G.R. No.

168852

RTC RULING: dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground

that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the
well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."

September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and
Respondents.*

JUANITA L.

TAN,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven)
were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra
Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parentsin-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before
the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance
of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A.
No. 9262.

Petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that

the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader
interests of substantial justice and due process.
Respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly
broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition
for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under
the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law
ISSUE:
W/N RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE
PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004"?
HELD:

Petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to respondents' Motion to

Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under
a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence.

YES!
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and

their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the
Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have
suppletory application.
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to

said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262.
For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally
or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the following acts:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private

places;

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied
in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such
as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the

woman or her child against her/his will;

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8

of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the

woman or her child;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm

to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x.

her alone.

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may
include

Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture

of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed
on the figure. The senders cellphone number, stated in the message,
was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised
that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003.

G.R. No. 182835

April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Private Respondent-complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province.
Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards
the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a
live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke
up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and
tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the
woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told
Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to
get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 09218084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he
sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in
text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum
ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted
Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture
and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a
motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting
police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While
Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
"Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and
computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift
the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of
another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question had two distinct
irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face
had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it

had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a
computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from
Rustan.
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible,
given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that
she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish
for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is
evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out
of human nature and experience."
On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a
decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion
for reconsideration.

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The

crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:

ISSUE:

xxxx

W/N accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the

picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting
anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation
of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262?

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or

through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:

HELD:

xxxx

YES!
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he
has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the
crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or

series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship
from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating
relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter
"refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give
their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was
Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself . It is doubtful if the
woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show
on them.

G.R. No. 182367

December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D.
Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in
P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in thepro-forma complaint, Dolina
added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for
their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latters Certificate of
Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the childs father. The petition also
asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to
withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was
essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses; that he was not the childs father; that the
signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his;
that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to
acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that
Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since

no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and

granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the
giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she
first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a
prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for
review directly with this Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support for her
child.
HELD:
YES!
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her
child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the
protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse
or violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife
and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order
and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her
child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this
was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child
ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action
was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being
that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based
on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina
shall have proved his relation to him. 7 The childs remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory

recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of

obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly
file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition
may be integrated and resolved.11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have
dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial
declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since
the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by
Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled
to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the
bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission
lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the
petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases
involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative fathers legitimate family. Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and
denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of
birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.

G.R. No. 140604

March 6, 2002

DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner, City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City,

was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime
of Sexual Harassment,
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged;
hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred
that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of
petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father
and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor
that the City Health Office had just then filled up the vacant positions
for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father
returned to the City Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner
that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in
December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro,
where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine
oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of
petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family
planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could
interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a
number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she
already had a boyfriend, she said "no." Petitioner suggested that perhaps
if her father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her
answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave.
Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her
his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He "hypothetically" asked
whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to
intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would
be the subject of a "research" program. She was requested to be back
after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet
dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so
"confused." When she got to the office, petitioner made several
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any

available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a
job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed
hesitation if a physical examination would include "hugging" her but
petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then
invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street
so that people would not see them on board the same car together. Soon,
at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got
in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping
by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the
car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her
bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it.
Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said
"no." Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he
might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research.
Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh.
He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair.
Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and instinctively pulled her pants
up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying
words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her
forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes
or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her
navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did,
she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him
angrily that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell
anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the
car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then
handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr.
Jacutin and the money he gave her but she did not give the rest of the
story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and instructed
her to return it. In the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to
the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she was not able to see
him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to give back the
money but petitioner refused to accept it.

A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December
1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating
the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some
psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for
counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her
sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to
be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow
Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration
was due to post trauma stress.
***Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that
on 28 November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see him in
his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a
boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee
introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed her wish to join the City
Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy in his office,
adding that only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city
personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged
incident happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards
in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said
she went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the
office for he was scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a
hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He
submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that
the complaint for sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed
against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela
Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding the accused,
Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877.
Hence this instant recourse.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 7877 is applicable to this situation.

HELD:
YES! The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious.
Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee."
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing
city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in
the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed,
petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment.
Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on
the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City
Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu,

petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo,

Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health
nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse
behavior by petitioner.

G.R. No. 135981

January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by

petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on
Awards; the court a quo said:

PANGANIBAN, J.:

"There are some observations which the Court would like to point
out on the evidence adduced by the defense, particularly in the
Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by
witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for
acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS),
which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,
however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was
no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her
by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not
indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,6 no cogent reasons having been
sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the
credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of
its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand,
an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife
Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage,
Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels
became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came
home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim
were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant
was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the
victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense
and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court

allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the
cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the
time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to
take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the

so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tensionbuilding phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil,
loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION

of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered
woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme
Court as part of the records.

First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven

to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner.

ISSUE:
W/N appellant herein can validly invoke the battered
woman syndrome as constituting self defense?

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense

arising from the battered woman syndrome.

Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of

the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.

W/N treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa?

HELD:
1. NO! The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to
prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern
for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as
a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation,
she is defined as a battered woman.

Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of

self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of
violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant
proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled
in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided

must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised
Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent
danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or
even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He
was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and
obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be
clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of
facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of
the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as
a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which

the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO.
Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must
be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose
of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that
might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of
the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life
and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for
parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating
circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more
than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A.
9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that
"xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil

liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for

justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.xxx"

June 25, 2013

demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade

private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working
part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and
prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact
that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point
threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a
bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother
of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private
respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private

respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook
her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann,
who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he
blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped
her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner,
Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows
up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private
respondent.11

G.R. No. 179267

FACTS:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34
years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three
(3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural
child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone
J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife,
whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner,
who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to

the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son
bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking
her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven
(7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized
or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been

undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant

medications.12

respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had

helped raise to millions of pesos.17

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank

that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got
angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his
things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family
home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair
since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child
with her.13

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of

violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is

afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes
on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to

the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial
of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with
the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the JBros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of
the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
P100,000.00.

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the

construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations
326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than
P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use
of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together
with the bills for utilities.15

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved for the modification

of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00

from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances
and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the
corporations.16After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until
the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros

Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president,
with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van
used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen
with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but
subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support;
failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed
another application24for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two
men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the
boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and JoAnn subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for
violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by
the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came
about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside
a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period
of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30
however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion
to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated
October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been
issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion
for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in
futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEBSP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining

order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being

violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional
issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack
on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been
denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now
before us alleging that

ISSUE:
Constitutionality of RA. 9262?
HELD:
CONSTITUTIONAL!
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of
the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition filed
by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts
will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.40
It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."46
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed
the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).

violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be

denied protection under the same measure.
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the
real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained
in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as
erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment
or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of
the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough
basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61
which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa
Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally
proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 providing
protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the
same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of

equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is
not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should
be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find
that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter
be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause
by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In
the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the

women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its
most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself.
If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle
of
women
for
equality
but
will
be
its
118
fulfillment." Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it
should be, sustained.