JSNT 29.

2 (2006) 139-161 Copyright 2006 SAGE Publications

(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://JSNT.sagepub.com
DOI: 10.1177/0142064X06072835

Paul and Roman Stoicism:

Romans 12 and Contemporary Stoic Ethics
Runar M. Thorsteinsson
Centre for Theology and Religious Studies, Lund University
Allhelgona Kyrkogata 8, SE-223 62 Lund, Sweden
runar.thorsteinsson@teol.lu.se

Abstract
Exemplifying a rather widespread attitude among Pauline scholars, it has
recently been argued on the basis of Rom. 12 that Paul differed sharply from the
Stoics in his moral teaching. The present article aims to show that such a claim
does not hold if and when the sources of Roman Stoicism are taken into consideration. A comparison of Pauls moral teaching in Rom. 12 and contemporary
Stoic ethics reveals that, whereas the two differ somewhat in scope (particular
vs. universal), the differences are clearly outweighed by the many, striking
similarities.

Key Words
Paul, Romans, Stoicism, moral teaching, ethics, agape

Introduction
In a recent issue of New Testament Studies (2004), Philip F. Esler published an article entitled Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case.
The article is a response to Troels Engberg-Pedersens claim that there is
a fundamental similarity between Stoic ethics and the moral teaching of
Paul (2000).1 With Rom. 12 serving as a test case Esler comes to the
conclusion that, while there indeed are some similarities with the Stoic
ethical tradition, the existence of differences in [Pauls] account produces
a total package which is, in the end, radically divergent from Stoicism
(p. 120; emphasis mine). Romans 12 reveals an interaction with Stoic
ethics, but Pauls paramount concern with the nature of face-to-face
1. Engberg-Pedersen has partlybut only partlyresponded to Eslers article in
his The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences between Paul and
Stoicism (2005).

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contacts between Christ-followers, who must treat one another with

a)ga&ph and put the interests of others ahead of their own, is so radically
different from anything in Stoic thought that it brings into sharp focus his
distinctive vision of moral life in Christ (p. 124; my emphasis). In this
article, I want to draw attention to contemporary sources of Stoicism, the
comparison of which with Pauls moral teaching in Rom. 12 cannot result
in such a conclusion as Eslers.2 His position is by no means unique, to be
sure, but constitutes a particularly clear-cut and explicit example of a
broader tradition within Pauline scholarship that needs to be questioned.
Paul and Stoicism:
The Close Comparison and Stoic Sources Consulted
Esler takes a social-scientic approach to the ancient sources (2004: 108).
In the social sciences there are two broad types of comparison between two
phenomena. The rst is the close comparison of phenomena existing
together in time and place. Due to their cultural contiguity which
already makes some similarity inevitable, this type of comparison intends
to bring out differences between the two phenomena and not similarities.
The second is the distant comparison of phenomena which are remote
in time or place or both. Because differences are only to be expected, in
this type of comparison the attention is drawn to similarities. Esler opts
for the former type in his comparison of Rom. 12 and Stoic ethics, since
Paul and Stoicism co-existed in the rst-century Mediterranean world.
This is obviously an appropriate choice between the given alternatives.
However, in view of the very scope of the close comparison, Eslers
selection of Stoic sources strikes me as surprising.
Esler mentions three main sources for Stoic ethics (2004: 107-108): (1)
Book 3 in Ciceros On Ends (De nibus); (2) Book 7 of the Lives of
Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius (c. 200250 CE; book 7 covers
Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus); and (3) the Epitome of Stoic Ethics
collected by Stobaeus (early fth century CE) and attributed to Arius
Didymus (late rst century BCE).3 It is primarily the last source from

2. Translations of Pauline texts are more or less my own. Unless otherwise noted,
translations of other texts used in this article are from the LCL.
3. This piece of work is found in Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.5-12 (ed. Wachsmuth and
Hense), entitled The beliefs (do&gmata) of Zeno and the other Stoics about the ethical
part of philosophy. The other Stoics are, in addition to Cleanthes and Chrysippus
(third century BCE), Diogenes of Seleucia, Antipater of Tarsus, Archedemus of Tarsus

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141

which Esler draws in his comparison of Stoic ethics and Rom. 12.
What I nd surprising is this: although Esler chooses to follow the
close comparison in which phenomena existing together in time and
place are focused upon, he overlooks at least three important sources for
Stoic ethics which are closely related to Pauls letter to the Romans both
in time and place. The rst derives from Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 165
CE). Not only did Seneca write extensively on Stoic ethics but he was
also Pauls exact contemporary and operated in the city of Rome. The
second source comes from the great Roman Stoic teacher Musonius Rufus
(rst century CE), and the third from one of his students, namely Epictetus
(c. 50135 CE), who was a near contemporary of Paul and partly operated
as a moral philosopher in Rome.
Esler includes one single reference to Epictetus in his comparative
study of Rom. 12 (2004: 118 n. 60) and none whatsoever either to
Musonius or Seneca. This total absence of the latter two in particular is
even more striking when one takes into account Eslers social-scientic
approach, which stresses that ideas active in particular settings (such as
the respective teachings of Paul and the Stoics on ethical matters) can
have real social impacts (2004: 109), and which underlines the actual
form of these ideas in the social life of the rst century (2004: 110).
Esler then goes on to criticize those [w]estern intellectuals with a philosophic bent who, according to him, are mainly interested in deep
ideas divorced from their particular social settings.4 Quoting Anthony A.
Long, Esler insists that the work attributed to the Alexandrian philosopher
Arius Didymus is the longest and most detailed surviving account of
Stoic ethics (2004: 108), and makes a number of observations about
Stoicism in general on the basis of that account. However, according to
Arthur J. Pomeroy, the editor and translator of the text to which Esler
himself refers in his article,
[Arius Didymuss] very aim of offering a clear outline of Stoic principles
probably means that he harmonized conicting theories in earlier Stoic
thought in order to create logical consistency. It is also likely that he incorporated syncretising elements from other systems where this assisted his
aim. The result is not a history of the development of Stoic doctrine, but a
quite individualistic example of Stoic thought as it existed in the late rst
century BC (Pomeroy 1999: 3).

and Panaetius of Rhodes (all from the second century BCE); see Pomeroy 1999: 10-11
with n. 1.
4. Esler notes that such an interest may lead to a return to the idealistic fallacy, a
phrase coined by Bengt Holmberg.

