Art. 138. Inciting a rebellion or insurrection.

G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007

Beltran vs People
Facts: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
petitioners prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and
prosecution of petitioners cases. Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, are members of the House of Representatives representing
various party-list groups. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of
the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the
Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on
the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint
affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected to a second
inquest, this time for Rebellion. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of
the CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan,
and several others as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo
government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a
tactical alliance.
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran
and San Juan as leaders/promoters of Rebellion. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan,
and other individuals conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as
Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng
Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up
arms against the duly constituted government.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltrans inquest for
Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such
felony.
Issue: Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether
there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.
Held: The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are
proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran,
without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could
only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void.
None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion.
Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed
Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What

these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of
Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was
not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.
For the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112
in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltrans inquest void.
Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial court to
make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of such
proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.
The elements of Rebellion are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end.
We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The allegations in these affidavits
are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against
the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP
Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of
the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltrans alleged presence during the
1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion. Assuming that Beltran
is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does
not constitute rebellion.29[29] As for the alleged funding of the CPPs military equipment from
Beltrans congressional funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a general conclusion without
any specific act showing such funding. Such a general conclusion does not establish probable
cause.
In his Comment to Beltrans petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes affidavit, dated
25 February 2006,] as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided

details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and
2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed,
among others. The claim is untenable. Fuentes affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG
referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have
Fuentes affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran
on that day. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran
during the inquest, does not improve the prosecutions case. Assuming them to be true, what the
allegations in Fuentes affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion,
punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134.
Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere
preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Thus, the RTC Makati
erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the
evidence before it.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a
Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation.
Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he
is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a
leader or promoter of the Rebellion. However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for
conspiring and confederating with others in forming a tactical alliance to commit rebellion. As
worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, a bailable offense

Art. 156. Delivery of prisoners from jails.

ALBERTO v. DELA CRUZ (1980)
PONENTE: Concepcion, J.
FACTS: Eligio Orbita is a provincial guard who is being prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the
Custody of Prisoner as punished by art. 224 of the RPC. Orbita is charged with the duty of keeping
one of the evidences presented during the trial was a note purportedly written by Governor
Cledera. Cledera was asking Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at
his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur. Esmeralda declared the he could not remember
who handed him the note and that he was not sure as to the genuineness of the signature. The
defense, believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of Cledera to
Esmeralda, filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include
Cledera and Esmeralda. The Fiscal manifested in court that after conducting a reinvestigation of
the case and a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case
against Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence they cannot be charged. Orbita field an MFR and the
Court issued an order to amend the information so as to include Cledera and Esmeralda. Fiscal
filed an MFR but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether Cledera and Esmeralda should be included in the information?
HELD:
NO.
RATIO: Rule: Fiscal is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to 152 [2013. Crim2] support the allegations thereof Although this
power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient
to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to
judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute
a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary
evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better
procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a
special prosecutor. The fiscal was not capricious or whimsical when he refused to prosecute
Cledera and Esmeralda. A reinvestigation was conducted but no additional fact was elicited. There
is also no sufficient evidence in record to show a prima facie case against the two.
There is no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under article 223. Under article 223 it is
necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner
under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in
charge is an essential condition in the 153 [ 2013. Crim2] commission of the crime of faithlessness
in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not

connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. No
evidence to prosecute the two under article 224. article 224 punishes the public officer in whose
custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence.

G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO
A.
AMBIL,

JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

and

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found
guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado,
ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the
latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governors residence.
Issues:
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has
a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation
in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with
a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position
with a salary grade 27 or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being
a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested
before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and
badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the
granting of licenses and concessions. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty
to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the
fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application.
The act employs the phrase private party, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either
a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was
proper.
Art. 173. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph and telephone messages, and use of
said falsified messages. (OUTDATED, Sir)
[G.R.

No.

L-5805.

September

16,

1910.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAQUIN ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant.

Alberto
Attorney-General

Barretto,
Villamor,

for Appellant.
for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. FALSIFICATION; TELEGRAPH MESSAGES. The telegraph operator and public official who,
with intent to gain, reduces the number of words written in a telegram received by him for dispatch,
by making alterations in its wording, when unauthorized to do so by the sender, and who transmits
the message by wire in the form as amended by him after suppressing several of the words
therein contained, commits the crime of falsification of a telegram; provided for and punished by
article 303 in connection with article 300 of the Penal Code.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On April 24, 1908, Joaquin Romero, as postmaster in charge of the post-office and telegraph
station in the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac, received from one named Eugenio two
telegrams for their transmission one to Olongapo, addressed to Mariano de la Cruz, and the
other to Los Banos, addressed to Severino Maguigao. The telegram sent to Cruz in Olongapo was
drawn up in the following terms: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Sr. Mariano de la Cruz. Olongapo.
Aver is hay dinero necesita porque estoy enfermo manda si puede, Eugenio." (See whether there
is money. I need it because I am sick. Send if you can. Eugenio.) This telegram consists of twentyone words and was transmitted by the telegraph operator Romero in the following form: "Paniqui,
April, 24-08. Mariano de la Cruz. Olongapo, Mandame dinero pronto, estoy enfermo
Eugenio." (Send me money soon, am sick. Eugenio.) The original telegram was thus reduced to
nine words, and twelve words were omitted. The telegraph operator Romero received for the
transmission of the said telegram P1.26, the price charged for the twenty-one words which it
contained, and by the reduction gained P0.72, corresponding to the twelve words omitted.
The second telegram was originally worded as follows: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Sr. Severino
Maguiago. Los Banos. Haga el favor de remitir lo que me debe estoy muy enfermo y
necesita el dinero. Eugenio." (Please remit what you owe me. I am very sick and need to
money. Eugenio). The operator omitted eight words from this telegram, which was reduced to the
following: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Severino Maguigao. Los Banos. Remitame dinero,
necesito estoy enfermo. Eugenio." (Remit me money. Need. Am sick. Eugenio.) By the
reduction of words made, the telegraph operator Joaquin Romero gained the price corresponding
to
the
difference
of
eight
words,
to
wit,
P0.48.
On August 24, 1908, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
based upon the above facts, charging Joaquin Romero with the crime of falsification of telegrams.
The case having come to trial, the judge, in view of the evidence adduced thereat, sentenced the

