombudsman, to wit:

To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that for the period
of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from
the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a
half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct involving infractions such as
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct were placed
beyond the reach of the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the
Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to be resolved on the ground there are no
contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was
an impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due
course has been given to the contempt action; thus, the Ombudsmans claim was
premature.