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The works of the Roman Stoics, on the other hand, are primary examples
of and witnesses to Stoicism as it was understood, interpreted, and experienced in the very city to which Paul dispatched his letter to the Romans.
Hence, not only does the close comparison call for their works to be
consulted, but a social-scientic perspective such as that advocated by
Esler would seem to do so also. We know that Seneca was highly inuential as a Roman politician and moralist, and the Emperor Neros tutor
and counsellor. Tacitus informs us that Seneca and his companion Burrus
guided the emperors youth with an unity of purpose seldom found where
authority is shared, and though their accomplishments were wholly different, they had equal inuence (Ann. 13.2).5 In fact, Senecas sociopolitical inuence was at its peak precisely when Pauls letter was
(presumably) being read and interpreted for the rst time(s) by the Roman
addressees. We also know that in the time of Nero, Musonius too was at
the height of his inuence.6 Moreover, unlike some philosophers, he was
no doctor umbraticus, but was rather a public gure, a conspicuous
participant in civic affairs (Lutz 1947: 24).7 As for Epictetus, he was a
slave owned for a time by Epaphroditus, the famous freedman and administrative secretary of Nero (see Epictetus, Diatr. 1.1.20; 1.19.19-22), which
suggests that in his early years Epictetus had direct experience of the
imperial court (cf. Long 2002: 10). While still a slave, he was a student of
Musonius (see, e.g., Diatr. 1.7.32; 1.9.29; 3.23.29), under whose patronage
Epictetus later began his teaching career in Rome, and whose legacy he
carried on far beyond the city walls.8
These, then, are the Stoic moralists who are (almost) entirely missing
in Eslers social-scientic comparison of Paul and the Stoics who coexisted in the rst-century Mediterranean world.9
5. Cf. Dio Cassius, Hist. Rom. 61.3-4. Cf. also Senecas De clementia, addressed
to the emperor.
6. Cf. Arnold 1911: 117: the inuence of Musonius was so great that we may
almost regard him as a third founder of the philosophy. Another student of his (in
addition to Epictetus) was the famous orator Dio Chrysostom (Dio of Prusa).
7. Lutz provides a most helpful collection of the texts attributed to Musonius (with
translations), to which I will refer in this article.
8. Cf. the following comments of W.A. Oldfather in his introduction to the LCL
edition of Epictetuss Diatribai (p. ix n. 4): the system of thought in the pupil is little
more than an echo, with changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of
the master. While Oldfather may have overstated the case a bit, his words rightly call
attention to the rst-century Roman roots of Epictetuss teaching.
9. With respect to Eslers close comparison, it is possible that certain similarities
between Paul and these Stoics may simply be considered as given, but the problem is

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143

It may certainly be the case that some or all of these Stoics actually
reect a return to early Stoicism as well as a revival of its Cynic roots,10
and that the Stoic ethical tradition as a system of thought is better presented
by Ciceros account in De nibus11 or even by Arius Didymus.12 But, as
I am in basic agreement with Esler about the relevance of time and place,
and about the signicance of the texts particular social settings, I consider
it imperative (also) to examine what Pauls (near) contemporary Roman
Stoics have to say about matters addressed by him in Rom. 12. Let me put
it this way: Would Pauls rst-century Roman readers, who doubtless
were exposed to Stoic principles,13 have regarded Pauls total package
in Rom. 12 as radically divergent from Stoicism?
The purpose of this article, then, is to compare Pauls moral teaching in
Rom. 12 with contemporary Roman Stoic ethics. Since recent interpreters
of Pauls letters often take the differences for granted rather than the
similarities in spite of all cultural contiguity, I will pay attention to
differences and similarities.14 But let us begin with reading through Rom.
12.
Romans 12 in Context
In terms of the epistolary structure of Romans, the request formula in
12.1-2 (parakalw~ ou]n u9ma=j, a)delfoi/ etc.) can be taken as the letters
structural centre (see Thorsteinsson 2003: 47-54). With ch. 12 the dialogical exchanges of questions and answers so prominent in chs. 311 cease

that Esler does not even mention the latters relevance to the whole subject or attempt
to bring out the differences between them and Paul (in accordance with the purpose
of this type of comparison).
10. Although, on ethics, Seneca in particular may adhere more to middle Stoicism;
cf. Colish 1985: 48-49. On differences between Seneca, Musonius and Epictetus, see
Arnold 1911: esp. 111-27.
11. So Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 46.
12. So Esler 2004: 107-108.
13. Mostly owing to Cicero, already by the end of the rst century BCE Stoicism
was the predominant philosophy among the Romans. Besides the philosophical
schools and the court in Rome, Stoics (some of them prone to Cynicism) were also
found in public lecture-rooms and at street corners; cf. Arnold 1911: 99-127; Pohlenz
1964: 279-90; Sandbach 1989: 16-17.
14. An excellent survey of scholarly views of the similarities and differences
between Stoicism (esp. Seneca and Epictetus) and the New Testament is found in
Colish 1992.

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to occur,15 to be followed now by a predominantly imperative language.

Pauls hortatory request in 12.1-2 is based on the previous discourse as a
whole (cf. the inferential conjunction ou]n) and functions at the same time
as a summary of the subsequent exhortations. In light of what he had
proclaimed so far in his letter, Paul here summons his readers to serve
God by presenting their bodies (sw&mata) as a living sacrice, holy and
acceptable to God (qusi/an zw~san a(gi/an eu0a&reston tw~| qew~|),16 and to be
transformed (metamorfou=sqe) by a renewal of the mind (th|= a)nakainw&sei
tou= noo&j).17 Appealing to his divine authority vis--vis the audience
(v. 3),18 Paul then goes on to explain the way in which this living sacrice
is to be embodied (12.315.14).19 It is mainly by showing mutual love,
care, respect and adaptability that they full their service to God. It is by
doing good (to_ a)gaqo&n/to_ kalo&n) and not evil (to_ kako&n/to_ ponhro&n).
What truly is good in the eyes of God, and thus what is not, they will
discern by a renewal of the mind (v. 2)and by heeding Pauls words.
Paul begins from admonishing his addressees not to think too highly of
themselves, but to bear in mind that they all enjoy their own particular
gifts (xari/smata) which differ according to the grace given to them by
God (vv. 3-8).20 Scholars often stress that the words h9 a)ga&ph a)nupo&kritoj
in v. 9a serve as an introductory heading to the subsequent exhortations
(Furnish 1972: 103. Cf., e.g., Wilson 1991: 150; Sding 1995: 241-50),
15. On the dialogical style in Romans (commonly referred to as the diatribe),
specically compared with analogous elements in other Graeco-Roman letters, see
Thorsteinsson 2003: 123-50.
16. Cf. Phil. 2.17 in which Paul refers to the sacrice (qusi/a) and offering
(leitourgi/a) of the audiences faith (pi/stij), but the text immediately preceding
(2.1-16) points to a very physical aspect of such a sacrice and offering.
17. I have argued elsewhere that this renewal of the mind concerns a transformation from the godless Gentile existence described in 1.18-32 (cf., e.g., the a)do&kimoj
nou=j and ta_ mh\ kaqh/konta etc. in 1.28-31) to the god-fearing way of life outlined in
chs. 1215; see Thorsteinsson 2003: 165-77.
18. A comparison with 1.5-6, 13-14a; 11.13 and 15.15-16 suggests that Paul here
refers to his authority as an apostle to the Gentiles; cf. Thorsteinsson 2002; 2003: 87122.
19. This is a part of Pauls mission as a minister of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles
(leitourgo_n Xristou= 0Ihsou= ei0j ta_ e1qnh) in the sacred service (i9erourgou=nta) of Gods
good news (15.15-16). The purpose of this mission is explained in v. 16: so that the
offering of the Gentiles (h9 prosfora_ tw~n e0qnw~n) may be acceptable, sanctied by the
holy spirit (eu0pro&sdektoj, h9giasme/nh e0n pneu/mati a(gi/w|). This is actually a restatement
of Pauls epistolary request in 12.1-2, rounding off, so to speak, his ethical discourse
in chs. 1215.
20. Cf. 1 Cor. 7.7; 12.4-11.

