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Title Three

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER


Chapter One. REBELLION, COUP D ETAT, SEDITION
AND DISLOYALTY
Article
committed
Article
Article
coup
Article
coup d
Article
employees
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

134.

Chapter Six. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

Rebellion or insurrection how

134-A. Coup d etat how committed


135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or
d etat
136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit
etat, rebellion or insurrection
137. Disloyalty of public officers or
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

publication and
unlawful utterances
Article 155. Alarms and scandals
Article 156. Delivering prisoners from jail

Inciting to rebellion or sedition


Sedition how committed
Penalty for sedition
Conspiracy to commit sedition
Inciting to sedition

the

occasion
of
disorders,
conflagrations,
earthquakes
or
other
calamities
Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of
Sentence
Chapter Seven. COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME
DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
Article 160. Quasi- recidivism

Chapter Two. CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR


REPRESENTATION
Section One Crimes against legislative bodies
and
similar bodies
Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting
of the
Assembly and similar bodies
Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings
Section Two Violation of parliamentary immunity
Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity
Chapter Three.
ASSOCIATIONS

ILLEGAL

ASSEMBLIES

Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence


Article 158. Evasion of service of sentence on

Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection


how committed
Elements:
1.
2.

There is a public uprising and taking


arms against the government;
The purpose of the uprising or
movement is a.

AND

Article 146. Illegal assemblies


Article 147. Illegal associations
Chapter Four. ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND
DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND
THEIR AGENTS

OR
b.

Article 148. Direct assaults


Article 149. Indirect assaults
Article 150. Disobedience to summons issued by
the

National Assembly, its committees or


subcommittees, by the Constitutional
Commissions,
its
committees,
subcommittees or
divisions
Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a
person
in authority or he agents of such person
Article 152. Persons in authority and agents of
persons
in authority who shall be deemed as such

Chapter Five. PUBLIC DISORDERS

Article 153. Tumults and other disturbances of


public
order

tumultuous
disturbance
or
interruption
liable to cause
disturbance
Article 154.
Unlawful use of means of

to remove from the allegiance


to the government or its laws Philippine
territory or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval, or other armed
forces;

to deprive the Chief Executive


or Congress, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives.

Rebellion
is
more
frequently used where the object of the
movement is completely to overthrow and
supersede the existing government.
Insurrection is more
commonly employed in reference to a
movement which seeks merely to effect
some change of minor importance, or to
prevent the exercise of governmental
authority with respect to particular matters
or subjects.
The crime of rebellion
or of inciting is by nature a crime of
masses, of a multitude.
Actual clash of arms
with the government, not necessary to
convict the accused who is in conspiracy

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with others actually taking arms with the


government.
It is not necessary
that the purpose of the rebellion be
accomplished.
Giving
aid
and
comfort is not criminal in rebellion.
Republic Act. No. 6968
An Act Punishing the Crime of Coup dtat by Amending
Articles 134, 135, and 136 of Chapter One, Title Three of Act
Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Fifteen, Otherwise
Known as the Revised Penal Code, and For Other Purposes

Definition of Terms
Rebellion or insurrection - the crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.
Coup DTAT The crime of coup DTAT is a swift
attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted
authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any
military camp or installation, communications
networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of power,
singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the
Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to
the military or police or holding any public office or
employment, with or without civilian support or
participation, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power."
Rebellion
Levying of war against
the government during
peace time for any of the
purposes in Article 134
Always involves taking
up arms vs. the
government

Treason
Levying of war against
the government, when
performed to aid the
enemy; adherence to
enemy
May be committed by
mere adherence to the
enemy, giving him aid or
comfort

Enrile vs. Salazar


A warrant was issued on an information filed by a panel of
prosecutors, charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the failed coup attempt which
took place from Nov. 29 to Dec. 10.
HELD: The written and oral pleas for the defendants
(Enrile et al.) presented the SC with three options: First,
abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed
in the dissent that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimes, and that under Article 48, rebellion may be
complexed with common offenses.
Second, hold

Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in


furtherance or as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a
rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or
less grave character.
Third, maintain Hernandez as
applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or furtherance thereof.
11 members of the SC voted against abandoning
Hernandez, while 2 felt the doctrine should be reexamined. Because of this, the ruling remains good law, as
no new challenges are presented in this case persuasive
enough to warrant a complete reversal.
This view is reinforced by the fact that President Aquino,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom
Constitution, repealed P.D. No. 942 of the former regime
which sought to nullify Hernandez by enacting a new
provision in the RPC to the effect that when by reason, or
on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this
Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by the law are committed, the
penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum period
shall be imposed upon the offender. The president has
then in effect reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine
with the effect of law by legislative fiat.
The court unanimously voted to reject the second option.
The consensus was that the arguments were not sufficient
to overcome the thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of
Article 48.
If Art. 48 were applied, and murder were not complexed
with rebellion and the 2 crimes were punished separately,
the extreme penalty could be imposed upon him, even in
the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,
said provision, if construed this way, would be unfavorable
to the accused.
Thus, Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other crime.
The SC ruled by a vote of 11 to 3 that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. That
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
Together with the information charging Enrile with
rebellion complexed with murder in the RTC of QC,
prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of P.D. No. 1829 in the RTC of Makati. It is alleged
that on Dec. 1, 1989 at Dasma Village, Enrile, having
reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gringo Honasan has committed a crime, obstructed,
impeded, frustrated or delayed the apprehension of
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
Enrile apparently gave Gringo food and comfort in the
Dasma house, despite knowing that Gringo is a fugitive
from justice.
Is the alleged harboring or concealing by Enrile of Honasan
absorbed in the complexed rebellion charge against Enrile
(in Enrile vs. Salazar)?
HELD: YES

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The rebellion charges filed against Enrile in Q.C. were


based on affidavits executed by 2 employees of a hotel who
stated that Gringo and some 100 rebel soldiers attended
the mass and birthday party held at the Enrile residence in
Dec 1, 1989. Based on this testimony, the prosecution
concluded that Enriles talking with the rebel leader Gringo
in his house in the presence of 100 armed soldiers, it can
be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the December
coup attempt. Thus, the factual allegations supporting the
rebellion charge include the very incident which gave rise
to the charge of the violation under P.D. 1829.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Gringo, Enriles
alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other
purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constituting a part thereof. It was motivated by the single
intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. The
decisive factor in political crimes is the intent or motive.
If Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Gringo simply because the latter is a friend and
former associate, the motive for the act is completely
different. But if the act is committed with political
motives, then it should be deemed to form part of the
crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
Inthis case, the act or harboring or concealing Gringo is
clearly a mere component of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of rebellion. It cannot therefore be made
basis of a separate charge. All crimes, whether punishable
under special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes
themselves.
People vs. Dasig

overthrowing the duly constituted government.


It is
therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of
Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of
the subversive ends of the NPA. As such, appellant is liable
for rebellion and not murder with direct assault upon a
person in authority.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes
in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere
component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
rebellion.
It cannot be made the basis of a separate
charge.
People vs. Lovedioro
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along a
street when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a
gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policemans right
ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had 3 other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen
policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking
the Lucilos gun, the man and his companions boarded a
tricycle and fled. The accused-appellant was charged and
was convicted of the crime of murder.
HELD: In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated. If no political motive is
established and proved, the accused should be convicted of
the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of
rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership
in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion
would not, by and of itself, suffice.

One afternoon, Pfc. Manatad, Pfc. Tizon and Pfc. Catamora


were tasked by their commanding officer to man the traffic
at 2 streets of Mandaue City. While on duty, Catamora saw
8 persons, including accused Nunez, acting suspiciously. He
noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men
to approach Manatad. Catamora followed the two men,
but sensing that they were being followed, the men went
to the middle of the road and engage Catamora to a gun
battle. Catamora then heard a series of shots from the
other group and afterwards, he saw Manatad sprawled on
the ground. Catamora sought refuge at a nearby building
from where he saw 2 persons take Manatads gun and fired
at him to make sure he was dead. The group then fled the
scene.

Appellants contentions regarding the reason for the killing


of Lucilo are couched in terms so general and non-specific
that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the
killing would have made towards the achievement of the
NPAs subversive aims. Thus, in the absence of clear and
satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the
killing of SPO3 Lucilo, the trial court correctly convicted
appellant of the crime of murder.

Later on, 2 teams of police officers were tasked to conduct


surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
NPA sparrow unit in Cebu City. When they reached the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Nunez trying to
escape. The two men were apprehended, and their
firearms were confiscated. Dasig confessed in the hospital
that he and the group of Nunez killed Manatad and that he
and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit. He was
found guilty of murder with direct assault.

1.

HELD: Dasig should be prosecuted for rebellion. Appellant


not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the
Sparrow unit, but also his participation and that of his
group in the killing of Manatad. The Sparrow unit is the
liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of

Article 134-A.
committed

Coup

etat

how

Elements:

2.
3.

