Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Answer: Yes. Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The fact that the lawyer
obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and
not as an attorney of the complainant is of no moment.
Therefore, for issuing worthless checks, the lawyer may be held
administratively accountable. (Lawyer was suspended for three years. She
died while serving her suspension.)
Question: Can a lawyer borrow money from his client without crossing
ethical boundaries?
Answer: No. As a general rule, a lawyer should not borrow money from his
client. Canon 16.04 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.
Reason: The lawyers duty to society demands his uprightness in his
dealings with third persons.
Thus, while the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be
justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to
show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his license and
the law confer.
Question: What circumstances may warrant a more severe penalty upon a
lawyer in disbarment proceedings where the complaint includes a criminal
offense committed by the lawyer against the complainant?
Answer: The following circumstances may warrant a severe penalty in
disbarment proceeding:
1. unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing the lawyer
to file an answer to the complaint;
2. failure to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference before the
Investigating Commissioner; and
3. blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office for her to file her counter-affidavit in a criminal case.
The above acts violate Canon 10.03: Failure to observe rules of
procedure.
DISBARMENT PROCEEDING IS SUI GENERIS
Question: Can a disbarment case be filed against the lawyer while a
criminal case remains pending which arose from the same commission of a
deplorable act by the lawyer?
Answer: Yes. A disbarment case is sui generis in nature. Thus, a disbarment
case can proceed simultaneously with the criminal case instituted against the
lawyer. To sustain a conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in a disbarment case, only
preponderance of evidence is required.
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Question: What are the formalities required before a Notary Public can affix
his signature to a notarial deed which requires acknowledgment?
Answer: The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the
instrument to present
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; and
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary
public; and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public competent proof of identity.
The Notary Public must ascertain the identities of the affiant(s) and the
witnesses to the document. He must also ensure that all parties must sign on
the left side margin of each and every page of the document.
The details of the notarized document must be recorded in the notarial
register (Notarial Book) of the commissioned lawyer.
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES: QUALITIES OF COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE
RICKY GARAY, et al. v. JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1703, June 17, 2008)
Question: Complainants are the accused in a criminal case wherein they
were charged with qualified theft of bus starters and different tools
amounting to P187,000. Judge Nicasio Bartolome, the MTC judge
presiding over the case, issued a warrant of arrest against them and detained
them in the provincial jail. Was the judge correct in assuming jurisdiction of
the case?
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
Answer: No. The respondent judge should have not assumed jurisdiction
because at the time the case was instituted the amount involved is
P187,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction of a first level court. The
respondent judge exhibited his unfamiliarity with the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. He is guilty of violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
He also betrayed his lack of
competence which is a constitutional qualification for a member of the
judiciary. He likewise violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct on
Competence and Diligence.
Question: Respondent judge took more than three (3) months to issue the
Joint Resolution ordering the return of the cases to the provincial prosecutor
for further preliminary investigation. The rule mandates that he should
resolve this issue within a period of ten (10) days. Was the action of the
judge proper?
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otherwise a simple case may be subjected to a monetary fine. The Court held
that undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious
offense for which respondent judge is subjected to a fine. (Violation of
Canon 6, Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C.
CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P.
ELBINIAS, CA - Mindanao Station (A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J,
January 11, 2011) REMINDER: VERY IMPORTANT CASE PLEASE
READ CAREFULLY ALL RELATED QUESTIONS
*Question: How may an administrative complaint be initiated against a
judge?
Answer: Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on
how to institute administrative proceedings against judges. Under this rule,
the three ways to initiate the complaint are:
First, motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
Second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or
Third, upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.
*Question: Certain employees of the Court of Appeals filed a lettercomplaint against a justice of the court for: Gross Inefficiency; Bribe
Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of
Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employees
Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through
Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of
Authority.
The letter-complaint was signed by all the complaining employees but
was not verified. Will the case prosper?
Answer: No. An unverified letter-complaint cannot be a basis of an
administrative complaint against a judge. Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, an administrative case against a judge must be verified.
A complainant must attest to his personal knowledge of the allegations
embodied in his verified letter-complaint.
*Question: Can the Court take cognizance of an anonymous lettercomplaint against a judge?
Answer: Yes. In Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, the Court took cognizance of the
unverified motion and subsequent letters of complainants submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator since the unverified complaint was
properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the material
allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also
verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the
trial court, as aptly found by the CA.
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within the required period. The OCA recommended that the erring judge be
fined fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000). Is Judge Quilatan is guilty of gross
inefficiency?
