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SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No.

100150, January 5, 1994


FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined
only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not
civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also
prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo,
et.al".
ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?
HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII,
Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all
forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that then it does not possess.
The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the
SC.
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of
the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected
to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment
and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because
they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or administration
of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015


ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of
the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by
way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of
President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs
were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May
10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC
because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second
highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying
that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo.
HELD: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal
bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so patent and gross as
to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable
from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section
12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary GR 212426 Jan 12 2016


Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may

undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed
upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops or facilities
whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issues: 1: W/N EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
2. W/N the EDCA is merely an implementation of the VFA and the MDT
HELD:
1. No. EDCA is not a valid executive agreement entered into by the President because it falls under those treaties and
international agreements which need the concurrence of the Philippine Senate.
Article XVIII, Sec 25 of the 1987 Constitution is a special provision that prohibits the entry of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. As an exception, such would be allowed only if: first, the stay of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities is allowed by a treaty; second, such treaty is with the concurrence of the Senate, and
when Congress so requires, such treaty should be ratified by majority of the votes cast by the Filipino people in a
national referendum held for the purpose; and third, such treaty is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party.
Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the
Constitution does not distinguish. In the case of EDCA, it clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
2. No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.
First, while the VFA allows only the presence of US military troops, the EDCA on the other hand contemplates the
presence of not just the troops but also military bases and facilities in the so-called Agreed Locations.
Second, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against either of the parties territories
or armed forces but there is nothing in the MDT that specifically authorizes the presence, whether temporary or
permanent, of a partys bases, troops, or facilities in the other partys territory even during peace time or in mere
anticipation of an armed attack. The presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities provided under the EDCA
cannot be traced to the MDT. Moreover, the general provisions of the MDT cannot prevail over the categorical and specific
provision of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
Hence, the EDCA as an agreement creating new rights and obligations must satisfy the requirements under
Sec 25, Art XIII of the Constitution.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION Jan. 18, 2000


FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case. Pending evaluation of the afore-stated extradition documents, Mark Jimenez through counsel, wrote a letter to
Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given
ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner
denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of
the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of
the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

TANADA v. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997


Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs
on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented

to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise
of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international
trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their
duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015


Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for
flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued,
leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because
of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c)
he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong. 2. Whether or not petitioner is
bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This
right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to
judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to
Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
[to allow petitioner to post bail].

JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent (wife and
daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to
the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and
hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17,
2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she
was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single
centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full
information about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to
surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1.
making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men.
2.
He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already
sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.
3.
The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women.
4.
He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it because
its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender.

5.
There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal protection
guarantee is violated.
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
fully enjoyed by everyone.
1.
It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In addition,
the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties such as the
a. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
b. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the
c. Convention Against Torture, and the
d. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the
standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1.
RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines
compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to
undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive
document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the
existence of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality
of rights and respect for human dignity.
2.

Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW


The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for the improvement of
their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of
discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis
that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological
sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting
gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have
made in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are often

reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or
had a sexual or dating relationship.
RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative action
that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the
government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."