accused, on January 13, 1909, to the penalty of three years and seven months prision
correccional, crediting him with one-half of the time he was held as a detention prisoner, to the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to the payment of the costs. From this judgment the
defendant
appealed.
From the facts related, which were duly proved in this cause, it is found that the crime of
falsification of telegrams sent from the Paniqui station and addressed, one to Mariano de la Cruz
residing in Olongapo, and the other to Severino Maguigao residing in the pueblo of Los Banos, La
Laguna, was committed, since, with the intent of gain, the number of words contained in each
telegram was diminished or reduced and alterations were made therein in such a way as to
pervert the truth in the narration of the facts, and statements different from those contained in the
telegrams, delivered at the telegraph station by the sender Eugenio, were transmitted by wire. This
crime is provided for and punished by article 303 in connection with article 300 of the Penal Code,
which
article
303
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A public official in charge of the telegraph service who shall originate or falsify a telegraphic
message shall incur the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
degrees."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It is unquestionable, in this cause, that the defendant Joaquin Romero was a public official in
charge of the post-office and the telegraph station of the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac, was
appointed by the Government to discharge the said positions, and as such official received salary
from
the
public
treasury.
The said defendant is the sole confessed and convicted perpetrator, by direct participation, of the
crime mentioned. No motive, other than that of intent of gain, can be ascribed as having
determined him to reduce or diminish the number of words contained in each of the telegrams
deposited with their cost at the telegraph station under his charge, inasmuch as, by the reduction
of the first telegram, addressed to Olongapo, the defendant appropriated to himself P0.72, the cost
of the twelve words therein omitted, and in the second telegram he gained P0.48, the amount
received for the eight words omitted. The defendant only affixed to the first telegram stamps to the
value of P.054, and to the other stamps to the value of P0.60, while he received P2.34 as the total
charge for the twenty-one words of the first telegram and for the eighteen of the second message.
It is a fact, admitted by the defendant, that he changed the wording of the telegrams which he
received, by omitting several words in each of them; and the record of the cause shows no proof
of his allegation that he made an error in recounting the amount received for each one of the
telegrams, owing to the number of words they contained, and that he was therefore obliged to
diminish the number of words of each of them. Such allegation is negatived by the proven facts
that he affixed stamps only to the value of P.054 to one of the telegrams, and of P0.60 to the other,
and as he received P2.34 for the dispatch of the two messages, it is evident that the surplus
money must have remained in his possession, since, on striking a balance, instead of a surplus it
was found that there was a shortage of P3 in the postal funds, as the defendant himself confesses
in his official letter of April 25, 1908 (p. 39 of trial record). From all of which it is concluded, as
aforesaid, that the defendant obtained profit from the remainder of the sum received by him,
equivalent to the price of the words omitted by him from the two telegrams before mentioned.
The defendant, therefore, with manifest violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the unlawful act in
question and has thereby incurred the penalty which he merits for his criminal acts. In view of the
fact that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance enters into the commission of the crime, the
punishment should be imposed upon him in the medium degree of the penalty of prision
correccional
in
its
medium
and
maximum
degrees.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors attributed to the judgment appealed from have been
decided, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm the said judgment and we hereby affirm the same,

with

the

costs

of

this

instance

against

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.

the

defendant.

So

ordered.

Art. 189. Unfair competition, fraudulent registration of trade-mark, trade-name or service

mark, fraudulent designation of origin, and false description.
G.R. No. L-9458

November 24, 1914

THE
UNITED
vs.
J. KYBURZ, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien
&
De
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Witt

for

appellant.

CARSON, J.:
Kyburz, the defendant and appellant in this case, was convicted in the court below of a violation of
section 6 of Act No. 666 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes the fraudulent
use of trade-marks and trade names, and was sentenced to pay a fine P200 and costs.
The information charges the commission of the alleged offense as follows:
That on or about and during the period included between the 4th and the 22d days of
September, 1913, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said J. Kyburz was a
merchant and the proprietor of the business known as the Manila Jewelry Store, engaged in
the sale of watches, among other things; that during the same period, and for a number of
years prior thereto in the said city of Manila, the commercial firm known by the name of
Greilsammer Hermanos, a partnership duly licensed to do business therein, was also
engaged in the sale of watches, including those known as Meridian watches, the trademark in the Philippine Islands for which was then and there owned and registered
exclusively by the said firm of Greilsammer Hermanos, under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, which trade-mark consisted of a sphere with the word Meridian in its center, applied
to the case and movements of the Meridian watches; and that during the aforesaid period,
in the said city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said J. Kyburz, with intent to defraud the
public and the said firm of Greilsammer Hermanos, owner of the above-described trademark, did then and there unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously use the word Meridian on cards
placed on in connection with his watches, for the purpose of selling the same as genuine
Meridian watches, at his place of business, the said Manila Jewelry Store and with the
intention of the making purchasers believe that the said watches thus offered for sale and
sold by the said J. Kyburz, were genuine Meridian watches when in truth and inn fact they
were watches of some other make, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
Greilsammer Hermanos. All contrary to law.
Greilsammer Hermanos is a regularly organized partnership engaged in the retail jewelry business
in Manila. Since the year 1903 it has imported from a manufacturing firm in Europe a certain class
of watches upon which after due inspection it engraves a trade-mark consisting of a sphere across
which runs a scroll bearing the word Meridian. The watches thus inspected and marked have been
advertised and put on sale in this country for several years under the trade name of Meridian
watches. The trade-mark above described was duly registered on or about December, 1908.

In this month of September, 1913, Kyburz, the defendant in this case was the owner of two retail
jewelry stores in Manila, located within about two minutes' walk of each other. He spent most of his
time in one of them known as EL Zenith, the other, known as the Manola Jewelry Store, being in
charge of a manager. The defendant admitted that he visited the Manila Jewelry Store several
times a week, and it would appear to have been at all times under his supervision and control.
During the month of September, 1913, a number of watches were displayed in a prominent place
in one of the show windows of the Manila Jewelry Store under a show card or placard (Exhibits B
and C) which reads as follows:
MERIDIAN
Ten
jewels
At P13.50. Before P16.50.