Offender is a person or persons


belonging to the military or police or
holding any public office or employment;
It is committed by means of a swift
attack
accompanied
by
violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
The attack is directed against the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of
the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation,
communication
networks,
public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of
power;

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4.

The purpose of the attack is to seize or


diminish state power.

The crime of coup d etat may


be committed with or without civilian
participation.

Article 135.
Penalty for
insurrection or coup d etat

rebellion,

Persons liable for rebellion, insurrection or coup


d' etat:
1.

b.

b.

c.

Any person who promotes,


maintains or heads a rebellion or
insurrection; or
Any person who leads, directs
or commands others to undertake a
coup d' etat;

The participants a.

The leaders
a.

2.

Any person who participates or


executes the commands of others in
rebellion or insurrection;
Any person in the government
service who participates, or executes
directions or commands of others in
undertaking a coup d etat;
Any
person
not
in
the
government service who participates,
supports, finances, abets or aids in
undertaking a coup d' etat.

Public officer must


take active part, to be liable; mere silence
or omission is not punishable in rebellion.
When the rebellion,
insurrection or coup d etat shall be under
the command of unknown leaders, any
person who in fact directed the others,
spoke for them, signed receipts and other
documents issued in their name, or
performed similar acts, on behalf of the
rebels, shall be deemed a leader of such
rebellion, insurrection or couo d etat.
It is not a defense in
rebellion that the accused never took the
oath of allegiance to, or that they never
recognized the government.
Those
who
killed
persons in pursuance of the movement to
overthrow the government are liable for
rebellion only.
Is there a complex
crime of rebellion with murder and other
common crimes? NO. Engaging in war
against the government necessarily imply

everything that war connotes: resort to


arms, requisition of property, collection of
taxes, restraint of liberty, damage to
property, physical injuries and loss of life.
When any of the acts
above are committed as means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends, they
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion
and cannot be regarded or penalized as
distinct crimes in themselves. (This is the
Hernandez ruling, later reiterated in Enrile
vs. Salazar)
Killing, robbing etc.
for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, would be separately
punished and would not be absorbed in
rebellion
Political crimes are
those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as
may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is intent or
motive.
A crime usually regarded as
common (e.g. homicide) may be stripped
of its common character if perpetrated for
any of the purposes of rebellion.

Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to


commit coup d etat

There is conspiracy to commit


rebellion when two or more persons come
to an agreement to rise publicly and take
arms against government for any of the
purposes of rebellion and decide to commit
it.
There is proposal to commit
rebellion when the person who has decided
to rise publicly and take arms against the
government for any of the purposes of
rebellion proposes its execution to some
other person or persons.

Bar Questions
Art 134; Rebellion; Politically Motivated;
Committed by
NPA Members (1998)
On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor
Alegre of Laguna was on board his car traveling along
the National Highway of Laguna, Joselito and Vicente
shot him on the head resulting in his instant death. At
that time, Joselito and Vicente were members of the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army and they
killed the governor upon orders of their senior officer.
Commander Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente,
they were ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of
his corrupt practices. If you were the prosecutor,
what crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? [5%J
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and
Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering that
the killers were members of the liquidation squad of

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the New People's Army and the killing was upon


orders of their commander; hence, politicallymotivated. This was the ruling in People vs. Avila,
207 SCRA 1568 involving identical facts which is a
movement taken judicial notice of as engaged in
rebellion against the Government.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and
Vicente for the crime of murder as the purpose of the
killing was because of his "corrupt practices ", which
does not appear to be politically motivated. There is
no indication as to how the killing would promote or
further the objective of the New Peoples Army. The
killing is murder because it was committed with
treachery.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime should be rebellion with murder
considering that Art. 135 of the Revised Penal Code
has already been amended by Rep. Act No. 6968,
deleting from said Article, common crimes which
used to be punished as part and parcel of the crime
of rebellion. The ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515 (1994), that rebellion may not be completed
with common crimes committed in furtherance
thereof, was because the common crimes were then
penalized in Art. 135 together with the rebellion, with
one penalty and Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code
cannot be applied. Art. 135 of said Code remained
exactly the same when the case of Enrile vs, Salazar,
186 SCRA 217 (1990) was resolved. Precisely for the
reason that Art. 48 cannot apply because the
common crimes were punished as part of rebellion in
Art. 135, that this Article was amended, deleting the
common crimes therefrom. That the common crimes
were deleted from said Article, demonstrates a clear
legislative intention to treat the common crimes as
distinct from rebellion and remove the legal
impediment to the application of Art.
48. It is noteworthy that in Enrile vs. Salazar (supra)
the Supreme Court said these:
"There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to
clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that if it cannot
be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every
sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
only interpret the law as it stands at any given time,
and what is needed lies beyond interpretation.
Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing
the initiative in this matter, which is purely with in its
province,"
And significantly the said amendment to Art. 135 of
the Rev. Penal Code was made at around the time the
ruling in Salazar was handled down, obviously to
neutralize the Hernandez and the Salazar rulings. The
amendment was sort of a rider to the coup d'etat
law,
Rep. Act No 6968.
Art 134-A: Coup d etat & Rape; Frustrated
(2005)
Taking into account the nature and elements of the
felonies of coup d etat and rape, may one be
criminally liable for frustrated coup d etat or
frustrated rape? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, one cannot be criminally liable for frustrated
coup detat or frustrated rape because in coup d etat

the mere attack directed against the duly constituted


authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any
military camp or installation, communication
networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of power
would consummate the crime. The objective may not
be to overthrow the government but only to
destabilize or paralyze the government through the
seizure of facilities and utilities essential to the
continued possession and exercise of governmental
powers.
On the other hand, in the crime of rape there is no
frustrated
rape
it
is
either
attempted
or
consummated rape. If the accused who placed
himself on top of a woman, raising her skirt and
unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor to have sex with
her very apparent, is guilty of Attempted rape. On
the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the
female organ by the penis, even without rupture of
the hymen or laceration of the vagina, consummates
the crime of rape. More so, it has long abandoned its
stray decision in People vs. Erina 50 Phil 998
where the accused was found
guilty of Frustrated rape.
Art 134-A; Coup detat (2002)
If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces
makes a swift attack, accompanied by violence,
intimidation and threat against a vital military
installation for the purpose of seizing power and
taking over such installation, what crime or crimes
are they guilty of? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the
Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup
d'etat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, because their attack was against vital
military installations which are essential to the
continued possession and exercise of governmental
powers, and their purpose is to seize power by taking
over such installations.
B. If the attack is quelled but the leader is
unknown, who shall be deemed the leader
thereof? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The leader being unknown, any person who in fact
directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts
and other documents issued in their name, or
performed similar acts, on behalf of the group shall
be deemed the leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135,
R.P.C.)
Art 134-A; Coup detat; New Firearms Law
(1998)
1. How is the crime of coup d'etat committed? [3%]
2. Supposing a public school teacher participated in a
coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime
or crimes did he commit? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The crime of coup d'etat is committed by a swift
attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth against the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, military
camps
and
installations,
communication networks, public utilities and facilities
needed for the exercise and continued possession of
power, carried out singly or simultaneously anywhere
in the Philippines by persons belonging to the
military or police or holding public office, with or
without civilian support or participation, for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (Art

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134-A, RPC).
2. The public school teacher committed only coup
d'etat for his participation therein. His use of an
unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat
under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294).
Art 136; Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (1994)
VC, JG. GG and JG conspired to overthrow the
Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the
titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were
held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he,
VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government. Father Abraham did not report this
information to the proper authorities. Did Father
Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because
the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion,
not a conspiracy to commit treason which makes a
person criminally liable under Art 116, RFC. And even
assuming that it will fall as misprision of treason,
Father Abraham is exempted from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 7, as his failure to report can be
considered as due to "insuperable cause", as this
involves the sanctity and inviolability of a confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in criminal
liability to the co-conspirators, but not to a person
who learned of such and did not report to the proper
authorities (US vs. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People vs.
Atienza. 56 Phil. 353).
Art. 134; Rebellion vs. Coup d'etat
Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between rebellion and
coupd'etat, based on their constitutive elements as
criminal offenses.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
REBELLION is committed when a multitude of
persons rise publicly in arms for the purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted government, to be
replaced by a government of the rebels. It is carried
out by force and violence, but need not be
participated in by any member of the military,
national police or any public officer. COUP D'ETAT is
committed when members of the military, Philippine
National Police, or public officer, acting as principal
offenders, launched a swift attack thru strategy,
stealth, threat, violence or intimidation against duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, military camp or installation,
communication networks, public facilities or utilities
needed for the exercise and continued possession of
governmental powers, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state powers.
Unlike rebellion which requires a public uprising, coup
d'etat may be carried out singly or simultaneously
and the principal offenders must be members of the
military, national police or public officer, with or
without civilian support. The criminal objective need
not be to overthrow the existing government but only
to destabilize or paralyze the existing government.

