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Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of

Stephen Reicher, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
John Drury, School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract
In this article, we rst review classic models of crowd and collective psychology, second outline a contemporary approach to
crowd phenomena based on social identity theorizing, and third apply this approach to understand the dynamics of social
conict and social change. We nish by arguing that crowd and collective psychology needs to be moved from the periphery
to the center of social psychology and the social sciences and that its continuing exclusion reects a tendency to underrepresent and undervalue resistance to and change of the existing social order.

Introduction
The term collective behavior has many different meanings in
different disciplines. It has variously been used to refer to the
behavior of the masses in society, to publics or groups organized around a particular issue, to social movements which are
organized to effect change around an issue, and to crowds
which are physically copresent groups characteristically (but
not necessarily) organized around some event (such as
a sporting crowd) or some shared concern (such as a protest
crowd).
Psychologists, however, have generally concentrated on the
last of these meanings. Collective behavior and crowds become
largely synonymous. This is the position we shall follow here.
Additionally we shall use the term collective action to refer to
instances where crowd members act together in a coordinated
way.
The psychological study of crowds and collective action
attests to a profound conservatism at the core of the discipline.
Crowds have tended to be feared and reviled as a threat to the
status quo in society. They are an eruption of the primitive, the
passionate, and the pathological which has the potential to
shatter the order and reason of everyday life.
This leads to two problems: one of commission and one of
omission. On the one hand, where crowds and collective action
are studied, they are viewed as something exotic and exceptional which reveals the breakdown of ordinary psychological
processes and hence has little to tell us about these processes.
On the other hand, when it does come to the bread and butter
issues that dominate the discipline, crowds and collective
action are all but ignored. In psychology we are predominantly
concerned with what individuals see, think, and feel and our
interventions are designed to change perceptions, cognitions,
and emotions. Collective action, it appears, has no place in this
at all.
Here, we will examine the traditional psychology of crowds
and collective action, how it came into being, and what it has to
say about these phenomena. We will then outline a body of
recent work which challenges the pathologizing perspective of
this traditional work and which shows collective action to be
meaningful, purposeful, and both reecting and also changing
the perspectives of participants. Moreover, we will point to the
ways in which collective action plays a pivotal role in shaping

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 4

the perspectives which regulate mundane social life. We will


conclude by examining how, despite this, collective action is
excluded from mainstream social psychological analysis partly
through the way in which change and collective resistance is
ignored in the discipline and partly through the way that, even
when change is addressed, it is treated more in terms of individual changes among the privileged than in terms of the
collective action of the oppressed.
Overall, we shall argue that any social psychology which
recognizes the unequal and contested nature of social reality,
and which is open to the possibility of social change, must
move the study of crowds and collective action from the
periphery to the center of the discipline.

Studying Crowds and Collective Action


The Origins of Collective Psychology
There are three layers of inuence which shaped the emergence
of a systematic collective psychology, predominantly in France,
in the late nineteenth century. First, through the centuries, there
has been a constant ow of elite invective directed at the crowd.
Emblematic is a comment by the Danish philosopher, Soren
Kierkegaard: you must be aware of the opinion of the masses
in order to know what to do: the opposite (cited in Reiwald,
1949: p. 325. Translation by the authors). Second, the industrialization of western Europe through the nineteenth century
led to a rapid growth of the masses, concentrated in the cities.
This posed an urgent question of social order: would the
masses accept their place or would they rise up and overthrow
the existing order (Giner, 1976)? Moreover, if the masses in
general were a cause of concern, the crowd, as the mass in
action, was a particularly rich repository of elite fears (Barrows,
1981). Third, some countries were less stable than others and
more vulnerable to mass agitation. Notably, the elites of the
French Third Republic were permanently on guard against
a wave of oppositional mobilizations: clerical, populist, and,
above all, politically radical (Nye, 1975).
Of all the early crowd psychologists, one name stands out,
that of Gustave Le Bon. This is less because of his theoretical
originality (Le Bon was an expert synthesizer of others ideas)
and more because of his practical and activist bent. Whereas
other authors simply noted and bemoaned what they saw to be

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Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of

the dangerous and destructive tendencies of the crowd, Le


Bons project was to use his understanding in order to harness
the power of the crowd for the elite and against the radicals. His
book The Crowd (1895/1947) reads like a primer on how to
manipulate crowds. It was enormously successful, inuencing
the like of Mussolini, Goebbels, and Hitler, and has been
described as the most inuential psychology text of all time
(Moscovici, 1980).