20

years

guaranty.

It appears that the watches thus put on the sale in the defendant's jewelry store purchased from
the same manufacturer in Europe from whom Greilsammer Hermanos purchased the watches
upon which they engraved their trade-mark and which they sold under the trade name of Meridian
watches. It would appear furthermore that these watches are substantially identical in quality and
design, and apparently are shipped by the manufacturer from one and the same stock.
The witness Wolfson purchased one of these watches from a clerk employed in the Manila
Jewelry Store, who issued to him a written guaranty in which this watch was described as a
Meridian sin marca (unmarked). This guaranty before the signature of both clerk who issued it and
the defendant, the owner of the store. It would appear, however, that the defendant signed the
guaranty in blank, leaving it to be filled out by the clerk at the time of the sale.
The defendant testifying in his own behalf, swore that the clerk was not instructed or authorized to
set forth in the guaranty that these watches were Meridian watches. The clerk himself, who
testified that he was not a watch-maker but that he had been working for the defendant for about
four months, said that he first discovered the identity of the Meridian watches with those sold by
the defendant upon an occasion he made a comparison of the two watches and satisfied himself
that they were of the same make in every respect. Upon cross-examination, he was unable to
describe the Meridian mark, and his testimony to the effect that he himself made the discovery as
to the identity of origin of these watches does not impress us favorably, and was not accepted as
true by the court below. Both the manager of the branch store and the defendant himself admitted
that they were aware of the identity in origin of the two watches, and the defendant went so far as
to say that when prospective purchasers asked him for a meridian watch he informed them that he
had the same watch but without the mark Meridian.
The first contention of counsel for appellant is that the trial court in holding Kyburz criminally
responsible for the acts of his employees in the Manila Jewelry Store in offering for sake and in
selling watches under the trade name of Meridian watches. It is urged that the trial court erred in
holding that Kyburz directed or authorized the action erred in holding that Kyburz directed or
authorized the action of his employees in the Manila Jewelry Store, in view of the positive denials
of that fact by both Kyburz and the clerk who made the sale above mentioned. After a careful
review of the whole record we find nothing which would justify us in holding that the trial court
erred in refusing to believe the testimony of these interested witnesses, and upon the whole record
we do not think that we would be justified in disturbing the finding of the trial judge that the offer to

sell and the sale of watches under the trade name of Meridian watches were made with the
knowledge and consent, if not by the express direction of the defendant.
While it is true that in cases of this kind the master cannot be held criminally responsible for the
acts of his employees unless they are done by his direction or with his consent, nevertheless,
there can be no question that he is amendable to the criminal law when he assents, either
expressly or impliedly, to the commission of the act, whether he is present or not.
The doctrine, supported by authority, is set forth as follows in 7 Labatt's Master and Servant,
section 2566: "So the master is criminally responsible if he causes the illegal act to be done, or
requests, commands, or permits it, or in any manner authorizes it, or aids and abets the servant in
its commission. He cannot, without rendering himself amenable to the criminal law, participate in
the offense, or have knowledge of it, or exercise any control over it, or in any manner assent to it,
whether he is present at the time the unlawful act is committed or not."
It is contended on various grounds that the trial court erred in holding that the facts as found by
him constituted a violation of the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 666.
Counsel insists that since defendant did not place the trade-mark or trade name on the watches
sold by him, he cannot be held liable for an infringement of the penal provisions of section 6 of the
Act, which prescribe that "any person who, with intent to defraud the public or the owner of a
trade-mark or trade name, shall use the trade-mark of another on his goods offered for sale, . . .
shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both, in the discretion of the court. . . ."
But this contention is manifestly untenable in view of the fact that the penal provisions of the
statute are extended also in express terms to one who uses the "trade name of another in his
business, occupation, or profession." Indeed one of the distinguishing characteristics of a trade
name is that, unlike trade-marks, they are not necessarily attached or affixed to the goods of the
owner.lawph!1.net
Section 5 of the Act provides that: "A trade name is the name, device, or mark by which is intended
to be distinguished from that of others the business, profession, trade, or occupation in which one
may be engaged and in which goods are manufactured or sold to the public, work is done for the
public, or professional services are rendered to the public. It is not essential that the trade name
should appear on the goods manufactured or dealt in by the person owning or using the same. It is
sufficient if the trade name is used by way of advertisements, signs over the place of business,
upon letter heads, and in other ways to furnish to the public a method of distinguishing the
business, trade, or occupation of the person owning and using such name. Property in trade
names shall be as fully protected as property in a trade-mark by the civil remedies provided in
section three of this Act for the protection of property in trade-marks."
Trade names have been frequently confused with trade-marks, and, broadly considered, they do
include names which may constitute trade-marks.
More accurately, however, trade names are names which are used in trade to designate a
particular business of certain individuals considered is located, or of a class of goods, but
which are not technical trade-marks either because not applied or affixed to goods sent into
the market, or because not capable of exclusive appropriation by anyone as trade-marks.

