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FINAL REPORT
THIRD 4RMY
MANEUVERS
• MAY-15»40
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FINAL REPORT THIRD ARMY" MANEUVERS
MAY 1940
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
IV EQUIPMENT 14-17
V COMMUNICATIONS 18-20
TO
FINAL REPORT
•
MAY 1940
NO. CONTENTS
8. MAP
- BASE CALIFS IN SABINE AREA.
9. RECORD OF MOTOR MOVEMENT TO SABINE AREA.
21. •
TYPICAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE DIVISION.
KAY^IS^O
1
SECTION II
4. DIRECTIVES.
and~"att ached units'* from base camps at Fort Beniiing, Georgia, and
southern route. One officer from the Ist Division, one from the
6th Division and one fron Corps troops made similar reconnaissances,
and, acting for the Rents and Claims Board, Fourth Corps Area, secured
leases for all march bivouac areas on the northern route. Sketches
of all areas wore prepared and distributed.
\
(Section 11, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
6. (Cont'd)
7. THE MOVEMENT
a. Hail
as billeting detachment;-;.
proceeded to Montgomery, Alabama, ana one to lloridian, Mississippi,
Under the supervision of the billeting
officers (subparagraph (j), above), these companies assigned and mar
ked areas for subordinate units of the successive march groups sche
duled to occupy that bivouac, prepared entrances and turn arounds,
reinforced bridges, established water distributing points and guided
successive march group unite into their assigned areas. Those tyro
engineer companies remained at Montgomery and Meridian until the
last clement of the Corps had cleared, They then repaired all damages
and the Billeting Officer adjusted all claims. As a result of this
system, damages and claims wore negligible. At Vicksburg, Mississippi
no engineer billeting detachment was necessary as the bivouac area
was in Vicksburg National Military Park and Park officials and a group
of local reserve officers who voluntcrred, did excellent service in
guiding successive march group units to their areas. Units using the
march bivouac area in Chiokas aw State Park, Domopolis, Alabama arranged
for their own advance billeting detachments.
3
(Section 11, L?inal Report, Third Army l.lanouvers)
7.
d. Motor Movement.
4
SECTION 111
8. PURPOSE.
9. TERRAIN.
-
-
North: U.S. Route 84, inclusive.
South: State Route 7
East: U.S. Route 165 U.S. Route 71
-
U.S. Route 190, inclusive.
State
Route 26, inclusive.
West: Sabine River.
c. Tactical movements beyond the north and south boundaries
of The maneuver area were not permitted.
5
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
Red: IX Corps.
Approximate relative total strength:
May 9 May 10 May 11
Blue 11542 11542 22694
Red 17274 17274 17274
b. Situation
- See AItfNEX NO. 12 which includes
By 6:00 PM 8 May the 6th Div arrived in its area and immediate
line FIATWOODS
- GLENMOEA and along DEVILS CREEK
-
ly dispatched CT-1 to organize and hold tactical localities along the
CALCASIEU RIVER.
14
-
These dispositions were in accordance with Control Instructions No.
31uo. The remaining two Combat Teams were held in reserve,
pending the developments of enemy action.
Contact was gained with the Rod Forces early in the day by
the 29th Inf in vicinity of NATCHITOCHSS and by the 2d Sq. 6th Cay
in front of the 6th Div. It was apparent that the Red Force was en
deavoring the break through the. north flank with elements of the 2d
Hod Div. In the afternoon the situation warranted reinforcing of
the 29th Inf, and the 6th Div was ordered to dispatch CT-20, and
2 companies of the 18th Engrs, and the Tank Brigade to dispatch Co
F, 67th Inf (LT), with rifles,, This caused Red tc withdraw and per
mitted recalling CT-20 to rejoin the 6th Div.
6
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Amy Maneuvers)
10.
c. (Cont'd)
On 10 May the Ist Div, approaching the concentration area
fron the north, was ordered to change direction, cross the RED
RIVER at COUSHATTA and CLARENCE and strike the hostile left and
rear. The crossing was made late in the afternocn--CT-26 at COUSH
ATTA, CT-16 at CLARENCE, and CT-18 over the ponton bridge at MONT
GOMERY, which had just been completed by the 18th Engrs.