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and that the concept of a)ga&ph is the principle upon which Pauls moral
teaching is based. Victor P. Furnish speaks in this respect of the universalism of the Pauline love ethic (1972: 107).21 But none of this is readily
apparent in Rom. 12. What vv. 9-21 offer is a series of exhortations which
seem to be singled out rather randomly. Replete as it is with asyndeta (cf.
also v. 8), the passage gives the impression that it simply contains a
jumble of loosely related maxims. Attempts have been made to identify
in vv. 9-21 a coherent, calculated pattern of structure, for instance,
through chiasmus (e.g. Black 1989; Wilson 1991: 175-77 [for vv. 14-21])
or aural repetition (Esler 2003: 318-19), but few without using considerable force. Not all Pauline passages are necessarily structured according to a thoroughly calculated pattern. When the words h9 a)ga&ph a)nupo&kritoj in Rom. 12.9a appear, they simply appear as one among many
maxims, without having any clear programmatic or thematic function.22
The unhypocritical love spoken of in this verse is instead a direct
continuation of v. 3 and following, where Paul urges the addressees not
to think [too] highly of themselves (mh\ u9perfronei=n) with respect to one
another (cf. v. 16), precisely as the words on brotherly love, honour
and so on immediately following v. 9 also suggest: th=| filadelfi/a| ei0j
a)llh/louj filo&storgoi, th=| timh=| a)llh/louj prohgou/menoi (v. 10).
In fact, neither the word a)ga&ph nor its cognates occur again in ch. 12.
It is not until 13.8 that a)ga&ph reappears, and there it is patently presented
as a basic principle for Pauls moral teaching. But, again, this is in no
way evident in ch. 12. Most signicantly, in 13.8 a)ga&ph is conned to
the very members of the group addressed in and by the letter. The act of
loving is an in-group act: Owe no one anything,23 except to love one
another (to_ a)llh/louj a)gapa=n). According to Paul, the one who loves
(o( a)gapw~n) the other (to_n e3teron) has fullled the Law. In absolute
terms, love (h9 a)ga&ph) does no wrong to the neighbour (tw~| plhsi/on)
(v. 10). In light of Pauls statement in v. 8a, o( e3teroj and o( plhsi/on (sc.
21. Furnish cites Rom. 12.18 as a mark of such universalism, but it should be
noted that in v. 18 Paul does not urge his readers to love all men but to live at peace
with all men. His concern seems to be that the addressees are to take care not to evoke
any unnecessary hostility on behalf of outsiders; cf. 13.1-7; 1 Thess. 4.12.
22. Cf. Ksemann 1974: 331: So wird anders als in 1.K 13 das Stichwort Agape in
9akeineswegs deutlich als berschrift herausgestellt, bezeichnet vielmehr eine
Verhaltensweise neben andern, nicht ihr Kriterium und ihre rechte Modalitt Dabei
sollte beachtet werden, da 9 weder stilistisch noch sachlich einen neuen Abschnitt
markiert.
23. It is possible also to read the dative mhdeni/ as a dative of respect: Owe nothing
in any respect; cf. Thorsteinsson 2002: 540-41.

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w!n) must here refer to people within the group addressed, viz. fellow

Christ-believers.24 It is they who constitute the object as well as the subject

of a)gapa=n. It may very well be that, for Paul, a)ga&ph was the primary
virtue (Esler 2004: 117. Cf. 1 Cor. 13, esp. v. 13), but it is important to
note that there is no positive evidence that he ever taught that a)ga&ph should
extend to outsiders as well.25 In none of his extant letters does he urge his
addressees to love (a)gapa=n) others than fellow Christ-believers.26 Pauls
love ethic may not be so universal after all.
What unites the rather disorderly discourse in Rom. 12.9-21, then, is
not the concept of a)ga&ph in particular but, more generally, Pauls concern
for the addressees moral behaviour as Christ-believers. As a further token
of his unsystematic treatment of the topic, Paul here speaks interchangeably of in-group and out-group relations: in line with vv. 3-8, vv.
9-12 relate to in-group relationsand this is where a)ga&ph is mentioned.
In v. 13 Paul refers rst to the holy (oi9 a3gioi)presumably an in-group
termand then, indirectly, to strangers or foreigners (filoceni/a). In v. 14
a very denite out-group term comes into focus, viz. persecutors (oi9
diw&kontej). By contrast, in v. 16 Paul shifts again to in-group relations
(ei0j a)llh/louj etc.), only to speak of the addressees conduct before and
towards all people (pa&ntej a1nqrwpoi) in vv. 17-18. The remaining verses
of the chapter most likely concern out-group relations. The enemies
who are in view here may even include such persons as the persecutors
mentioned in v. 14. Unlike Pauls statements in v. 14, however, in vv. 1921 he urges the Roman Christ-believers to give opportunity for Gods

24. Cf. Gal. 5.13-15 in which Paul exhorts his readers to serve one another through
love (dia_ th=j a)ga&phj douleu/ete a)llh/loij) and refers to Lev. 19.18 in that respect:
Love your neighbour as yourself (a)gaph/seij to_n plhsi/on sou w(j seauto&n). The
following verse is also concerned with in-group relations: But if you bite and devour
one another (a)llh/louj), take care not to be consumed by one another (u9p a)llh/lwn).
25. Contra Wilson who asserts that in Romans 12, Paul explicitly extends the
application of a)ga&ph to ones dealings with outsiders, people in general, even enemies
and persecutors (1991: 131). Paul does no such thing explicitly in Rom. 12.
26. A possible exception to this is found in 1 Thess. 3.12, where Paul expresses his
wish that his addressees may abound in love for one another and for all (ei0j
a)llh/louj kai\ ei0j pa&ntaj). However, the immediately following just as we [abound
in love] for you (kaqa&per kai\ h9mei=j ei0j u9ma=j) suggests that these all are in fact all
fellow Christ-believers (cf. also Pauls discussion of brotherly love [filadelfi/a]
shortly thereafter in 4.9-10: a)gapa=n a)llh/loujpa&ntaj tou\j a)delfou\j e0n o3lh| th=|
Makedoni/a)| . In Gal. 6.10 and 1 Thess. 5.15 Pauls all (pa&ntaj) probably refers to
outsiders too, but it is important to observe that here the issue is not the primary
virtue a)ga&ph but, more broadly, to_ a)gaqo&n.