Such trade names may, or may not, be exclusive. Exclusive trade names are protected very
much upon the same principles are trade-marks, and the same rules that govern trademarks are applied in determining what may be an exclusive trade name. (38 Cyc., 764, and
cases there cited.)
It is further contended that the evidence does not disclose a violation of the penal provisions of
section 6 of the Act because it does not appear that the public was in fact deceived as to the
quality of the watches purchased form the defendant, the watches sold by the defendant and the
complaining company having been made by the same manufacturer, and being in fact of exactly
the same standard and quality. It is to be observed, however, that the statute penalizes the use of
trade-marks and trade names with intent to defraud either the public or the owner of such trademark or trade name.
Trade names are protected against use or imitation upon the ground of unfair competition, and an
examination of the statute clearly indicates its purpose to protect the manufacturer or dealer as
well as the public.
The rule which protects against unfair competition is primarily for the protection of the party
against whom such competition is directed, and only incidentally for the protection of the
public. In some of the case language is used which would suggest that the public is under
the protection of the court, but in fact the liability of the article to mislead the public from
being misled, except in so far as it is necessary to protect the owner of a business from its
fraudulent invasion by others. If what is done tends to mislead the public, it naturally diverts
customers from the complainant, to the injury of his business. The prohibition is upon so
acting as to beguile the public, and thus mislead an intending purchaser into buying the
goods of one person under the belief that he is buying those of a rival. (Paul on Trademarks, sec. 215.)
The same author in section 209 says that "the law of unfair competition rests upon the simple
principle that no person has the right to sell his own goods as those of another. In other words, the
basic rule is that no one shall, by imitation or any unfair device, induce the public to believe that
the goods he offers for sale are the goods of another, and thereby appropriate to himself the value
of the reputation which the other has acquired for his own products or merchandise."
We think that the following citation from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Menendez vs. Holt (128 U.S., 514), written by Chief Justice Fuller, quite clearly the
grounds upon which the decision of the court below must be sustained:
The fact that Holt & Co. were not the actual manufacturers of the flour upon which they had
for years placed the brand in question does not deprive them of the right to be protected in
the use of that brand as a trade-mark.
They used the words La Favorita to designate flour selected by them, in the exercise of
their best judgment as equal to a certain standard. The brand did not indicate by whom the
flour was manufactured but it did indicate the origin of its selection and classification. It was
equivalent to the signature of Holt & Co. to a certificate that the flour was the genuine article
which had been determined by them to possess a certain degree of excellence. It did not, of
course, in itself indicate quality, for it was merely a fancy name and in a foreign language,
but it evidenced that the skill, knowledge, and judgment of Holt & Co. had been exercised in

ascertaining that the particular flour so marked was possessed of a merit rendered definite
by their examination and of a uniformity rendered certain by their selection.
Greilsammer Hermanos import watches of a certain make and standard, stamp them with their
trade-mark, put them on the market under the trade name of Meridian watches, and have
advertised them and established a market for them. By so doing they give the public to understand
that watches known in Manila as Meridian watches are of a certain make, standard, and quality,
guaranteed by them. A sale of Meridian watches by them carries with it the guaranty that in their
best judgment it is equal to the standard thus established. They do not claim to be the
manufacturers of these watches, but every sale by them of a watch under the trace name thus
adopted and advertised implies that their skill and judgment, as watchmakers and jewelers, has
been exercised in ascertaining that this watch is up to the standard established for watches known
as Meridian watches.
Trade names are acquired by adoption and user, and belong to the one who first uses them and
gives them value. (Viano vs. Baccigalupo, 183 Mass., 160; Chardron Opera house Co. vs.
Loomer, 71 Neb., 785., Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. vs. Liebig Extract Co., 172 Fed., 158.) We
think that there can be no doubt that Greilsammer Hermanos have acquired the exclusive
ownership of the trade name Meridian as applied to this class of watches, and that they are clearly
entitled to protection from the use of this trade name by others, not only under the express
provisions of section 6 of the Act, but also upon the general grounds which afford protection
against unfair competition.
Of course, nothing that has been said should be construed as a holding that Greilsammer
Hermanos have ab exclusive right to sell watches of the make or standard of those on which they
engrave their trade-mark, and which are thereafter sold by them under the trade name of Meridian
watches. There is nothing in the record which would indicate that, by contract with the
manufacturer or otherwise, they have acquired any such exclusive right in and to this make of
watches or in and to their sale. We hold only that no person is entitled in these Islands to sell
watches, whether of the same make and quality as those of the defendant or of any other make
and quality, under the trade name of Meridian watches, which by adoption and user has become
the property of Greilsammer Hermanos. With the infinity of distinguishing names, marks and signs
which are subject to the use and appropriation of makers and dealers in watches, the use of the
trade name Meridian by any other firm than Greilsammer Hermanos can have but one reasonable
explanation, and that is the intent to take advantage of the favorable opinion formed by the public
of the quality and standard of the watches sold by that firm under the trade name adopted by it for
advertising purposes, and as a guaranty to the public that such watches have passed through its
hands and are up to the standard set by it for watches advertised and sold as Meridian watches.
We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The judgment entered
in the court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31380

January 13, 1930

E.
SPINNER
and
vs.
NEUSS HESSLEIN CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.
Benj.
S.
Ohnick
and
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

John

R.

COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant,

McFie,

jr.,

for

appellant.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 23, 1926, by E.
Spinner & Co., of Manchester, England, for the purpose of restraining the defendant, the Neuss
Hesslein Corporation, organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, from using the word
"Wigan," as applied to khaki textiles sold by the defendant in the Philippine Islands, and to recover
damages for violation of the plaintiff's trade-mark right in the word "Wigan" and for alleged unfair
competition committed by the defendant in the use of the same. Upon hearing the cause the trial
court absolved the defendant from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
appealed.
There is little or no dispute upon the determinative facts of the case which are subtantially these:
E. Spinner & Co. is a copartnership with head offices in Manchester, England, and Bombay, India,
being represented in the Philippine Islands by Wise & Co., a domestic corporation with principal
office in the City of Manila; while the defendant is a corporation organized in December, 1922,
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its principal office in the City of Manila. The
defendant is a subsidiary of Neuss Hesslein & Co., Inc., of New York, U. S. A., for whom it acts as
selling agent in the Philippine Islands. The plaintiff, E. Spinner & Co., has long been engaged in
the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics, including khaki cloth, with distributing business
connection in different parts of the world. Soon after the American occupation of the Philippine
Islands, or about 1900, the plaintiff began exporting its khaki into the Philippine Islands through
local firms, notable Holliday, Wise & Co., (now Wise & Co.), Smith, Bell & co., Ltd., and others.
Because of the superior qualities of its goods, such as the fastness of its color, the consistency of
its texture, and its proven durability, the plaintiff's khaki made favorable impression in the
Philippine market, enjoying a popular favor and preference which resulted in a lucrative trade.
Among the brands of khaki enjoying such favor was the grade indicated by the manufacturer as
"Wigan." A higher grade was marketed by the plaintiff under the brand "Stockport;" while still other
grades were put upon the market under the brands "Jackton" and "Ashford."
All of these different grades of khaki were marketed by the plaintiff under a common trade-mark,
which was first registered in the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks of the Philippine
Government in the year 1905. This trade-mark consists of a large label representing the profiles of
two elephant heads placed close to each other in the upper middle center of the label and looking
in opposite directions, with trunks extending respectively to the right and left. This device has for
its rectangular border a garland of leaves; while over the point of union between the two heads
appear several flags. Inside the space formed by the trunks of the elephants and the garland of
leaves appears a label consisting of the following words:
LEEMANN
ORIGINAL

&

GATTY'S

PATENTED
KHAKI DRILL
Agents:
Messrs.
MANCHESTER
Quality:................................Yds.