Early 11 May the attack on the front of the Ist Div progress
ed rapidly despite the fact that the 7th Cay Brig (Mecz) was
held up by umpires until 11:00 AM, south of MiNSFIELD. The enemy
began a general withdrawal on the entire front south of HINESTON
as a result of Ist Div pressure. At 9:00 AM, 11 May, the 6th
Cavalry was ordered to HINESTOK to attack in the direction UNION
HILL, the 6th Div to organize a Combat Team pursuit force and the
7th Cay Brig (Mecz) to advance rapidly on LEESVILLE when re
leased by umpires.
- --
At 11:00 All 11 May, the exercise was terminated. (Situation
-
at this time is shown in ANNEX NO. 12), The Blue forces were order
-
ed into bivouac east of the line COUSHATT:. RED RIVER NATCHITOCHES
STATE HWY 20 STATE WIY 265 DEVILS CREEK CALCASIEU RIVER. The
7th Cavalry Brig (Mecz) was released to army control.
The sth Div and Corps Troops closed into bivouac the after
noon of 11 May, completing the concentration of IV Corps,
a. Opposing; forces.
Blue: IV Corps
29th Infantry
Red: IX Corps
7
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
11.
c. Conduct of tho Exercise,
-
WOODS, on the front of the Ist Div near ROBELINE, and on the front
-
of the 6th Div 7 mi south-west of HINESTON. The Rod MLR was'even
tually developed along the line SLAGLE KURTHIYOOD PBASON. The
advance was rapid on all fronts. However, all major units were
frequently held up due to enemy destruction of bridges over the
numerous small streams of the maneuver area. At 8:50 AM the sth
8
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
11.
c. (Cont fd)
A Red Mecz Regt that had broken through on the front of the
6th Div in the vicinity of LA CAMP was successfully prevented from
advancing north across the CALCASIEU RIVER ,• by road blocks which
were quickly established by elements of the 6th and sth Divs. This
Red unit although surrounded was permitted by the umpires to with
draw. By 11:30 "All elements of all major units of the Corps were
near LEESVILLE.
At 8:30 PM, 'l5 May, a teletype message was received from the
Commanding General, Third Army announcing completion of the 2d
phase of tho maneuvers. For situation at this time see ANNEX NO, 13.
All units were directed to bivouac in tho vicinity of their present
locations. Later in the evening instructions wore received to nove
- -
units of IV Corps to bivouac areas, to be designated by the Command
ing General, IV Corps, east of the lino DERRY DEVILS CREEK
HINESTON. Two army truck companies were allotted to assist in tho .
move.
At 1:00 AM, 16 May Corps instructions for movement of units
to selected bivouac areas were issued. At daylight return movement
began, all attachments being released to parent organizations. The
Prov Tank Brig (less 2 Bns 66th Inf (LT) and 1 Bn 67th Inf (MT) )
plus the 29th Inf were turned over to the Red IX Corps. The 3d
Radio Intelligence Co was transferred to the Blue IV Corps, Allunits
closed in base bivouacs by late afternoon 16 May.
a. Opposin" forces.
Blue: IV Corps
Red: IX Corps.
29th Inf. (less 1 Co,)
9
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
12.
b». Situation. See ANNEX NO. 14, which includes
Maneuver Instructions from Commanding General Third Armjr
dated May 19, 1940, as changed by message 5:30 PM May 19, 1940,
Field Order s' Nos. 19, 20 and 21, with operations maps, Special
Military map, showing dispositions and the, situation at end of
exercise 3:00 PM 21 May.
out the day,- the IV Corps went into bivouac for the night along the
SLAGLE'- CRAVENS, approximately
15 miles west of tho morning jump off lino.
10
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
12.
o, (Cont'd)
- -
end of "the Third Phase at 3:00 PM 21 May. See situation map, ANNEX
NO. 14, The IV Corps was directed to hold the important road net '
just gained in the KORTRWOOD SLAGLE
- -
SIMPSON area to facilitate
Blue operations in the next phase. In accordance with Army instructions
the Corps went into bivouac east of the lino KISATCHIE KURTHWOOD
SIAGLE and immediately began preparations of plans for organisation
and defense of the area hold, against Red "reinforcements reported
approaching from west of the SABINE RIVER.
Red: IX Corps.
29th Inf
34th Inf
Combat Aviation
11
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers )
13.
b. Situation. See ANNEX NO. 15 for
- -
balance of the Third Army which was assembling in tho Beaurogard
Area. The mission given the Corps was to prevent the enemy" from
advancing east of tho line, KISA2CEIE KURTIWOOD SLA.GLE.