2.
3.

By continuing to discharge the duties


of their offices under the control of the
rebels; or
By accepting appointment to office
under them.
Offender must be a public
officer or employee
The crime of disloyalty of
public officers presupposes the existence
of rebellion by other persons.
If the public officer who
commits any of the acts in this article is in
conspiracy with the rebels, he will be guilty
of rebellion.

Article 138.
insurrection.

Inciting

to

rebellion

or

Elements:
1.
2.
3.

Offender does not take arms or is not in


open hostility against the government;
He incites others to the execution of
any of the acts of rebellion;
The inciting is done by means of
speeches,
proclamations,
writings,
emblems, banners or other representations
tending to the same end.
In proposal and inciting to
rebellion, the crime of rebellion should not
actually be committed by the persons to
whom it is proposed or who are incited. If
they commit the rebellion, the proponent of
the one inciting becomes a principal by
inducement in the crime of rebellion.

Inciting to rebellion

Proposal to commit
rebellion
In both crimes, the offender induces another to
commit rebellion
It is not required that the
The person who proposes
offender has decided to
has decided to commit
commit the rebellion
rebellion
The act of inciting is
The person who proposes
done publicly
uses secret means

Article 139. Sedition how committed


Elements:

Acts punishable:

Offenders rise publicly and tumultuously;


Offenders employ force, intimidation, or
other means outside of legal methods;
Purpose is to attain any of the following
objects:

1.

a.

Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers


or employees

By failing to resist a rebellion by all the


means in their power;

1.
2.
3.

To prevent the promulgation or


execution of any law or the holding of
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b.

c.
d.
e.

any popular election;


To prevent the national government or
any
provincial
or
municipal
government, or any public officer from
exercising its or his functions or
prevent
the
execution
of
an
administrative order;
To inflict any act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of any
public officer or employee;
To commit, for any political or social
end, any act of hate or revenge against
private persons or any social classes;
To despoil for any political or social
end, any person, municipality or
province, or the national government of
all its property or any part thereof.

Sedition, in its general


sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. The ultimate
object is violation of public peace.
Sedition
may
not
be
committed by one person only, because
the word tumultuous means that it is
caused by more than three persons who
are armed or provided with means of
violence.
Are
common
crimes
absorbed in sedition? NO, according to
jurisprudence.

Sedition
The purpose may be
political or social
It is sufficient that the
public uprising must be
tumultuous

public functionary. The law makes no distinction between


the persons to which it applies.

Article 140. Penalty for sedition


Persons liable for sedition:
1.
2.

Article 141.
sedition

to

commit

There must be an agreement


and a decision to rise publicly and
tumultuously to attain any of the objects of
sedition.
There is no crime of proposal to
commit sedition.

Acts punishable:
1.

Inciting others to the accomplishment


of any of the acts which constitute sedition
by means of speeches, proclamations,
writings, emblems, etc.;
Elements:
a.
b.
c.

People vs. Cabrera

HELD: The crime committed was sedition. Sedition, in its


more general sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject
makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal
methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting
any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property or
any official or agent of the Insular Government or of a
Provincial or Municipal Government. It is not necessary that
the offender be a private citizen and the offended party a

Conspiracy

Article 142. Inciting to sedition

Rebellion
The purpose is always
political
There must be taking up
of arms against the
government

A constabulary soldier died as a result of an encounter with


a policeman. His death engendered a desire for revenge
against the police force on the part of the constabulary
soldiers. The next day, constabulary soldiers escaped from
their barracks with rifles and ammunitions and divided into
groups for an attack upon the city police force. They fired
indiscriminately along the streets of Calle Real, killing a
policeman and wounding civilians, including several
passengers of a passing streetcar. They attacked the Luneta
Police Station and the office of the secret service.

The leader of the sedition; and


Other person participating in the
sedition.

2.
3.

Offender does not take direct part in


the crime of sedition;
He
incites
others
to
the
accomplishment of any of the acts
which constitute sedition; and
Inciting is done by means of speeches,
proclamations,
writings,
emblems,
cartoons,
banners,
or
other
representations tending towards the
same end.

Uttering seditious words or speeches


which tend to disturb the public peace;
Writing, publishing, or circulating
scurrilous libels against the government or
any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof, which tend to disturb the public
peace.

Uttering seditious words, publishing and


circulation scurrilous libels are punishable
(second and third type of inciting to sedition),
when:
1.

They tend to disturb or obstruct any


lawful officer in executing the functions of
his office; or

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2.
3.
4.

They tend to instigate others to cabal


and meet together for unlawful purposes;
or
They suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots; or
They lead or tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and
order of the government.

against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of


the community and the safety and order of the
Government. The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the
play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and
enmity against the American people and the Government of
the United States in the Philippines.

knowingly concealing such


evil practices is another way of violating
this article. This is ordinarily an act of an
accessory after the fact, but under this
article, the act is treated and punished as
that of a principal.
It is not necessary that the
words used should in fact result in a rising
of the people against the constituted
authorities.
Rules relative to seditious
words:
o
Clear and present danger
words must be of such a nature that by
uttering them there is a danger of a
public uprising and that such danger
should be both clear and imminent
o
Dangerous tendency if the
words used tend to create a danger of
public uprising
Seditious
utterances
are
prohibited because the State should not be
compelled to wait until the apprehended
danger became certain, before it can
protect itself.

Petitioner Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it


appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece
of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation for their publication with a suicide not, wherein
he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicidal, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latters
supposed wife and children. The letter narrated that the
reason why he committed suicide was because he was not
pleased with the administration of Pres. Roxas. It also
contained a request to his wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill, and to tell them that the Philippine
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
As if out of desperation, he ended the letter by saying that
he sacrificed his life because he has no power to put
under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people who are in
power.

Unlawful rumor mongering: Committed by any


person who shall offer, publish, distribute,
circulate and spread rumors, false news and
information and gossip, or cause the
publication,
distribution,
circulation
or
spreading of the same, which cause or tend to
cause panic, divisive effects among the people,
discredit or distrust for the duly constituted
authorities, undermine the stability of the
Government and the objectives of the New
Society, endanger the public order, or cause
damage to the interest or credit of the state.
(P.D. No. 90)
US vs. Tolentino
A theatrical work entitled Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas,
written by Aurelio Tolentino, was presented by him and
others on May 14, 1903 at the Teatro Libertad in Manila.
HELD: The crime committed is inciting to sedition. The
publication and presentation of the drama directly and
necessarily tended to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people

Espuelas vs. People

HELD: The essence of seditious libel is its immediate


tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal
methods in order to redress the evils which press upon
their minds.
A published writing which calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested
with Nazis and Fascists, and which reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the
disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a
scurrilous libel against the Government.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: CAPCOM got a tip that a member of the NPA Sparrow
Unit (liquidation squad) was being treated for a gunshot
wound at the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Q.C.
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person
was Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers. Dural was
positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who
went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the CAPCOM soldiers seated inside. Dural was
then transferred to another facility, under CAPCOM
supervision (basically, he was arrested). Dural questions the
legality of his arrest, having been made without a warrant.
HELD: Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA,
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the SC
in an earlier case:

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The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,


conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, are all in the nature
of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. If killing and other acts of violence against the
rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified

unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an


aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of
or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted
coup d'tat, such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion, or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'tat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm,
company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of
them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms
without any legal authority to be carried outside
of their residence in the course of their
employment. (1)
2.

Republic Act 8294


Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal / Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives (P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8294) as an element of the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup detat

When a person commits any of the crimes


defined in the RPC or special laws with the use of
the aforementioned explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devices, which results in
the death of any person or persons, the use of
such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

Punishable acts
1.

Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,


Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition
or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition. Provided that no
other crime was committed.
Higher penalty shall be imposed if the firearm is
classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three.
Provided, however, that no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an

Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,


Disposition or Possession of Explosives
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess
hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other
explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,'
'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other
incendiary devices capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,


or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup d'tat, such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'tat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm,
company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives
owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity, to be used by any person or persons
found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs. (3)
3.

Carrying licensed firearm outside ones


residence without legal authority therefor
(1)

4.

Tampering of Firearm's Serial Number


any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change,
deface or erase the serial number of any firearm.
(5)

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5.