FAST

E.

SPINNER
&

&

CO.
BOMBAY

REGISTERED
No. 50,275.
This label was pasted on the outside of each bolt of khaki sold by the plaintiff, the different grades
being indicated by the words "Wigan," "Stockport," etc., inserted with stencil in the blank space
following the word "Quality." The trade-mark proper, as thus used, was a general mark covering
various brands. This practice was followed for more than twenty years, but the plaintiff learned in
1924 that the defendant, the Neuss Hesslein Corporation, was selling a brand of khaki in the
Philippine Islands with the word "Wigan" stenciled on the bolts below the defendant's own trademark. As thus employed by the defendant, the word "Wigan" purports to show the color of the
defendant's khaki, but the proof shows that the word was thus used by the defendant upon khaki
of different shades. After discovering this fact, the plaintiff, in April, 1925, caused its trade-mark,
consisting of the two elephant heads, to be again registered in the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry, as per certificate No. 4807. In its essential features, this trade-mark is identical with the
trade-mark registered by the plaintiff in 1905, but in the latter trade-mark the word "Wigan" is
inserted after the word "Quality." The purpose of this registration was of course to incorporate the
word "Wigan" as an integral part of the registered trade-mark.
As already stated, the defendant, the Neuss Hesslein Corporation, was organized in the Philippine
Islands in December, 1922, as subsidiary of Neuss Hesslein & Co., Inc., of New York; and
beginning with 1923, the defendant has been marketing khaki in the Philippine Islands for the New
York house. But before the organization of the defendant the New York house had, for several
years, been selling its khaki in the Philippine Islands, under two different brands. These were
known respectively as the "Five Soldiers" and the "Four Soldiers," the last named being also
known as the "Wide Awake" brand. The "Five Soldiers" trade-mark was registered in the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in 1916, and the "Four Soldiers" trade-mark in February, 1923. These two
grades of khaki are marketed at a much lower price than plaintiff's "Wigan," since it appears that
the plaintiff's "Wigan" is sold in the Philippine market by Wise & Co. for 71 centavos per yard, and
by other firms at 70 centavos a yard, while defendant's "Five Soldiers" sells at from 54 centavos to
55 centavos, and its "Four Soldiers" from 35 centavos to 40 centavos a yard.
After the defendant corporation had assumed the agency in the Philippine Islands for the products
of the New York house, the manger of the defendant, at the request of Chinese customers, began
to give orders to the New York house for the printing of the word "Wigan" conspicuously upon the
bolts of khaki intended for sale in Philippine Islands; and in the latter part of 1923 or in the early
part of the year 1924, the defendant's khaki began to be marketed here with the word "Wigan"
thereon.
It appears that the words "Wigan," "Stockport," "Jackton," and "Ashford," adopted by the plaintiff to
indicate different qualities of khaki, are the names of manufacturing towns of minor importance in
England; but the brand of khaki with which the defendant associates the name "Wigan" does not
appear to be manufactured in the town of Wigan. It also appears that the term "Wigan" is used in

commercial parlance as the name of a canvass-like cotton fabric used to stiffen parts of garments.
But it is clear that in adopting the word "Wigan" to indicate a brand of khaki, the plaintiff did not use
the word "Wigan" either in its geographical sense or in the trade sense of a material for stiffening.
The use made by the plaintiff of the term "Wigan" is therefore arbitrary and artificial, in that it
departs from any previously accepted sense.
It will be noted that the plaintiff uses the word "Wigan" to indicate quality, while the defendant
purports to use the term to indicate color, though the defendant's practice in this usage is
somewhat loose. There is some proof in the record tending to show that American dealers are
accustomed to use the word "Wigan" to indicate a color or certain shades of color of khaki cloth.
But it is evident that the plaintiff first adopted the word "Wigan" in connection with khaki cloth, and
this was done for the purpose of indicating quality. In this sense the word "Wigan" has
accompanied the plaintiff's khaki for years in the different markets of the world, and the term has
become associated in the minds of merchants who deal in this material with the standard of quality
maintained by the plaintiff in the "Wigan" brand.
This action involves a question of trade-mark right and a further question of unfair competition, and
the problem is to determine whether, upon the facts above stated, the defendant corporation has a
right to use the word "Wigan" on khaki sold by it in the Philippine Islands. The law governing trademark rights as well as unfair competition in this jurisdiction is found in Act No. 666 of the Philippine
Commission, which is a reduction to statutory form of the jurisprudence developed by the courts of
England and the United States in connection with the subjects mentioned; and to the summary of
substantive law expressed in the statute are added the provisions relative to the registration of
trade-marks. Act No. 666 has been from time to time amended, but none of the amendatory
provisions adopted prior to the beginning of this lawsuit have any bearing on the problem before
us.
Though the law concerning infringement of trade-marks and that concerning unfair competition
have a common conception at their root, which is that one person shall not be permitted to
misrepresent that his goods or his business are the goods or the business of another, the law
concerning unfair competition is broader and more inclusive. On the other hand, the law
concerning the infringement of trade-mark is of more limited range, but within its narrower range
recognizes a more exclusive right derived from the adoption and registration of the trade-mark by
the person whose goods or business are first associated therewith. One who has identified a
peculiar symbol or mark with his goods thereby acquires a property right in such symbol or mark,
and if another infringes the trade-mark he thereby invades this property right. Unfair competition
cannot be placed on the plane of invasion of property right. The tort is strictly one of fraud. It
results that the law of trade-marks is specialized subject distinct from the law of unfair competition,
though, as stated above, the two subjects are entwined with each other and are dealt with together
in Act No. 666. Inasmuch as the principles applicable to trade-marks were precisely defined at an
earlier date than the principles applicable to unfair competition, it is not surprising that confusion
should be found in the earlier decisions between the legal doctrines relating to the two subjects. Of
late years, however, the term "trade-mark" has been restricted to its proper technical meaning and
the term "unfair competition" is used to include wrongful acts of competition not involving any
violation of trade-mark right proper. As the tort of unfair competition is broader than the wrong
involved in the infringement of a trade-mark, one who fails to establish the exclusive property right
which is essential to the validity of a trade-mark, may yet frequently obtain relief on the ground of
his competitor's unfairness or fraud. Any conduct may be said to constitute unfair competition if the
effect is to pass off on the public the goods of one man as the goods of another. It is not necessary