FO 22, 5:00 PM, 21 May was prepared to coordinate tho defense
of the area. In general the defensive plan assigned tho Ist Division
to the 'north flank which included tho high ground in vicinity of
PEASON, tho center and most vulnerable area of KURTHI7OOD to the sth
Division, and the loss vulnerable area on the south to the 6th
Division. In this situation the IV Corps' was opposed to a Red force
which had been given all available tanks, some 382, and what was
reported to be 400 combat planes, leaving none to tho Blue side.
To combat this powerful mechanized force, the Commanding General
IV Corps decided to dolay on tho first position with two battalions
of Infantry, a battalion of 75 *s and a battalion of 155 f s from each
division. The action between the first and second positions was
to bo road blocking and barrage to destroy a part of the mechanized
force, to break up his formation, to give an opportunity to det
- - -
ermine his principal effort, and to move forces to meet it. The
plan involved fighting a delaying action back to the 2d
position along tho IHHK HUTTON SIMPSON
JHfIBBB
HINESTON lino, rather
than a withdrawal. This lino was more suited for defense than any
other in the area. Here the flanks were protected by streams that
- - -
were serious obstacles, which converged toward the center, thus
canalizing the attack along a 6 mile fronts in the center of the
KISATCHIE KURTHWOOD MINK HUTTON area. On this front, almost
perfect fields of fire existed, and the innumerable stumps would
slow down any tank attack. Subsequent to the preparation of FO
22, 5:00 PM, 21 May, a message was received at Corps Headquarters
(TEMPLE SPUR) at 5:10 PM prescribing that only two divisons be used
in defense of a line, shown on an attached sketch, and one division
to be held in reserve (ANNEX NO. 15), The Commanding General IV
Corps immediately protested, in writing, the Army's action in
designating a defensive lino which would loavo the Corps flanks
wide open against the enemy's mechanized forces, and prevent the
oxecution of the dofonsivo maneuver outlined above. The request of
tho Corps Commander was approved as indicated by Army message 9:25
AM, 22 May and the defensive scheme contained in FO 22 was adopted
for the operation.
12
(Section 111, Final Import, Third Army Maneuvers)
13.
c, (Cont'd)
FO 22 was augmented by special instructions contained in a
corps memorandum issued at 11:00 AM 22 May (ANNFX 110. 15). The
memorandum outlined in detail "what was to be don© in organization
of the ground, coordination of fires, camouflage and cover, with
drawal plans, and restriction of use of transporation except for
supply and reserves.
- mm
120 Antitank weapons (54-37 and 66-, 50 cal MG) were made ready
to meet the heavy mochanizod attack which would be canalized, as
expected, between HUTTON MINK, The positions of the 19th FA were
such that it would have direct fire on tanks penetrating the second
position.
13
SECTION IV
EQUIPMENT
14. GENERAL.
Every possible priority and expedition has been exerted
by the War Department to provide new equipment for the IV Corps.
The new equipment has in general proved highly satisfactory, and
has contributed greatly to the value cf the maneuvers. Field tests
have developed some minor" deficiencies, most of which would appear
to be readily correctable.
15. TRANSPORTATION,
a. Trailers.
Camouflage of Transport,
14
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
15.
o. Command-Reconnaissance Cars.
.
f Motorcycles.
b. Tentago.
Consideration should be riven to reducing the visibility
of tentago, the use of a darker color (possibly black), and with
impregnation to permit the use of lights without being observed by
enemy aircraft, being suggested as basis for further study. The
painting of tents in irregular designs in the normal camouflage
colors is also worthy of investigation.
15
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
17.
c. The 37m Antiaircraft Gun.
Ono lone example of the now 105 mm howitzer was present with
the Corps Artillery,
.
The Corps Artillery Brigade had only ti-o of these new
weapons during the maneuvers With their effective range of
26,000 yards they have proven invaluable, especially for intor
diction fires. Their mobility going into or out of position is
surprising. The speed of their prime movers on the read is,
however, only about nine miles per hour. If the Corps is to
be a homogeneous unit, its component parts roust have approximately
the same speed. Hence either an increase in the speed of those
prime movers or a dc- crease in the caliber of this weapon seems in
dicated.
16
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
18.
a, (Cont'd)
This arrangement would pemit the employment of a plant
for oach conbat team of a division, plus one for divisional special
troops, (or all ether divisional troops not a ]:>art of the cor.ibat
teams). The arrangement for Corps Troops would pcrr.iit the simul
taneous operation of several water DP's with possibly one set in
reserve for replacement purposes.
d. Balloons.
