Nozick's thought experiment examines limits of consent in political philosophy

18.07.
2016
EdwardFeser:NozicksTaleoftheSlave
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Nozicks Tale of the Slave

While on the subject of Robert Nozick, we might
note that hes been written up this week in
Slate, in an article by Stephen Metcalf. Its a
pretty feeble piece gratuitously snotty,
philosophically shallow, and lame even as mere
journalism insofar as its central hook is just
wrong. Contrary to what Metcalf supposes,
Nozick did not renounce libertarianism. In fact
he explicitly denied doing so in an interview
with Julian Sanchez given not long before
Nozicks death in 2002 (as Sanchez reminds us in
responding to Metcalf). Like too many critics of Nozick, Metcalf also
focuses exclusively on his famous Wilt Chamberlain argument (and,
as Sanchez notes, badly misses the point of it). That argument is
indeed important, but Nozick gave other arguments too, some of
them no less interesting. Consider, for instance, the argument
implicit in his thought experiment The Tale of the Slave.
You can find the thought experiment on pp. 29092 of Anarchy, State,
and Utopia. You can also find it online here. Its brief give it a
read, then come back.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.ro/2011/06/nozickstaleofslave.html
Edward Feser
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Now, lets consider Nozicks closing question: Which transition in the

series of cases Nozick describes makes it no longer the tale of a
slave? Nozicks own apparent implicit answer is that none of them
does, and that the situation in the last case constitutes a kind of
slavery, even if a mild sort. And since that situation is more or less
the sort all of us find ourselves in in modern democratic societies, the
implication is that such societies constitute slave states, at least to
the extent that they make demands of their citizens (in the form of
taxation, regulation, and the like) that go beyond the functions of
Nozicks minimal state (police, national defense, and courts of
law). Naturally, this would also entail that nondemocratic
governments that make such demands also constitute slave states,
presumably even more so.
In my libertarian days I agreed with this judgment, though I no longer
do. The usual disclaimer applies: That does not by any means entail
that I now think that anything goes. Much that modern
governments demand of us is unjust, and some of it (such as saddling
their citizens with crushing debt) may fairly be described as in some
respects comparable to slavery. The point is just that I now believe,
on natural law grounds, that it is false to say that requiring citizens to
support any functions beyond the minimal state is inherently unjust or
comparable to slavery. Some such demands can be justifiable, even if
the demands socialists and egalitarian liberals would make are (I
agree) not justifiable. (Which demands are justifiable, and under
what conditions? There is no glib, oneline answer to that question of
the sort a Rand or Rothbardstyle libertarian always seems to want,
because the relevant moral considerations are more complicated than
they suppose. See my Social Philosophy and Policy article Classical
Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation for the way
traditional Thomistic natural law theory would approach the issue.)
But then, where exactly does Nozicks Tale of the Slave go wrong?
The problem with it is that it is underdescribed. In particular, the end
result seems like slavery only because Nozick leaves out certain
crucial moral facts. To see how, lets first alter the thought
experiment a little bit by supposing that the 10,000headed master
emancipates you, but that, for whatever reason, you go on voluntarily
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to sign an employment contract with this group of people.

Specifically, you agree to be on call at all hours of the night, over the
course of a year perhaps to do errands for various members of the
group, or to deal with various overnight emergencies, or whatever.
Suppose further that after a few weeks of this you get sick of being
awakened in the middle of the night and in other ways start to hate
the job. You wish you could quit but given the terms of your contract
you cannot. Still, the group has come to rely on you and would be
seriously inconvenienced if you didnt do your job, and after all, you
did agree to do it. Now, are you a slave? Nozick would say that in
this case, you arent a slave, even though you hate your job as much
as a slave might.
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Why arent you a slave? The reason, of course, is that in this case you
consented to the job, consented to be on call, for one year, to your
10,000headed employer; and for the libertarian, consent suffices to
make the situation something other than slavery. (Whether agreeing
to surrender complete control over yourself for life would generate an
enforceable obligation is something libertarians disagree over, but
that issue does not affect the present point.)
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But notice that this cannot be a complete answer, for two reasons.
First of all, while you might have consented initially, you might also
come to regret this. You might say I want more than anything else
to be free of this job! Its so horrible I feel as if I were a slave! Oh
how I wish I had never signed that contract! All the same, Nozick
would say, you are obligated to do the job. And this shows that,
whatever it means to say that you are obligated to do what you
consent to doing, it does not mean that you have to be in any way
willing to do it at the time you have to do it. Consent in that sense
is not required. Hence Nozick and likeminded libertarians would
seem to be committed to the following proposition:
Christopher Martin
1. A person can be obligated to do something even if, at the time he

has to do it, he does not want to do it and feels as if he were being
treated like a slave.
Francis Beckwith
But notice that even your having initially consented cannot be the
whole story either. For why is it that you are obligated in the first
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place to do what you have consented to doing? The answer cannot be