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147

wrath and revenge on such people. The vengeance is Gods and not
the addressees, whose task is instead to show charity to their enemies so
that the latter may be driven to repentance.27 Thus, to_ kako&n is defeated e0n
tw~| a)gaqw~.|
Pauls Moral Teaching in Romans 12 and Roman Stoic Ethics
Scholars have long been aware of Stoic echoes in Rom. 12.1-2. And yet,
for some reason, these echoes tend to be mentioned merely in passinga
startling default, considering the weight of Rom. 12.1-2 for the reading of
the letter as a whole.
When Paul speaks of the addressees living sacrice as their rational
or reasonable worship (h9 logikh\ latrei/a), he alludes to a popular Stoic
concept and utilizes a word (logiko&j)28 which was highly favoured
among the Stoics in particular to describe humans as rational beings and
how they relate to God (as lo&goj) (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.87-88,
134, 147; Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.6 [= Arius Didymus 6; ed. Pomeroy];
Epictetus, Diatr. 1.3.1-3; 2.8.2-3, 11-14; 3.1.25; Marcus Aurelius, Med.
4.4; 5.27. Cf. also Cicero, Nat. d. 1.39; Seneca, Epp. 66.12; 76.9-10;
92.1-2, 27; 124.23). Epictetus associates reason with worship as follows:
If we had sense (nou=n), ought we to be doing anything else, publicly and
privately, than hymning and praising the Deity, and rehearsing His benets
(xa&ritaj)? If, indeed, I were a nightingale, I should be singing as a
nightingale; if a swan, as a swan. But as it is, I am a rational being (logiko&j
ei0mi), therefore I must be singing hymns of praise to God and I exhort
(parakalw~) you to joint me in this same song (Diatr. 1.16.15, 20-21).

Further accentuating the cognitive dimension of proper worship, Paul

urges his readers to be transformed or metamorphosed (metamorfou=sqe)
by a renewal of the mind (noo&j). These words come strikingly close to
the Stoic transformation of the mind (cf. Betz 1991: 338 n. 87). Seneca
observes that virtue depends partly upon training and partly upon practice;
you must learn rst, and then strengthen your learning by action. And he
continues: Philosophy is divided into knowledge and state of mind. For
27. Pauls point in 12.20 (quoting Prov. 25.21-22 LXX), and thus in vv. 19-21 as a
whole, is disputed. For alternative readings of v. 20, see Fitzmyer 1993: 657-59.
28. Signicantly, this is the only instance of the adjective logiko&j in Pauls letters.
Due both to the clear physical aspect of the worship called for in 12.1 (cf. ta_ sw&mata)
and to the cognitive dimension of the transformation in v. 2 (cf. nou=j), the translation
spiritual worship (e.g. RSV, NRSV, ASV) misses the mark. Fitzmyers translation of
h9 logikh\ latrei/a, as a cult suited to your rational nature, is noteworthy (1993: 637).

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one who has learned and understood what he should do and avoid, is not
a wise man until his mind (animus) is metamorphosed (transguratus est)
into the shape of that which he has learned (Ep. 94.47-48; cf. Epictetus,
Diatr. 3.21.1-3).29 It appears that Paul wants his readers to learn and understand what they should do and avoid. The aim of their transformation is
to discern Gods will, viz. what is good and acceptable and complete
(to_ a)gaqo_n kai\ eu0a&reston kai\ te/leion).30 But, precisely as Seneca, Paul is
not only thinking of intellectual transformationthat of learning and
understandingbut of a metamorphosis of both discernment and deed.
He is thinking of a total moral transformation. That is what he means when
he urges his addressees to offer their bodies as a living sacrice. They
are to learn how their way of life can be counted as holy and acceptable
to God, but they are also to strengthen their learning by action. Indeed,
as the subsequent discourse reveals, Paul wants them to present their
bodies and transform their minds in a way which fully embodies what
they have learned (cf. also 15.14, 16). Only thus will they put on the lord
Jesus Christ (13.14) or, in Stoic terms, become wise men.
It is clear that Paul in 12.1 makes use of traditional sacricial terms,
both Jewish and non-Jewish (cf. Dunn 1988: 708-12). But it is equally
clear that these are used guratively as a means of pointing to a particular
attitude of mind and way of life as the proper and sufcient worship. This
was a theme not uncommon in Graeco-Roman antiquity (cf. Behm 1965:
186-89), and would most likely have sounded familiar to those acquainted
with Stoic points of view. Seneca, for instance, states:
Precepts are commonly given as to how the gods should be worshipped
but God is worshipped by those who truly know Him Although a man
hear what limit he should observe in sacrice, and how far he should recoil
from burdensome superstitions, he will never make sufcient progress
until he has conceived a right idea of Godregarding Him as one who

29. On another occasion (Ep. 6.1-3), Seneca informs his friend Lucilius that he
feels that he himself is being not only reformed, but transformed (transgurari)
(immediately pointing out, however, that this does not amount to the total transformation of the wise man). With respect to Pauls move in Rom. 12 from the readers
transformation to their relation to others, it is interesting that the primary effect of
Senecas transformation in this case concerns his very relation to his friend: I should
then begin to place a surer trust in our friendshipthe true friendship, which hope
and fear and self-interest cannot sever [I]n such cases men know that they have all
things in common, especially their troubles (ibid.).
30. In Stoic ethics, te/leion kaqh=kon is a complete and appropriate moral act (as
opposed to an act para_ to_ kaqh=kon which is a(ma&rthma, cf. Rom. 1.28-31); see further
Rist 1969: 97-98.

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possesses all things, and allots all things, and bestows them without price
Would you win over the gods? Then be a good man. Whoever imitates
them, is worshipping them sufciently (Ep. 95.47-50).31

Unlike Seneca, however, Paul does not criticize cultic worship.

Now, considering the programmatic function of 12.1-2 and the Stoic
stamp of this passage, both features of which are widely acknowledged
by scholars, a question arises which, despite this acknowledgment, is
seldom asked: Could Pauls hortatory request in 12.1-2 have set the whole
chapter in a certain Stoic framework for the Roman Gentile audience? Or
do vv. 3-21 perhaps include some contrary statements to Stoic values
which would have made it evident that Paul was proclaiming something
radically different from Stoicism? Or would all such associations simply
have faded away as the reading proceeded?
As a matter of fact, Paul proceeds in v. 3 by engaging Graeco-Roman
discussions of the moral virtues. He exhorts his addressees not to think
highly (mh\ u9perfronei=n) of themselves beyond what [they] ought to
think (par o4 dei= fronei=n), but to think (fronei=n) so as to mind a proper
moderation (ei0j to_ swfronei=n). The Stoics adhered to the four traditional
cardinal virtues, viz. prudence (fro&nhsij, prudentia), moderation
(swfrosu/nh, temperantia), justice (dikaiosu/nh, iustitia) and courage
(a)ndrei/a, fortitudo). These were both widely known in the Graeco-Roman
world and generally acknowledged in philosophical circles, but to most
Stoics fro&nhsij was the pre-eminent virtue on the basis of which the
other three were determined (cf., e.g., Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034C; Virt.
mor. 440E-441D; Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.5a-5b7 [= Arius Didymus 5a-5b7];
2.31.123; 2.59.4-60.24; 2.63.6-24; Flor. 117.8 [ed. Meineke]; Seneca,
Epp. 85.2; 90.46; 120.11). All the virtues were thus viewed by them as
consequences of inner intellectual judgments (cf. Colish 1985: 43-44).
Pauls allusions to two of the four cardinal virtues (fro&nhsij and swfrosu/nh) suggest that he was familiar with current Graeco-Roman moralistic
discussions. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Roman audience would have
missed his playing on the root (fron-) of the Stoic primary virtue,
especially since such linking had already been established in the verses
immediately preceding. Pauls usage of the verb fronei=n in 12.3 thus
31. Cf. Seneca, Ben. 1.6.3: [T]he honour that is paid to the gods lies, not in the
victims for sacrice, though they be fat and glitter with gold, but in the upright and
holy desire of the worshippers. Good men, therefore, are pleasing to the gods with an
offering of meal and gruel; the bad, on the other hand, do not escape impiety although
they dye the altars with streams of blood. Cf. also Ben. 4.25.1; Ep. 115.5; Epictetus,
Diatr. 1.19.25; 2.18.19-21; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.5.

