Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Gobonseng, Jr.

G.R. No. 163562

July 21, 2006
Facts:
On January 5, 1982, Julio Tan Pastor, original owner of Lot No. 853-A, sold it to the respondent for
P1.3M. However, the amount indicated in the Deed of Absolute was only P13,000.00. On the same date, the
parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement in order to reflect their real intention.
Respondent succeeded in registering the conveying instrument with the Registry of Deeds. In the
meantime, Tan Pastor presented for encashment the postdated checks issued to him by respondent as payment
for the subject lot. Unfortunately, the drawee bank dishonored those checks for insufficient funds, stop payment
order, or closed account. Subsequently, Tan Pastor filed a criminal case for violation of Bouncing Checks Law.
Prior to the sale of the lot, Tan Pastor had been operating gas stations. Pilipinas Shell succeeded all the
previous gas stations previously owned by Tan Pastor. He remained as the distributor of Pilipinas Shell products
and continued to operate the gas station on the subject matter of the contract.
Respondent sent demand letters to Pilipinas Shell for payment by the latter of rentals for its occupancy
and use of his property. Pilipinas Shell answered that it was a dealer-owned filling station, thus, the liability
must be upon Tan Pastor. On January 30, 1992, the parties and Pilipinas Shell executed an agreement for peace
and humanitarian with some conditions, one of which is that all the parties have no more further claims against
each other, and waived, abandoned, relinquished, any such claim or claims
Therafter, Tan Pastor executed and filed an affidavit of Desistance of the Criminal Case he filed, which
was eventually dismissed. Subsequently, Respondent filed a civil suit for collection of rentals and damages
against Tan Pastor and Pilipinas Shell.
In its answer, Pilipinas Shell countered that respondents claim for unpaid rentals had no basis because
the gas station on his property is a dealer-owned filling station as evidenced by a certification. Also, Pilipinas
Shell averred that the parties agreed that they have no more claims against each other.
The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Pilipinas Shell. However, it was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the decision of the CA in upholding ownership by Respondent of Lot 853-A is in accordance
with Article 1496 considering there was no delivery yet.
Whether or not the decision of the CA making the Petitioner liable for the payment of rentals is with basis.
Held:
A contract of sale is not a real, but a consensual contract. As such, it becomes valid and binding upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object and price. If there is a meeting of the minds, the contract is
valid despite the manner of payment, or even if the manner of payment was breached. It is not the act of
payment of the price that determines the validity of the contract of sale. Payment of the price goes into the
performance of the contract and not to its perfection. In the present case, with regards to the manner of payment
or the breach thereof does not vitiate the contract.
The gas station in the case is a dealer-owned filling station as evidenced by a certificate issued by it
company. Thus, the collection must be against the owner, which is Tan Pastor. However, in parties and Pilipinas
Shells subsequent agreement, they have no more claims against each other. Thus, respondent is barred by
estoppel.

Cantemprate vs. CRS Realty Development Corporation

G.R. No. 171399
May 8, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners bought on an installment basis subdivision lots from respondent CRS Realty and had paid in
full the agreed purchase prices; but notwithstanding the full payment and despite demands, respondents failed
and refused to deliver the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners.
They alleged that respondent Casal was the owner of a parcel of land situated in General Mariano
Alvarez, Cavite known as the CRS Farm Estate while respondent Salvador was the president of respondent CRS
Realty, the developer of CRS Farm Estate.
Petitioners averred that respondents failed to deliver the titles to their respective properties. Casal
averred that despite his willingness to deliver them, petitioners refused to accept the certificates of title with
notice of lis pendens covering the subdivision lots. Respondent Salvador alleged that the failure by respondent
Casal to comply with his obligation under the first agreement to deliver to CRS or the buyers the certificates of
title was caused by the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title covering the subdivision
property.
HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino declared that the regular courts and not the HLURB had
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint, thus, the complaint for quieting of title could not be given due course.
The Heirs of Laudiza and Ligon were dropped as parties on the ground of lack of cause of action.
However, she found respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador liable on their obligation to deliver the
certificates of title of the subdivision lots to petitioners who had paid in full the purchase price of the properties.
She also found as fraudulent and consequently nullified the subsequent transfer of a portion of the subdivision
to respondents Ang and Cuason.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the absence of a license to sell has rendered the sales void.
Whether or not the subsequent sale to respondent Cuason and Ang constitutes double sale.
Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint.
Held:
The only requisite for a contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law is the meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and the price, including the manner the price is to be paid by the
vendee. The absence of the license to sell does not affect the validity of the already perfected contract of sale
between petitioners and respondent CRS Realty. In the instant case, the failure by respondent CRS Realty to
obtain a license to sell the subdivision lot does not render the sale void on the ground alone.
There is no double sale as the petitioners have a better right than the subsequent buyer.
The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for specific performance to compel
respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador as subdivision owners and developers to deliver to petitioners the
certificates of title after full payment of the subdivision lots. On this score, the Court affirms the findings of
HLURB Arbiter Aquino with respect to the obligation of respondents Casal, Salvador and CRS Realty to deliver
the certificates of title of the subdivision to petitioners pursuant to their respective contracts to sell. As regards
petitioners prayer to declare them the absolute owners of the subdivision lots, the HLURB had no jurisdiction
to declare petitioners as absolute owners of the subdivision lots as against the Heirs of Laudiza who filed an
action for reconveyance against respondent Casal, which is still pending before the RTC.