Classic Crowd Psychology: Debating the Site of Pathology


For Le Bon, crowd psychology is a litany of loss. When people
become submerged in a crowd, they lose their individual identity, the source of their standards, and values. Hence they lose
their ability to judge and reason. As a consequence, crowds are
marked by contagion whereby people simply go along with any
passing idea or (because people become incapable of dealing
with complex concepts) any passing emotion. These impulses
largely derive from an underlying racial unconsciousness which
remains once our conscious personalities cease to function.
Because this unconsciousness is atavistic and primitive, the
behavior of crowds is primitive, sometimes heroic, but above all
destructive. Crowd members, having lost their selves and their
minds, also lose their morality. People descend several rungs on
the ladder of civilization upon entering the crowd, avers Le Bon.
Ordinarily reasonable people become senseless beasts. These
ideas have ltered into, and continue to inuence modern social
psychology through the notion of deindividuation (for
a critique see Reicher et al., 1995).
However inuential Le Bons ideas may have been outside
psychology, in many ways his greatest inuence inside the
discipline came through those who reacted against them.
Notably, Floyd Allport used a large part of his foundational text
Social Psychology (rst published in 1924) to refute Le Bons
ideas. He denounced the idea of a racial unconscious or
indeed any notion of mind separate from the individual as
a nonsense. He argued that there is no psychology of groups
which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals (1924: p. 4). And, most famously, he insisted that the
individual in the crowd behaves just as he would alone only
more so (p. 295).
While the details of Allports crowd psychology have been
largely forgotten, the individualism that he championed has,
over time, become orthodoxy throughout social psychology. In
crowd research it takes the form of convergence models (cf
Turner and Killian, 1972), which propose that the character of
crowd action derives from personal characteristics of crowd
members. Specically, violent and antisocial crowds reect the
convergence of violent antisocial or riot prone individuals, the
so-called riffraff of society (e.g., US Riot Commission, 1968).
If Le Bons position can be characterized in terms of the
crowd rendering people mad, so Allports position can be
characterized in terms of the crowd as an assembly of the bad.
And despite the apparent opposition between the two
perspectives, they share a number of fundamental assumptions
in common. Both view individual identity or personality as the
sole basis for reasoned action. Both see the operation of
a reasoning self as lacking in the crowd. Where they differ is
whether this lack derives from the crowd process itself (Le Bon)
or the nature of the individuals who are attracted to the crowd

(Allport). Traditional crowd psychology of whichever variant


sees crowds as pathological, the difference lies in whether the
site of this pathology lies at the collective or the individual
level.
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of these ideas is
that they cannot explain the empirical characteristics of
collective action. While both Le Bon and Allport suggest that
crowds are characteristically and indiscriminately violent, the
historical record tells a very different story. Not only do very
few crowd events result in violence but even when they do,
behavior is highly patterned. What is more, these patterns are
highly meaningful in terms of social belief systems. A case in
point is Daviss analysis of the St Bartholomews Day massacre
of 1572 (Davis, 1978). This event, the culmination of French
religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, was
extremely brutal. Members of each side killed members of the
other. Catholics then concentrated on desecrating Protestant
bodies, while Protestants concentrated more on desecrating the
objects of the holy mass. This, Davis argues reects the fact that,
in the struggle over imposing the true doctrine, Catholics saw
heresy as residing in the individual Protestant, whereas Protestants saw heresy as residing more in the rites of Catholicism
the demonic mass. Albeit in the most brutal of manners, each
side literally inscribed its beliefs upon the opponent.
The question, then a question which classic crowd
psychology cannot answer is how can crowd members come
together, often spontaneously and in unstructured gatherings,
yet still act in coherent and meaningful ways? The obvious
answer is that they are governed by social norms, and that is
indeed the approach of emergent norm theory (Turner and
Killian, 1972). According to ENT, crowd events begin with
a period of milling during which prominent individuals
(keynoters) determine norms of behavior. But the theory does
not explain what does and does not become normative (beyond
rooting it in the personal charisma of keynoters and their
interpersonal interactions with crowd members). Hence, while
ENT can explain the restrained and patterned nature of crowd
action, it provides no basis for explaining how the local norms
developed in the event connect to larger belief systems and
hence it cannot account for the socially meaningful nature of
these patterns. It is precisely this issue which led to the development of social identity models which have come to dominate
the study of crowds and collective action in recent decades.