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maintains the attention drawn to the intellect in v. 2, and reinforces the

Stoic associations in 12.1-2 (cf. the repetition in v. 16).32 Pauls primary
concern is not to advocate something like a triumph of the intellect, nor
to argue that a virtues intellectual aspect is an end in itself. Rather, he
uses the cardinal virtues as common property for his own purposes, viz.
to present the virtue and act of swfronei=n as a social antithesis of u9perfronei=n. In other words, as becomes evident in the subsequent verses,
swfronei=n denes here how one is to behave toward others (cf. Moxnes
1994: 219-23). While many moralists would have put more weight on the
rational side of the virtues, Roman Stoics such as Seneca would probably
have welcomed such an attention to their social aspects. In the typical
Stoic fashion of subdividing and adding to the virtues,33 he holds, for
example, that besides the four cardinal virtues there are several others
among which he includes the virtue humanitas (Ep. 115.3). This virtue
occurs on another occasion along with fortitudo, des and temperantia,
and is explained in the following terms: It forbids you to be over-bearing
towards your associates (superbum esse adversus socios), and it forbids
you to be grasping. In words and in deeds and in feelings it shows itself
gentle and courteous to all men (Ep. 88.29-30).34
All the more interesting for the present discussion is Pauls use of the
body metaphor in 12.4-5 as an argument for the signicance of showing
respect to one another, irrespective of different social and religious functions. That is, in relation to the positions of the others, every addressee is
to view his or her own position with proper moderation (cf. v. 3). According to Paul, the way in which the human body functions provides good
support for this: Just as the body has many members which have various
functions, so the (many) Christ-believers form one body in Christ and are
members of one another (a)llh/lwn me/lh). The implication is that all roles
within the community of Christ-believers (vv. 6-8) are interconnected;
one cannot do without the other, however insignicant that role may
seem.35 The Roman addressees are bound together with invisible socio32. Note also that L.T. Johnson has recently pointed out some close parallels in
Rom. 12.3 with Aristotles discussion of fro&nhsij; see Johnson 2003: esp. 221-25.
Cf. also Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 626-27.
33. Cf. Seneca, Ep. 92.19 where the virtues specied are iustitia, pietas, des,
fortitudo, prudentia. See also Ben. 2.31.1 (pietas, des, iustitia); 4.8.3 (iustitia,
probitas, prudentia, fortitudo, frugalitas).
34. Cf. also Senecas vision of an emperor in his address to Nero: To his fellowcountrymen (civibus), to the obscure (ignotis), and to the lowly (humilibus) he should
show the greater moderation (moderatius agendum est) (Clem. 1.21.4).
35. One may compare 1 Cor. 12, which seems to constitute the underlying thought

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religious ties in Christ. That is also what is implied when Paul in v. 1

exhorts them to present their individual bodies (sw&mata) as a single, collective sacrice (qusi/an). The plural becomes embodied in the singular.
The body metaphor was frequently utilized in Graeco-Roman antiquity
to illustrate and argue for mutual affection, obligation and responsibility
in human relations, whether between relatives, citizens or human beings
in general.36 The metaphor was particularly popular among the Stoics for
this purpose. Senecas answer to the question how to deal with men
(hominibus) is telling: I can lay down for mankind a rule, in short compass, for our duties in human relationships: all that you behold, that which
comprises both god and man, is onewe are the parts of one great body
(membra sumus corporis magni) (Ep. 95.51-52).37 Elsewhere he asks:
What if the hands should desire to harm the feet, or the eyes the hands? As
all the members of the body are in harmony one with another (omnia inter
se membra consentiunt) because it is to the advantage of the whole that
the individual members be unharmed, so mankind should spare the individual man, because all are born for a life of fellowship (ad coetum), and
society can be kept unharmed only by the mutual protection (custodia) and
love of its parts (amore partium) (Ira 2.31.7).

According to Epictetus, one should act like the foot or the hand, which,
if they had the faculty of reason and understood the constitution of nature,
would never exercise choice or desire in any other way but by reference
to the whole [viz. the body] (Diatr. 2.10.4). This thought was even better
expressed several decades later by the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius
(121180 CE): Reasonable beings, constituted for one fellowship of
cooperation (mi/an sunergi/an), are in their separated bodies analogous to
the several members (ta_ me/lh) of the body (tou= sw&matoj) in individual
organisms (Med. 7.13).38
here (although, unlike 1 Cor. 12, in Rom. 12.4-5 Paul does not speak of the body as
Christ; rather, the believers themselves are one body in Christ).
36. A much celebrated example is the tale of Menenius Agrippas attempt to restore
harmony among Roman citizens (concordia civium) by likening the city with a human
body (Livy, Hist. 2.32).
37. Seneca then proceeds by adding a likening of human relations to an arch of
stone: Our relations with one another are like a stone arch, which would collapse if
the stones did not mutually support each other, and which is upheld in this very way
(Ep. 95.53).
38. Marcus Aurelius continues: The idea of this will come home to you more if
you say to yourself: I am a member (me/loj) of the system made up of reasonable
beings. If, however, by the change of one letter, you call yourself a part (me/roj), you
do not yet love (filei=j) men from your heart; well-doing is not yet a joy to you for its