17
SECTION V
COMMUNICATIONS
20, GENERAL.
18
(Section V, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
22.
c. A battle reconnaissance radio intelligence unit should be
a part of the Corps Signal Battalion. A signal officer trained
in crypt oanalysis and to act as evaluating officer on radio in
telligence matters for the Asst. Chief of Staff G-2 seems desir
able.
19
PROPER
"
a. Mossago Cantors.
k» ifo-dio Communication.
20
SECTION VI
25. QUARTERMASTER.
a» Organization,
b. Class ISupplies.
21
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
25.
b. (2), (a) (Cont'd)
.
and ice can bo left in
trucks
refrigerator cars until loaded onto unit
22
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuver s )
25.
c. Class 111 Supplies (Gasoline and Oil).
had from the oil companies involved* namely the Standard Oil Com
pany of Kentucky, Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, Homo Oil
Company, The Texas Company, and the .'Sinclair Oil Company. The
ton gallon drums. Motor vehicles wero rofuolad from the drums at
the rate of about six hundred vehicles per hour or about as fast
Vehicles 1600
- 1575 1666
\
i
t
' i
Trucks, l^-T
(4x4) T : : \ T
Cargo ; "
420 ; 321223
" : 37184 ; 8.63 :
Trucks, (4x4)
2J-T : : : : :
c.
(2) Third Army Exercises,
Equipment
Item Quantity
Drums, 10-gallon capacity, each 600
Nozzles, flexible for cans 100
Funnels, largo size, (12-inch) 24
Electric Lanterns, Portable Battery Typo 6
Trucks, 2-j- ton (6x6) 16
Cars, Command or Sedan 2
Trucks, -| ton (4x4), Pick-up 4
Trailers, truck 3
Hand Pumping Apparatus, 4-nozzle • 4
Fire Extinguishers, Foamito 12
Tank Trucks, 1500 gallon, 2-compartment 6
24
25.
d. Motor Maintenance.
(c ) Transportation.
25
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
25.
d.., (1), (c), (3) Cont'd.
26. WATER.
ous small streams wore available in the maneuver area, and it S,,
never became necessary to haul water any great distance.
/'
27. ORDNANCE.
_a. Organization*
Ordnance troops .
There was no change in the organization of the Corps
They functioned in the same manner as in the IV
Corps Exercises at Fort Benning except that each company operated
as a shop under the supervision of a battalion maintenance officer.
This method proved far superior to the method of grouping sections
as was done at Fort Benning.
b . .
Maintenanc e «*
26
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
27.
c. Ammunition Suppl;
(l) There was no change from the plan usod in the IV Corps
Exercises at Fort Bonning,
27
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)
28.
a. (Cont'd)
(2) During the march period May 4th to 11th inclusive
there was no prevalence of communicable disoaso and only eight
(8) voncr&l cases, all gonorrhea, wore reported, Thore was a
total of 138 patients admitted to all hospitals as follows:
Civilian Hospital
Ist Evacuation Hospital. ,
IV Corps Clearing Station...
. 21
,108
9
(Immobilized Hospital)
Total 138
28
SECTION VII
ADMINISTRATION
30. ROUTINE
tive matters were sent back to the Roar Echelon at Dry Prong, La.,
31. PERSONNEL.
.
sx Sco Administrative Instructions Nos. 11 & 12,
AMEXA NOS. 17 k 18.
29
(Section VIIFinal Report Third Army Maneuvers)
(1) Thoso who woro ready for full duty in a short time.
(2) Those who woro ready for duty during the period
of maneuvers in the Sabin© Aroa.
(3) Thoso no longor requiring hospitalization and
who were ready for ordinary garrison duty, but who were not yet fit
for active field duty.
(4) Thoso who required prolonged hospitalization, or
transfer to a general hospital.
Those in groups (1) and (2) were returned to duty
with their organizations in tho Sabine Area by tho Commanding General,
Fort Bonning, upon completion of hospitalization. Those in group (3)
wore returned to their home stations on orders issued by Headquarters,
4th Corps Area. Those in group (4) were reported to Headquarters, 4th
Corps Aroa for disposition.
Ist Division:
38th Division May 13, 14, 15.
- 10 officers.
sth Division:
31st Division May 14, 15, 16.