Social Identity and Collective Action


The starting point for social identity researchers is a reformulation of the concept of self. Rather than being a singular entity,
selfhood is a system that operates at different levels of
abstraction. At different times and places, different elements of
the system become salient and guide what we think and do
(Turner et al., 1987). Specically, we can either think of
ourselves in terms of what makes us, as individuals, distinctive
from other individuals (I vs you personal identity) or in
terms of what makes the various groups that we belong to
different from other groups (we vs they social identity).
Moreover, when a given social identity (associated with
a specic group membership, such as Catholic) is salient, we
behave in terms of the beliefs and values that characterize that
group.

Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of


The concept of social identity has been proposed as an
antecedent of participation in collective action (thus we are
more likely to participate when we identify with a social group,
believe that we have to struggle for the rights of the group; feel
angry because we consider that the group suffers from unfair
social disadvantage; and also believe that, as a group, we have
the power to rectify that disadvantage see van Zomeren et al.,
2012). It has also been studied as a consequence of collective
participation (both in terms of the content of identity and the
strength of attachment to the group see Drury and Reicher,
2009). Most of all, however, it has been used to account for
the nature of collective action itself, and to contest the pathological perspective of classic crowd psychology.
The starting point for social identity accounts lies in a shift
(rather than a loss) of identity when people become crowd
members. They begin to perceive themselves in terms of social
rather than personal identity. This is at the root of three
psychological transformations. First, there is a cognitive transformation. Thus, people begin to evaluate their interests and
their priorities in relation to group-level beliefs and values
(Reicher, 2001). Given the ambiguous and novel circumstances
that attend many crowd events, however, this is not a matter of
mechanically applying predetermined rules of action. Instead,
it is a matter of developing situational norms that translate
superordinate categorical beliefs into contextually appropriate
behavior. So, there needs to be a process of norm construction,
as suggested in Turner and Killians emergent norm theory.
However, critically, only those proposals which are seen as
consonant with identity beliefs are liable to become normative
and have inuence at the collective level. This explains how the
patterns of crowd behavior, albeit based on locally elaborated
norms, reect broader belief systems (Reicher, 1984).
Second, there is a relational transformation. This derives less
from the fact that people start to see themselves as group
members and more that they start to see each other as fellow
group members. They cease to regard those around them as
other and more as one of us. This increases the closeness
between crowd members: shared identity in the crowd leads to
greater trust, respect, cooperation, and mutual support for
a review, see Reicher and Haslam, 2009. Such closeness,
combined with a common perspective on the world, allows
crowd members to align their efforts, to become more organizationally effective and hence more powerful (Reicher,
2011).
The combination of these two transformations is at the root
of a third emotional transformation. Many authors, including Le
Bon, have focused on the passionate nature of crowds. Durkheim coined the term effervescence to denote the zzing
bubbling excitement of such events. In contrast to Le Bon,
though, who considered that heightened emotionality ows
from the loss of reason, Durkheim (1912/1995) saw effervescence as owing from the ability of people to express their ideas
in the crowd. This latter approach is very much in-line with
social identity accounts. Thus both the development of
a common perspective and the development of intimate and
empowering social relations between crowd members are in
themselves a source of positive emotions. However, in
combination, these two factors enable people to enact their
collective worldview, to translate beliefs and priorities into
lived social practice even against the opposition of others. It is

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this, which has been termed collective self-objectication


