CASES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY vs. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and/or
ANGEL JOSE TRANSPORTATION, INC. and HON. A. MELENCIO-HERRERA
The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction
of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly
harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations
and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.The
Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract executed by a foreign
corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab initio.
A Michigan statute provides: No foreign corporation subject to the provisions of
this Act, shall maintain any action in this state upon any contract made by it in
this state after the taking effect of this Act, until it shall have fully complied with
the requirement of this Act, and procured a certificate to that effect from the
Secretary of State. It was held that the above statute does not render contracts
of a foreign corporation that fails to comply with the statute void, but they may be
enforced only after compliance therewith.
There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy.
Significantly, Batas PambansaBlg. 68, the Corporation Code of the Philippines
has corrected the ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the old
Corporation Law. Section 133 of the present Corporation Code provides: SEC.
133. Doing business without a license.-No foreign corporation transacting
business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shag
be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency in the Philippines; but such corporation may be
sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts
was cured by the subsequent registration is also strengthened by the procedural
aspects of these cases.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK (Formerly Producers Bank of
the Philippines) and MERCURIO RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CARLOS EJERCITO, in substitution of DEMETRIO DEMETRIA, and JOSE
JANOLO
Black's Law Dictionary says that forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts
to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will
receive the most favorable judgment or verdict." Hence, according to Words and
Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of "forum shopping" whenever he
chooses a forum with slight connection to factual circumstances surrounding his
suit, and litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences
without imposing undue expenses and vexatious situations on the courts".
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but
also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling.
TEST: Buan vs. Lopez , also by Chief Justice Narvasa, and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Corporate veil cannot be used to shield an otherwise blatant violation of the
prohibition against forum-shopping. Shareholders, whether suing as the majority
in direct actions or as the minority in a derivative suit, cannot be allowed to trifle
with court processes, particularly where, as in this case, the corporation itself
has not been remiss in vigorously prosecuting or defending corporate causes
and in using and applying remedies available to it. To rule otherwise would be to
encourage corporate litigants to use their shareholders as fronts to circumvent
the stringent rules against forum shopping.
McGee v Int'l Ins. Co
The Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment binding on respondent, since the suit was based on a contract which
had a substantial connection with California.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, the Court decided that
"due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
RATIONALE: In part, this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years. Today, many commercial transactions touch
two or more States, and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time,
modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity.
The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there,
and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied
that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for
its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be
at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to
a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable
VALMONTE VS. ALCALA
the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the petition for failure to
strictly follow the verification requirements. Stated otherwise, we do not consider
the variance between the dates as fatal to the petitioners case because the
variance did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no verification was
made, or that the verification was false. More importantly, the variance totally lost
significance after the petitioners sent from the US and submitted to the CA the
required Verification/Certification in compliance with their previously manifested
intent. As this Court noted in a case where compliance with a certificate of nonforum shopping was at issue, the fact that the Rules require strict compliance
merely underscores its mandatory nature; it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as we find in this
case.
JURISDICTION (EEOC) v. Arabian American Oil Co.
Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of
United States firms that employ American citizens abroad.
It is a longstanding principle of American law "that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. This canon of construction is a valid approach
whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It serves to

protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord.
Absent clearer evidence of congressional intent, this Court is unwilling to ascribe
to Congress a policy which would raise difficult international law issues by
imposing this country's employment discrimination regime upon foreign
corporations operating in foreign commerce. This conclusion is fortified by other
factors suggesting a purely domestic focus, including Title VII's failure even to
mention foreign nations or proceedings, despite a number of provisions
indicating a concern that the sovereignty and laws of States not be unduly
interfered with, and the Act's failure to provide any mechanisms for its overseas
enforcement. It is also reasonable to conclude that, had Congress intended Title
VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with
foreign laws and procedures, as it did in amending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to apply abroad.
Small vs United states
Section 922(g)(1)s phrase convicted in any court encompasses only domestic,
not foreign, convictions.
In considering the scope of the phrase convicted in any court it is appropriate to
assume that Congress had domestic concerns in mind. This assumption is
similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to
have domestic, not extraterritorial, application.
foreign convictions may include convictions for conduct that domestic laws would
permit. In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at
issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the
statutory definition is not consistent with the statutes language; it is not easy for
those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those
previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic crimes) uncertain about
their legal obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis for
applying the ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes here.
CORAZON C. SIM, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and EQUITABLE PCI-BANK, respondents
LA has extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides: SECTION 10. Money Claims.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after
the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
804219 provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC.
Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including
termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino
workers.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the
contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public
policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. For the State assures the basic rights
of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work [Article 3 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987
Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil
Code which states that laws "which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country."
Kirtsaeng vs. John Wiley & Sons Inc
First sale doctrine - the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord, Sec109(a).
Importing a copy made abroad without the copyright owners permission is an
infringement of sec106(3).
Section 109(a) of the copyright act says nothing about geography. A nongeographical interpretation provides each word in the phrase lawfully made
under this title with a distinct purpose: lawfully made suggests an effort to
distinguish copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, and under
this title sets forth the standard of lawful[ness] (i.e., the U. S. Copyright Act).
This simple reading promotes the traditional copyright objective of combatting
piracy and makes word-by-word linguistic sense. In contrast, the geographical
interpretation bristles with linguistic difficulties. Wiley first reads under to mean
in conformance with the Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable.
Wiley then argues that the Act is applicable only in the United States. However,
neither under nor any other word in lawfully made under this title means
where. Nor can a geographical limitation be read into the word applicable.
The fact that the Act does not instantly protect an American copyright holder from
unauthorized piracy taking place abroad does not mean the Act is inapplicable to
copies made abroad.
BMW of North America Inc vs. Gore Jr.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a substantive
limit on the size of punitive damages.Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens,
with whom Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyerjoined, began his
analysis by focusing on the relationship between Alabama's interests in
punishment and deterrence and the size of the punitive-damages award.
Justice Stevens noted that under the federal system Alabama, like the other
states, has "considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages
that [it] will allow in [various cases]." However, while Alabama could compel
BMW NA to comply with a particular disclosure policy in that state, Alabama
could not punish BMW NA for out-of-state conduct that was neither unlawful nor
detrimental to Alabama's residentswith the intent of changing the tortfeasors'
lawful conduct in other States." 77 Applying this state-interest analysis, the Court
concluded that the $2 million punitive award was "grossly excessive" in relation
to Alabama's legitimate objectives.

The Court developed three "guideposts" for determining whether adequate

notice has been given: (1) the "degree of reprehensibility" of defendant's
conduct; (2) the ratio between the actual or potential harm and the punitive
damages; and (3) the authorized civil or criminal sanctions for comparable
misconduct.80 Using the guideposts, the Court made three key findings. First,
because BMW NA's conduct "evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard for
the health and safety of others," and because the harm that Gore suffered was
"purely economic in nature," BMW NA's conduct was not "sufficiently
reprehensible" to justify the $2 million award.
Second, the punitive damages were 500 times the actual damages as
determined by the jury, and there was no reasonable relationship between these
two types of awards.8 2 Third, the $2 million award was dramatically greater
than the maximum $2000 civil penalty authorized by Alabama for a violation of
its Deceptive Trade Practices Act.8 3 Furthermore, there was no judicial
precedent in which similarly large punitive damages were awarded for
comparable misconduct when BMW NA's nondisclosure policy was first
challenged.
The Relationship Between Reasonableness and Substantive Due Process The
BMW Court declared that when a punitive-damages award is unreasonably large
in relation to a state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, the
award "enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
SPECTOR V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD. (03-1388)545 U.S. 119 (2005)
Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flagged cruise ships doing business in the
United States. Unless Specifically Exempted by the Statute in Question, ForeignFlag Cruise Ships Doing Business Within the Internal Waters and Ports of the
United States Must Comply with All Generally Applicable Laws. It is axiomatic
that activities taking place on United States waters are generally governed by
United States law.
The fact that a cruise ship sails under a foreign flag or is registered in a foreign
country does not exempt it from generally applicable laws of the countries in
which it does business. As this Court has recognized, [i]t is well settled that
when a foreign-flag shipping line chooses to engage in foreign commerce and
use American ports it is amenable to the jurisdiction of the United States and
subject to the laws thereof.The jurisdiction of the country whose territorial limits
a ship voluntarily enters attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other
objects within those limits. During her stay she is entitled to the protection of the
laws of that place and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to them.
PENNOYER vs. NEFF
No. A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party: 1) is
personally served with process while within the state, or 2) has property within
the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi in rem
jurisdiction).
If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against
non-residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in
the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested, could
be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and
oppression.
In this case the property was moved against to satisfy a personal judgment
against a non-resident. Pre-trial seizure of the land would have satisfied
notification of a property judgment (in rem), because it is assumed that property
is attached to the person
Neff was not personally notified nor was his land attached at the time of
adjudication. Judgments in rem for non-residents must be given due process,
which involves a personal appearance by the Defendant or personal service of
notification or attachment of land.
The substituted service of process by publication in actions brought against nonresidents is valid only where property in the state is brought under the control of
the court, and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that purpose, or
where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such property or affecting
some interest therein; in other words, where the action is in the nature of a
proceeding in rem.
The Oregon court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was
not served in Oregon. The courts judgment would have been valid if Mitchell had
attached Neffs land at the beginning of the suit. Mitchell could not have done
this because Neff did not own the land at the time Mitchell initiated the suit.
Asiavest Limited v. CA
Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and
respondent Court of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by a
court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by the subsequent
title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to
repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment.
The testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a foreign lawn
according to a private international law expert.
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the
specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in
rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident
of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this
particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called
processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed that the
Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present
in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An
exception was wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his
wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representatives and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was
a mere offshoot of the first case.
Since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was,
indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on
him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore
invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It

follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here
in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
BANCO DO BRASIL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ARSENIO M. GONONG, and CESAR S. URBINO, SR., respondents.
When the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, Section
17 of the Rules of Court. Under this provision, there are only four (4) instances
when extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely: "(1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the
subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims
a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such
action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's
property has been attached within the Philippines." In these instances, service of
summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave
of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.
Clear from the foregoing, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the
action is in rem, an action against the thing itself instead of against the person,
or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. This is so inasmuch as, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res.
However, where the action is in personam, one brought against a person on the
basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When the defendant is
a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.
This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
It must be stressed that any relief granted in rem or quasi in rem actions must be
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment
against the defendant. Clearly, the publication of summons effected by private
respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner, since by seeking to recover damages from petitioner for
the alleged commission of an injury to his person or property caused by
petitioner's being a nuisance defendant, private respondent's action became in
personam. Bearing in mind the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if
not possible, substituted service of summons on petitioner, and not
extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and validly hold it liable to private respondent for damages.
REGNER v. LOGARTA
There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in
personam. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of
his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself,
instead of against the person.
The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed by
Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the respondents, summons must be served upon them. Further,
the certificate is indivisible, Cynthias and Teresas interests thereto can only be
determined if both are summoned in court.
In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the Philippines, they may
be served summons in the following order:
1.
Personal Service;
2.
If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
3.
If respondent cant be found because he is abroad but still a resident
of the Philippines, by publication with leave of court.
4.
In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents, they
may be served summons in the following manner:
Personal service through the Philippine embassy; By publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or In any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient. The above must be with leave of
court.
NM Rothshild& Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company
Rothschild, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.
Section 12, Rule 14 of said rules provides:
Sec. 12.Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or
agents within the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 15 of the same rule which provides:
Sec. 15.Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff
or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates
to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant

from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service
out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is
in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem
and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of
summons can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of
summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the
defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand,
when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try
any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
International shoe co. vs Washington
The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of
the State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation
fund. The activities in question established between the State and the
corporation sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in
conformity to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such
activities. In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment
compensation fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's salesmen
within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home
office, satisfies the requirements of due process. The tax imposed by the state
unemployment compensation statute -- construed by the state court, in its
application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen
within the State -- does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities
of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or
authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.
Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the
corporate agent, or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation's behalf, are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there. To require the corporation in such
circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where
it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.
Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon obligations arising out of
the activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present
suit in personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of
employing appellant's salesmen within the state.
Kulko v. Superior Court of California
The exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the California courts over appellant,
a New York domiciliary, would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The mere act of sending a child to California to live with her mother
connotes no intent to obtain nor expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit
in that State that would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction
over appellant.
A defendant to be bound by a judgment against him must "have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
The acquiescence of appellant in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in
California was not enough to confer jurisdiction over appellant in the California
courts. Exercise of in personam jurisdiction over appellant was not warranted by
the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's presence in California
for nine months of the year, since any diminution in appellant's household costs
resulted not from the child's presence in California, but from her absence from
appellant's home, and from appellee's failure to seek an increase in support
payments in New York.
The "effects" rule that the California courts applied is intended to reach wrongful
activity outside of the forum State causing injury within the State where such
application would not be "unreasonable," but here, where there is no claim that
appellant visited physical injury on either property or persons in California; where
the cause of action arises from appellant's personal, domestic relations; and
where the controversy arises from a separation that occurred in New York, and
modification is sought of a contract negotiated and signed in New York that had
virtually no connection with the forum State, it is "unreasonable" for California to
assert personal jurisdiction over appellant.
Since appellant remained in the State of marital domicile and did no more than
acquiesce in the stated preference of his daughter to live with her mother in
California, basic considerations of fairness point decisively to appellant's State of
domicile as the proper forum for adjudicating this case, whatever be the merits of
appellee's underlying claim.
California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children residing in
California without unduly disrupting the children's lives is already being served
by the State's participation in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
of 1968, which permits a California resident claiming support from a nonresident
to file a petition in California and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the
alleged obligor's residence, without either party's having to leave his or her own
State. New York is a signatory to a similar statute. Those statutes appear to
provide appellee with means to vindicate her claimed right to additional child
support from appellant and collection of any support payments found to be owed
to her by appellant
Burnham vs. Superior court
Jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because
it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due
process standard. That standard was developed by analogy to physical
presence. Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice
BLACKMUN, and Justice O'CONNOR, although agreeing that the traditional
"transient jurisdiction" rule is generally valid, concluded that historical pedigree,
although important, is not the only factor to be taken into account in establishing
whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process, and that an independent

inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing in-State service rule must be
undertaken. The transient jurisdiction rule will generally satisfy due process
requirements.
Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over non-residents who are
physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State had the
power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within its
borders, and that, once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by
properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter
udgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. That view had antecedents
in English common law practice, which sometimes allowed "transitory" actions,
arising out of events outside the country, to be maintained against seemingly
non-resident defendants who were present in England.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the California Superior Court. Among
the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are
physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State had the
power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within its
borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by
properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter
judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. A state court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause if it does not violate
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
World-wide Volkswagen corp. vs. Woodson
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant. A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the
rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.
A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
forum State. . It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." The defendant's contacts
with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the relationship
between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable . . . to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there."
Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that
are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners
carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales and perform no
services there, avail themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, and
solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the record show that they
regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or that they indirectly, through others,
serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. Vs Superior Court
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "[T]he
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts' in the forum State."
Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by
the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State."
RATIONALE: 1) to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on no
more than the defendant's act of placing the product in the stream of commerce
2)to have jurisdiction it is required that the action of the defendant to be more
purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act of placing a product in
the stream of commerce)
Because the stream of commerce eventually brought some valves Asahi sold
Cheng Shin into California, Asahi's awareness that its valves would be sold in
California was sufficient to permit California to exercise jurisdiction over Asahi
consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AREOSPATIALE V. U.S. DC
(1) Hague Evidence Convention applied to request for information from foreign
national which was a party to the litigation; (2) Hague Evidence Convention did
not provide exclusive and mandatory procedure for obtaining documents and
information located within territorial foreign signatory; (3) first resort to Hague
Convention was not required; and (4) Hague Convention did not deprive district
court of jurisdiction it otherwise possessed to order foreign national party before
it to produce evidence physically located within a foreign signatory nation.
The Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for
obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory's territory.
The Convention's plain language, as well as the history of its proposal and
ratification by the United States, unambiguously supports the conclusion that it
was intended to establish optional procedures for obtaining evidence abroad. Its
preamble speaks in non-mandatory terms, specifying its purpose to "facilitate"
discovery and to "improve mutual judicial cooperation." Similarly, its text uses
permissive language, and does not expressly modify the law of contracting
states or require them to use the specified procedures or change their own
procedures. The Convention does not deprive the District Court of its jurisdiction
to order, under the Federal Rules, a foreign national party to produce evidence
physically located within a signatory nation.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Convention "does not apply" to
discovery sought from a foreign litigant that is subject to an American court's
jurisdiction. Although they are not mandatory, the Convention's procedures are
available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence, and "apply" in
the sense that they are one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to
employ.
The concept of comity requires, in this context, a more particularized analysis of
the respective interests of the foreign and requesting nations than a blanket "first
resort" rule would generate. Thus, the determination whether to resort to the
Convention requires prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign
interests, and likelihood that such resort will prove effective.
PFEGER R. DULAY vs. RODRIGO S. DULAY
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk
of Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became
impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely
brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted for the
resultant delay brought about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be
faulted for allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence

to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the depositions
authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial court's power, much less the
respondent's to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition taken
before it. After all, while a court had the authority to entertain a discovery
request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance thereto. This reality was
recognized by the trial court when it ordered respondent to have the questioned
depositions authenticated by the Philippine consulate.
More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with the
requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. In our jurisdiction,
depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any person
authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. While
letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to
officials of the issuing jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of
the authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The
deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through
letters rogatory.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition cannot be said to have caused any
prejudice to the adverse party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered
by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners
were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial court's
action.
Navida v Dizon
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body,
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be
dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a
law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases
under Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by RA 7691, In all other cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceed P100K or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds P200K. It is clear that the claim
for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the
complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The
RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City
and Davao City.
Del Monte Fresh Produce, petitioner vs DOW Chemical Company, etc.,
respondents
There are two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or crossclaim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before
judgment. The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims
of the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental
defendants as they complied with the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del
Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend their answers to include their
cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires that they be
allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert
Gilbert himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any event connected with
the case take place there, nor does any witness with the possible exception of
experts live there. No one connected with that side of the case save counsel for
the plaintiff resides there.
It is a strange argument on behalf of a Virginia plaintiff that the community which
gave him patronage to make his business valuable is not capable of furnishing
jurors who know the value of the goods they store, the building they are stored
in, or the business their patronage creates. And there is no specification of any
local influence, other than accurate knowledge of local conditions, that would
make a fair trial improbable. The net of this is that the Court cannot say the
District Court was bound to entertain a provincial fear of the provincialism of a
Virginia jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff without even a suggested reason
for transporting this suit to New York.
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter
of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary
generality, and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite
sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy.
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the
private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of
access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of
view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action, and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is
often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex,"
"harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble
not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But, unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed. Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine.
Piper aircraft co. vs Reyno
The possibility of a change of law should not be given substantial weight in a
forum non conveniens analysis. Plaintiffs can choose among many forums, and
generally choose the most favorable one. If they do not choose the most
favorable but the action can be dismissed anyway, it would not be proper. In
addition, courts would have to interpret the law of foreign districts, which would
pose a lot of problems and inconsistencies. This is why there is a doctrine of
forum non conveniens, to get rid of this kind of confusion.
Giving the plaintiffs interests less weight is justified when the plaintiffs are
foreign. Under this circumstance, the choice of forum is not necessarily
convenient. The connections with Scotland were not necessarily overwhelming,
but the District Court correctly found that there would be fewer evidentiary
problems. If Defendants had to prove exactly what persons it would be difficult to
identify and bring as witnesses, Defendants required expenditures would defeat
the purpose of their motion. Even if Scottish law would not apply, the other public
interest factors would be sufficient to support dismissal. There is a local interest.
The American interest is not sufficient.

SINOCHEM INTL CO. v. MALAYSIA INTL SHIPPINGCORP

The Court ruled 9-0 that "a court need not resolve whether it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that a foreign tribunal is plainly the
more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case." The opinion by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non conveniens
without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court held that
determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a chance that the
court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that the case would be
more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should immediately dismiss for
forum non conveniens rather than undergo a burdensome and unnecessary
determination of jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway.
Philsec Investment Corp. vs. CA
The trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case is not justifiable under the
principle of forum non conveniens.
First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, 1, which does
not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis
of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to
dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic
corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it
was the extinguishment of the latters debt which was the object of the
transaction under litigation.
Manila Hotel Corporation vs. NLRC, Marcelo Santos
The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case
involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the
case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL
are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square
incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify
respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that
a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any
binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a
corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with
summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. If Santos were an
"overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the
NLRC, would protect him.
BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is
inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global
forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum
or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a
court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it
is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.
However, though this case satisfies all the requisites for the application the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, this principle should not be used as a ground
for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
include said doctrine as a ground.
This Court has also further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based
on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence
it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., vs. M/V LOK MAHESHWARI
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or will
exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were
furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific
Congressional directive as to the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should
be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act;
(2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum;
and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims
arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in
general.
Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only
falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign Canada is
the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the
place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant
shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it is inconceivable that the Philippine
court has any interest in the case that outweighs the interests of Canada or India
for that matter
Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy
behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry.
Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien
under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will
encourage forum shopping.
It is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The
injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the
orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the
bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada,
and the supplies were delivered in Canada.
CHOICE, ASCERTAINMENT AND APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD. vs. MINORU KITAMURA

Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lexfori will often coincide, the
"minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant
contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied
to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by
law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of
an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant
must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it
because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. In the instant case,
petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for,
indeed, the case for specific performance and damages is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What
they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lexcontractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law
of the place where a contract is made.,The doctrine of lexcontractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of the most significant
relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court
should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed,
and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This
rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of
laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when
the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution
of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives
open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack
of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other
State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of
foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties
or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC.,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD
The "Employment Agreement" between Norse and the late Abordo states that
compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since RestitutaAbordo was offered
P30k only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of
Restituta and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore
Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in
applying that law.
Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen
Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including
money claims, involving er-ee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to
assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative
to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial
notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure
particularly of evidence applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply."
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs National Labor Relations
Commission
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed
by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law
between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the
contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states
that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g.
specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor
Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of
Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us.
Heirs of the Deceased Spouses Vicente Arcilla v. Teodoro
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides: Certification against forum
shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint /other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief/in a sworn

certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint/initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint/other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance w/
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, w/o
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Circular No. 28-91, w/c originally required the certification of non-forum shopping
for petitions filed with the SC and the CA; and SC Administrative Circular No. 0494, w/c extended the certification requirement for civil complaints and other
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and other agencies.
However, it is equally settled that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.
Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Moreover, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error
in proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein respondent was able to
submit a certification of non-forum shopping. More importantly, the apparent
merit of the substantive aspect of the petition for land registration filed by
respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she had no intention to
violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited the attention of
the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed as
special circumstances/compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
Section 25, Rule 132, to wit: Proof of public or official record An official record
or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the
foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in
Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. The SC agrees w/ the CA that had the Court
intended to include notarial documents as one of the public documents
contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only
the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the
foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only
mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a
foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such
courts.
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT,
(GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and ANNE NICOLAY vs CA
The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state,
is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the
State may not be sued without its consent." If the instant suit had been brought
directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt that it
is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said
State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against
GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are the parameters of
the legal personality of GTZ.
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one
of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal
that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This
ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government
agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The
simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of
the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces
and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
A corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine
government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original
charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that
"[e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity x
xx to sue and be sued in its corporate name."

GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be
sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We adhere to
the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, and
following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a
governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by
virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued.
Had GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided
factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a
disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party is indeed immune
which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence.
Cadalin vs. POEA
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated
therein.
Adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel
thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so
forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just
agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated
into their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by
the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of
contractual terms deemed written in the contract. A basic policy of contract is to
protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by
giving effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law
must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is
no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that
country.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local
court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law. A law on
prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may
be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing
statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the
forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing
statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where
it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not
run against it.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
HOME INSURANCE CO. v. DICK
Doubtless a state may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of
rights acquired elsewhere which violate its laws or public policy, and, under
some circumstances, it may refuse to aid in the enforcement of such rights. But
the Mexican corporation never was in Texas, and neither it nor the garnishees
invoked the aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws.
And, in the absence of a contractual provision, the local statute of limitation may
be applied to a right created in another jurisdiction even where the remedy in the
latter is barred. In such cases, the rights and obligations of the parties are not
varied. When, however, the parties have expressly agreed upon a time limit on
their obligation, a statute which invalidates the agreement and directs
enforcement of the contract after the time has expired increases their obligation
and imposes a burden not contracted for.
The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives the garnishees of
property without due process of law. A state may prohibit and declare invalid the
making of certain contracts within its borders. It may prohibit performance within
its borders. Even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are required to be
performed within the state and their performance would violate its laws. But, in
the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the
contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts
relating to the making of the policy and contracts of reinsurance were done in
Mexico or in New York.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague
The decedent was a member of Minnesota's workforce. The State of
employment has police power responsibilities towards non-resident employees
that are analogous to those it has towards residents; as such employees use
state services and amenities and may call upon state facilities in appropriate
circumstances. Also, the State's interest in its commuting non-resident
employees, such as respondent's decedent, reflects a state concern for the
safety and wellbeing of its workforce and the concomitant effect on Minnesota
employers. That the decedent was not killed while commuting to work or while in
Minnesota does not dictate a different result, since vindication of the rights of the
estate of a Minnesota employee is an important state concern. Nor does the
decedent's residence in Wisconsin constitutionally mandate application of