Answer: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to
resolve their cases with dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious
violation of the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without
doubt, Judge Quilatan violated his mandate when he failed to decide 34
cases within three (3) months from their submission, for which he should be
administratively sanctioned. (Violation of Canon 6, Competence and
Diligence)
DISQUALIFICATION/INHIBITION OF JUDGES
JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO (G.R. No. 147923, October
26, 2007)
Question: During the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on
behalf of Go, wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of
the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of
the aforementioned witnesses. This prompted Go to file an administrative
complaint against Judge Nemesio Felix for partiality.
The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. Go failed to establish the partiality
of the presiding judge when it limited the number witnesses. It rationalized
that Judge Felix had the discretion to inhibit himself from the case unless the
ground for his inhibition is that which calls for mandatory inhibition of the
same and in this case no such ground exists. Go insists that there is a valid
ground to inhibit the judge. Is his contention tenable?
Answer: None. There is no valid ground to inhibit the judge as there was no
manifest partiality. Indeed, the adverse rulings on the denial of the proposed
testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses are judicial in nature. Absent
proof that the trial court judge had acted in a wanton, whimsical or
oppressive manner or for an illegal consideration, and similar reasons,
in giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is not a remedy to oust
the judge from sitting on the case.
Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is
an age old rule in civil cases that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga (A.M. OCA IPI No.
09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013)
Question: Complainant charged Judge Wacas of Impropriety and Partiality
for not inhibiting himself in the case alleging that he is Dagadags second
cousin by affinity, the formers aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag.
Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of "some reliable sources," not
from his personal knowledge. Judge Wacas maintained that Tiggangay
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never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings. Should the
judge inhibit himself under the foregoing facts cited by complainant?
Answer: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In
the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial evidence to prove his
allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere
allegation is not evidence.
N.B. As a general rule, the objection for the judge to inhibit himself must
be raised during the trial and not after the judge had rendered an adverse
ruling against the complainant.
Reason: Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the
uncle of respondent Dagadag, such reality is not a ground for the mandatory
inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 1of Rule 137, Revised Rules of
Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives
of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by
affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes brother. There
is no affinity between the husbands brother and the wifes sister.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS
ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN
(A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014)
Question: Complainant asked respondent sheriff not to execute an adverse
decision since he has not yet received a copy of the denial of the motion
from the adverse judgment
Despite his plea, respondent sheriff still pushed through with the execution
of the judgment and in enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the
reputation of the complainant. The lawyer filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct. Is the respondent
sheriff guilty of grave misconduct?
Answer: Yes, the respondent should be penalized for discourtesy in the
performance of his official duties. As a public officer and a trustee for the
public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent to demonstrate
courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.
Public service requires integrity and discipline. At all times, employees of
the judiciary are expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of
another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES C. DELA
CRUZ, Process Server, MTCC, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan (A.M. No.
P-07-2321, April 24, 2009)
Question: After complainant judge left her office a few minutes before 5:00
p.m., security guard reported to her that process server Dela Cruz allegedly
arrived in the office, apparently drunk, and hurled invectives while pointing
his fingers at other employees present. Afterwards, respondent process
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A. A lawyer cannot have a dichotomy between his private life and his
professional responsibility as a lawyer. He can be disbarred even if there is
no lawyer-client relationship between him and a complainant in a
disbarment case and if the transaction involves his sale of a portion of his
real property. Gacias v. Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006)
Q. Can an individual practicing before the Shaira court affix the prefix
ATTY. before his name?
A. No. While the Supreme Court administers the examinations for one to
practice before the Shari a courts, any one admitted is not allowed to use the
prefix ATTY. unless he is also a member of the Philippine bar. Shari a
courts have limited jurisdiction particularly on matters related to personal,
family and property law consistent with the provisions of the Constitution
and national laws. Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997
II. Qualifications for Admission to the Practice of Law
Q. What are the requirements for admission to the practice of law?
A. Sec. 2, Rule138 of the Rules of Court provides for the following
qualifications: One must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of
age, must be a resident of the Philippines, must have obtained his law
degree in a local school (Sections 5 & 6, Rules of Court), possesses Good
Moral Character (presentation of proof of good moral character,
certification that one does not have any pending charges or have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude)
Q. Mr. Roberto Lo was born in Australia of Filipino parents. After he
completed his college degree in Business Administration in Sydney,
Australia, he enrolled in one of the universities in Metro Manila to obtain
his law degree. He successfully graduated with a Bachelor of Laws degree
and is now processing his documents to be able to take his bar
examinations. Can he qualify to take the bar examinations? Justify your
answer.
A. Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Roberto Lo is considered a naturalborn Filipino since both his parents remain Filipino citizens at the time of
his birth. He also completed his law degree from a local school in Metro
Manila.
Q. Can a Filipino citizen be allowed to take the bar when he obtained his
law degree from Columbia University in New York?