- 10 officers.
6th Division:
33rd Division May 9, 10, 11.
- 10 officers.
A total of 1267 Reserve officers took part in the training of
the IV Corps in the Sabine Area.
30
(Section VIIFinal Report Third Army Maneuvers)
31
(Section VII Final Report Third Army Maneuvers)
(4) Duo to the fact that tho personnel of the Army Post
Offices arc required to maintain 24 hours service,' Army Post Offices
should bo established in the vicinity of Corps end Division CPs so
as to be provided with electric lighting.
32
SECTION VIII
TACTICS
a. Infant ry-Artil
lery.
The combination of an infantry regiment and a battalion of
light artillery as the basic elements of a combat team has become
standard throughout the divisions of the corps. It is the practice
to have them march, bivouac and initiate conbat together. As soon
as the tactical situation warranted, the artillery of combat teams
was brought under centralized control. This procedure has proved
to be entirely sound and desirable.
Effort ytq.s made to extend the team idea to include tho In
fantry-Air field by automatically alloting to the using troops,
air units which would be at the disposition of those units habit
ually. To do this, Standing Procedure proscribed that airplanes
of tho Observation Aviation Group would be habitually at the
disposition of each division, the Corps Cavalry Regiment and the
Corps Artillery Brigade.
c. Cavalry-Air.
33
(Section VIII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers )
34.
c.
d. Combat Aviation.
c. Antitank-Air .
A need exists for combined training of observation aviation
these maneuvers.
£. Infantry-Cavalry.
.
jz;. Infantry- Tank
34
(Section VIII,Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)
34.
h.
.
J: Engineers.
35
(Section VIII, Find Report, Third Army Maneuvers )
35*
a.
(2)
mechanized units, the Corps was free to operate without danger
of a sudden flank incursion.
b. Antiaircraft.
36
(Section VIII,Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
35.
b.
(^) WQWQQ-P ons .
The automatic weapons batteries were found
to bo highly mobile and capable cf keeping up with the type corps,
whereas the 3 inch guns, owing to their weight, must make re
latively fo\r changes of position and move over roads having strong
bridges if they are to perform their mission. Since protection
against high-altitude bombardment willnormally be required only
in rear areas, it is believed that Army rather than the Corps
should be provided with the heavy guns. When required by the
corps they could be attahced to it.
a. Triangular Divisions.
filtration
-
time permitted, movements by day generally were effected by in
trucks moving 500 to 600 yards apart. Whon a move
ment had to bo completed rapidly, the distance between vehicles '\u25a0
was reduced to roughly 200 yards. Such ir.o /emonts require strict
traffic control and supervision by staff officers. Only when the
distance to be moved was under 4 or 5 miles, or whon roads were
not available, or when enemy fire or combat aviation mado it
necessary, was inarching on foot resorted to. Whon close to the
enemy and threatened by his artillery fire* woapons carriers and
other vehicles were moved across country to the Maximum, extent
possible. This can be done to a marked degro" "w.i.'-h the now four-
wheel-drive transportation.
37
(Section VIII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
36.
a. (Cont'd)
orders. Liaison officers were used to the utmost between higher and
lower units. It is believed that they should have been used to a
greater extent between adjacent units.
38
(Section VIII,Find Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
37.
b. Iho Offensive.
The offensive possesses many advantages for mechanized
forces or triangular divisions, Rapid novenent makes it possible
for a corps to carry out envelopments on flanks separated by
100 miles or more.
39
SECTION IX
The exercise in the Sabine area have not caused any change of
opinion from that expressed in the final report on the maneuvers
in the Benning area. The. triangular corps of the modernized mobile
divisions is a homogenous, very mobile and flexible organization
and is fctill capable of rendering a powerful effort. "When deploy
ed in a mobile situation it extends over such a wide area that it
about reaches the limit of present means of communication. Any
additional divisions added to it would only tend to extend its field
of action beyond those limits without any compensating advantages.
It is also believed that any mixture of less mobile units would
only tend to slow down its operations. Some of the elements in
the corps troops arc in need of increased mobility or otherwise
reorganized so as to permit them to keep pace with the speed and
tempo of the other units and be able to play their part. £t_J^s_
iysß]^s^.appj«:.e}at_jfeha.tL..tp.^e^th© most_out of tho_mobile divisions,
the commanders and staffs must bo highly trained, Gnergetlc^in^tr"'
aggros sivS,^^^ the uniT is wasted in long
deTiber ation or indec i ,
si on
40
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Manouvers)
39.
b. Antiaircraft.
c. Enginocrs.
o. Medical Troops.
f. Military Police.