Wisconsin law to the exclusion of forum law. Employment status is not a

sufficiently less important status than residence, when combined with the
decedent's daily commute across state lines and the other Minnesota contacts
present, to prohibit the choice of law result in this case on constitutional grounds.
Petitioner was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota. By virtue of
such presence, petitioner can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host
jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law to litigation in
which the company is involved. Moreover, such presence gave Minnesota an
interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations insofar as they
affected both a Minnesota resident and court-appointed representative
(respondent) and a longstanding member of Minnesota's workforce
(respondent's decedent).
In addition to the other contacts, respondent became a Minnesota resident prior
to institution of the instant litigation. She subsequently moved to Savage, Minn.,
after marrying a Minnesota resident who operated an automobile service station
in Bloomington, Minn.
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts
Although some of the class members were non-residents who had no contacts
with the forum state, the class members were plaintiffs, and therefore the
traditional minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction was not applicable.
The Shutts Court also concluded that due process considerations were afforded
to absent class members because each class member was provided with notice
of the action, an opportunity to appear in person or through counsel, an
opportunity to opt out, and adequate legal representation. The Supreme Court's
analysis centered on distinguishing among the different burdens of litigation
placed upon class action plaintiffs as opposed to those placed upon a defendant
in a non-class suit.
state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident
class members constituted a vital step in the process of ensuring the full and fair
litigation of multistate class actions. A decision otherwise would have denied
judicial access to multistate class action plaintiffs with small monetary claims,
thus contradicting the explicit purpose of class action adjudications. Although
precedent supports the Court's conclusion, the Court's analysis in reaching this
conclusion was inadequate. Generally, restrictions are placed upon a state
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction for two reasons: first, to guarantee
protection of the personal liberty interests of the parties to the litigation;second,
to protect state sovereignty concerns. The Shutts Court, however, based its
decision primarily on matters of convenience,'" rather than conducting a
complete analysis of the controversial aspects of personal jurisdiction.
The minimum contacts test is premised on the theory that due process permits
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
have certain contacts with the forum state. Thus, the minimum contacts
requirement ensures that the maintenance of the action in a forum does not
offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Included in these notions of fair play and substantial justice is the principle of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution." Accordingly, the minimum
contacts requirement limits a state court's jurisdictional powers in order to protect
the personal liberty interests of nonresident parties in obtaining a fair
adjudication of their claims. In addition, the minimum contacts requirement
guarantees the concept of state sovereignty"
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.
The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of
a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible
test for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of
contact or connecting factors could be any of the following: (1) The nationality of
a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;(2) the
seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;(3) the situs of a thing,
that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the
lexsitus is decisive when real rights are involved;(4) the place where an act has
been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made,
a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;(5) the place where an act is intended
to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;(6) the intention of the
contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lexforithe law of the forumis particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lexfori
applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded
from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and (8) the flag of a ship, which in
many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties,
act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith.
Considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the
law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to
establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.
NATIONALITY AND DOMICILE
Djumantan vs. Domingo
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration
authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent
residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is

deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right
to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country, this right is based on the fact
that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is
a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on
the part of the government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be
admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The
fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation
of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens.
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her
a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to
admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country,
the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be
admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply
for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and
their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens. Indonesian wife can be deported.
Tuan Anh Nguyen vs. INS
When the citizen parent of the child born abroad and out of wedlock is the childs
mother, the requirements for the transmittal of citizenship are described in
1409(c): c. Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out
wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his
mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such
persons birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the
United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuos period of one
year. Specifically, the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship,
but not a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives.
The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a
biological parent - child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the relation
is verifiable from the birth itself.
The second important governmental interest furthered in a substantial manner
by 1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity, or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognzed by the law but one that consist of the real
everyday ties that provide a certain connection between child and citizen parent
and in turn the United States. In the case of citizen mother and a child born
oversees, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent
and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to our
constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship.
Section 1409(a) thus imposes a set of requirements on the children of citizen
fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen mother that are not
imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is the mother. All
concede the requirements of 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4), relating to a citizen fathers
acknowledgement of a child while he is under 18, were not satisfied in this case.
As an individual seeking citizenship under 1409(a) must meet all of its
preconditions, the failure to satisfy 1409(a)(4) renders Nguyen ineligible for
citizenship. Before considering the important governmental interests advanced
by the statute, two observations concerning the operation of the provision are in
order. First, a citizen mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to
reenter the United States so the child can be born here and be a 14th
amendment citizen. From one perspective the statute simply ensures
equivalence between two expectant mothers who are citizens abroad if one
chooses to reenter for the childs birth and the other chooses not to return, or
does not have the means to do so. This equivalence is not a factor if the single
citizen parent living abroad is the father. For, unlike the unmarried mother, the
unmarried father as a general rule cannot control where the child will be born.
Second, although 1409(a)(4) requires certain conduct to occur before the child of
a citizen father born out of wedlock and abroad reaches 18 years of age, it
imposes no limitation on when an individual who qualifies under the statute can
claim citizenship. The statutory treatment of citizenship is identical in this respect
wether the citizen parent is the mother of the father. A person born to a citizen
parent of either gender may assert citizenship, assuming compliance with
statutory preconditions regardless of his or her age. And while the conditions
necessary for a citizen mother to transmit citizenship under 1409(c) exist at birth,
citizen father and/or their children have 18 years to satisfy the requirements of
1409(a)(4).
Statutory distinction relevant in this case, is that 1409(a)(4) requires one of three
affirmative steps to be taken if the citizen parent is the father, but not if the citizen
parent is the mother: legitimation, a declaration of paternity under oath by the
father, or a court order of paternity. Congress decision to impose requirements
on unmarried fathers that differ from those on unmarried mothers is based on the
significant difference between the respective relationships to the potential citizen
at the time of birth.
Specifically, the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not
a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives.The first
governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a biological
parent - child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the relation is
verifiable from the birth itself.The second important governmental interest
furthered in a substantial manner by 1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure
that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity, or
potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognzed by the law but one
that consist of the real everyday ties that provide a certain connection between
child and citizen parent and in turn the United States. In the case of citizen
mother and a child born oversees, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship
between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so
often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship.
SCHNEIDER vs. RUSK
352(a)(1) is discriminatory, and therefore violative of due process under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution, since no restriction against the length of foreign
residence applies to native-born citizens, though some members of that majority
believe that Congress lacks constitutional power to effect involuntary divestiture
of citizenship.
Section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality' Act of 1952, provides:
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his
nationality by --"(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory
of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his
birth is situated, except as provided in section 353 of this title, whether such
residence commenced before or after the effective date of this Act. . . ."