that any particular means should be used to this end. The most usual devices are the simulation of
labels and the reproduction of the form, color and general appearance of the package used by the
pioneer manufacturer or dealer. But unfair competition is not limited to these forms. The general
principle underlying the law of unfair competition is that a competitor in business cannot be
permitted to do acts which have deceived, or are reasonably designed to deceive, the public into
buying his goods as those of another.
As stated in section 7 of Act No. 666, a person is guilty of unfair competition who "in selling his
goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either
in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in
any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that
the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer," etc. This language is very broad; and as applied to the case before us it is evident that, in
using the word "Wigan" on the khaki cloth sold by it, the defendant has appropriated a word likely
to lead purchasers to believe that the goods sold by the defendant are those of the plaintiff. The
representation that the khaki sold by the defendant is of the kind known to the trade as "Wigan"
directly tends to deceive the purchaser and, therefore, constitutes unfair competition as against
the plaintiff.
It is no doubt true that the adoption of the word "Wigan" by the defendant does not deceive
merchants or tailors buying from the defendant. But the person most to be considered in this
connection is the consumer, and when the word "Wigan" is found upon a bolt of khaki, the ultimate
buyer, or consumer, would naturally be led to suppose that the goods sold under this name is the
goods sold by the plaintiff. In the case before us it is revealed that the word "Wigan" was first
stamped upon the khaki sold by the defendant at the suggestion or request of a Chinese
customer, presumably a tailor or merchant, and the purpose behind the suggestion undoubtedly
was that, if this term were found stamped upon the khaki thus sold it could be represented to the
ultimate purchaser that the khaki thus sold was the plaintiff's "Wigan." In this connection it should
be noted that, in the action to enjoin unfair competition, the fraudulent intention on the part of the
defendant may be inferred from the similarity of the goods offered for sale by him to the goods of
the plaintiff (Act No. 666, sec. 7, end). In the case before us the use of the word "Wigan," stamped
by the defendant upon the bolts of khaki sold by it, sufficiently discloses an intention to mislead the
consumer. Moreover, as was observed by the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in
Barton vs. Rex-Oil Co., (40 A. L. R., 424), it makes no difference that dealers in the article are not
deceived. They are informed and usually know what they are buying. The law concerns itself with
the casual purchaser who knows the commodity only by its name. In obtaining what he asks for he
is entitled to protection against unfair dealing. (Citing National Biscuit Co. vs. Baker, 95 Fed., 135;
Eli Lilly & Co., vs. Wm. R. Warner & Co., 275 Fed., 752; William R. Warner & Co. vs. Eli Lilly &
Co., 265 U. S., 526.)
With respect to the question of infringement of trade-mark right, it is clear that the appropriation by
the defendant of the word "Wigan" for use in the sale of its khaki did not constitute a violation of
trade-mark prior to April, 1925, when the word "Wigan" was first incorporated in the plaintiff's
registered trade-mark; but after that date it was certainly illegal for the defendant to use the word
"Wigan" stamped upon the khaki sold by it; and this act was an infringement of trade-mark right. It
is true that the plaintiff's trade-mark proper consisted of a pictorial representation of the heads of
two elephants, embelished by leaves, and the word "Wigan" was only a part of said trade-mark.
Nevertheless, the misappropriation of this word by the competitor was a violation of the plaintiff's
right. It has been held in the Supreme Court of the United States that the use of only one of the

words constituting a trade-mark may be sufficient to constitute an infringement, and it is not

necessary to this end that all of the words comprising the trade-mark should be appropriated
(Saxlehner vs. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S., 20; 45 Law. ed., 60).
In section 2 of Act No. 666 it is declared that a designation or part of a designation which relates
only to the name, quality, or description of the merchandise, or geographical place of its production
or origin, cannot be made the subject of a trade-mark; and it seems to be supposed by the
defendant that this provision disables the plaintiff from complaining of the use made of the word
"Wigan" by the defendant. But it will be noted that the word "Wigan" as applied to quality, is not an
English word in common use for describing quality. The word "Wigan" is here used in an entirely
artificial sense and its association with quality had the origin exclusively in the use which the
plaintiff has made of it. The designation of name, quality, or description, as used in the statute, has
reference to linguistic terms in common use. In words of this character no particular manufacturer
can acquire an exclusive property right. Again, it will be noted that, although "Wigan," being the
name of a town, was an original geographical term, it is not used upon the plaintiff's khaki to
indicate the geographical place of production of the product. Even geographical terms can be used
in an arbitrary and artificial sense, and when so used by one manufacturer the improper
appropriation of the same term by another may be enjoined as an invasion of trade-mark right. Of
course, if the defendant were manufacturing its khaki in the town of "Wigan," it would be entitled to
use that name to indicate the place of manufacture of its goods. But such is not the case here.
From what has been said it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction for the purpose of
restraining the defendant from using the word "Wigan" upon the bolts of khaki sold by it, whether
the wrongful act of the defendant be considered as an act of unfair competition or as an
infringement of the trade-mark registered by the plaintiff in April, 1925. But the plaintiff further
seeks to recover damages in the estimated amount of P15,000 for the injury sustained by the
plaintiff. As in Forbes, Munn & Co., vs. Ang San To (43 Phil., 724), the provision in the complaint
referring to damages should, we think, be interpreted as a prayer for an assessment of the
compensation to which the plaintiff might be entitled for the damage done to its business. The
proof, however, shows that the plaintiff's business has shown a healthy growth during the period
covered by the wrongful acts which are the subject of this action, and it is not proved that any
assessable damage has been inflicted upon the plaintiff by the wrongful acts of the defendant,
though the infringement of legal right is clear. We are therefore of the opinion that no damages
should be awarded to the plaintiff. It will be noted that Act No. 666 gives the plaintiff a right to elect
between the recovery of damages for the harm done to the plaintiff's business and the
enforcement of an accounting against the defendant for the profits which may be shown to have
accrued to it by reason of the sales made in violation of the plaintiff's right. But these two remedies
are different and, where the plaintiff has elected to sue for damages and no damages are proved,
none can be awarded. This makes it unnecessary to analyze the proof with a view to discovering
the profits which the defendant may have earned by the illegitimate sales.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be modified, and the defendant and its agents will be
enjoined, as they are hereby enjoined, from using the word "Wigan" upon the khaki sold by it in the
Philippine Islands, and from otherwise representing its khaki to be of the "Wigan" brand. In
absolving the defendant from the claim for damages, the judgment will be affirmed. So ordered,
without costs.

Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order.

Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)
Facts:
This is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint of Lucia F. Layola,
dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional
Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sent the above-mentioned
affidavit-complaint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret.), of
the Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law. According
to the complainant the respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be held in the
custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any
legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for
murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion for
reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
The Office of the Court Administrator, after thorough examination of the evidence submitted
before it, found that the charges for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, bereft of merit but respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the OCA stressed that the important element of the offense, which is damage or injury to the
complainant, or manifest partiality shown to any party, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is
no allegation of any injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of
the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage given to the
adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in connection with the
denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the petition of
the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found
such a charge to be unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the
offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust

interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree

through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order
knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
1. x x x
2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. is liable for issuance of unjust
interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code notwithstanding the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the same be dismissed for lack of
merit?
Decision:
The Supreme Court sustained the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator,
thus:
It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to
law or unsupported by the evidence, and that the same was rendered with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold
respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the
Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence
does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to convict. Here, the
allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be
pronounced guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction
can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.

G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18

October 31, 1960

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
YARD CREW UNION, STATION EMPLOYEES UNION, RAILROAD ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT UNION, MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
MANILA
RAILROAD
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, MANILA RAILROAD CREW UNION, STATION
EMPLOYEES UNION and KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, respondents.
L-16292-94.
Jose
Espinas
for
petitioner.
F.A.
Sambajon
for
respondent
CIR.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and F.A. Umali for respondent MRR.
Carlos
E.
Santiago
for
respondent
Unions.
F. Da. Bondoc for respondents (REDU).
L-16309
and
L-16217-18.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and F.A. Umali for petitioner.
V.C.
Magbanua
for
respondent
CIR.
F.
Da.
Bondoc
for
respondent
(REDU).
Jose
R.
Espinas
for
respondent
Kap.
Ng
Manggagawa
sa
MRR.
Carlos C. Santiago for the other respondent Unions.
PAREDES, J.:
In the Court of Industrial Relations, three separate petitions were registered: Case No. 491-MC, by
Yard Crew Union, Case No. 494-MC, by Station Employees' Union; and Case No. 507-MC, by
Railroad Engineering Department Union. The Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila
Railroad Company, intervened. They were treated jointly by the respondent Court because they
involved identical questions. On appeal, three separate petitions for certiorari were presented by
the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company (G.R. Nos. L-16292-94) and
three separate petitions for certiorari by the Manila Railroad Company (G.R. No. L-16309, L-16317
and L-16318.).
We glean from the record the following facts:
On March 7, 1955, the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company, hereinafter
called Kapisanan, filed a petition (Case No. 237-MC), praying that it be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company, hereinafter called Company. A decision was
promulgated on September 29, 1956, affirmed by the Court en banc on January 16, 1957, in which
the respondent Court found three unions appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, to wit:
(1) The unit of locomotive drivers, firemen, assistant firemen and motormen-otherwise known as
the engine crew unit: (2) the unit of conductors, assistant conductors, unit agents, assistant route
agents and train posters, otherwise known as the train crew unit, and (3) the unit of all the rest of

the company personnel, except the supervisors, temporary employees, the members of the
Auditing Department, the members of the security guard and professional and technical
employees, referred to by the respondent court as the unit of the rest of the employees. To these 3
units, the following unions were respectively certified as the exclusive bargaining agents: (1) The
Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudantes y Motormen; (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes
(conductors); and (3) the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company.
After the decision had become final, Case No. 491-MC was filled on September 20, 1957,
amended on August 13, 1958, by the Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union, praying that it be defined
as a separate unit; Case No. 494-MC, on September 25, 1957, amended on August 13, 1958, by
the Station Employees' Union, praying that it be constituted as a separate bargaining unit, and
Case No. 507- MC, on November 30, 1957, by the Railroad Engineering Department Union,
praying that it be defined as a separate bargaining unit. All asked that they be certified in the units
sought to be separated. The respondent unions are legitimate labor organizations with certificates
of registration in the Department of Labor.
The Kapisanan and the Company opposed the separation of the said three units on the following
grounds:
(1) That the Kapisanan had been duly certified as the collective bargaining agent in the unit of all
of the rest of the employees and it had entered into a collective bargaining agreement on
November 4, 1957, and this agreement bars certification of a unit at least during the first 12
months after the finality of Case No. 237-MC (contract bar rule).
(2) That the Court had denied similar petitions for separation of unit as was ordered in Case No.
488-MC, wherein the petition for the separation of Mechanical Department Labor Union was
dismissed by the respondent Court on April 25, 1958 and in the case of the Benguet Auto Lines
Union, Case No. 4-MC-PANG) dismissed on July 18, 1958.
(3) That the three unions in question are barred from petitioning for separate units because they
are bound by the decision in Case No. 237-MC, for having been represented therein by the
Kapisanan.
After due hearing, the respondent Court, through the Hon. Arsenio Martinez, Associate Judge,
handed down an order, dated June 8, 1959, the dispositive portion of which recites as follows:
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, and without passing upon the basic questions
raised herein and as part of its fact finding investigations, the Court orders a plebiscite to be
conducted among the employees in the three proposed groups, namely: the Engineering
Department, the Station Employees and the Yard Crew Personnel. The employee in the
proposed groups minus the supervisors, temporary employees, members of the Auditing
Department, members of the security group, professionals and technical employees, shall
vote, in a secret ballot to be conducted by this Court, on the question of whether or not they
desire to be separated from the unit of the rest of the employees being represented by the
Kapisanan. In this connection, the Court requests the cooperation of the Manila Railroad
Company to extend its facilities for the holding of this plebiscite, particularly the payrolls for
the month to be agreed upon by the parties. . . .