A. No. Every person intending to be admitted to the practice of law in the
Philippines must meet all the qualifications under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
138. (In Re: Application of Adriano M. Hernandez, July 27, 1993)
Q. Christian San Juan passed the bar with a passing grade of 80.50%. He
was not allowed to take his oath because Cristina Garcia, his childhood
sweetheart with whom he has a child without benefit of marriage, filed a
timely motion to exclude him from the oath taking ceremonies. Was
Cristina justified in preventing San Juan from taking his Attorneys Oath?
Why?
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A. Yes, because San Juan does not possess good moral character which is a
requirement for admission to the bar.
Barba v. Pedro (61SCRA 484, 1974): A bar passer who sired a child with a
public school teacher was not allowed to take his oath for lack of good moral
character but was allowed to do so after 18 years based on testimonials of
his reformation when he worked as a community social development worker
after passing the bar.
Q. Santiago Go was conditionally allowed to take the bar examinations
because he indicated in his application for admission that there are only
two pending civil cases against him at that time and no criminal charges
were filed against him at the time of his application for admission to the
practice of law. Santiago Go successfully passed the bar examinations and
landed 5th in said examinations. Before taking his oath, Leticia Sia asked
the Supreme Court not to allow Go to take his oath because she actually
filed a rape case against him which case remains pending but which
information Go withheld in his application. Will her request be given due
course?
A. Yes. If it can be established that the bar passer does not possess good
moral character, he will not be allowed to take his oath.
Zaguirre v. Castillo, (A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003): Good moral character
is required for admission to law and misrepresentation about his true legal
status will be a ground for a bar passer was suspended indefinitely upon
passing the bar.
Q. Is possession of good moral character required only for admission to
the practice of law?
A. Maintenance of good moral character is required to retain continued
membership in the bar.
Mecaral v. Velasquez (A.C. No 8392 June 29, 2010): The Supreme Court
disbarred a lawyer who founded a religious cult and made his secretary a sex
slave.
Cordon v. Balicanta (Adm. Case No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299
(2002): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who used his knowledge of the law to
commit fraud against his client by forming a corporation out of the estate of
the deceased husband of the complainant. The lawyer made himself the sole
signatory of said company which allowed him to mortgage several
properties of the corporation which were eventually foreclosed by the
creditor bank.
Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, 605 SCRA 93, 2009: The S.C.
disbarred a lawyer who admitted in his Affidavit in the disbarment case
against him that he asked for facilitation fee to bribe the Vice Mayor of
Manila in the course of his engagement as counsel. The S.C. referred the
case to the Ombudsman against the Vice Mayor and the lawyer for the crime
of bribery. The Court held that a lawyers professional fee does not include
facilitation fee.
Q. What is the coverage of the annual bar examinations?
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A. Bar Subjects under Sec. 9, Rule 138, Rules of Court include: Political
Law, Labor and Social Legislation, Civil Law, Taxation, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical
Exercises.
Q. What is the essence of bar examinations?
A. Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to the bar in the
Philippines be required to furnish satisfactory proof of his knowledge of the
law and ethical standards and of his possession of such degree of learning
and proficiency in law as may be deemed necessary for the due performance
of the duties of lawyer.
Q. Candido completed his law degree in October 2015. He wanted to
become a lawyer but he realized that it was too late for him to take the
November 2015 bar examinations. Can he file a petition to the Supreme
Court to be allowed to take his special bar examinations?
A. No. The Supreme Court administers the bar examinations only once a
year.
Q. Fernando, a Filipino citizen, completed his study of law in Spain and
was allowed to practice law in Spain. He sought permission from the
Supreme Court that he be allowed to be admitted to Philippine bar. In his
petition he invoked the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
Professions between the Philippines and Spain. How will you rule on the
petition of Fernando?
A. I will deny Fernandos petition. Fernando has remained a Filipino citizen
and he cannot invoke the provisions of the treaty which is founded on
reciprocity of the nationals of each country and the grant of the privilege is
always subject to the domestic laws of both countries. In Re: Garcia, 2
SCRA 985
Q. Define the following:
1. Attorneys-at Law: the class of persons who are by license, officers of the
court, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.
Cul v. Cul, 120 Phil. 729
2. Attorney-in-Fact: an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the
instrument appointing him. His authority is provided in a special power of
attorney or a general power of attorney or letter of authority. An attorney-infact is not necessarily a lawyer.
3. Counsel de oficio: a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from
among such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. The person need
not be a member of the bar if no lawyer is available in a given locality. (Sec.
7, Rule 116, Rules of Court)
A counsel de oficio is appointed to defend an indigent in a criminal action
(Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 116; Sec. 32, Rule 138); or to represent a destitute
party in a case (Sec.31, Rule 138).