(Drury and Reicher, 2009), which is a crucial source of positive
affect (Reicher, 2011).
Far from being mindless and meaningless, crowds are one
of the few contexts in which people have both the inclination
and the ability to express their social identities in full (Reicher,
2001). Far from being peripheral to everyday social process,
crowds provide a privileged site in which to explore the identities that underpin our everyday lives. However, to leave the
analysis at that is to miss three crucial things about crowds.
First, thus far we have discussed crowds and collective action in
terms of a set of people who share a common identity.
However, many collective gatherings may involve people who
lack shared identity (say shoppers in a high street) or else
a number of different groups sharing different identities (say
fans of different clubs at a football match). Second, we have
examined how collective action is based on the nature of the
relevant social identities. However crowds do not just reect
existing social identities and social realities, but they are also
a source of change both at individual and social levels (Dixon
et al., 2012). Third, our discussion has focused on intragroup
processes the transformations which happen within crowds.
Yet, as the discussion of collective self-objectication has intimated, crowd events are characteristically intergroup affairs.
As we shall show next, the elaborated social identity model
of crowds (ESIM; Drury and Reicher, 2009) seeks to connect
these three elements by analyzing how categories are formed
and how identities change through the intergroup dynamics of
crowd events.

Intergroup Dynamics and Social Change: An ESIM of Crowd


Action
As we have seen, different approaches to crowds turn on
different conceptions of the nature and dynamics of selfhood
is self-lost in the crowd (Le Bon), accentuated in the crowd
(Allport), or else shifted from the personal to the social level?
Likewise, the ESIM begins by elaborating the very notion of
social identity that underpins social identity analyses of
collective action. That is, the construct is dened as a model
of our position in a set of social relations along with the actions
which are proper and possible in that position. Social identity,
then, is a rich representation of social reality. To dene oneself
as black, for instance, is to see the world in terms of racialized
categories, to be subordinated and oppressed, and to be constrained in ones ability to ourish by the acts of powerful white
individuals and institutions.
This denition makes the denition of identity into an
interactive accomplishment. Our social identity depends not
only upon the way we see ourselves but also how we are
positioned by others. Most of the time, the way we see
ourselves and the way we are seen by others coincide. Hence
our interactions consolidate our social position and our sense
of self. However, there are times in some crowd contexts where
there is an asymmetry between auto- and hetero-perceptions.
When that happens we can see dramatic changes in the social
identities of crowd members (Drury and Reicher, 2009).
One example of such change occurs in heterogeneous
crowds which consist of a plurality of social groups some of
whom see themselves as positively aligned with the authorities

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Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of

in general and the police in particular, others who see themselves as in an antagonistic relationship to the police and
authorities. To the extent that the police themselves see the
entire crowd as antagonistic and to the extent that they use their
power to act on this perception (for instance, using coercive
tactics to contain or disperse the crowd as a whole), then
a series of consequences are set in motion.
First, those in the crowd who previously saw themselves as
aligned with the authorities are repositioned as antagonistic
and hence begin to redene themselves, their relationship with
the authorities and with fellow crowd members. They begin to
see the police as an oppressive out-group acting in illegitimate
and oppressive ways. Next, whereas the crowd as a whole was
previously segmented into separate groups, their common
positioning by the police leads to the emergence of a sense of
shared identity and hence the sense of solidarity and empowerment described above. This sense of empowerment enables
crowd members to challenge what they see as oppressive crowd
action. Finally, the actions of the crowd conrm and consolidate the original police perceptions of the crowd as a homogeneous danger. In this way, a spiral of escalating radicalization
in the crowd and of escalating conict between crowd members
and the police is set in motion (for analyses of such dynamics,
see Stott and Drury, 2000; Stott et al., 2001).
As can be seen, this dynamic sets in train a whole series of
changes. Most obviously, it changes participants sense of their
social position and hence their social identity. As a consequence, it changes the way in which people see their relationship with others not just the police and authorities. Most
immediately, members of the crowd who might previously
have been seen as other come to be seen as fellow crowd
members. Thus Drury charts how an antiroad building
campaign was initially split between locals and seasoned
environmentalist campaigners. Locals viewed the environmentalists with suspicion, as unrespectable and as outsiders.
However common experiences of harsh policing led to the
formation of a single category and to intimate in-group relations between erstwhile opponents (Drury and Reicher, 2009).
Such recategorization was not limited to the actual participants
in the local campaign. More generally, locals came to see
others involved in antiroad campaigns around the country and
in conict with the authorities as in a similar social position to
themselves and hence as part of a broad oppositional category. As a result, support and solidarity for their struggles
developed. The emergence of more global categories both
within the specic campaign and more generally went hand
in hand with a greater sense of empowerment and hence
a greater condence in taking action (Drury and Reicher, 2009).
Willingness to take action was not just a matter of
empowerment. It is also derived from a reconceptualization of
what the campaign was all about and hence a change in
understanding as to what constituted success. Whereas, to
begin with, the locals saw the campaign as a matter of
convincing reasonable authorities to protect their community,
as they began to see the authorities as unreasonable and
antagonistic, so they saw the mere act of resistance and exposing
the nature of the State as a crucial achievement in the longerterm campaign. Hence, even if the road was built through the
community, the campaign could still be seen as part of a longerterm success in terms of changing government roads policy.

