Professional Documents
Culture Documents
complaint with
the RTC of Makati alleging that
petitioner owed it
P114,650.76, which petitioner
incurred in the course of
her work as an insurance agent for
respondent.
Respondent also prayed for
exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
Petitioner filed her answer and by
way of
to answer such
counterclaim.
TC ruled in favor of the
respondents and ruled that
defendant despite
repeated demands in gross violation
of their Special
Agents Contract. CA found this
statement misleading
because while on one hand
appellant alleged that
appellees cause of action had
nothing to do with the
Special Agents Contract, on the
other hand, she claim
that FGU violated said contract.
Motion for
reconsireation was denied by CA.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. Whether respondent is estopped
from questioning CA
jurisdiction over the appeal filed by
petitioner? Yes.
The objection to CAs jurisdiction is
raised for the first time
before this Court. Although the lack
of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the
action, a party may be
estopped from raising such
questions if he has actively taken
part in the very proceedings which
he questions, and then
belatedly objects to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that
that the judgment or order
given petitioner a
reasonable time to pay the filing
fees for her permissive
counterclaim, but in no case beyond
the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Held 2: Petitioners claims for
damages are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to
pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim.
4.) Whether respondent should be
declared in default for
having failed to answer the
counterclaim? NO.
Insofar as the permissive
counterclaim of petitioner is
concerned, there is no need to file
an answer until petitioner
has paid the prescribed docket fees.
Meanwhile, the
compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner for damages need not
be answered since it is inseparable
from the claims of
respondent.
DISPOSITION: CA Decision and
Resolution modified.
Compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner is ordered reinstated.
Meanwhile, Makati RTC is ordered to
require petitioner to
reversible error in denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims. At the time
PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees
for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004
under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
Case
is
real
action.
St. Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias [G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]
ST.
LOUIS
vs.
EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]
UNIVERSITY,
INC., petitioner,
FACTS:
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of faculty and
employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision that for teaching employees
in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be
on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended.
Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating points. Respondent sought
recourse from the CBAs grievance machinery, but to no avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation
and mediation again failed. The parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before
Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case
between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a
five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period. Petitioner argued
that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of
the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the
petition.
ISSUES:
Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondents petition despite her failure to appeal
(docket) fee within the reglementary period.
RULINGS:
Remedial Law
(1) Yes. The CA erred in its ruling. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must
be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals
from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the
CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements
shall be a sufficient ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without
which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. Here, the
docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected
within the reglementary period.
There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellants fault; (10)
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all
the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
De La Cruz vs Joaquin
FACTS
Domingo Carabeo entered into a contract "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa" with Sps Norberto and Susan
Peaches Dingco whereby Caraveo agreed to sell his rights over a 648 sq m unregistered land in Orani, Bataan for P38,000.
(initial payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on Sept 1990).
Norberto & Dingco were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price,
Carabeo requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over the land.
Norberto & Dingco gave Carabeo small sums of money from time to time which totaled P9,100, on Carabeos request
according to them; due to Norberto & Dingco inability to pay the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to
Carabeo.
Despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on Carabeos acceptance of the remaining balance
of P18,900 but Carabeo remained firm in his refusal, proffering as reason that he would register the land first.
Sometime in 1994, Norberto & Dingco learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that
Carabeo had caused its registration in his name on Dec 21, 1993. They offered to pay the balance but Carabeo declined,
drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence, N & D
filed a complaint for specific performance before the RTC.
Carabeo:
o
sale was void for lack of object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land.
if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, N & D failure to comply with their obligation to pay the balance of the
Carabeo maintained that they failed to pay the balance of P28,000 on Sept 1990 to thus constrain him to accept
The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, Carabeos counsel of
record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted
as a party after his death. The TCs decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
Petition Denied.
FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
Standard
money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue
writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers,
Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since
Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case
but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos (husband) leasing business is a conjugal
property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule
4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro,
a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action
by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a
real party in interest.
HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a
judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it
is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not
appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Therefore, only one of
the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of
the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court.
MANDAUE GALLEON TRADE, INC. and GAMALLOSONS TRADERS, INC., represented by FAUSTO B. GAMALLO,
Petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO ISIDTO, ERWIN BA-AY, VICTORIANO BENDANILLA, EDUVIGIS GUTIB, JULITO GUTIB,
GREGORIO ORDENISA, DAMIAN RABANAL, ROSITA RABANAL, EUSTAQUIA SIGLOS, PRIMITIVO SIGLAS, and
RODOLFO TORRES Respondents.
G.R. No. 181051
July 5, 2010
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents, alleging that they were employees of petitioners, filed a case for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of, among others, overtime pay. They averred that they started working at Gamallo Sons, Inc. in
1977. In 1980, the firm name was changed to Gamallosons Traders, Inc. and eventually it became Mandaue
Galleon Trade, Inc. The employees suspected that the adoption and substitution of many firm names was
intended to subvert the labor standard benefits, status, terms, and conditions of employment.
In 1978, respondents were notified that the company adopted a policy of voluntary retrenchment but they did
not avail of the said plan. They asserted that, in 2001, they were dismissed from employment without just
cause and without due process.
The LA held that the respondents were illegally dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC.
However, they failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping to their notice of appeal so the NLRC
dismissed the petition and so did the CA.
ISSUE: WON the attachment of a certification of non-forum shopping in the notice of appeal may be
dispensed with in this case.
RULING:
Section 4(a), Rule VI of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC10 prescribes, viz.:
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. - (a) The Appeal shall be filed within
the
unjustified or inequitable. In this case, however, the petitioners offered no valid justification for their failure
to comply with the Circular.
Oaminal vs Castillo
[G.R. No. 181235. July 22, 2009.]FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc
Standard
(JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as actual construction went on,
progress billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein
respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were
initially remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not
turned over to JOCI but instead, Tansipek deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said
deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the deposit to payees account only, and despite
the alleged lack of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of
the check despite demands made by the latter.
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss.
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was
granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for
failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied. Upon being declared in default,
respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to attach the
assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied
for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct remedy
HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very
beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for
Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should
be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious
defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
meritorious defenses must concur.
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this case is not barred
from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to
Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However,
the appeal should be based on the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already presented,
and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.