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Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. S.C. said that it
could not countenance the following patent violations of the government
prosecutors: failure of the prosecution failed to present certified true copies
of the documentary evidence under Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the petition for certiorari was filed
beyond the reglamentary period. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice and the presumption that the case was doomed by
design from the start was doomed by design from the start. Verily, the
lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be
reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high
sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court reminded the lawyers
in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
Q. May a labor arbiter apply a principle in Corporation Law to support his
decision in a labor dispute?
A. Yes. YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO
P. ANDRES v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, A.C. No. 7158, March
09, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.: This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed
against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar v. Nambi (respondent) on the ground
of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution
against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein
complainants, who are not parties to the case. The Court held that the labor
arbiter had legal basis to pierce the corporate veil to serve the ends of
justice but he was reprimanded for not complying with the lawful orders of
the IBP and the Court.
VI. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rule
of Court)
Q. What is the nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against
lawyers?
A. Disbarment or disciplinary actions against lawyers are sui generis. It is c
class of its own and does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
disbarment proceeding is imprescriptible; all proceedings are strictly
confidential; may proceed despite withdrawal of the complaint.
Bengco v. Bernardo, 672 SCRA 352 (2012): S.C. said that administrative
cases against lawyers do not prescribe. Despite the considerable lapse of
time between the commission of the infraction and the time of filing, there is
need to determine the administrative liability of lawyers.
Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352(2012): A lawyer cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court despite any delay in the filing of an
administrative case against a lawyer.
IBP Board of
Governors
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Chairman, CBD
REPORT
Commissioner
May uphold the findings
May reverse the findings
May amend the findings
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the case, S.C. disbarred him because disbarment is the appropriate penalty
for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Q. Can a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a
subject of a disbarment proceeding?
A. Yes. OCA v. Liangco, 662 SCRA 103 (2011): The dismissal of a judge
from service will not preclude the filing of a disbarment case against him
before the IBP. The disbarment was based on the same grounds for his
dismissal: gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance. He failed to make a
distinction between a Resolution and an Ordinance and that as judge, he
cannot render an Opinion but rather he must receive evidence and make a
decision after termination of trial. It will be the IBP who will investigate a
judge who has retired from the judiciary and not the Supreme Court.
Q. What is the proof required to establish the culpability of a lawyer in a
disbarment proceeding?
APO1 JOSE B. CASPE v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, A.C. No.
10679, March 10, 2015, Villarama, J.: In disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to
establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that
taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified.
Q. Does the lawyer have the burden of proof in a disbarment case?
A. No. Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie
O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013. The burden of proof in
disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty.
Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4,
2014.The S.C. said in when it comes to administrative cases against
lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires
clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. Even if Atty.
Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with
bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith.
Q. What is the effect of the withdrawal of a disbarment case?
A. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June
4, 2014. The S.C. held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of the
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
Q. What are the grounds for suspension (Disbarment)?
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A. Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court provides the following grounds:
deceit or any gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of
crime involving moral turpitude, violation of lawyers Oath, willful
disobedience of any lawful order, or corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party in a case without authority, malpractice which includes
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers..
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581,
January 14, 2014. The Court ordered Celera disbarred for contracting a
second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still
subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment
proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January
15, 2014. This case involves a PAO who advised her clients Iyak-iyakan
lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon.Thus, a complaint was lodged against her for violation of the
attorneys oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. S. C. held that
Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. However, while her remark
was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she
was only reprimanded and sternly warned.
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO
L.CARACOL, A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of
a lawyers appearance on behalf of his client, hence: SEC. 21. Authority of
attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney
is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear
in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
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employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An
attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or
the lawyer. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and
attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8330,
March 16, 2015, Leonen, J. An administrative complaint for disbarment or
suspension was filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina
De Vera. The Court found Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct
and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of
several post-dated checks. She was suspended from the practice of law for
one year
Trial Courts and first level courts where respondent lawyer has pending
cases.
(iii) If satisfied, the Court will lift the order of suspension and reinstate the
erring lawyer
Q. What is the effect of an adverse disciplinary action instituted abroad
against a Filipino lawyer?
A. A decision in a disciplinary action against a Filipino lawyer practicing
abroad may also be a basis for a disbarment proceeding against the same
lawyer in the Philippines.
Velez v. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 (2006): A finding of fact by the California
State Bar can be a basis of an administrative complaint against a Filipino
lawyer before the IBP.
Q. Can the penalty of a lawyer be mitigated by virtue of relationship?
A. Yes. ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTALOZADA, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015. On December 13, 2005, the
Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie
Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending Atty.
Lozada for two years for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
During her period of suspension she represented her husband where
complainant Feliciano was a party. The Supreme Court said it recognizes
the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families
will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so,
in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was
prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness of her penalty.