Gaite vs. Fonacier

G.R. No. L-11827
July 31, 1961
Facts:
Defendant-appellant Fonacier was the owner/holder of 11 iron lode mineral claims, known as the
Dawahan Group, situated in Camarines Norte. By Deed of Assignment, Respondent appointed plaintiffappellee Gaite as attorney-in-fact to enter into contract for the exploration and development of the said mining
claims on. On March 1954, petitioner executed a general assignment conveying the claims into the Larap Iron
Mines, which owned solely and belong to him. Thereafter, he underwent development and the exploitation for
the mining claims, which he estimates to be approximately 24 metric tons of iron ore.
However, Fonacier decide to revoke the authority given to Gaite, whereas respondent assented subject to
certain conditions. Consequently a revocation of Power of Attorney and Contract was executed transferring
P20k plus royalties from the mining claims, all rights and interest on the road. Furthermore, included in the
transfer was the rights and interest over the 24K+ tons of iron ore that had been extracted. Lastly the balance of
P65K was to be paid for covering the first shipment of iron ores.
To secure the payment of P65k, respondent executed a surety bond with himself as principal, the Larap
Mines and Smelting Co. and its stockholder as sureties. Yet this was refused by petitioner. Appellee further
required another bond underwritten by a bonding company to secure the payment of the balance. Hence a
second bond was produced with Far Eastern Surety as an additional surety, provided the liability of Far Eastern
would only prosper when there had been an actual sale of the iron ores of not less than the agreed amount of
P65k, moreover, its liability was to automatically expire on December 1955.
On December 1955, the second bond had expired and no sale amounting to the stipulation as prior
agreed nor had the balance been paid to petitioner by respondent. Thus, such failure prompted petitioner to file a
complaint in the CFI of Manila for the payment of the balance and other damages. The Trial Court ruled in
favor of plaintiff ordering defendant to pay the balance of P65k with interest.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Lower Court erred in holding that the obligation of appellant Fonacier to pay appelle
Gaite the balance of P65k, as one with a period or term and not one with a suspensive condition, and that the
term expired on December 8, 1955; and
Whether or not the Lower Court erred in not holding that there were only 10,954.5 tons in the stockpiles of
iron ore sold by appellee Gaite to appellant Fonacier.
Held:
In onerous contracts the rules of interpretation favor the greater reciprocity of interest and because sale
is onerous this rule applies. Greater reciprocity is obtained if the buyers obligation to pay is deemed existing
compared to such obligation non-existing until the ore was sold. The contract expresses no contingency in the
buyers obligation to pay. The contract recognizes the existence of an obligation to pay and only the maturity is
deferred. Under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1198 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 1198 . The debtor
shall lose every right to make use of the period. Appellants' failure to renew or extend the surety company's
bond upon its expiration plainly impaired the securities given to the creditor unless immediately renewed or
replaced.
This is a case of a sale of a specific mass of fungible goods. The quantity of 24,000 tons of iron ore,
more or less, is a mere estimate by the parties. A reasonable percentage of error may be allowed because
neither of the parties had actually measured the mass. No provision was made in their contract for the