Repacking or Altering the Composition of


Lawfully Manufactured Explosives any
person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or
modify the composition of any lawfully
manufactured explosives. (6)

Coverage of Unlicensed Firearm


The term unlicensed firearm shall include:
1) firearms with expired license; or
2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime
Bar Questions
Illegal Possession of Firearms RA 8294 (1998)
Supposing a public school teacher participated in a
coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime
or crimes did he commit? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat
for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed
firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new
firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294). A prosecution for
illegal possession of firearm under the new law is
allowed only if the unlicensed firearm was not used in
the commission of another crime.
Illegal Possession of Firearms & Ammunitions
(2000)
A has long been wanted by the police authorities for
various crimes committed by him. Acting on an
information by a tipster, the police proceeded to an
apartment where A was often seen. The tipster also
warned the policemen that A was always armed. At
the given address, a lady who introduced herself as
the elder sister of A, opened the door and let the
policemen in inside, the team found A sleeping on
the floor. Immediately beside him was a clutch bag
which, when opened, contained a .38 caliber paltik
revolver and a hand grenade. After verification, the
authorities discovered that A was not a licensed
holder of the .38 caliber paltik revolver. As for the
hand grenade, it was established that only military
personnel are authorized to carry hand grenades.
Subsequently, A was charged with the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. During trial,
A maintained that the bag containing the unlicensed
firearm and hand grenade belonged to A, his friend,
and that he was not in actual possession thereof at
the time he was arrested. Are the allegations
meritorious? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A's allegations are not meritorious. Ownership is not
an essential element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law
requires is merely possession, which includes not
only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession where the firearm and explosive are
subject to one's control and management. (People
us. De Grecia, 233 SCRA)
RA 9372
Human Security Act of 2007
Defines the crime of terrorism to be the commission
of any of the crimes of :
A. Under the Revised Penal Code.
i. Piracy in general and Mutiny in the High

Seas or in the Philippine Waters


ii. rebellion
iii. Coup detat
iv. Murder
v. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
B. Under Special Laws
i. Arson under P.D. 1613
ii. Violation of R.A. 6969 ( Toxic Substance ad
Nuclear Waste Control)
iii. R.A. 5207 ( Atomic Energy Regulatory and
Liability Act of 1968)
iv. Hijacking
v. Piracy in Phil. Waters and Highway
Robbery
vi. P.D. 1866 ( Possession and Manufacture of
Firearms/explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand
Requirements for Terrorism
A. The accused ( maybe a single individual or a
group) must commit any of the enumerated
crimes
B. There results a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace
i. The extent and degree of fear and
panic, including the number of people
affected in order to meet the term
populace, are questions of facts to be
determined by the courts and on a case to
case basis.
ii. Is the term populace to be interpreted
as referring to the local inhabitants where
the acts were committed, or does it refer
to the national population?
C. The purpose of the accused must be to coerce
the government to give into an unlawful demand
i. The word demand is too broad as to
cover not only political, criminal or
monetarial demands but also those which
maybe categorized as social or economic.
This however is qualified by the word
unlawful.
Other Acts/Persons Liable
A. Conspiracy to commit terrorism. The penalty is
the same as terrorism itself ( i.e. 40 years of
imprisonment)
B. Accomplices- he cooperates in the execution of
either terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
by previous or simultaneous acts (Penalty is 17
yrs. 4 months and one day to 20 years)
C. Accessory-The acts punished are the same as
that under Article 19 of the RPC. The penalty is 10
yrs. And one day to 12 years
1. The law however adopts the absolutory
cause of exemption of accessories from
liability with respect to their relatives

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People vs. Quijada

Case where a dance was held in a basketball


court and Quijada kept on pestering Iroys
sister and Quijada killed the brother.
He was convicted of two separate offenses
of murder and illegal use of firearm
aggravated with illegal use of firearm.
The unequivocal intent of the second par of
section 1. of PD 1866 is to respect and
preserve homicide or murder as a distinct
offense penalized under the RPC and to
increasae the penalty for illegal possession
of firearm where such a firearm is used in
killing a person.
Its clear language yields no intention of the
lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto,
Articles 248 and 249 of the RPC in such a
way that if an unlicensed fiream is used in
the commission of homicide or murder,
either of these crimes, as the case may be,
would only serve to aggravate the offense of
illegal possession of firearm and would not
anymore be separately punished.
The words of the subject provision are
palpably clear to exclude any suggestion
that either of the crimes of homicide and
murder, as crimes mala in se under the RPC
is obliterated as such and reduced as a
mere aggravating circumstance in illegal
possession of firearm whenever the
unlicensed firearm is used in killing a
person.
The only purpose of the provision is to
increase the penalty prescribed in 1 st par of
sec 1reclusion temporal in its max to
reclusion perpetua to death.

People v Feloteo
Facts: Wilfredo Feloteo was found guilty by the trial
court of murder under Article 248 of the RPC and
Illegal Possession of Firearm, a violation of Section 1
of PD 1866 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
20 years respectively.
In the evening of May 6, 1993, the victim,
Sonny Sotto, and his two friends were walking along
the highway after a few drinks earlier that day and
were on their way home, having a lively mood. At
one point, the accused appeared at the opposite side
of the road and walked past the victims two friends.
The two recognized accused under the bright moon
as he was a barriomate.
The three friends did not pay much
attention to accused as they were playing habulan
and without a uttering a word, the accused aimed the
armalite at Sotto and pulled the trigger. Sotto, was
hit above the chest and fell to the ground, face down.
The two friends scampered away to find help while
the accused fled. Sotto was later found dead.
The armalite belong to SPO2 Roman Adion
said accused stole the gun from him. Accused
obviously denied, saying his purpose for carrying the
gun was to bring it to SPO2 Adion as the latter went
somewhere (to check his borrowed tricycle whose
engine broke down) after leaving the gun at the
house where accused was.
Accused then walked past the victims group
at around 7PM. The group zigzagged as they walked.

In jest, accused said to victim, Boots, dont get near


me, Ill shoot you. He pointed the gun and pulled the
trigger, allegedly unaware that it was loaded. It fired
and hit Sotto. The accused was apprehended the
next day by SPO2 Adion.
On appeal, accused denies that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery for murder was
present.
Ratio: Illegal possession of firearms should only be
an aggravating circumstance in light of the
amendments to PD 1866 by RA 8294:
a. In the old Section 1 of PD 1866, if
homicide or murder is committed with
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed;
b. RA 8294 amended this, deleting the
penalty of death and considered the
carrying of unlicensed firearm only as
an aggravating circumstance;
c. It was approved in 1997 but is
retroactively applied since it favours the
accused; court cites People v Molina;
d. Intent of Congress: two cases from
Supreme Court were presented in a
senate session People v Barros (1996)
and People v Evangelista (1996);
i. Former case ruled that illegal
possession of firearm (when killing of
another person is committed) should
only be an aggravating circumstance;
while in the latter case, it is possible
to file two separate informations
one for murder and one for illegal
possession of firearms;
ii. So the senate chose between
integrating the crimes (taking illegal
possession in its aggravated form)
and treating the two as separate
crimes; Senate chose the former;
e. However, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua of appellant is not affected
since RA 7659 or the Death Penalty Law
was enacted only on December 31,
1993, after the crime was committed in
May 1993;
Advincula vs. CA (2000)
The Court of Appeals ruled that no charges for Illegal
Possession of Firearms could be filed against Amando and
Isagani Ocampo for two (2) reasons: First, as to Amando
Ocampo, he had the requisite license to possess the firearm
(from the Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office,
which was established by sufficient evidence on record.
Second, as to Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing
evidence that he was in possession of a gun during the
incident involving him, his father and petitioner, except for
the eyewitness account of petitioner and one Federico San
Miguel.
HELD: The rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal
Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to
exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that
it is not licensed. However, it should be noted that in
People v. Ramos, citing People v. Gy Gesiong, this Court

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ruled: " . . . Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the


firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor."
The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus
made the following findings: Even if Amando had the
requisite license, there was no proof that he had the
necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and
Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive
identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in
assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by
evidence, which cannot be disturbed by this Court.
People vs. Tac-an (1990)
Tac-an and the deceased Escao were high school
classmates [and gang mates in Bronx gang]. The
relationship between Tac-an and Escao turned sour as the
quarrel between them escalated from September up to
December 1984. While the class was still going on, Tac-an
slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun.
Tac-an suddenly burst into the room, and upon sighting
Escao Tac-an fired at scampering Escao, hitting Escao.
Escao remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely.
Tac-an was charged with qualified illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition and of murder. After trial the RTC
imposed upon him the penalty of death in both cases.
HELD: P.D. 1866 is applicable. There is nothing in P.D. No.
1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for
the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country
by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute
contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into nonenforceability upon the termination of the state or period
of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own
terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all
prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and
manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in
order "to harmonize their provisions," as well as to update
and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order to
more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms,
ammunitions and explosives."