Reinstatement after Disbarment
Readmission to the Bar and Resumption to Practice Law
Q. Can a bar passer convicted of a homicide still be admitted to the
practice of law?
A. Yes. IN RE: OATH TAKING OF ARGOSINO, B.M. 712, July 13, 1995
and En Banc Resolution dated March 19, 1997. A lawyer who was involved
in the fatal death of a neophyte in the initiation rites of his fraternity was
finally allowed to take his oath after he showed several proofs of testimonial
of good character.
Q. Can a disbarred lawyer be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys?
A. Yes. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE
GUZMAN), 586 SCRA 372 A lawyer who leaked the bar questions in
Mercantile Law prepared by a founding partner in his law firm was
reinstated upon proof of good moral character during his period of
suspension.
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Other officers: The IBP shall have a Secretary, Treasurer and such other
officers as well as employees the President may appoint with the consent of
the Board of Governors under such terms and conditions specified in the
appointment of each officer and/or employee.
Membership and Dues: Non-payment of dues may subject the lawyer to
disciplinary action including removal of the name of the delinquent lawyer
from the Roll of Attorneys. (Sec. 9, Rule 139-A)LIFETIME DUE: P12, 500
and ANNUAL DUE: P1, 000
In the Matter of Brewing Controversies in the IBP Elections (A.M. No. 095-2-SC, A.C. No. 8292, April 2013): Lawyers seeking positions in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines must respect the rotational rule. The
rotational rule is adopted to allow equal opportunity for all lawyers in
different regions to have access to positions of leadership in the IBP. The
S.C. also reminded IBP officers that they should not use the Court as
referee for their intramurals.
Please take note the relevant provisions of the 2004 Notarial Rules:
(Take particular attention of the date when a document was notarized. A
document notarized before the effectivity of the 2004 Notarial Rules will
be governed by the relevant provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code where the cedula will suffice as proof of identity.)
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO v.
ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN, A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015. The
complainants charged Atty. Examen of notarizing Deeds of Sale where his
brother was the vendee. In his defense, Atty. Examen said that at the time of
the execution of the subject Deeds of Sale the Notarial Rules of 2004 were
not yet in effect. Under the Revised Administrative Code which governed the
notarial practice there was no prohibition on notarizing documents of
relatives up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity and affinity. The
Court, however, held Atty. Examen liable for not ascertaining the details of
the cedulas of the affiants. He relied on the entries made by his secretary.
The Court suspended Atty. Roberto E. Examen from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, was
likewise REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this decision.
(1). Commissioning of a Notary Public
WILBERTO C. TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. No. 8761,
February 12, 2014: A lawyers notarial commission was revoked and he was
not allowed to renew the same for one year for failure to ascertain the
identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale
which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.
(2). Qualifications (Section 1, Rule III)
(3). Manner of Obtaining a Commission (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8, 9 and
10 Rule III); and Renewal of Commission (Sections 13 and 14, Rule III)
(4). Powers and Limitations
Powers (Section 1, Rule IV; Sections 1-4, Rule VII)
Prohibitions (Section 2, Rule IV; Section 1, Rule XII)
Disqualifications (Section 4, Rule IV)
(5). Instances when a Notary Public may refuse to notarize, issue
certification (Sections 4, 5 & 6, Rule IV)
(6). Jurisdiction and Period of Validity of Commission (Section 11, Rule
III; Section9, Rule IX)
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE A.M. No.
09-6-1-SC,
January 21, 2015, MENDOZA, J.: A review of the records and evidence
presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law
office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the
complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno
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Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5,
2014: The Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupanas revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one
year are in order for failure to require the personal presence of the affiant in
an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in 1994.
Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12,
2014 . The S.C. held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not
39 | P a g e
notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person
executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its
contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys
free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as
a notary public for two years.
the prevalence to use the two financial companies to solicit. The Court
reminded lawyer to be clear as to what services they are rendering if they
have multiple professions. On the issue of gross immorality, the belated
move of the lawyer to institute civil actions to annul his marriages will not
exculpate him. The Court held: x x x respondent exhibited a deplorable
lack of that degree of morality required of him x x x. He made a mockery of
marriage, x x x. His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted gross
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of court.
5. No assistance in the unauthorized practice of law
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. (Rules 9.01-9.02)
Q. What constitutes unauthorized practice of law?
A. Tapay et al v. Attys. Charlie L. Bancolo et al, A. C. No. 9604, March 20,
2013: A lawyer who allowed his secretary to sign his pleading in the Office
of the Ombudsman is guilty of violation of Canon 9.Only lawyers are
allowed to sign pleadings and the same cannot be delegated.
Atty. Edita Noe Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamente (A.C. No.