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The correspondence with Rom. 12 is clear. Paul and these Stoics39

employ the very same type of argument for the same purpose. Pauls
Roman audience would have had no difculty grasping his use of so
common a metaphor, and those who were familiar with and perhaps sympathetic to Stoicism would have had no problems with assenting to his
reasoning. It would almost certainly not have occurred to them that Pauls
message here was something radically different from Stoicism. But they
may have noticed a difference which lies in the scope of the body:
Whereas the Stoic body refers to humankind as a whole, Pauls concern
is restricted to a tiny portion of the whole, namely the Christ-believing
community.
In his comparison of Rom. 12 and Stoicism, Esler pays no attention to
Stoic uses of the body metaphor. In fact, he makes no mention at all of
the metaphor in Rom. 12. He asserts, on the other hand, that the social
dimension to Stoic ethics was extremely weak (2004: 116). A common
misconception indeed,40 such a claim runs counter to the Stoicism we
meet in the ancient sources. Central to Stoic ethics was the notion that,
since all men have a share in the divine and universal lo&goj, all men by
nature are equal and have moral obligations to each other. I am naturally
born to love all men, Seneca says (Ep. 102.18: natura me amantem
omnium genuit). As Marcia L. Colish observes, In practical terms, this
doctrine gives Stoic ethics an inescapable social dimension (1985: 38).
And that is precisely what we see time and again in Roman Stoic literature.
To take but a few examples: according to Seneca, man is a social creature
(hominem sociale animal), begotten for the common good (communi bono
genitum) (Clem. 1.3.2). Human life is for him founded on kindness
(beneciis) and concord (concordia), and is bound into an alliance for
common help (in foedus auxiliumque commune), not by terror, but by
mutual love (mutuo amore) (Ira 1.5.3). When Seneca poses the question
if we should stretch forth the hand to the shipwrecked sailor, or point out
the way to the wanderer, or share a crust with the starving, his answer is:
Yes. And why?
[Because] Nature produced us related to one another She engendered in

own sake; you are still doing it as a bare duty, not yet as though doing good to
yourself (ibid.; trans. OWC). Cf. also Med. 2.1: For we have come into being for
co-operation (sunergi/an), as have the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the rows of upper
and lower teeth (trans. LCL).
39. Cf. also Cicero, Fin. 3.62-63; as well as the discussion of fraternal love by the
early second-century CE Stoic Hierocles (see Malherbe 1986: 93-95).
40. One striking example is found in Russell 1979: 263-64.

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us mutual love (amorem mutuum), and made us prone to friendships

(sociabiles). She established fairness (aequum) and justice (iustum);
according to her ruling, it is more wretched to commit than to suffer injury.
Through her orders, let our hands be ready for all that needs to be helped.
Let this verse be in your heart and on your lips: I am a man; and nothing in
mans lot do I deem foreign to me (homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum
puto) (Ep. 95.51-53).41

In his description of past ages in human history, as contrasted with

nowadays, Seneca writes:
Not yet had the stronger (valentior) begun to lay hands upon the weaker
(inrmiori); not yet had the miserbegun to shut off his neighbour from
even the necessities of life; each cared as much for his neighbour as for
himself (par erat alterius ac sui cura) (Ep. 90.40).

Senecas message to his fellow Roman citizens as to the treatment of slaves

is clear: Treat your inferiors (inferiore) as you would be treated by your
betters (superiorem) (Ep. 47.11; on slaves and slavery, cf. esp. Ben.
3.18-28). Social status is of no consequence in this respect; what matters
is not whether ones neighbour wears a toga or not:
Nature bids me do good to all mankind (hominibus prodesse)whether
slaves or freemen, freeborn or freed-men, whether the laws gave them
freedom or a grant in the presence of friendswhat difference does it
make? Wherever there is a human being there is the opportunity for a
kindness (beneci) (Vit. beat. 24.3; for similar lines of thought, cf., e.g.,
Ben. 3.18-28; Clem. 1.7.1; 1.11.2; 2.5.26.3; Epp. 5.4; 20.2; 88.30; 94.43;
95.63; Ira 1.15.2; 1.16.1; 2.28.2-4; 2.31.7; 2.32.1; 3.5.6; 3.8.1; 3.26.4
27.3; Otio 1.4; 3.5).

No stranger himself to material wealth, Seneca informs us that when his

teacher, the Stoic Attalus, began to praise poverty he often desired to
leave the lecture-room a poor man (Ep. 108.14).42 Such was the nature of
the message of this popular teacher and lecturer in Rome (cf. Arnold
1911: 111-12). Musonius Rufuss critical comments on expensive abodes
in the city are also illustrative:

41. The phrase amorem mutuum is translated as mutual affection in the LCL
edition. The verse quoted by Seneca derives from the Roman poet Terence (Haut.
77).
42. Cf. Ep. 110.14-20. In Vit. beat. 17-28 Seneca explains why he preferred to keep
his wealth rather than give it all away and become poor. It is noteworthy that by the
time of Juvenal (Sat. 5.108-11) Senecas generosity appears to have become proverbial, as may also be hinted at in Tacitus, Ann. 15.62.

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Do they not cost great sums of money from which many people (pollou\j
a)nqrw&pouj) might have beneted by public and private charity (kai\
dhmosi/a| kai\ i0di/a|)? How much more commendable than living a life of
luxury it is to help many people (to_ pollou\j eu0ergetei=n). How much nobler
than spending money for sticks and stones to spend it on men (ei0j
a)nqrw&pouj) What would one gain from a large and beautiful house comparable to what he would gain by conferring the benets of his wealth
(xari/zesqai) upon the city and his fellow-citizens (Lutz no. 19, p. 122,
lines 24-32 [= Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.1.209]).

According to Musonius, evil (kaki/a) consists in injustice and cruelty

(a)diki/a te kai\ a)grio&thj) and indifference to a neighbours trouble (to_
tou= plhsi/on pra&ttontoj kakw~j a)frontistei=n). Virtue (a)reth/), on the
other hand (= to_ a)gaqo&n), he denes as brotherly love and goodness and
justice and benecence and concern for the welfare of ones neighbour
(filanqrwpi/a kai\ xrhsto&thj kai\ dikaiosu/nh e0sti\ kai\ to_ eu0ergetiko_n ei]nai
kai\ to_ khdemoniko_n ei]nai tou= pe/laj) (Lutz no. 14, p. 92, lines 29-33 [=
Stobaeus, Flor. 67.20]).
The social dimension to Stoic ethics was indeed so prominent that
E. Vernon Arnold came to the conclusion that, in the legislation of the
second-century emperors Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius with regard
to the poor, the sick, the infant, the famine-stricken and the slave, the
humane and cosmopolitan principles of Stoic politics at last triumph over
Roman conservatism (1911: 403; cf. 280-81).
There is no good reason to assume that the Stoics would have differed
from Paul in this respect to the effect that for them the social aspect would
only have been a theoretical, not an actual, reality (so Esler 2004: 121).
On the contrary, one characteristic of Roman Stoicism is the very weight
put on the practical application of its ethics.43 Of course, Seneca advises
Lucilius, the living voice and the intimacy of a common life will help
you more than the written word. You must go to the scene of action (Ep.
6.5).44 Similarly, Musonius urges that, while theory (lo&goj) must necessarily come rst, in effectiveness, however, practice (to_ e1qoj)45 takes

43. Cf. Sandbach 1989: 19: Many of the later Stoics were practical men of action
and one can see the relevance of their beliefs to their doings. Even those who were
primarily teachers were mainly concerned with the practical problems of life which
faced them and their pupils.
44. Cf. Ben. 7.1.3; Ep. 20.2 (Philosophy teaches us to act [facere], not to speak
[dicere]). Arnold observes that Senecas writings admirably illustrate for us Stoicism
in its practical application to daily life (1911: 115).
45. On the translation of to_ e1qoj as practice, see Lutzs note on line 32 on p. 49.