(1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by


subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and
(2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms
against the Government (R.A. No. 1700).
Baylosis vs. Chavez (1991)
Baylosis, de Vera and Marco Palo, all known high ranking
officers of the CPP-NPA, were charged with a illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of, or incident to, or
in connection with the crimes of rebellion or subversion.
HELD: Charging the qualified offense of Illegal possession
of firearms under PD 1866 does not charge the complex
crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms, and
hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good
and correct rule and is applicable in CAB.
People vs. Tiozon (1991)

Misolas vs. Panga (1990)


Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided a suspected NPA
"underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili the
early morning. The house was searched and in a red bag
under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge
Remington shotgun and four live rounds of ammunition
were found. Misolas was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866 with
allegation that it was in furtherance of subversion so as to
qualify the offense.
HELD: Illegal possession of firearms is not absorbed in
rebellion or subversion. Hernandez ruling cannot find
application in this case because Misolas is being charged
specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under PD 1866.
He is not being charged with the complex crime of
subversion with illegal possession of firearms. Neither is he
being separately charged for subversion and for illegal
possession of firearms.
SC considered the fact that the Legislature had deemed it
fit to provide for two distinct offenses:

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of


reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes
further by providing that "if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed."
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder
qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1
because it is a circumstance which increases the
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the
homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense;
otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense,
which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for
the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the
decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws
on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally
affecting public order and safety due to the
proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured
firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person
with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to
separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised
Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar
to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the
first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised
Penal Code.
However, to justify the imposition of the
increased penalty under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
because of the resulting crime of homicide or murder,
the prosecution must allege in the information and
prove by the quantum of evidence required for
conviction violation of said section and, more
specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the
commission of homicide or murder.
Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under
the foregoing section if one does not have the license
to possess the firearm. Even if he has the license, he
cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer


25

legal authority therefor. It follows then that the lack


or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of
the offense which the prosecution must allege and
prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged
and proved.
There being no proof that accused-appellant
had no license to possess the firearm in question,
he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a
firearm. Therefore, the trial court then committed an
error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual,


or harmless possession or control of a firearm
cannot be considered a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon,
such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although
there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no
offense committed.
People vs. Garcia (2002)

People vs. De Gracia (1994)

The rule is that ownership is not an essential


element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same
perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon
be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object
of this law the proprietary concept of the possession
can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive
possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to
possess to constitute a violation of the law? This
query assumes significance since the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished
by a special law, in which case good faith and absence
of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a
rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent
to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent;
in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is
enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.
A distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere possession,
without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still
be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to
commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. This is not important in convicting a person
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order
that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that
he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without
criminal intent.

Tioleco was kidnapped while he was jogging alone in the


morning. His abductors took him to a house in Fairview,
where the accused Rogel and Lariba were assigned to
watch over him. When the police discovered the hideout,
Rogel and Lariba immediately ran to a room in the house
where several unlicensed firearms were stored. Both were
convicted of Kidnapping for Ransom AND Illegal Possession
of Firearms.
HELD: Rogel and Lariba cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions there being
another crime - kidnapping for ransom - which they were
perpetrating at the same time.
Under R.A. 8294, if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense
of simple illegal possession of firearms. The language of the
new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no
other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the
intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said
so, as it did in the third paragraph. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
People vs. Castillo (2000)
Wilhelmina was kidnapped by persons pretending to be
interested buyers of real estate. She was brought to a
safehouse in Quezon City, where the accused Gonzales was
assigned to watch over her at all times. Gonzales carried
an unlicensed firearm while watching over Wilhelmina.
When the police discovered the safehouse, Gonzales
immediately threw his firearm away from him. The police
found more unlicensed firearms in another room in the
house. Gonzales was convicted of Illegal Possession of
Firearms, with penalty derived from P.D. 1866.
HELD: The penalty imposed on him by the trial court
exceeded that prescribed by law. Under Republic Act No.
8294, amending P. D. No. 1866, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm classified as high powered is prision
mayor minimum or six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years and a fine of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos.
Here, the offense was committed on November 27, 1992.
Since the amendatory law is favorable to the accused, it
shall be given retroactive application.
People vs. Nepomuceno (1999)
Accused here was charged with parricide that was
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The 2
charges were separately charged and tried.

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RA8294 was passed which said that if a homicide or murder


is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
latter cannot be tried separately but will just be treated as
an aggravating circumstance.
HELD: Accused can no longer be separately charged with
parricide and illegal possession of firearms. The
amendment says that the latter is only to be treated as an
aggravating circumstance. Being clearly favorable to the
accused, the amendatory law RA8294 can be applied
retroactively to this case.

1.

2.

There is a meeting of Congress or any


of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees
or divisions thereof, or of any provincial
board or city or municipal council or board;
Offender does any of the following
acts:
a.
b.

People vs. Evangelista (1996)


Accused here was charged with murder and simple illegal
possession of firearms. Accused here killed someone with a
homemade gun. However the court found the accused
guilty of murder and aggravated illegal possession of
firearms (weapon used for murder) and sentenced him to
death.
Held:
1) Accused cannot be found guilty of aggravated illegal
possession as the information simply charged simple
illegal possession. That an unlicensed firearm was
used in the commission of murder or homicide is a
qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it must be
specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the
accused cannot be sentenced to death without
violating his right to be informed of the charge against
him.
2) He cannot even be convicted of simple illegal
possession as there was no proof that the gun was
unlicensed. The fact that the gun used was homemade
does not mean that it cannot be licensed and
therefore it is right for the court to automatically
assume that it is unlicensed. Even if a homemade gun
is used, it does not dispense with the required proof
that the gun was indeed unlicensed.

Violation of parliamentary

Acts punishable:
1.

Using force, intimidation, threats, or


frauds to prevent any member of Congress
from attending the meetings of Congress or
of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees
or divisions thereof, or from expressing his
opinion or casting his vote;
Elements:
a.
b.

Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the


meeting of the Assembly and similar
bodies

Offender
uses
force,
intimidation, threats or fraud;
The purpose of the offender
is to prevent any member of Congress
from o

Elements:
There is a projected or actual meeting
of Congress or any of its committees or
subcommittees, constitutional commissions
or committees or divisions thereof, or of
any provincial board or city or municipal
council or board;
Offender, who may be any person,
prevents such meetings by force or fraud.

The complaint for


disturbance of proceedings may be filed by
a member of a legislative body.
One who disturbs the
proceedings of Congress may also be
punished for contempt by such Congress.

Article 145.
immunity

Note: In this case, the amendatory law AR8294 had not yet
been passed, therefore it was still allowed to separately
charge murder and illegal possession of firearms.

1.

He disturbs any of such


meetings;
He behaves while in the
presence of any such bodies in such a
manner as to interrupt its proceedings
or to impair the respect due it.

o
o

Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings

Arresting or searching any member


thereof while Congress is in regular or
special session, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable
under the Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor.

Elements:

Elements:

2.

2.

attending
the
meetings of the Congress or of any
of its committees or constitutional
commissions, etc.;
expressing
his
opinion; or
casting his vote.

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a.
b.
c.
d.

Offender is a public officer


of employee;
He arrests or searches any
member of Congress;
Congress, at the time of
arrest or search, is in regular or special
session;
The member arrested or
searched has not committed a crime
punishable under the Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor.

It is not necessary
that the member of Congress is actually
prevented from attending.
Parliamentary
immunity does not protect members of
Congress
from
responsibility
before
Congress itself.
Under
the
1987
Constitution, members of Congress are
exempted from arrest, while Congress is in
session, for all offenses punishable by a
penalty LESS THAN PRISION MAYOR.
Thus,
under
the
Constitution, a public officer who arrests a
member of Congress who has committed a
crime punishable by prision mayor (six
years and one day, to 12 years) is not
liable Article 145.
To be consistent with
the Constitution, the phrase "by a penalty
higher than prision mayor" in Article 145
should be amended to read:
"by the
penalty of prision mayor or higher."

a.
b.

Persons liable:
1.
3.

The organizer or leaders of the meeting;


Persons merely present at the meeting,
who must have a common intent to commit
the felony of illegal assembly.

Meeting includes a
gathering or group, whether in a fixed
place or moving.
Under the first type
of illegal assembly, not all persons present
at the meeting must be armed to be liable
under this article.
The unarmed person
merely present at the meeting of the first
type is liable, but armed persons are
punished more severely under this article.
Note however that
the person merely present must have an
intent to commit the felony of illegal
assembly. If he was a curious bystander,
he is not liable.
If any person present
at the meeting carries an unlicensed
firearm,
o
it is presumed
that the purpose of the meeting insofar
as he is concerned is to commit acts
punishable under the Revised Penal
Code,
o
He
is
considered a leader or organizer of the
meeting.
Under the first type,
the audience must be actually incited to
the commission of any of the crimes
enumerated. If the meeting was dispersed
before there was actual inciting, there is no
illegal assembly.

Article 146. Illegal assemblies


Acts punishable:
1.

Any meeting attended by armed


persons for the purpose of committing any
of the crimes punishable under the Code;
Elements:
a.
b.
c.

2.

There is a meeting, a gathering


or group of persons, whether in fixed
place or moving;
The meeting is attended by
armed persons;
The purpose of the meeting is
to commit any of the crimes punishable
under the Code.