7269, November
23, 2011: A lawyer who allowed a paralegal to attend court hearings on his
behalf has violated Canon 9 because only lawyers are allowed to undertake
representation clients before the regional trial courts.
TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO, 678 SCRA 60 (2012): This case also deals
with the lawyers commitment to share a portion of his legal fees with a nonlawyer in a case for partition of estate which complainant referred to
Pefianco. The lawyer was found guilty of this violation by his admission in a
letter he wrote to the parties in the partition case. On the second charge of
abandoning his legal wife to cohabit with his mistress with whom he has
four children, the Court that it was a clear betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage and is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
C. Duty to the Courts
1. Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
(Rules 10.01-10.02)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(c) and (d), Rules of Court, Duties of
Attorneys
Q. Can a Senator be exonerated from any liability for calling the Supreme
Court as a court of idiots?
A. Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399,
August 25, 2009. S.C. exonerated the respondent for calling the S.C. justices
as a court of idiots. She invoked parliamentary immunity.
Q. Is a lawyer liable for resorting to a fraudulent order of the court to gain
custody of his minor children?
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A. Yes. In Re: Almacen G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970. Lawyers as part
of free speech may criticize decisions of the Court but such post litigation
utterances must never be resorted in order to malign the Court.
D. Duty to Clients
(i) Services regardless of a persons status
CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. (Rules
14.01-14.04)
Read: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court on Duties of Attorneys (h)
and (i)
Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court on Attorneys for Destitute
Litigant
(ii) Services as counsel de oficio primarily in CRIMINAL CASES
- Appointment as Counsel de oficio (to represent accused in
criminal proceedings)
Read: Rule 116, Section 6, Rules of Court, Right to Counsel of an
Accused
Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court, Appointment of Counsel de
oficio during trial
Q. Who may be appointed as counsel de oficio?
A. A lawyer in good standing; or any person who reside where the case is
filed, of good repute for probity and ability where there is no lawyer in the
jurisdiction.
(i) Confidentiality rule: Rule will cover partners in legal profession and
non-legal staff working for the lawyer.
(ii) Privileged communications. Sec. 21(b), Rule 130 will apply.
(iii) Conflict of interest: Disclose matters that would give rise to
representation of two adverse interests. Conflict of Interest, concept;
when lawyer may lawyer may held accountable; liability
Q. When can a lawyer be found liable for conflict of interest?
A. Pacana v. Pascual-Lpez, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. A lawyer who
acted as a retained counsel of a company was disbarred for also rendering
advice to the creditors of the company. The S.C. reminded lawyers to avoid
at all times any occasion where they will represent two adverse interests.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client
relationship is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
1. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients.
2. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
3. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and guarded with care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double- dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.
3. Candid and honest advice to clients: Give a fair assessment of the
case referral.
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients. (Rules 15.01-15.08)
When lawyer-client relationship commences: no formal contract is
needed, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.
Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16,
2013. S.C. said that the termination of the attorney-client relationship does
not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients confidence
once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. As a general rule, the ban on disclosure of clients confidences
is perpetual. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and
Canon 17 of the CPR and was suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years
4. Compliance with laws: No one is above the Rule of Law
5. Concurrent practice of another profession: pay separate PTRs; one
profession is governed by the Professional Regulation Commission and
the legal profession by the Supreme Court.
5. Dealing with Clients monies and properties
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CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his profession. (Rules 16.01-16.04)
(i)Fiduciary relationship
(ii) Co-mingling of funds: A lawyer must not co-mingle his personal
funds with those of his client.
(iii) Delivery of funds: A lawyer must promptly surrender to his client
and/ or account for any money received by way of a money judgment or
proceeds from a transaction he handled in the course of his engagement.
(iv) Borrowing or lending: A lawyer must refrain from borrowing
money from his client.
Please note: Article 1491(5), New Civil Code which covers the
prohibition against lawyers to participate in any public or judicial
auction of a property or rights where his professional services were
engaged.
Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to ask from her client for an advance for her
professional fees and thereafter not render any kind of legal service to the
client? A.
A. No. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050,
December 3, 2013. S.C. found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct for
failure pay a personal loan to her client which she initially asked as an
advance for her professional fees. The deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct. A lawyer
may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Thus,
Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
CECILIA AGNO VS. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN [558 SCRA 1,
December 7, 2010] A lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a
bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely
low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers,
thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should
hold in high esteem.
Q. What instances would indicate violation of a lawyers fiduciary duty?
A. Bayonla et al v. Atty. Purita A. Reyes, A. C. No. 4808, November 22,
2011. For her failure to turn over to her clients the just compensation in an
expropriation case, S.C. disbarred the respondent lawyer.
Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, A. C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011.