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precedence over theory as being more inuential in leading men to action

(ta_j pra&ceij) (Lutz no. 5, p. 50, line 32; p. 52, lines 1-4 [= Stobaeus,
Ecl. 2.15.46]). According to his student Epictetus, the task of philosophy
is truly to examine and to establish the standards; but to go ahead and
use them (xrh=sqai) after they have become known is the task of the good
and excellent man (Diatr. 2.11.24-25). Whether or not the audience of
these Stoics and the audience of Paul differed in actually following such
advice is difcult to ascertain. There is good reason to believe, however,
that the inuence of Musonius on his fellow citizens went far beyond his
circle of students (cf. Arnold 1911: 116-18).46 And it is not unlikely that
his active concern for social affairs in Rome played a signicant part in
his expulsion from the city by Nero (see Tacitus, Ann. 15.71).47
In addition to the social dimension of Stoicism, Esler also misrepresents
the religiosity of the Stoics. Referring to a single passage from Diogenes
Laertius (7.119),48 he states that [w]hile the Stoics believed in honoring
the gods, especially by sacrice and keeping themselves pure, Paul differs
sharply from the Stoics when he in Rom. 12.11-12 speaks of being on
re with the Spirit, serving the Lord (v. 11), and persisting in prayer
(v. 12) (Esler 2004: 122). Whereas it is no doubt correct that the charismatic character of being on re with the Spirit makes such a state quite
distant from Stoic practice and belief, our sources do not allow us to hold
that the Stoics did not urge prayer and (non-cultic) service to the deity.
Nor do they allow us to claim that it was especially by sacrice and
keeping themselves pure that the Stoics honoured their gods. We have
already seen Senecas critique of cultic worship and his insistence on
serving God by being a good man. We have also noted Epictetuss
opinion of proper worship (publicly and privatelyhymning and praising
the Deity, and rehearsing His benets [Diatr. 1.16.15]). According to
him, living up to the philosophical principles is a way of serving God,
and the ideal sage ought to be wholly devoted to the service of God
46. On Musoniuss inuence on early Christians, such as Justin, Origen and
Clement of Alexandria, see Malherbe 1992: 268.
47. Cf. Lutz 1947: 24: His very prominence in public life, his active concern with
the problems of his day, and his keen sense of duty to society necessarily made him
an object of Neros persecution. Cf. also Pohlenz 1964: 300-303. For ne examples
of Musoniuss attention to social affairs (not treated in the present study), see Lutz
no. 3 (that women too should study philosophy); no. 4 (that daughters should receive
the same education as sons); no. 12 (on sexual indulgence, esp. on abuses of female
slaves by their male masters).
48. As has already been noted, this source, dating from the third century CE,
attempts to cover the teachings of the earliest Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus).

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(o3lon pro_j th=| diakoni/a| tou= qeou=) (Diatr. 3.22.69).49 Furthermore,

Epictetus repeatedly cites one of the most celebrated Stoic texts from
antiquity, viz. the hymn of Cleanthes (Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.1.12), which is not
only a hymn but also a prayer to God (Zeus). Epictetus emphasizes that
one should always (pantaxou=) (Diatr. 3.22.95 [lit. everywhere]),
upon every occasion (e0pi\ panto&j) (Ench. 53) and at any time (pote)
with [ones] whole heart (e0c o3lhj yuxh=j) (Diatr. 4.1.131) be able and
ready to say it.50 Prayers hardly get more persistently applied than that.
A case of difference between Stoicism and Pauls discourse in Rom. 12
can be seen in v. 15, where Paul exhorts his audience to weep with those
who weep (klai/ein meta_ klaio&ntwn). This would probably have sounded
rather un-Stoic to contemporary readers who were (fairly) well acquainted
with Stoic perspectives on pa&qh (passions) such as grief.51 According to
Seneca, the Stoic sage, who is born to be of help to all and to serve the
common good, will certainly aid those in need, those who suffer, and
those who weep, but he will lend his hand with a tranquil mind. Thus, he
will bring relief to anothers tears, but will not add his own (Clem. 2.6.23).52 In other words, one should truly support and encourage those who
grieve, but one should not make their grief ones own. If the latter is what
Paul had in mind in Rom. 12.15, he surely differs from the Stoics on this
particular point.53
In Rom. 12.14 Paul exhorts his addressees not to curse but to bless
or speak well of (eu0logei=te) those who persecute them, and in vv. 17-21
49. Typically, the sage is here represented by Epictetuss ideal Cynic.
50. See also Diatr. 2.23.42; 4.4.34. Cf. Senecas quotation in Ep. 107.11. Cf. also
Epictetuss prayer in Diatr. 2.16.42-43; as well as Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.40.
51. Similarly Esler 2004: 122-23. Eslers discussion, however, is marked by the
common misconception that the Stoics scorned and rejected the emotions altogether.
But Stoicism did not speak of pa&qh simply as emotions in the ordinary, modern sense
of the word. Rather, ta_ pa&qh (more properly translated as the passions) are excessive
and irrational impulses which reveal an unhealthy state of mind; see, e.g., the ne
discussion in Rist 1969: 22-36; cf. also Pohlenz 1964: 141-53; Brennan 1998: esp.
30-39.
52. Seneca continues: to the shipwrecked man he will give a hand, to the exile
shelter, to the needy almshe will grant to a mothers tears the life of her son, the
captives chains he will order to be broken, he will release the gladiator from his
training, he will bury the carcass even of a criminal, but he will do these things with
unrufed mind, and a countenance under control (ibid.). Cf. also Tranq. 16.4; and
Epictetus, Diatr. 3.24.22-24.
53. Note, however, that Musonius seems to have been more positively inclined
toward actively sharing anothers grief than many of his fellow Stoics; see Lutz no.
14, p. 94, lines 6-8 (= Stobaeus, Flor. 67.20).

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he urges them to behave in a blameless and peaceful manner toward people

in general (i.e. outsiders), and to meet evildoers not with evil but with good.
According to Esler, this is radically different from anything in Stoicism
(2004: 123 [my emphasis]). However, Epictetus is in fact even more
radical than Paul in this respect when he describes the Cynics pattern of
life (which, to Epictetus, is equivalent to that of the ideal Stoic sage): He
must needs be ogged like an ass, and while he is being ogged he must
love (filei=n) the men who og him, as though he were the father or brother
of them all (w(j pate/ra pa&ntwn, w(j a)delfo&n) (Diatr. 3.22.54). Here
Epictetus takes his mentors line of thought a step further, since Musonius
had already taught his students that to scheme how to bite back the biter
(a)ntidh/cetai/ tij to_n dako&nta)54 and to return evil for evil (a)ntipoih/sei
kakw~j to_n u9pa&rcanta) is the act not of a human being but of a wild beast,
and that
to accept injury (ta_j a(marti/aj) not in a spirit of savage resentment and to
show ourselves not implacable toward those who wrong us, but rather to
be a source of good hope to them (ai1tion ei]nai au0toi=j e0lpi/doj xrhsth=j) is
characteristic of a benevolent and civilized way of life (h9me/rou tro&pou kai\
filanqrw&pou e0sti/n) (Lutz no. 10, p. 78, lines 26-28, 31-33 [= Stobaeus,
Ecl. 3.19.16]).