Because I consented to do whatever I consent to doing, on pain of
infinite regress. Consent can generate obligations only if we are
already obligated, for other reasons, to do what we consent to doing.
Consent cannot itself be the ground of all obligation. Certainly the
Nozickian libertarian cannot think so: In Nozicks view, it is because
of a Kantian respect for persons as ends in themselves that we are
obligated not to make slaves of them, even if we have never
consented to regarding them as ends in themselves. They just are
ends in themselves and thats that. In that case, though, Nozick and
likeminded libertarians are also committed to a further proposition:
James F. Ross
2. A person can have enforceable obligations to others that he did not

at any time consent to having.
Lydia McGrew
Now the circumstance described in 2 is itself something a person

might come to dislike intensely. In the situation Ive described,
where you have consented to be the midnight errand boy for your
10,000headed employer, you might think to yourself I hate it, just
hate it, that the world is set up in such a way that I have obligations I
never consented to putting myself under for example, obligations
like the obligation to honor contracts that I freely consented to
signing! Yet the Nozickian libertarian would say: Too bad. Thats
the way the world is. Deal with it. More to the point, the Nozickian
libertarian would have to say that having obligations like this does not
by itself suffice to make you a slave. That is to say, the Nozickian
libertarian is committed to a third proposition:
Michael Gorman
3. It is possible for a person who is not a slave nevertheless to have

enforceable obligations to others that he never consented to having
and that he finds deeply odious.
Stephen Mumford
Notice further that these obligations may not be merely of a negative

sort, but even of a positive sort. In the scenario Ive described, you
are obligated not merely to refrain from harming your 10,000headed
employer, but also to carry out certain acts as your employer
demands, given the terms of your contract. It is true that you
consented to this, but you did not consent to being obligated to do
whatever youve consented to doing. And in this sense, your consent
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is only partial. That means that the Nozickian libertarian is

committed also to:
4. It is possible for a person who is not a slave nevertheless to have
enforceable positive obligations to others that he never fully
consented to having and that he finds deeply odious.
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Now, keep in mind that none of what has been said so far rests on any
moral premises of my own, natural law or otherwise. All I have been
doing is drawing out what is implicit in Nozicks own position. But
look what happens when we return to the original Tale of the Slave
and apply to it the points we have made. Nozick, it seems, expects us
to regard case 9 the case that parallels a modern democratic society
as tantamount to a mild form of slavery. But why should we so
regard it? The answer cannot be Because it involves our having
obligations to others that we find odious and that we never consented
to having. For given 3, there is nothing necessarily wrong or slavery
like with that.
Note also that Nozick does not tell us in his Tale of the Slave whether
the 10,000headed master gives the purported slave a right of exit
that is, a right to emigrate from the territory over which the 10,000
headed master rules. (This is one respect in which Nozicks thought
experiment is, as I have said, underdescribed.) But he will have to
add such a right to the story if he wants the example to be relevantly
parallel to a modern democratic society, since such societies do allow
their citizens to emigrate. Now, a right of exit entails that anyone
who dislikes the positive obligations a 10,000headed master (or some
government) imposes on him could always escape them by
emigrating. Of course, exercising this option might be burdensome,
but if a person could still take it and yet refrains from doing so, then
his being subject to the positive obligations in question involves at
least partial consent, even if not full consent. But in that case, if we
ask why we should regard Nozicks case 9 as tantamount to slavery,
the answer cannot be Because it involves our having positive
obligations to others that we find odious and that we never fully
consented to having. For given 4, there can be nothing necessarily
wrong or slaverylike with that either.
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So, whatever it is about case 9 that is supposed to amount to slavery,