S.C. disbarred respondent-lawyer for employing deceit to personally gain
from the proceeds of the insurance claims and retirement benefits of the
deceased British spouse of the complainant.
Important matters to consider on fiduciary duty:
(1). Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received in the course of his engagement as counsel.
(2). Even if a lawyer has a lien for fees, he is bound to turnover any
property or money received on behalf of his client.
(3). The turnover of money or property to his client is subject to
lawyers lien.
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part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He is expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with
the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule
10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. Atty.
Quesadas failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due
notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of
care and diligence in managing his clients cause in violation of Canon 17
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,
A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014. For having violated Canons 17 and 18 of
the CPR, Atty. Guaren was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Despite acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 for the titling of
complainants lot, he failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years
to elapse without any progress on the referral. S.C. reiterated that the
practice of law is not a business and it reminded lawyers that the duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits
Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4,
2013: The Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he filed a
criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the
filing of a civil case for breach of contract; when the case was dismissed he
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific
performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with
the MTC; and he did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases.
Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His
lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and
inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an
obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and
fervor in the protection of the clients interest.
Carlito P. Carandang v. Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina, A. C. No. 7813, Apr. 21,
2009.In a June 3, 2013 case, S.C. reiterated that the Attorneys negligence to
file an appellate brief and his failure to inform the client that the case was
dismissed because of his negligence is guilty of violating Canon 18.
Similarly, a lawyer who falsifies the date of receipt of the decision to make it
appear that the time was filed within the prescriptive period is also guilty of
negligence and was slapped with a monetary fine.
Ermelinda Lad vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March
10, 2014.The S. C. held that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his
clients cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he
48 | P a g e
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. For his
failure to promptly file a pleading he already signed on the ground that his
client did not send the filing fees and 30% of his professional fees, the S.C.
was suspended for three months The Court said that this act exhibited his
lack of professionalism.
To summarize:
On the Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
(i) Adequate protection: A lawyer must ensure the appropriate legal
reliefs for his client.
(ii) Negligence: A client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.
(iii) Collaborating Counsel: With the consent of the client, a
collaborating counsel may participate in an on-going case
7. Representation with zeal within legal bounds
Q. What is the recourse of a party who has lost a case?
A. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente
S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No.
10300, December 10, 2013. S.C. held administrative complaints against
justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial
remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty
to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by
law. It found Atty. Adaza guilty of indirect contempt for his failure to impress
upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts.
(i) Use of fair and honest means: A lawyer must only employ such legal
strategy allowed by the circumstances.
(ii) Clients fraud: A lawyer must not condone any illegal acts of his
client.
(iii) Procedure in handling the case: The lawyers acceptance and the
limits of the engagement of his services must be made clear at the
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law.
Q. When will the lawyer be held accountable for violation of the
responsibility to serve his client with zeal within the bounds of law?
Dimagiba v. Montalvo, Jr. Adm. Case No. 1424, October 15, 1991. Lawyer
was disbarred for stretching for almost 49 years a case involving a probate
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of a will from which more than other ten criminal and civil suits were
instituted.
Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417, February 6, 2003. S.C. suspended a
lawyer for six months for using harassing tactics to harass a party from him
his client wanted to obtain child support.
CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2011: The case stemmed from the execution of a final decision
with the C.A. in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a
compromise agreement with the respondents pending appeal without
informing her counsel. Malvars counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to
Protect Attorneys Rights.
S.C., on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies
of clients compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for
the purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting to naught the
stipulated contingent fees. It said that even if the compensation of the
attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
withdrawal of the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
Attorneys fees: (i) Acceptance fees; (ii) Contingency fee arrangements;
(iii) Attorneys liens; (iv) Fees and controversies with clients; (v)
Concepts of attorneys fees - (a) ordinary concept and (b) extraordinary
concept.
On Lawyers fees and other charges:
Read Rule 138, Section 24, Rules of Court on Compensation of Attorneys
Rule 138, Section 12, Rules of Court on Compensation for Attorneys de
officio
Rule 138, Section 37, Rules of Court on Charging Lien
Q. What is a charging lien?
A. A charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for
payment of money, and executions in pursuance of such judgments, obtained
in favor of the client, to secure reimbursement for advances made and
payment of attorneys fees.
Q. What is a retaining fee?
A. A retaining fee can partake of an acceptance fee and covers
professional fees for services rendered including the payment of such
amount of amount as may be agreed upon by the parties in the course of
handling a legal matter for the client.
Read Rule 20.01 of CPR and Rule 138, Section 24 on factors to consider
in charging fees (importance of the subject matter of controversy, extent of
services rendered, professional standing)
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held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them
in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Court said Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos
of herself wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this
available for public viewing. .