In detailing these various dimensions of change, ESIM does


not suggest that crowds always or even often result in
change. To the contrary, the model species stringent conditions which must be satised for change to occur: (1) there
must be an asymmetry between the self-perceptions of crowd
members and the hetero-perceptions of observers; (2) the
observer group must have and use their power to impose their
perspective on crowd members and hence reposition them in
practice. What is more, for the change process to become a selfreinforcing cycle, (3) as a result of observer action and recategorization within the crowd, members must in turn feel
empowered to impose their new perspective upon the observer
group. ESIM thereby helps to explain both when change does
and does not occur. The model addresses the potential for
change in and through crowds a crucial requirement for any
adequate psychology of collective action.
Equally, ESIM does not suggest that change, when it does
occur, always goes in the same direction and leads to increased
antagonism or radicalization. It follows from the model that,
where crowd members see police and authorities as an antagonistic out-group but are seen and treated by the police as
being respectable and reasonable members of the general
community, so there may be shift in identity and action toward
inclusion and harmony (Stott et al., 2008).
Finally, ESIM, although specically developed through the
study of crowds, also addresses a whole series of issues which
are central to psychology in general: the nature of identity, our
perceptions and evaluations of in-groups and others, and our
sense of efcacy and its relationship to action. Irrespective of
the particular merits or demerits of the model itself it recognizes the crowd as a particularly valuable site in which to study
the interactive processes which underpin social understanding
and social action.

The Continuing Exclusion of Collective Action


Conformity Bias and the Neglect of Collective Resistance
In recent years, there have been some signs of a growing interest
in collective action in social psychology (e.g., van Zomeren and
Klandermans, 2011). However, rst, the majority of the work
concerns the factors that lead people to participate in various
forms of protest action and not in the nature or dynamics of
what happens when people do actually gather together.
Second, for all its growth, collective action remains a niche
topic, rarely if ever invoked when more central issues in the
discipline (such as intergroup relations, prejudice, and stereotyping) are addressed.
Part of the reason for this can be put down to a strong
conformity bias which has marked and continues to mark social
psychology (see Moscovici, 1976). This suggests that people
generally follow those with status and power. It implies that social
understandings are consensual rather than contested. It rules out
a study of how people challenge and resist dominant points of
view. As we shall see, it is through the neglect of resistance that the
importance of collective action is likewise obscured.
Perhaps the most powerful examples of conformity bias can
be found in two of the best known studies in all of psychology,
Milgrams obedience studies (Milgram, 1974) and Zimbardos
Stanford Prison experiment (Haney et al., 1973). The former is

Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of


generally represented as showing that people will obey the
orders of an authority gure, no matter how extreme. The
Zimbardo experiment is popularly represented as showing that,
even without overt orders, people naturally slip into their
assigned roles: those assigned to the position of a guard in
a simulated prison setting rapidly became brutal. Those
assigned to the role of a prisoner became passive and increasingly disturbed.
Yet, in contrast to the received accounts, closer inspection
tells a very different picture. Both studies are replete with
examples of resistance and of people rejecting orders and roles
(see Smith and Haslam, 2012 for detailed critiques of both
studies). Obedience varies from 0% to almost 100% in
different versions of Milgrams studies, so it is very far from
automatic. Equally, in Zimbardos study, many guards resisted
their role, refusing to be brutal and even siding with the prisoners. The prisoners also resisted their allotted position and
challenged the guards throughout the study.
What is more, in both studies, the resistance was most likely
and most effective when people had collective support. In
Milgrams studies, only 10% of participants went up to 450v
when they were in the company of two others who dissented.
In Zimbardos study, the dissent was greatest at the start
because the prisoners acted in a coordinated manner. This
analysis is supported by the results of the BBC Prison Study
which demonstrated that the extent to which participants dissented from and were willing to challenge the system was
a function of their degree of shared identication with and
expected support from fellow group members (Reicher and
Haslam, 2006).
Of course, it is arguable that the degree of resistance that was
found reects the articial nature of such studies and that, in
the real world, resistance is rarely found in prisons and other
situations of extreme inequality. But in fact dissent and even
prisoner control is easily found in even the most extreme
carceral (see Haslam and Reicher, 2012 for examples). In the
real world, as in psychological studies, such resistance is
dependent upon the development of shared identity, mutual
support, and effective coordination among the subordinated
and oppressed. All in all, the possibility of resistance is always
present, however repressive the defense of the status quo. And
the emergence of resistance is characteristically bound up with
the emergence of collective action. To privilege conformity and
stability in everyday life over resistance and change is therefore
to obscure the incidence and the signicance of collective
action in the formation and reformation of groups and intergroup relations.