While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. A nativeborn citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of
citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their
rights to live and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed
a second-class citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or
native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in no way evidences a
voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be compelled
by family, business, or other legitimate reasons
Trop vs Dulles
Section 401(g), the statute that decrees the forfeiture of this petitioner's
citizenship, is based directly on a Civil War statute, which provided that a
deserter would lose his "rights of citizenship." The meaning of this phrase was
not clear. Citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National
Government, and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers.
The right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned either by express
language or by language and conduct that show a renunciation of citizenship.
Under these principles, this petitioner has not lost his citizenship. Desertion in
wartime, though it may merit the ultimate penalty, does not necessarily signify
allegiance to a foreign state. Section 401(g) is not limited to cases of desertion to
the enemy, and there is no such element in this case. This soldier committed a
crime for which he should be and was punished, but he did not involve himself in
any way with a foreign state. There was no dilution of his allegiance to this
country.
Use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment.
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is,
instead, the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual
the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment
strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political
community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he
happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights and,
presumably, as long as he remained in this country, he would enjoy the limited
rights of an alien, no country need do so, because he is stateless. Furthermore,
his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to
termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost
the right to have rights.
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution
stands. The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is true that several
countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals engage in
conduct in derogation of native allegiance.
AASJS MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue
of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.
Pursuant to Sec. 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be
dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress,
the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual
allegiance. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration
of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, the framers
were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to
rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act: xxxxxxxxx d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized
as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit
shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional
Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the
Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who
reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines,
and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in
construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The
same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President
and Vice-President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list
representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote
for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:Sec. 18.On-Site Counting and
Canvassing.18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the

proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be

affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that
the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if
the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors
and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors
and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates for President
and Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the following provisions of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:Sec. 4.The returns of every election for
President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and
the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. Section 25 of R.A. No.
9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing
Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR
that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows: Sec. 25. Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House
of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
Provided, that of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3)
from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission. All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in
claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one of which is the
aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions.
The Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted
it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. The Court
has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its
decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that
because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court
holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be
stricken off from the said law.
Loida Nicolas- Lewis, et.al. v. COMELEC
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before
they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
are qualified to vote.
Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible
all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age
abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them
qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that intention that the
Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has
in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be
allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body
with the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been
consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other
countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent
provisions of RA 9225.
Lopez vs Comelec
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is
not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of
law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show
that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof
we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an

affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he
failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission
holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process
that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired
or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one
citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The
record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document
or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony
under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where
the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and
states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and
(2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition
of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the
circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof
offered.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on
him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. In effect, Arnado was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact
that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a
Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the
application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for
Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position. This requirement
of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that
anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes
the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to
what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport
because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow
act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.
REYES v. COMELEC and TAN G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013, EN BANC
xxx for Reyes to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public
office the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1)
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the ConsulGeneral of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath." In the case at bar, there is no showing that
Reyes complied with the aforesaid requirements.