Any meeting in which the audience,


whether armed or not, is incited to the
commission of the crime of treason,
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or
assault upon person in authority or his
agents.

There is a meeting, a gathering


or group of persons, whether in a fixed
place or moving;
The audience, whether armed
or not, is incited to the commission of
the crime of treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition or direct assault.

Article 147. Illegal associations


What are illegal associations?
1.

Associations
totally
or
partially
organized for the purpose of committing
any of the crimes punishable under the
Code;

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2.

Associations
totally
or
partially
organized for some purpose contrary to
public morals.

b.

Persons liable:
1.
2.

c.

Founders, directors and president of the


association;
Mere members of the association.

Illegal associations
It is not necessary that
there be an actual
meeting
The act of forming or
organizing and
membership in the
association is punished
Persons liable are the
founders, directors and
president, and the
members

Illegal assemblies
It is necessary that there
is an actual meeting or
assembly for the
purposes stated in Article
146
The meeting and
attendance at such
meeting is punished
Persons liable are the
organizers or leaders of
the meeting and the
persons present at such
meeting

d.
e.

Article 148. Direct assaults


Acts punishable:
1.

Without public uprising, by employing


force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition;

Elements:

a.
b.

c.
2.

Offender employs force or


intimidation;
The aim of the offender is to
attain any of the purposes of the crime
of rebellion or any of the objects of the
crime of sedition;
There is no public uprising.

Without public uprising, by attacking,


by employing force or by seriously
intimidating or by seriously resisting any
person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
Elements:

a.

Offender
employs force,

makes
makes

an
a

attack,
serious

intimidation, or makes a serious


resistance;
The person assaulted is a
person in authority or his agent;
At the time of the assault, the
person in authority or his agent is
engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or that he is assaulted
by reason of the past performance of
official duties;
Offender knows that the one he
is assaulting is a person in authority or
his agent in the exercise of his duties.
There is no public uprising.

Any
person
who
assaults, strikes, wounds or in any other
manner offers violence to the person of an
ambassador or a public minister, shall be
subject to an additional penalty under R.A.
75.
In the first type of
direct assault, it is not necessary that the
offended party is a person in authority or
his agent.
If the offended party
is only an agent of a person in authority,
the force must be of a serious character as
to indicate a determination to defy the law
and its representative.
The force employed
need not be serious when the offended
party is a person in authority (reason:
penalty is even higher when the offender
lays hands upon a person in authority)
The intimidation or
resistance must be serious whether the
offended party is an agent only or he is a
person in authority.
To determine whether
a certain public officer is a person in
authority, look at his powers and duties
vested by law.
When
persons
in
authority or their agents descended to
matters of private nature, an attack made
by one against the other is not direct
assault, because they are not considered in
performance of official duties.
If the person in
authority or his agent provokes the
offender, there is no direct assault if
accused is acting in lawful self-defense.
Direct assault of the
second type may be committed by a public
officer, because the law considers it an
aggravating
circumstance
when
the
offender is a public officer or employee.

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Knowledge of the
accused that the victim is a person in
authority or his agent is essential. The
information must allege such knowledge.
It is not necessary
that the person in authority or his agent be
in the actual performance of official duty
when attacked or seriously intimidated.
Attack may be done
by reason of the performance of duty
means by reason of the past performance
of official duty, even if at the time of the
assault no official duty was being
discharged.
Evidence of motive is
important when the person in authority or
his agent is not in the actual performance
of duty when attacked.
Direct assault of the
second form is qualified when:
o
The
assault
is
committed with a weapon, or
o
The offender is a
public officer of employee, or
o
The offender lays
hands upon a person in authority.
The crime of slight
physical injuries is absorbed in direct
assault, because it is the necessary
consequence of the force or violence used.
Serious physical injuries, murder or
homicide may be complexed with direct
assault.
People vs. Beltran

Mayor Quirolgico and patrolman Tolentino went to the


Puzon compound to talk to Beltran and his companions to
surrender in connection with an incident where Beltran
shouted vulva of your mother to Alvarado and Urbi.
Mayor and patrolman suffered gunshot wounds and the
mayors son died due to a simultaneous discharge of gunfire
by the accused.
HELD: The accused are guilty of murder and double
attempted murder with direct assault (under the 2 nd form
of direct assault). The accused attacked and employed
force against the mayor and police while the latter were
engaged in the actual performance of duty and the accused
knew that they were assaulting persons in authority.

People vs. Dollantes


Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start a dance
when Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor
making a dance movement, brandishing a knife and
challenging everyone. The Barangay Captain approached
him and told him to stop and keep quiet. Dollantes and his
companions stabbed and eventually killed the Barangay
Captain.

HELD: The accused were guilty of Assault upon a person in


authority, resulting in Murder. The Barangay captain was in
the act of trying to pacify Dollantes who was making
trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death.
Hence, he was killed while in the performance of duties. A
Barangay Captain is a person in authority.
Bar Questions
Art. 148Direct Assault vs. Resistance &
Disobedience
(2001)
A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad
at X, one of his pupils, because of the latter's
throwing paper clips at his classmates, twisted his
right ear. X went out of the classroom crying and
proceeded home located at the back of the school.
He reported to his parents Y and Z what A had done
to him. Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school
building and because they were running and talking
in loud voices, they were seen by the barangay
chairman, B, who followed them as he suspected that
an untoward incident might happen. Upon seeing A
inside the classroom, X pointed him out to his father,
Y, who administered a fist blow on A, causing him to
fall down. When Y was about to kick A, B rushed
towards Y and pinned both of the latter's arms.
Seeing his father being held by B, X went near and
punched B on the face, which caused him to lose his
grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z shouted words
of encouragement at Y, her husband, and also
threatened to slap A. Some security guards of the
school arrived, intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z
so that they could be investigated in the principal's
office.
Before leaving, Z passed near A and threw a small
flower pot at him but it was deflected by B. a) What,
if any, are the respective criminal liability of X Y and
Z? (6%) b) Would your answer be the same if B were
a barangay tanod only? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the
physical injuries inflicted on B, the Barangay
Chairman, to be only slight and hence, would be
absorbed in the direct assault. A Barangay Chairman
is a person in authority (Art. 152, RPC) and in this
case, was performing his duty of maintaining peace
and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault
With Less Serious Physical Injuries for the fist blow on
A, the teacher, which caused the latter to fall down.
For purposes of the crimes in Arts. 148 and 151 of
the Revised Penal Code, a teacher is considered a
person in authority, and having been attacked by Y
by reason of his performance of official duty, direct
assault is committed with the resulting less serious
physical injuries completed. Z, the mother of X and
wife of Y may only be liable as an accomplice to the
complex crimes of direct assault with less serious
physical injuries committed by Y. Her participation
should not be considered as that of a coprincipal,
since her reactions were only incited by her
relationship to X and Y. as the mother of X and the
wife of Y.
b) If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of
laying hand on him, being an agent of a person in
authority only, would constitute the crime of
Resistance and Disobedience under Article 151, since
X, a high school pupil, could not be considered as
having acted out of contempt for authority but more

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of helping his father get free from the grip of B.


Laying hand on an agent of a person in authority is
not ipso facto direct assault, while it would always be
direct assault if done to a person in authority in
defiance to the latter is exercise of authority.
Art 148; Direct Assault; Teachers & Professors
(2002)
A, a lady professor, was giving an examination. She
noticed B, one of the students, cheating. She called
the student's attention and confiscated his
examination booklet, causing embarrassment to him.
The following day, while the class was going on, the
student, B, approached A and, without any warning,
slapped her. B
would have inflicted further injuries on A had not C,
another student, come to A's rescue and prevented B
from continuing his attack. B turned his ire on C and
punched the latter. What crime or crimes, if any, did
B commit?
Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for
slapping the professor, A, who was then conducting
classes and thus exercising authority; and another
one for the violence on the student C, who came to
the aid of the said professor.
By express provision of Article 152, in relation to
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, teachers and
professors of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance are deemed persons in
authority for purposes of the crimes of direct assault
and of resistance and disobedience in Articles 148
and 151 of said Code. And any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority shall be deemed an
agent of a person in authority. Accordingly, the attack
on C is, in the eyes of the law, an attack on an agent
of a person in authority, not just an attack on a
student.
Art 148; Persons in Authority/Agents of
Persons in Authority (2000)
Who are deemed to be persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Persons in authority are persons directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation,
board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay
chairmen are also deemed persons in authority.
(Article 152, RPC)
Agents of persons in authority are persons who
by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, are charged
with maintenance of public order, the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and
any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority (Art. 152, RPC), In applying the provisions
of Articles 148 and 151 of the Rev. Penal Code,
teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on
the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority.
(P.D. No. 299, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873).
Complex Crime; Direct Assault with murder
(2000)