Suggnw&mh (forgiveness, forbearance) is the key issue here (ibid., p. 78,

lines 33-34; p. 79, lines 1-3).55 We are also informed that Musonius held
that
to share the common notion that we shall be despised by others if in every
way we do not strive to harm the rst enemies (e0xqrou/j) we meet is the
mark of mean-minded and ignorant men. For we [commonly] say that the
despicable man is recognized among other things by his inability to harm
his enemies, but actually he is much more easily recognized by his inability
to help them (kata_ to_ a)du/naton ei]nai w)felei=n) (Lutz no. 41, p. 136, lines
22-26 [= Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.20.61]).

Similarly, Seneca stressed that it is not right to correct wrong-doing by

doing wrong (non oportet peccata corrigere peccantem) (Ira 1.16.1).
How much more human to manifest toward wrong-doers a kind and
fatherly spirit, not hunting them down but calling them back!, he declares
(Ira 1.14.3). Instead of defeating it with its match, unkindness must be
treated with kindness (mansuete immansueta tractanda sunt) (Ira 3.27.3;

54. Cf. Gal. 5.15: ei0 de\ a)llh/louj da&knete kai\ katesqi/ete
55. Contrast Arius Didymus 11d (= Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.11d), on whom Eslers claim
above is based.

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cf. Ben. 7.31.1; Epp. 66.21; 95.63; Ira 2.10.6; 2.28.4; 2.32.1; 2.34.5;
3.27.1; Otio 1.4; Vit. beat. 20.5).
While Paul in Rom. 12.14, 17-21 comes strikingly close to the viewpoints of both Seneca and Musonius as to how to act toward evildoers,
viz. by meeting and defeating evil with good, he does not go as far as
Epictetus in urging his addressees to love (a)gapa=n, filei=n) their persecutors.56 As we have already seen, a)ga&ph for Paul is an in-group term; it is
something which Christ-believers (should) show to fellow Christbelievers. Thus, if ogged, they should truly speak well of those who og
them, but they are not required to love such misdoers. Interestingly,
Pauls more general urging in v. 18 that his addressees are to be at peace
with all men (meta_ pa&ntwn a)nqrw&pwn ei0rhneu/ontej) is in close harmony
with Epictetuss advice to his interlocutor to be at peace with all men
(ei0rh/nhn a!geij pro_j pa&ntaj a)nqrw&pouj) (Diatr. 4.5.24). But while Paul
sets the rather cautious condition if possible for your part (ei0 dunato_n to_
e0c u9mw~n), Epictetuss demand is absolute: no matter what they do (o3 ti
a2n e0kei=noi poiw~si). Again, Epictetus takes a step further in his ethical
instructions. And there are other differences to be noted, to be sure. When
Paul in v. 19 expresses his belief of the legitimacy of divine revenge, a
disagreement between him and the Stoics comes to the fore. There seems
to be little room even for that sort of revenge in Roman Stoicism (cf.,
e.g., Seneca, Ben. 6.27.5; Ira 2.30; 2.32.1).
Despite such differences, however, there is clearly a fundamental similarity between Paul and the Roman Stoics relating to the question of how
to act toward ones enemies and misdoers.57 The Stoics in Rome would
no doubt have agreed wholeheartedly with Pauls words at the end of
Rom. 12: ni/ka e0n tw~| a)gaqw~| to_ kako&n.
Conclusions
In an apology pro Stoicis, Seneca writes:
I am aware that among the ill-informed (imperitos) the Stoic school is

56. In his recent study of the principle of loving ones enemies in pre-Christian
antiquity, M. Reiser concludes (2001: 426): As far as I can see the third level [i.e.
Never take revenge, love your enemywith all the consequences] is reached only
by Socrates, a few Roman Stoics, Lev 19.18 and Jesus Even Christianity, seen as a
whole, rarely transcended the second level [Try not to pay back evil with evil] and
often enough fell back to the rst level [Love your friend, hate your enemy]. Cf.
also the important article of Whittaker 1979.
57. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.20; 7.22, 26; 9.1; 11.13.

THORSTEINSSON Paul and Roman Stoicism

159

unpopular on the ground that it is excessively harsh But the fact is, no
school is more kindly and gentle (benignior leniorque), none more full of
love to man (amantior hominum) and more concerned for the common
good (communis boni attentior), so that it is its avowed object to be of
service and assistance (usui esse et auxilio), and to regard not merely selfinterest, but the interest of each and all (universis singulisque) (Clem.
2.5.2-3).

This study has shown that nothing could be further from the truth than the
claim that Pauls moral teaching in Rom. 12 was radically different
from Stoic ethics. Provided that one does not simply ignore the sources of
Roman Stoicismthose sources which present Stoicism as it was
understood and recognized in rst- and second-century Rome, and are
thus of much, if not most, relevance for a comparative study of this kind
of Romansthe similarities clearly outweigh the differences. Unless they
were terribly ill-informed of the philosophical thought and way of life
which above others affected the lives of Roman residents, Pauls audience
would never have perceived his total package in Rom. 12 as being radically divergent from Stoicism. Quite to the contrary: the present study
suggests that the audience may even have been amazed by the many
striking, fundamental similarities between Pauls moral teaching and Stoic
ethics. Romans 12 may well have been understood as having a specically
Stoic framework. Moreover, if Paul is interacting with Stoicism in the
chapter, there are little signs of his refutation of its precepts. In fact, he
does not seem to be concerned at all with highlighting the differences
between his own proclaimed moral teaching and Stoic ethics. A Stoic
reader of Rom. 12 would not have found the step a giant one to present
his or her body to God as a living sacriceth\n logikh\n latrei/an.
What are the differences, then? Or better, what would a contemporary
Roman reader with at least some basic knowledge of the Stoic ethical
tradition have perceived as a notable difference? Most importantly, there
is the difference in ethical scope, so to speak: whereas the ethics of the
Roman Stoics is universal in its scope, Pauls love ethic is not. His
primary concern is the community of Christ-believers and morality within
that particular community. This means that those addressees of Pauls
letter who were perhaps accustomed to or inuenced by a more universal
ethical teachingnot necessarily Stoic, to be sureare now urged to
focus primarily on a very specic portion of humankind: their Christbelieving neighbours. For the Stoic reader this would imply a restriction
from an unconditional, universal love of human beings as such to a love of
particular neighbours dened in terms of religion.
Whether or not this basic difference between Pauls moral teaching in

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Journal for the Study of the New Testament 29.2 (2006)

Rom. 12 and Roman Stoic ethics also applied when words became deeds
is another question.
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