C. Maintain Impartiality
CANON 3 A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with
impartiality and diligence. (Sections 1-6)
Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364. A judge
together with the Clerk of Court and the court stenographer assigned to his
court were also sanctioned by the S.C. The Court said that except for
clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to ask questions that
would elicit answers to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also
proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any proceeding
in the absence of the judge and for the stenographer to transcribe such
proceedings.
Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14, 2011 filed by
Inter-Petal Recreational Corp., A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The
complaint raised the issue on the capacity of then Chief Justice to decide on
a pending case without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the complaint because
the same has become moot and academic with the impeachment and
eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.
Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594.
This case was filed by Justice Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC
Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C. called the attention of Mijares that the
Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing cases involving relatives up to
the sixth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a
member of the bench may not hear cases where a counsel is a relative up to
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
D. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice
CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in
activities to improve the law, the legal system and the administration of
justice. (Sections 1-15)
Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994. A judge who failed to
sign the order granting bail to the accused and who left for an out of town
was found to have been remised of his responsibility as a judge.
Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. The
S.C. held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should
decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that
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may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific
to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to
disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal
compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and
the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note
the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the
Motion to Dismiss. .
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former
Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No.
RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.For his failure to sufficiently explain why
he failed to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for
decision/resolution, the S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions.
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his
judicial duties for his failure to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for
decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he
compulsorily retired. Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases and
resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining
cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency.
Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases
Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
The S. C. said that Carbonells failure to decide cases within the
reglamentary 90-day period without any justifiable and credible reasons
constitutes gross inefficiency. The reiterated that as a frontline official of the
Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his
guiding principle.
E. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities
CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the
risk of conflict of judicial duties. (Sections 1 - 5)
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA.
The Court held that a judge cannot be suspended in the discharge of her
responsibilities until after conviction of a criminal offense she allegedly
committed has become final and executory.
Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded the family
court judge to avoid using vulgar language in the course of the trial. Use of
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vulgar language insults a witness and may also diminish the respect of the
litigants towards the court because court proceedings are held in public.
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374.
The Court will not condone the acts of judges of accepting money from a
litigant with a pending case before his court nor should a judge be seen
dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his court.
F. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence
CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon
City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013. S.C. said that
as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The Court reminded
parties that resort to judicial remedies must be exercised to question the
decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial judge should
never be imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.
Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344. The
apparent bias exhibited by the judge shown in the delay in the legal
procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held reminded judges of their pivotal
role in the administration of justice.
Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93. S.C. held
that gross misconduct and serious lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the
court merit dismissal from the judiciary except for reasons of compassion,
the Court awarded the retirement benefits of the judge who died during the
pendency of this administrative case.
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutors Office, Tacloban City v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C.
Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No.
RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. The Court held Judge
Bitas judge liable for gross ignorance of the law when he deviated from the
requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail and
aggravated his offense when he also granted bail to Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail When an error is
so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court reiterated
the rule that in administrative cases and disbarment proceedings, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by
substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of
authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant
failed to establish Judge Austrias bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the
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accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her
judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a
judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal.
Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. The Supreme Court
held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. In this case, the civil case was already
submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the
Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision
must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge Regencia rendered judgment
only more than two years later the judge failed to proffer any acceptable
reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. .
IV. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary may
practice their profession during their incumbency.
A. Prescriptive Duty to resolve pending matters
All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be resolved
with 24 months;
Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1),
1987 Constitution)
B. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be voluntary or
involuntary: There are two rules governing the qualification and
voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court; and Rule 3. 12 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
provides: Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in case, for just or valid reasons other than those
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Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25,
Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014. Sheriff Macusi was
held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of duty
which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due
to carelessness or indifference. The Court held that the 30-day period
imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment has been received
by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. A
return which Macusi referred to as his Partial Report is not acceptable
because the court issues a writ, it is incumbent upon the sheriff to enforce it.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-133132, June 4, 2014. The Court dismissed from service Ampong for being
liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under
section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b)
forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every
employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069,
January 20, 2014. The Court said that absent a TRO, an order of quashal,
or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff
has no alternative but to enforce the writ. The S.C. did not find the sheriff
guilty of the charge of grave misconduct. He did not enforce the writ of
execution because there was still a pending Motion for Reconsideration
before the trial court. S.C. said that misconduct has been defined as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must
necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In this case, there
was no element of misconduct established against the accused.
The sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion
whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his
hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in
accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the
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order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein
where the nature of the case requires immediate execution.
Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar
Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-062261, December 11, 2013. Respondent Esponilla, Legal Researcher and
then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of
court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC Manila were charged with Gross
Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty for the irregular withdrawal of
deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte
Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case.
S.C. held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in
good faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion
which he himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course of the
subject administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved
that he exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte
Motion all in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon
was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
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