Because of the approaching town fiesta in San


Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay
Camias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to
deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was
delivering his speech. B, one of the guests, went to
the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance
movements, brandishing a knife and challenging
everyone present to a fight. A approached B and
admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the
dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of
heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his
back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the
microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the
ground and died. At the time of the incident A was
not armed. What crime was committed? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The complex crime of direct
assault with murder was committed. A, as a
Barangay Captain, is a person in authority and was
acting in an official capacity when he tried to
maintain peace and order during the public dance in
the Barangay, by admonishing B to keep quiet and
not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion.
When B, instead of heeding A's advice, attacked the
latter, B acted in contempt and lawless defiance of
authority constituting the crime of direct assault,
which characterized the stabbing of A. And since A
was stabbed at the back when he was not in a
position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was
treachery in the stabbing. Hence, the death caused
by such stabbing was murder and having been
committed with direct assault, a complex crime of
direct assault with murder was committed by B.
Art 148; Direct Assault with murder (1995)
Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud
where he resided. Renato, a resident of the
neighboring Barangay Guihaman, also operated a
mobile rice thresher which he often brought to
Barangay Napnud to thresh the palay of the farmers
there. This was bitterly resented by Pascual, one
afternoon Pascual, and his two sons confronted
Renato and his men who were operating their mobile
rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A
heated argument ensued. A barangay captain who
was fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to appease
Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent
confrontation. However, Pascual resented the
intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him
to death. What crime was committed by Pascual?
Discuss fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide
with assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 148
and 249 in relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay
chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a person in authority
and if he is attacked while in the performance of his
official duties or on the occasion thereof the felony of
direct assault is committed. Art. 48, RPC, on the
other hand, provides that if a single act produces two
or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex
crime is committed. Here, the single act of the
offender in hacking the victim to death resulted in
two felonies, homicide which is grave and direct
assault which is less grave.

Article 149. Indirect assaults


Elements:
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31


1.
2.
3.

A person in authority or his agent is the


victim of any of the forms of direct assault
defined in Article 148;
A person comes to the aid of such authority
or his agent;
Offender makes use of force or intimidation
upon such person coming to the aid of the
authority or his agent.
Indirect assault can
be committed only when direct assault is
committed.

Article 151. Resistance and disobedience


to a person in authority or the agents of
such person

Elements

1.
Article 150. Disobedience to summons
issued by the National Assembly, its
committees or subcommittees, by the
Constitutional
Commission,
its
committees, subcommittees or divisions

Acts punished under


this article may also be punished for
contempt of the Congress.

2.
3.

of

resistance
disobedience:

and

A person in authority or his agent is


engaged in the performance of official duty
or gives a lawful order to the offender;
Offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person in authority or his agent;
The act of the offender is not included in
the provision of Articles 148, 149 and 150.

Acts punishable:

Elements of simple disobedience:

1.

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

By refusing, without legal excuse, to


obey summons of Congress, its special or
standing committees and subcommittees,
the Constitutional Commissions and its
committees, subcommittees or divisions, or
by any commission or committee chairman
or
member
authorized
to
summon
witnesses;
By refusing to be sworn or placed
under affirmation while being before such
legislative or constitutional body or official;
By refusing to answer any legal inquiry
or to produce any books, papers,
documents, or records in his possession,
when required by them to do so in the
exercise of their functions;
By restraining another from attending
as a witness in such legislative or
constitutional body;
By
inducing
disobedience
to
a
summons or refusal to be sworn by any
such body or official.
Reason
for
this
article: to give strength to the legislatures
power of inquiry, which is essential to
legislative functions.
This article will not
apply if the papers may be used in
evidence against the owner, because it
would be compelling him to be a witness
against himself.
Self-incrimination is a
valid excuse.
The testimony of the
person summoned must be upon matters
into which Congress has jurisdiction to
inquire.

2.
3.

serious

An agent of a person in authority is


engaged in the performance of official duty
or gives a lawful order to the offender;
Offender disobeys such agent of a
person in authority;
Such disobedience is not of a serious
nature.
The
disobedience
contemplated consists in the failure or
refusal to obey DIRECT ORDER from the
person in authority or his agent.
Under
simple
disobedience, the offended party must be
only an agent of a person in authority.
If
no
force
is
employed by the offender against a person
in authority, the crime is resistance or
serious disobedience under the first type.

Resistance or serious
disobedience
Person in authority or his
agent must be in actual
performance of his
duties
Committed only by
resisting or seriously
disobeying
Force employed is not so
serious, as there is no
manifest intention to
defy the law and the
officers

Direct assault
Person in authority or his
agent must be engaged
in the performance of
official duties or that he
is assaulted by reason
thereof
(2nd type) committed by
attacking, employing
force, seriously
intimidating or seriously
resisting
Attack or employment of
force must be serious
and deliberate. But if the
one resisted is a person
in authority, any degree
of force is direct assault.

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32

1.
Article 152.
Persons in authority and
Agents of persons in authority

A person in authority is one


directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court
or government corporation, board or
commission.
Vested with jurisdiction the
power and authority to govern and execute
the laws.
Examples
of
person
in
authority:
division superintendent of
schools, president of sanitary division (in a
municipality), teachers, mayor, justice of
peace, barangay captain and barangay
chairman
An agent of a person in
authority is one who, by direct provision of
law or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with (1) the
maintenance of public order and (2) the
protection and security of life and property.
Examples: barrio councilman,
barrio policeman, barangay leader, any
person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, sheriff, postmaster, agents of
BIR, municipal treasurer, policemen
Teachers,
professors
and
persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in
the
actual
performance
of
their
professional duties or on the occasion of
such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority for purposes of Articles
148
(direct
assault)
and
151
(disobedience). By implication, Article 149
(indirect assault) is also included.

Article
153.
Tumults
and
other
disturbances of public order tumultuous
disturbance or interruption liable to cause
disturbance

2.

3.
4.
5.

Acts punishable: Causing any serious


disturbance in a public place, office or
establishment;
Interrupting
or
disturbing
performances, functions or gatherings, or
peaceful meetings, if the act is not
included in Articles 131 and 132
Making any outcry tending to incite
rebellion or sedition in any meeting,
association or public place;
Displaying placards or emblems which
provoke a disturbance of public order in
such place;
Burying with pomp the body of a
person who has been legally executed.
If the act of disturbing or
interrupting
a
meeting
or
religious
ceremony is not committed by public
officers, or if committed by public officers
they are participants therein, this article
should be applied.
Outcry to shout subversive or
provocative words tending to stir up the
people to obtain by means of force or
violence any of the objects of rebellion or
sedition.
If the outcry is an unconscious
outburst
which
is
not
intentionally
calculated to induce others to commit
rebellion or sedition, it should be punished
under this article. If the offender made the
outcry with the thought of inducing his
hearers to commit rebellion or sedition,
then it is punished as inciting to
rebellion/sedition.
Persons causing disturbance of
a tumultuous character shall be imposed a
penalty next higher in degree
Tumultuous If caused by more
than three persons who are armed or
provided with means of violence

Article 154. Unlawful use of means of


publication and unlawful utterances
Acts punishable:
1.

2.

Publishing or causing to be published,


by means of printing, lithography or any
other means of publication, as news any
false news which may endanger the public
order; or cause damage to the interest or
credit of the State;
Encouraging disobedience to the law or
to the constituted authorities or praising,
justifying or extolling any act punished by
law, by the same means or by words,
utterances or speeches;
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3.

4.

Maliciously publishing or causing to be


published
any
official
resolution
or
document without proper authority, or
before they have been published officially
Printing, publishing or distributing (or
causing the same) books, pamphlets,
periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear
the real printers name, or which are
classified as anonymous.
may endanger means that
actual public disorder or actual damage to
the credit of the State is not necessary.
The offender must know that
the news is false, to be liable under this
article.
R.A.
248
prohibits
the
reprinting, reproduction or republication of
government
publications
and
official
documents without official authority.

Article 155. Alarms and scandals


Acts punishable:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Discharging
any
firearm,
rocket,
firecracker, or other explosive within any
town or public place, calculated to cause
(which produces) alarm of danger;
Instigating or taking an active part in
any charivari or other disorderly meeting
offensive to another or prejudicial to public
tranquility;
Disturbing the public peace while
wandering about at night or while engaged
in any other nocturnal amusements;
Causing any disturbance or scandal in
public
places
while
intoxicated
or
otherwise, provided Article 153 in not
applicable.
The discharge of firearm should
not be aimed at any person, otherwise the
offense is discharge of firearm under Article
254.
The act in the first paragraph
must produce alarm or danger as a
consequence.
Discharge of firecrackers or
rockets during fiestas not covered by this
article.
Charivari a medley of
discordant voices, a mock serenade of
discordant noises made on kettles, tins,
horns, etc. designed to annoy and insult.
If the disturbance is of serious
nature, the case falls under Article 153.