measuring or weighing of the ore sold in order to complete or perfect the sale, nor was the price agreed upon by
the parties based upon any such measurement.
Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126376
November 20, 2003
Facts:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion,
Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino,
all surnamed Joaquin.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding
certificates of title issued in their names. They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio
because they are simulated.
They said that: a.) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the
properties in litis; b.) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned
deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein; c.)
Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties; and d.) Fourthly, the purported
sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs (petitioners) of their legitime.
Defendants, on the other hand aver a.) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them as well
as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; b.) that the sales were with
sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of
the consequences of their deeds of sale; and c.) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual
and legal basis.
RTC ruled in favor of the defendants (respondent) and dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA
upheld RTCs ruling.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conveyance in question had no valid consideration; and
Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that even assuming that there was a consideration, the same is
grossly inadequate.
Held:
If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the
manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract,
then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as
to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of
the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void. Petitioners failure to
prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings
financial capacity to buy the questioned lots. On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented
as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the purchase
price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent
siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent father.
Under Article 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code, gross inadequacy cannot invalidate a contract unless it
was employed with fraud, mistake or undue influence. Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned

in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed,
there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the
respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave.
United Muslim and Christian Urban Poor Association, Inc. vs. BRYC-V Development Corporation
G.R. No. 179653
July 31, 2009
Facts:
Sometime in 1991, petitioner United Muslim and Christian Urban Poor Association, Inc. (UMCUPAI),
an organization of squatters occupying Lot No. 300, through its President, Carmen T. Diola, initiated
negotiations with SFC for the purchase thereof. UMCUPAI expressed its intention to buy the subject property
using the proceeds of its pending loan application with National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMF).
Thereafter, the parties executed a Letter of Intent to Sell by SFC and Letter of Intent to Purchase by UMCUPAI.
However, the intended sale was derailed due to UMCUPAIs inability to secure the loan from NHMF as
not all its members occupying Lot No. 300 were willing to join the undertaking. Intent on buying the subject
property, UMCUPAI, in a series of conferences with SFC, proposed the subdivision of Lot No. 300 to allow the
squatter-occupants to purchase a smaller portion thereof. The lot was subdivide into 3 namely: Lot No. 300-A,
Lot No.300-B, and Lot No. 300-C.
UMCUPAI purchased Lot No. 300-A. Lot No. 300-B was constituted as right of way and donated by
SFC to the local government. UMCUPAI failed to acquire Lot No 300-C for lack of funds. They negotiated with
SFC and was given three moths to purchase said lot. Still, UMCUPAI failed to purchase the lot within three
months. It was then sold to BRYC-V Development Corporation.
A year later, UMCUPAI filed with the RTC a complaint against respondents of SFC and BRYC seeking
to annul the sale of Lot No. 300-C, and the cancellation of TCT No. T-121,523. UMCUPAI alleged that the sale
between the respondents violated its valid and subsisting agreement with SFC embodied in the Letter of Intent.
According to UMCUPAI, the Letter of Intent granted it a better, prior, and preferred right over BRYC in the
purchase of Lot No. 300-C.
In a separate answer, SFC countered that the Letter of Intent dated October 4, 1991 is not, and cannot be
considered, a valid and subsisting contract of sale. After trial, the RTC dismissed UMCUPAIs complaint.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Letter of Intent to Sell and Letter of Intent to Buy a bilateral reciprocal Contract within
the meaning or contemplation of Article 1479, first paragraph, Civil Code of the Philippines.
Held:
In the instant case, however, the parties executed a Letter of Intent, which is neither a contract to sell nor
a conditional contract of sale. As found by the RTC, and upheld by the CA, the Letter of Intent was executed to
accommodate UMCUPAI and facilitate its loan application with NHMF. Nowhere in the Letter of Inter does its
state that SFC relinquishes its title over the subject property, subject only to the condition of complete payment
of the purchase price; nor, at the least, that SFC, although expressly retaining owner ship thereof, binds itself to
sell the property exclusively to UMCUPAI.
The Letter of Intent to Buy and Sell is just a manifestation to acquire the same. The Letter of Intent
between SFC and UMCUPAI is merely a written preliminary understanding of the parties wherein they declare
their intention to enter into a contract of sale
Neither can the Letter of Intent be considered a bilateral reciprocal contract to sell and to buy
contemplated under Article 1479 of the Civil Code which is reciprocally demandable. The Letter of Intent does