The respondent Court also declared that the collective bargaining agreement could not be a bar to
another certification election because one of its signatories, the Kapisanan President, Vicente K.
Olazo, was a supervisor:
In considering however such existing contract between the Kapisanan and the Company,
the Court cannot close its eyes and fail to observe that among the signatories thereto, on
the part of the Kapisanan, is the President of the Union, Vicente K. Olazo.
In case No. 237-MC. one of the important and fundamental questions raised was whether
or not Vicente K. Olazo is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(k) of Republic Act
875. The Trial Court, as well as the majority of the Court en banc, reached the conclusion in
same Case No. 237-MC that he is a supervisor.
. . . For this reason, the Court believes that his existing contract, through embodying terms
and conditions of employment and with a reasonable period to run, would not be a bar to a
certification proceeding.
A motion for reconsideration of the order of June 8, 1959, was presented by the Kapisanan, and
same was denied on August 20, 1959, in an order, concurred in by three Judges of the Court, with
two Judges dissenting, against which the Kapisanan on November 28, 1959, filed its notice of
appeal. Appeals by certiorari were filed by the Kapisanan and the Company. In this Court,
respondents presented motion to dismiss the petitions, on the ground that the order of the
respondent court on June 8, 1959 and the resolution of the respondent court en bancdated August
20, 1959, to hold a plebiscite, were interlocutory, not subject to appeal. They also allege the same
in their answers, as one of the defenses. The case, therefore, poses three questions, to wit:
1. Are the appealed orders interlocutory in nature?
2. Is the order of the respondent court, granting groups of employees to choose whether or not
they desire to be separated from the certified unit to which they belong, during the existence of a
valid bargaining contract entered into by a union close to the heels of its certification, contrary to
law?
3. Is it legal error for the respondent court to hold that the bargaining agreement in question does
not bar certification proceedings, only because one of the signatories for the union was adjudged
by the majority of such court to be supervisor, in a previous case?
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, and without passing upon the basic question
raised herein and as part of its fact finding investigation, the Court orders a plebiscite to be
conducted among the employees in the three proposed groups, namely: the Engineering
Department, the Station Employees and the Yard Crew Personnel.
The resolution en banc, dated August 20, 1959, partially states:
It will be further noted that it is just a part of the investigatory power of the Court to
determine by secret ballot the desire of the employees concerned. What has been ordered
is merely a plebiscite and not the certification election itself. . . . Proceedings may still
continue and an order whether denying the petition or not would necessarily ensue. In a

word, something else has to be done within the premises and the order does not deny or
grant petition in the above entitled case.
In the case of Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., G.R. No. L-10321,
February 28, 1958, we stated that because of the modern complexity of the relation between both
employer and union structure, it becomes difficult to determine from the evidence alone which of
the several claimant groups forms a proper bargaining unit; that it becomes necessary to give
consideration to the express will or desire of the employees a practice designated as the "Globe
doctrine," which sanctions the holding of a series of elections, not for the purpose of allowing the
group receiving an over all majority of votes to represent all employees, but for the specific
purpose of permitting the employees in each of the several categories to select the group which
each chooses as a bargaining unit; that the factors which may be considered and weighed in fixing
appropriate units are: the history, of their collective bargaining; the history, extent and type of
organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same
industry; the skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees; the desires of the
employees; the eligibility of the employees for membership in the union or unions involved; and
the relationship between the unit or units proposed and the employer's organization, management
and operation, and the test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit must effect
a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
It is manifest, therefore, that "the desires of the employees" is one of the factors in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit. The respondent Court was simply interested "in the verification of the
evidence already placed on record and submitted wherein the workers have signed manifestations
and resolutions of their desire to be separated from Kapisanan." Certainly, no one would deny the
respondent court's right of full investigation in arriving at a correct and conclusive finding of fact in
order to deny or grant the conclusive findings of fact in order to deny or grant the petitions for
certification election. On the contrary, all respondent court, or any court for that matter, to
investigate before acting, to do justice to the parties concerned. And one way of determining the
will or desire of the employees is what the respondent court had suggested: a plebiscite carried
by secret ballot. A plebiscite not to be conducted by the Department of Labor, as contemplated in a
certification election under Sec. 12 of the Magna Charter of Labor, R.A. No. 875, but by the
respondent court itself. As well as observed by the respondent court, "the votes of workers one
way or the other, in these cases will not by any chance choose the agent or unit which will
represent them anew, for precisely that is a matter that is within the issues raised in these petitions
for certification".
The test in determining whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is "Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final" (Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., Vol. I,
p. 41). Having in view the avowed purpose of the orders in question, as heretofore exposed, one
should not stretch his imagination far to see that they are clearly interlocutory, as they leave
something more to be done in the trial court and do not decide one way or the other the petitions
of the respondent unions. We are, therefore, constrained to hold, as we do hereby hold, that the
present appeals or petitions for review by certiorari, are not authorized by law and should be
dismissed (Section 2, Rule 44, Rules of Court). There is, moreover, nothing, under the facts
obtaining in these cases and the law on the subject, which would warrant this Court to declare the
orders under consideration, illegal.

The herein petitioners contend that the collective bargaining agreement, executed on November 4,
1957 (Case No. 237-MC), is a bar to the certification proceedings under consideration. The
respondents counter that it is not so, because one of the signatories in the said agreement for the
Kapisanan, Vicente K. Olazo, was found to be a supervisor under section 2(k) R.A. 875,
in Kapisanan, etc. vs. CIR, etc., 106 Phil., 607; 57 Off. Gaz. (2) 254. Having, however, reached the
conclusion that the orders in question are not appealable and that the respondent court has not as
yet decided on whether the said collective bargaining agreement is a bar or not to the petitions for
separate units and for certification election, which could properly be determined after the result of
the plebiscite shall have been known by the respondent court, the consideration of this issue is
premature.
In view hereof, the petitions or appeals for review by certiorari are dismissed, without costs.