Article 156. Delivering prisoners from jail

Elements:
1.
2.

There is a person confined in a jail or


penal establishment;
Offender removes therefrom such
person, or helps the escape of such person.
Applies to any kind of prisoner,
whether detention prisoner or prisoner by
final judgment.
Violence,
intimidation
or
bribery increases the applicable penalty.
If the escape of the prisoner
takes place outside of said establishments
by taking the guards by surprise, the
penalty is the minimum period of that
prescribed.
What is the liability of the
prisoner who escapes?
o
If
he
is
a
detention prisoner, such person is not
criminally liable.
A prisoner is
criminally liable for leaving the penal
institution only when there is evasion
of service of sentence, which can be
committed only by a convict by final
judgment.
Alberto vs. Dela Cruz

Denaque escaped while working on the governors fence.


Petition to include as defendants Governor Cledera and
assistant provincial warden Esmeralda due to the belief
that they had a hand in the escape of Pablo Denaque.
Allegedly, the governor sent a note to Esmeralda asking for
five men to work on his fence.
HELD: The Governor and Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted
for the offense. It is necessary that the public officer
consented to or connived in the escape of the prisoner
under his custody. If the public officer charged with the
duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive,
then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the
crime. Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider. If
the offender is a public officer, then Article 223 applies.
Bar Question
Art 156; Delivery of Prisoners from Jail (2002)
A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital for
emergency medical treatment. His followers, all of
whom were armed, went to the hospital to take him
away or help him escape. The prison guards, seeing
that they were outnumbered and that resistance
would endanger the lives of other patients, deckled
to allow the prisoner to be taken by his followers.
What crime, if any, was committed by A's followers?
Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A's followers shall be liable as principals in the crime
of
delivery of prisoner from Jail (Art. 156, Revised Penal
Code). The felony is committed not only by removing
from any jail or penal establishment any person

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34

confined therein but also by helping in the escape of


such person outside of said establishments by means
of violence, intimidation, bribery, or any other
means.

Article 157.
sentence

Evasion

of

service

of

Elements:
1.
2.
3.

Offender is a convict by final judgment;


He is serving sentence which consists
in the deprivation of liberty;
He evades service of his sentence by
escaping
during
the
term
of
his
imprisonment.

Qualifying
imposed:

circumstances

as

to

penalty

If such evasion or escape takes place 1.


2.
3.
4.

By means of unlawful entry (this should


be by scaling if correct Spanish
translation is used);
By breaking doors, windows, gates,
walls, roofs or floors;
By using picklock, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation; or
Through
connivance
with
other
convicts or employees of the penal
institution.
Escape flee from, to avoid,
to get out of the way, as to flee to avoid
arrest.
Prisoners seen loitering a few
meters away from the city jail are not
considered to have escaped.
This article is applicable to a
sentence of destierro.

Destierro is a deprivation of liberty (though partial) and he


may escape from the restrictions of the penalty.
Bar Questions
Art 157; Evasion of Service of Sentence (1998)
Manny killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of
destierro during which he was not to enter the city.
While serving sentence, Manny went to Dagupan City
to visit his mother. Later, he was arrested in Manila.
1. Did Manny commit any crime? [3%]
2. If so, where should he be prosecuted? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Yes. Manny committed the crime of evasion of
service of sentence when he went to Dagupan City,
which he was prohibited from entering under his
sentence of destierro. A sentence imposing the
penalty of destierro is evaded when the convict
enters any of the place/places he is prohibited from
entering under the sentence or come within the
prohibited radius. Although destierro does not involve
imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of
liberty. (People vs. Abilong. 82 Phil. 172).
2. Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in
Manila where he was arrested. This is so because
evasion of service of sentence is a continuing
offense, as the convict is a fugitive from justice in
such case. (Parulan vs. Dir. of Prisons, L-28519, 17
Feb. 1968)

Article 158.
Evasion of service of
sentence on the occasion of disorders,
conflagrations, earthquakes, or other
calamities
Elements:
1.
2.

Tanega vs. Masakayan


Tanega was found guilty of slander. He failed to show up on
the day of the execution of the sentence imposed.
HELD: Under Article 157, escape should take place while
serving the sentence. For prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final judgment to commence to
run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment. Never placed in confinement, prescription
of penalty does not run in Tanegas favor.
People vs. Abilong
Abilong was sentenced to destierro by virtue of final
judgment for attempted robbery.
He violated this
judgment by going beyond the limits made against him, and
committed vagrancy.
HELD: Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence for
having violated the judgment of destierro against him.

3.

4.

Offender is a convict by final judgment,


who is confined in a penal institution;
There is disorder, resulting from
a.
conflagration;
b.
earthquake;
c.
explosion; or
d.
similar catastrophe; or
e.
mutiny in which he has not
participated;
He evades the service of his sentence
by leaving the penal institution where he is
confined, on the occasion of such disorder
or during the mutiny;
He fails to give himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation by the Chief
Executive announcing the passing away of
such calamity.
The offender must be a convict
by final judgment.
What is punished is not the
leaving of the penal institution, but the
failure of the convict to give himself up to
the authorities within 48 hours after the

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proclamation announcing the passing away


of the calamity.
If convict fails to give himself
up, he shall suffer and increase of 1/5 of
the time still remaining to be served under
the original sentence, not to exceed six
months.
If he gives himself up within 48
hours, he shall be entitled to 1/5 deduction
of the period of his sentence.
Mutiny organized unlawful
resistance to a superior officer, a sedition,
a revolt

Article 159. Other cases of evasion of


service
of
sentence
(Violation
of
conditional pardon)
Elements:
1.
2.
3.

Torres was convicted of estafa.


He was granted a
conditional pardon and was released. Subsequent to his
release, he was charged with 20 counts of estafa (cases
pending), was convicted of sedition (appeal pending) and
had a long list of crimes charged against him (grave
threats, grave coercion, swindling etc.)
HELD: Article 159 defines a distinct and substantive felony.
Under this article, the convict must be charged, prosecuted
and convicted by FINAL JUDGMENT before he can be made
to suffer the penalty in said article. In proceeding against
a convict who violated the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department may: 1) proceed against him under
Section 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code or 2)
proceed against him under this article of the RPC.

Article 160.
Commission of another
crime during service of the penalty
imposed for another previous offense
Elements:

Offender was a convict;


He was granted pardon by the Chief
Executive;
He violated any of the conditions of such
pardon.
A conditional pardon is a contract between
the Chief Executive and the convict. Since
it is a contract, the pardoned convict is
bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all
its consequences, not as he chooses, but
according to its strict terms.
If the penalty remitted does not exceed six
years, penalty for violation of this article is
prision correccional minimum.
If the
penalty remitted exceeds six years, the
penalty under this article is the unexpired
portion of the original sentence.
Condition that pardoned convict should not
commit another crime extends to offenses
punishable under special laws.
If there is a condition that convict shall not
commit another crime, offender must be
found guilty of a subsequent offense before
he can be prosecuted under this article.
The duration of the conditions in a pardon
would be limited to the remaining period of
the prisoners sentence, UNLESS an
intention to extend it beyond that time was
manifest from the nature of the condition
or the language in which it was imposed.
Violation of conditional pardon does not
cause harm or injury to the right of other
person nor does it disturb public order, it is
merely an infringement of the terms
stipulated in the contact between the Chief
Executive and the convict.

1.
2.

Offender was already convicted by final


judgment of one offense;
He committed a new felony before
beginning to serve such sentence or while
serving the same.
The second crime must be a
felony, that is, punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.
But the first crime for which the
offender is serving sentence need not be a
felony.
The new offense need not be of
different character from that of the old
offense.
Quasi-recidivism
does
not
require that the two offenses are embraced
in the same title in the RPC, unlike in
recidivism.
Reiteracion requires that the
offender has served out his sentences for
the prior offense. In quasi recidivism, the
offender is beginning to serve the sentence
or is already serving the sentence.
Quasi-recidivism
cannot
be
offset by ordinary mitigating circumstance,
because the article provides that the
offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the new felony.
A quasi-recidivist shall be
pardoned when he has reached 70 and has
already served out his original sentence, or
when he shall complete it after reaching
70, unless by reason of his conduct or
other circumstances, he shall not be
worthy of such clemency.
A quasi-recidivist may NOT be
pardoned even if he has reached 70 and

Torres vs. Gonzales

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer


36

has already served out his original


sentence, if he is a habitual criminal.
Take Note: Human Security Act of 2007
(RA 9372);

Define Terrorism;

Attempt/Conspiracy
Terrorism;

How principals, accomplices and


accessories are punished;

Surveillance and Interception of


suspected terrorist communication/
said communication considered
classified information;

Amount of damages paid to those


detained wrongfully (P500k/day),
taken from the budget of the
government agency who caused
his detention.

to

Commit

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer


37

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