The Decollectivization of Social Change


It would be wrong, however, to suggest that mainstream social
psychology ignores social change. In the period since World
War II, the question of prejudice and how to reduce it has been
at the very core of social psychology. The dominant approach
to the issue of prejudice reduction has been work on the effects
of contact between groups. Drawing upon Gordon Allports
foundational text (Allport, 1954), the question has been how
and under what conditions contact (notably between black and
white people) leads to more positive attitudes. By now there is
an overwhelming amount of evidence that contact will

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generally lead to greater liking between dominant and subordinate group members (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Such
ndings have led researchers to conclude that contact is the
royal road to change our unequal society. But there is
a problem with this work. It does not lie so much in the welldocumented link between contact and liking, but in the
assumption of a link between liking and social change. Indeed
there are a variety of reasons for thinking that liking may not
improve relations of social inequality (Dixon et al., 2012).
There is ample evidence that dominant group members can
like their subordinates without believing that they should be
equals or indeed supporting moves toward equality (Dixon
et al., 2012). This is most obvious in the case of gender relations: men can like women while treating them as inferiors
something that is encapsulated in the notion of benevolent
sexism (Glick and Fiske, 2001). However, even in more
extreme cases, like that of slavery, there is evidence that many
owners looked kindly on their slaves and felt that ownership
protected inferior creatures from the depredations of the freemarket. Thus, they could depict slavery as a blessing to both
master and slave (Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 2005: p. 515).
However such fondness lasted only as long as slaves accepted
their place. Should they challenge it, benevolence would
rapidly change to anger and brutality. But despite that, there
were multiple challenges and indeed slave revolts were critical
to the eventual abolition of slavery itself.
The same is true for most entrenched forms of inequality.
The end of apartheid, the introduction of civil rights to AfricanAmericans, and the granting of votes to women, all were
a result of collective action. To cite Barack Obamas speech in
Selma on 4 March 2007 Im here because someone marched.
It is hard to think of circumstances where equality has been
freely granted through the individual kindness of the dominant
group members. On the whole it has been claimed through the
collective mobilization of subordinate group members. That is
why it is particularly worrying that contact may have a demobilizing effect on them. Thus there is growing evidence that
increasing contact and increasing the extent to which subordinate group members like dominant group members may
actually decrease the extent to which the former will demand
and agitate for change in part at least because it reduces their
perception of racial discrimination and increases their perceptions of social mobility (Wright and Lubensky, 2009).
So, even where social psychology does address issues of
social change, collective action tends to be neglected. This is not
just a conceptual issue. The focus on psychological rather than
sociostructural outcomes leads to the employment of strategies
that demobilize people and therefore leave structural inequalities in society intact.

Conclusion
In this article we have considered both how crowds and
collective action have been studied in social psychology and
also how they have been neglected. We have encountered
evidence to show both that the study of collective action allows
us to understand the nature of social action and social change,
and also that collective action is critical to achieving social
change. Our conclusion is that a social psychology which

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Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of

marginalizes collective action will be both intellectually decient and socially conservative. For both reasons, we reiterate
that the study of collective action needs to be moved from the
periphery to the core of the discipline.

See also: Collective Action; Deindividuation, Psychology of;


Intergroup Relations; Political Psychology; Self-Categorization
Theory; Social Identity in Social Psychology; Social
Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective; Social
Psychology.

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