41
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
39.
Ja* Signal Battalion.
The Signal Battalion should include a radio intelligence
company. The Battalion did not have equipment of sufficient range
to take care of tho area covered by the Corps, Better and more
distant communications are absolutely essential. The introduction
of teletype between the Corps and Army was a great success. It
is recommended that similar equipment b© provided so that this
type of communication can bo had betweon corps and divisions as
well# It proved to bo tho fastest and most reliable means of dis
patch of routine matters. The activities of tho battalion were
handicapped by tho detachment of 1 officer and 44 men for duty with
tho Army Control Group,
—• Headquarters Special Troops.
A* Avis-tion.
k. Quartermaster Servico.
// i!
/
42
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
39.
k. (Cont'd)
The Corps had one Light Motor Maintenance Company which took
care of the corps needs satisfactorily end appears to bo sufficient.
1. Ordnance.
40. RECOMMENDATIONS.
As a result of our experience the "typo corps should bo about
as follows:
Corps Hq « Hq Co.
3 Triangular Divisions
Corps Troops:
Artillery Brigade
1 ikitiaircraft Regiment
1 Antitank Battalion
1 Engineer Regiment (Combat. 3 Bns),
1 Engineer Company (Topographic)
1 Uedioal Regiment
1 Cavalry Composite Regiment
1 Observation Aviation Group
1 Signal Battalion
1 Military Police Company
1 Ordnance Battalion
1 Quartormastor Battalion
43
J
SECTION X
40. ORGANIZATION.
"k* The G-l Section can function properly undor peace time
conditions similar to thoso of the maneuvers if reduced from 1
officer and 4 enlisted men to 1 officer and 2 enlisted men, pro
vided that it is officed and operates intimately with the G- Jr
Section, or its work can be allotted in part to G«4 and the AG Sec
tion. For the Third Army Maneuvers tho G-l Section functioned as
such only for the planning phase for the movement to, and concen
tration in the Sabine Area. Thereafter its duties were taken over
entirely by the G-4 Section and by that part of the AG Section with
the Forward Echelon. Prior to leaving Fort Benning, the G-l Section
had completed all plans and issued administrative instructions for
the movement, and for the period in Sabine Area base camps.
£. The G-2 Section was augmented by one officer for the Third
Army Maneuvers, so that its actual strength was 2 officers and 6
enlisted men as compared to 3 officers and 6 onlistod men authorized.
The part-time services of the Air Officers to the G-2 Section was
continued, as for the IV Corps Manouvors.
44
(Section X, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
40.
f.
(2) Koadquart Corps Quartormastor Service;
or s uorps
Jri.oaaqus.rT;ors oorvigc This office
was improvised
sod and consisted of four officers and f
f ive onlistcd men
of the Quartermaster Corps. It should be a part of tho Corps Quartor
master Battalion and of appropriate size to administer it.
41. EQUIPMENT.
Efforts were made to minimize tho amount of equipment
taken into the field. Standing Operating Procedure limited the
assignment of tentage, typewriters and other equipment.
4-a. PROCEDURE.
a. Standing Operating Procedure.
45
(Section X, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
42.
c. Duties and Functions.
46
SECTION XI
FACTUAL DATA
a, Normal Convoys,
(l) Table I gives data obtained during the march to the Sabine
Area, This data is given separately because divisions were reinforced by
Corps troops, and units of Corps troops were therefore split up, attach
ments and detachments were in accordance with the provisions of F} 3 3,, Hq,
IV Corps, Fort Bonning, Ga,, 30 April 40, All movements were during day
light.
47
(Section XI, Final Roport, Third Army Maneuvers)
44.
a.
(a) Daylight.
average
Vohicles
CT :48
:54 :59 243 4JT
Division Tps. 2:20 2:35 3:00 481 3
6th Cavalry :25 :20 :25 276 5 (less Ist Sq)
Lt.Tank Bn, :23 . :18 :28 101 142
13th FA Brig, j ;53 | :50 | :50 | 282 | 4 |
(b) Night w/lights.