not contain a promise to sell and to buy subject property. There was no promise or commitment on the part of
SFC to sell subject land, but merely a declaration of its intention to buy the land, subject to the condition that
UMCUPAI could raise the necessary funds to acquire the same at the price of P105.00 per square meter.
Silverio vs. Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 19, 2007
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio (Petitioner) filed a petition for the change of
his name and sex appearing in his birth certificate to reflect the result of sex reassignment surgery in the RTC of
Manila.
Petitioner stated in his petition that his name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio) and his
sex as male in his birth certificate. However, he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
consulted various doctors in the US, and underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, and breast
augmentation.
Dated January 27 2001, petitioner underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
Thereafter, he was examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., who issued a medical certificate attesting that
he had undergone such surgery. He then sought to have his name changed to Mely and his sex to Female.
Petitioner testified himself together with Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American Fianc, Richard P. Edel
as witnesses during the trial of the case. On June 24, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner ruling that the petition do not evade any law or judgment but for making petitioners birth records
compatible with his present sex, it would be more consonance with the principles of justice and equity, no
prejudice will be caused to the community, and there was no ground to deny the petition.
However, on August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Respondent) thru OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that no law in our jurisdiction allows the change of records in the
birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Respondent and set aside the decision of the
trial court. Subsequently, petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue(s):
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief (change of name and sex in his birth certificate) asked for?
Held:
A Persons first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment
The state has an interest in the names of persons and entities for purposes of identification. A change of
name is a privilege, not a right. RA 9048 does not allow change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment
as it was not mentioned on the grounds provided by Section 4, RA 9048.
The remedy and the proceedings governing change of first name are primarily administrative in nature
and not judicial. Trial court has no jurisdiction to the present petition filed as it should have been filed with the
local civil registrar. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative provided in RA
9048.
Furthermore, change of first name would lead to confusion, may create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment

RA 9048 removed from Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors. It now applies to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil registry. A change of sex is a substantial change and
can no way be considered as an error.
The entries correctable under Rule 108 are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
However, it does not cover the ground of sex reassignment.
The birth certificate of petitioner has no error contained therein. All entries particularly his first name
and sex were correct. Thus, no correction is needed.
Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity
The changes prayed for by the petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, to allow the petition, which was the petitioners first step towards his marriage to his
fianc, would greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
Second, there are certain laws which apply particularly to woman such as employment under Labor
Code, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, and presumption of survivorship under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court. If petitioners petition were to be granted, these laws underscore public policy will substantially
be affected.
Separation of Powers
It is true that under Article 9 of the Civil Code no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity, and insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. It is for the courts to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. One the other hand,
it is for the duty of the legislature to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines are imperative as the claims asserted are statute-based.
If the legislature allows the privilege to change the petitioners name and sex to be compatible with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact a law providing guidelines governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be
possible for the court to write a protocol for the recognition of his changed sex. However, this court has no
authority to enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of the Congress.

Sema vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597
July 16, 2008
Facts:
An ordinance added to the 1987 Constitution divided two legislative districts for the province of
Maguindanao. Cotobato City and eight municipalities composed the first legislative district. Maguindanao was
part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Minadanao. Although, Cotobato City is part of Maguindanao, under
the ordinance, it is not part of ARMM but of Region XII.
Dated August 28, 2006, The ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its authority to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 enacted MMA Act 201 establishing the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composing the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Thus, the second legislative district with its municipalities composed the Province of Maguindanao.
Cotobato City although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not included in the Province of
Maguindanao. Subsequently, a plebiscite ratifying Shariff Kabunsuans creation was held on October 26, 2006.
Resolution No. 3999 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Cotobato City on February 6, 2007,
asking the COMELEC (Respondent) to clarify the status of Cotobato City in view of the conversion of the first
district of Maguindanao into a regular province. In its answer, Resolution No. 07-0407 was issued by the
COLEC maintaining the status quo with Cotobato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the legislative district
of Maguindanao.
However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming
the legislative district in question as Sharriff Kabunsuan Province with Cotobato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotobato City).
In the case at bench, Sema (Petitioner), running as Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotobato
City, asked for the nullification of of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the
votes cast in Cotobato City. She contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issue(s):
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
If in affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201
pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the the House of
Representative without need of a national law creating legislative district for such province.
Whether Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first district of Maguindanao
despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district.
Held:
Constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
The court ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 in giving the ARMM the authority to create
provinces and cities, is void and unconstitutional as it is contrary to Section 5 of Article V1. The allowable
membership of the House of representative can be increase and new legislative district can be created, only
through a national law enacted by the Congress alone. An inferior legislative body created by the superior

legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body and cannot create legislative
districts for the Congress.
Furthermore, nothing in Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution authorizes ARMM to create and
reapportion legislative districts for Congress. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to operate outside the
ARMMs jurisdiction would violate Section 20, Article X of the Constitution limiting the coverage of the
Regional Assemblys power within its territorial jurisdiction. As well as it would violate Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The power to create provinces and cities with the creation of legislative district is vested only to
Congress under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution intended that every province shall have a legislative district.
Constitutionality of Muslim Minadanao Act 201
The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating national office like the office of the district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only
within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, the court rules
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.
Compliance of Resolution No. 7902 with the Constitution
The Comelec Resolution No. 7902 in preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First
District of Maguindanao with Cotobato City, is valid and constitutional as it complies with Section 5, Article VI
and Section 20, Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. No. 167324
July 17, 2007
Facts:
Dated year 1999, HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group, was
introduced by the DOH. The reform provided five general areas, one of which is to provide fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals, meaning they are allowed to collect socialized user fees.
Petitioners challenged said reform agenda in view of the collection of socialized user fees. Moreover,
they assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH and Administrative Order No. 172,
for putting more burden to Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services.
Furthermore, with regards to petitioners allegation, the HSRA is void for violating Section 5, 9, 10, 11,
13, 15, and 18 of Article 2, Section 1 of Article 3, Sections 11 and 14 of Article 13, and Sections 1 and 3 of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, for making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to the
poor.
On May 24, 1999, former President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Thus, the DOH adjusted its control to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, which resulted for the implementation of
RSP by the DOH and the deployment of DOH personnel.
Executive Order No. 102 was made under Section 17 of the Local Government Code for the devolution
to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related functions and
responsibilities.
However, Petitioners alleged that Executive Order No. 102 is void for being issued by the President.
They claim that it should be enacted by the Legislative Branch in its authority to make such order. Furthermore,
they contended that the RSP was implemented before the DBM approved it and that the President should have
issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but it failed to do so.
Also, other Petitioners challenged the validity of Executive Order No. 102 for the reason that they will
lose their jobs, and that some will experience inconvenience of having to travel to their new work place.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. However, Petitioners moved for Reconsideration but was
denied in a Resolution dated March 7, 2005.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the CA committed an error in ruling that any question on the wisdom and efficacy of the
Health Sector Reform Agenda is not a justiciable controversy and that the constitutional provisions
protecting the health of the Filipino people are not judicially enforceable;
Whether or not the CA committed an error in ruling that the Petitioners complaint that Executive Order No.
102 is detrimental to the Filipino is not a justiciable controversy and that the President has the authority to
issue the order; and

 Whether or not the CA committed an error in upholding technicalities over and above the issues of
transcendental importance raised in the petition.
HELD:
Some provisions have been declared by the Court as non self-executing
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing and do not necessitate
future legislation for their enforcement. If they are not considered as self-executing, the Congress can nullify
their effects. However, some provisions of the Constitution were declared as non self-executing.
Sections under Article 2 are non self-executing as it was a declaration of principles and state policies.
They are to be use as guides in the exercise of judicial review and by the legislature in its enactment. Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article 2, Sections 13 of Article 13, and Section 2 of Article 14 are likewise considered as nonself executing and cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts and they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights. Moreover Sections 11 and 14 of Article 13 and Section 1 and 3 of Article 15
are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments.
Thus, the HSRA remains valid and cannot be invalidated based on the mere allegations of petitioners
that it violates general principle which are non self-executing.
Validity of the Order issued by the President instead by the Congress
The law grants the President the authority to reorganize the office of the President in view of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office and agencies under it.
Thus, the DOH is an agency under the control of the President by which the President has the authority
to reorganize. It is clear that Executive Order No. 102 is within the realm of the constitutional power of the
President to issue. It is an exercise of the Presidents power supported by Section 17 of Article 7 and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Substantial interest shall allow a party to question the validity of the law
Substantial interest needs that the petitioners sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of Executive Order No. 102. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future interest. Thus,
Constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where the petitioners
substantive claim is without merit. However, the Court finds that the petitioners failed to show any merit to their
claim.