SEVILLA vs.

CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006

PILAPIL vs. SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS:

FACTS:

A civil marriage was contracted by the parties

and thereafter a religious ceremony was conducted.
Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into
marriage with the respondent and alleges that he did
not procure a marriage license. Respondent averred
that the plaintiff took her away from her parents and
arranged a wedding for them.

Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino Citizen

and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German National were
married on Sept. 7, 1979 in Germany. After about
three and a half years of their marriage, Erich
initiated a divorce proceeding against the Petitioner.

Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and

respondent were separated; thereupon plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree and subsequently married
in the US. The plaintiff filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of their marriage for lack of marriage
license.
Certification of Civil Registrar stated that they
"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license
number is registered for the reason that the
employee handling is already retired. Our loaded
work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem."

On Jan. 5, 1986 the local court of Germany

promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery, alleging that while still
married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair
with certain William Chia and Jesus Chua. A motion
to quash was filed in the same case but which was
denied.
Hence, a petition was filed before the
Supreme Court contending that the complainant
cannot be qualified as an offended party since he
has already obtained a final divorce under his
national law prior to the filing of the case.

ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certifications from the
Local Civil Registrar stating that no Marriage License
was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage
as null and void ab initio.

Whether or not the adultery case against the

petitioner can prosper even after a divorce decree
was obtained in Germany.

HELD:

HELD:

In this case, the wordings of the Civil

Registrar belie the claim of diligent search.
Therefore, if a marriage certificate is missing, and all
means HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED to find
it, then the marriage is presumed to exist.

In the present case, the fact that private

respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Finally, the rule is settled that every

intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage
is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

Under the same considerations and rationale,

private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371
November 3, 2000

G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005
FACTS:

FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was
married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of
war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was
naturalized by the United States. After the liberation
of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife
to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant
and was having an adulterous relationship.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for
divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived
together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo
on his last will and testament bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a
petition for letters administration over Lorenzos
estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal,
the decision was modified declaring Alicia as coowner of whatever properties they have acquired.

In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myro Villanueva in Lam-an,Ozamis City. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as
an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then remarried. Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a
petition for Authority to Remarry invoking Article 26
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted
the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the present recourse where the
Solicitor General argues that the subject provision
applies in case of a valid mixed marriage between a
Filipino citizen and an alien.

Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled
to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing
to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO

Whether or not the respondent can remarry

under Art. 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the

divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to

remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to
prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred
from remarrying.
TSOI CHI MING vs. CA
G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997

children based on the universal principle that

procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
SANTOS vs. CA
G.R. No. 112019
January 4, 1995

FACTS:
Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May
22, 1988. According to Gina, since the time of their
marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. They
submitted themselves for medical examinations.
Gina was found healthy & normal while that of her
husband
was
kept
confidential.
She claims that her husbands a homosexual who
married her to maintain his residency status and to
prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it
is Gina who refuses to have sexual intercourse.
Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological
incapacity. New medical examination proved that Chi
Ming is capable of having sexual intercourse. Lower
court & CA decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Hence, the instant petition.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant
Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18
1988, Julia left for the U.S. to work as a nurse
despite Leouls opposition. . In 1990, Leouel got the
chance to be in the US due to a military training.
During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife
but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have
his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage
due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouels
petition is however denied by the lower and appellate
court.
Before the SC, Leouel argues that the failure
of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life.

ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged refusal of both the
spouses to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

Whether or not psychological incapacity is

attendant to the case at bar.

HELD:

HELD:

If a spouse, although physically capable but

simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.

Psychological
incapacity
characterized
by (a)
gravity,
antecedence, and (c) incurability.

Evidently, one of the essential marital

obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate

must
be
(b)
juridical

Psychological incapacity should refer to no

less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the
Family Code include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.

The intendment of the law has been to

confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
FACTS:
On 14 April 1985 Roridel Olaviano was
married to Reynaldo Molina in Manila, and gave birth
to a son a year after. After a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to spend
more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances.
In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel
and as a result their relationship was estranged.
Roridel quit her work and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he
abandoned them.
Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. On 14
May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void.
TheSolicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals but it was denied. Hence, the present
recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conflicting personalities
should be construed as psychological incapacity.
HELD:

Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"

and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The following are the guidelines as to the
grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and
clinically inclined.
Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of
the marriage
Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the
person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as
well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court
or the Catholic Church must be respected
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the
fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
MARCOS vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda Marcos and defendant Wilson
Marcos were married twice on 6 September 1982
and on 8 May 1983.They had five children.
After the downfall of President Marcos, the
respondent left the military service in 1987.
Consequently, due to the respondents failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the
petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were already
living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment
of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the Family Code.
The court a quo found the respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC because psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality
of the evidence presented

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos
failure to find work to support his familyand his
violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos
and
their
children
constituted psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The totality of the respondents acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration.
NAVARRO vs. NAVARRO
G.R. No. 162049
April 13, 2007
Petitioner and respondent were college
sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in
civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their
first child. Since petitioner was still a medical
student, while respondent was a student of
pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on
whom they were financially dependent. Eventually,
their union bore four children.
He filed the petition for nullification of their
marriage when he found out their eldest daughter
had been made pregnant by a man whom
respondent hired to follow him. He concluded that

respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to

perform the marital obligations.
For the respondents part, respondent
refused to submit to the psychiatric examination
asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so
only when her defense requires it. She averred that
she had no marital problems, not until petitioner had
an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas.
Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated that
early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila inside
the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation
ensued. On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that
petitioner and respondent were both psychologically
incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the
ground of the parties psychological incapacity.
HELD:
We categorically said that psychological
incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. These include the obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
In the present case, the spouses frequent
squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with
petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity.
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that
the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.