CT "755 (1:12 [1756 | 263 | 10 |
Division Tps. 2:30 2:41 3:40 481 3
6th Cavalry :25 :20 270 2
Lt.Tank Bn. [ :23 | :18 [ :33 | 101 | 42 |
(o) Night w/o lights. ~
jIT3B [1754 [2728 j
_^
"CT 330 ] 4 I
Division Tps, 3:10' 3:20 4:14 481 3
Lt.Tank Bn. :18 :18 :38 101 16
13th FA Brig. {1:25 |1:26 ?.:38 ] 39 | 6 }
b. Infiltration by Truck*
48
(Section XI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
44.
d. Rate of March.
MPH (ay.) Number of eets
(1) Trucks .
Daylight 24,1
of data
55
Might with lights
Night without lights, • .•..
Infiltration. •••••••.•••••
21.1
15.8
24.5
19
6
11
(2) Tanks.
Daylight 30 142
Night with lights,.,. 30 42
Night without lights, •• ••• 10 16
Infiltration. , 30 16
(3 ) Tractor elements,
36th P. A.
Daylight
Night ivith lights
.
• • 5.7
4,1
Night without lights. • •• • • 3.3
Infiltration. 5.7
49
(Section XI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
b. At QM DPs.
50
SSCTION XII
(1) Infantry-Artiller;
The basio elements of the combat team should be a
regiment of Infantry and a battalion of light artillery, which
should march, bivouac, and initiate combat together. In many
situations a battery of medium artillery should be included.
(Par. 34 ju)
(2) Infantry-Air,
One squadron of observation aviation should be avail
able to support each division, liaison through division air officer
communication through radio at division CP. (Par. 34 b, )
(3) Cavalry-Air.
One flight of observation aviation and one autogyro
should habitually be at disposal of Corps Reconnaissance R.egiment;
liaison officer at regimental CPj Cavalry-Air radio set at regi
mental CP. (Par. 34 c* )
(4) Combat Aviation.
Ground troops should bo trained to operate with and
against combat aviation. (Par. 34 d. )
(5) Antitank-Air.
Antitank units and observation aviation should have
combined training. (Par, 34 c. )
(6) Infantry-Cavalr;
51
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
49.
£. (Cont'd)
(7) Infantry- Tank.
Frequent training of tanks with infantry is impora
tive, a tank battalion working with an infantry regiment or com
bat team. (Par. 34 £.g )
(9) Engineers.
Engineers should train froquently with the othor
arms, both in the performance of normal Engineer duties and in
combat duties with antitank units and as a component of a combat
team. (Par. 34 i.)
c. Anti-mechanized and anti-aircraft tactics.
52
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
49.
threatens. (Par. 36 cv )
c. Character of Maneuver.
ovor-extond his front, shift his reserves, and thus permit his
(Par. 37. b. )
53
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
51.
a. (Cont'd. )
(15) Except for the planning phase the G-l Section pan be dispens
ed with in peace time maneuvers, its duties b&irig taken over
by G-4 and *h© AG. (Par. 40 £ ) .
b. Equipment.
(l) Every motor vehicle, not a prime mover for weapons should
be provided with trailers to increase cargo capacity and make
trucks available for personnel. (Par, 15 a.)
(2) Semi- trailer vans outfitted as CP's should be provided for
headquarters; 4 per Corps, 2 per Div, and 1 per Combat Team.
(Par. 15 b.)
55
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)
51.
b. . (Cont'd.)
(14) The 26,000 yard range of the new 155ram gun M-l is an asset.
Either an increase in speed of its prime mover, or decrease in
caliber of this v/oapon is needed to make its road speed equal
to the rest of the corps, (Par. 17 £ ) .
(15) A supply of AT mines should be carried at all times by
division and corps engineer units. (Par. 17 g.)
(16) Four 900 gal, per hour water purification units should be
provided for the corps and for each division. Shower bath
accessories should be included in each unit. They should be
mounted complete on a trailer, (Par, 18 ji & Id)
£r Suppiy*
56
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Kanouvors)
51.
d. (Cont'd.)
(4) Gasoline distribution to cans from tank trucks "by special
multiple-distribution outlets was a success. Refueling ve
.
hicles from 10 gal. cans is the fastest nothod, Six 1500
gal. tank trucks with power pumps should be provided the
Gasoline Supply Company to obviate dependence on civilian con
tractors, (Par. 25 c. (1) (a))
(Par, 27 c. (4))
c. Administration,
tyjUfc^. <?.., /
WALTER C. SHORT
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
57