ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs.

SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry
with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Paraaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of
her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu
then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the
pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return
the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with
the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry
and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents complaint as well
as petitioners counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to
the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants
the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied,
hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles
in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since
robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable
or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have
been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of
human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso
fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;

(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the

debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests
on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt
one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at
the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the
pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby
bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by
the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault
inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicams testimony,
in effect, contradicts petitioners defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any
negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been
occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Paraaque Police
Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners
employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also
does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by
the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that
petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops
and other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by
pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be
observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code,
provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the
diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must
take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own

property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want
of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of
negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicams
testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient
precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there
was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had
sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing
that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to
prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious
individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even
doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is quite impossible
that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with
caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees.
Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to
corroborate petitioner Sicams claim; not one of petitioners
employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in
court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicams admission that the vault was open at
the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to
observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners pawnshop and they
were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a
pawnshop.
NOTES:

We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners

negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves against loss of the
pawned jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations
for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is
provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business
of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire
and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance
company accredited by the Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764
which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns The office
building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire.
(emphasis supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted.
Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible to require
insurance of pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the abovequoted amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners to
insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error for the CA to
consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners
failed to exercise the diligence required of them under the Civil Code.
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry
with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Paraaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of
her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu
then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the
pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return
the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with
the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry
and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents complaint as well

as petitioners counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to

the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants
the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied,
hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles
in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since
robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable
or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have
been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of
human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso
fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests
on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt
one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at
the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the
pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby
bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by
the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault
inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicams testimony,
in effect, contradicts petitioners defense of fortuitous event.

Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any
negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been
occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Paraaque Police
Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners
employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also
does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by
the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that
petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops
and other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by
pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be
observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code,
provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the
diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must
take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own
property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want
of care required by the circumstances.

A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to

exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of
negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicams
testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient
precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there
was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had
sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing
that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to
prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious
individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even
doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is quite impossible
that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with
caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees.
Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to
corroborate petitioner Sicams claim; not one of petitioners
employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in
court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicams admission that the vault was open at
the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to
observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners pawnshop and they
were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a
pawnshop.
NOTES:
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners
negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves against loss of the
pawned jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations
for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is
provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business
of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire
and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance
company accredited by the Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764
which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns The office
building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire.

(emphasis supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted.
Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible to require
insurance of pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the abovequoted amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners to
insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error for the CA to
consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners
failed to exercise the diligence required of them under the Civil Code.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS- FORTUITOUS EVENT, Robbery
Robbery per se is not a fortuitous event.
In Sicam, et al. v. Jorge, et al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007, Lulu
Jorge pawned several pieces of
jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam to secure a loan in the amount of
P59,500.00. It was alleged that two
armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry
found inside the pawnshop
vault. It was reported to the police. She sued for damages but Sicam
interposed the defense of fortuitous
event, alleging that there was robbery. The SC brushed aside the
contention and said:
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does
not foreclose the possibility of
negligence on his part.
In a case similarly situated, it was ruled that:
It is not a defense for a repaid shop of motor vehicles to escape
liability simply because the damage or
loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping.
Carnapping per se cannot be
considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully
and forcefully taken from anothers
rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically

give rise to a fortuitous event. To

be considered as such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful
taking of anothers property. It
must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or was
done solely by third parties and
that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any
participation. In accordance with
the Rules of Evidence, the burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rests on him who
invokes it which in this case is the private respondent. However,
other than the police report of the
alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented by private
respondent to the effect that the
incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an alleged crime,
to which only private respondent is
privy, does not suffice to establish the carnapping. Neither does it
prove that there was no fault on the
party of private respondent notwithstanding the parties agreement at
the pre-trial that the car was
carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of fault or
negligence on the part of private
respondent. (Co. v. CA, 353 Phil. 305 (1998); Sicam, et al. v. Jorge, et
al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8,
2007).
In another case, it was held that to be relieved from civil liability of
returning the pendant under Article
1174 of the Civil Code, it would only be sufficient that the unforeseen
event, the robbery, took place
without any concurrent fault on the debtors part, and this can be done
by preponderance of evidence;
that o be free from liability for reason of fortuitous event, the debtor
must, in addition to the case itself, be

free from any concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. (Sicam, et

al. v. Jorge, et al., supra.).