it cannot by Nozicks own lights cannot be merely that it involves
obligations to others that we find odious and that we never consented
to, nor even that it involves positive obligations to others that we
never fully consented to. For given 3 and 4, which Nozick himself is
committed to, these circumstances simply do not suffice to make a
situation tantamount to slavery.
I submit that these points entirely undermine the force of Nozicks
thought experiment. Probably most people who find the Tale of the
Slave an impressive piece of libertarian argumentation do so because
they are implicitly reasoning in one of two ways. First, they might be
reasoning as follows:
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Major premise: Slavery is odious and nonconsensual.
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Minor premise: The demands imposed on us by democratic and other

governments (or at least those that go beyond the functions of the
minimal state) are also (sometimes) odious and nonconsensual.
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Conclusion: So demands of this sort amount to slavery.
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But this argument is invalid, for (as anyone who has taken a basic
logic course can see) it commits the fallacy of the undistributed
middle term. Alternatively, we might replace the major premise with
its converse, giving us the following valid argument:
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Major premise: Any demands made on us that are odious and non
consensual amount to slavery.
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Minor premise: The demands imposed on us by democratic and other

governments (or at least those that go beyond the functions of the
minimal state) are (sometimes) odious and nonconsensual.
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Conclusion: So demands of this sort amount to slavery.
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But as we have seen, the Nozickian libertarian is committed to

rejecting this alternative major premise, given his commitment to 3
and 4. Nor would it do the Nozickian libertarian any good to
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reconsider his commitment to 3 and 4, so as to be avail himself of the

proposed alternative major premise. For one thing, 3 and 4 follow, as
we have seen, from Nozicks basic commitments; to abandon them is
just to abandon the foundations of Nozicks libertarianism. For
another thing, the claim that Any demands made on us that are
odious and nonconsensual amount to slavery simply begs the
question against the nonlibertarian, who holds precisely that we have
certain nonslavelike obligations we did not consent to, even if we
find them odious.
Now, obviously the Nozickian libertarian will insist that, even if not
all obligations that are nonconsensual and odious amount to slavery,
the specific obligations that democratic and other governments
impose on us do amount to slavery, at least when they go beyond the
functions of the minimal state. The trouble is that we now need a
separate argument for this claim; merely appealing to the odious and
nonconsensual nature of these obligations will not suffice, for the
reasons weve seen. That is another reason I say that Nozicks
thought experiment is underdescribed. To know whether his case 9
amounts to slavery and thus to know whether the demands
democratic and other governments make of us amount to slavery we
need to know what specifically are the demands that the 10,000
headed master (or such governments) are making of us, and why these
specific demands amount to slavery when other odious and non
consensual demands to not. But in that case the Tale of the Slave
itself with its implied emphasis on the nonconsensual and odious
nature of the obligations the 10,000headed master imposes on you,
abstracting away from the actual contents of the obligations drops
out as irrelevant, since it would not really be doing any work. Rather,
this separate argument (whatever it is) would be doing all the work.
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So, the implied argument of the Tale of the Slave seems to be either
irrelevant, or invalid, or to be committed to a premise which both
begs the question against the nonlibertarian and which Nozick
himself implicitly rejects in any case. Vivid and interesting though
the thought experiment is, it thus fails to provide any support for
libertarianism. Its appeal is entirely rhetorical, and has no actual
logical force.
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Again, this does not entail that democratic governments, or any other
kind of government, may demand whatever they wish of their citizens
without this amounting to slavery. That a certain argument for a
claim fails does not mean that the claim itself is false. In any event,
like Nozick, I reject socialism and egalitarian liberalism. But the
reasons have to do with natural law considerations of the sort outlined
in the article of mine linked to above, and not with superficial
comparisons to slavery of the sort that the Tale of the Slave rests on.
Nor do I intend any disrespect toward Nozick or his arguments. On the
contrary, Nozick was a brilliant philosopher, and the arguments he sets
out in Anarchy, State and Utopia are important ones that deserve our
consideration even if we ultimately reject them. Certainly they are
far more formidable than those of Nozicks absurdly overrated rival
John Rawls, whose main arguments are little more than flatulent
tautologies. The contrast between the cringemaking hagiography
usually afforded Rawls and the condescension toward Nozick one finds
in commentators like Metcalf (and Matthew Yglesias) says more about
the commentators than it does about the respective merits of Rawls
and Nozick themselves. Rawlss arguments are murky, plodding, and
(given their ultimate circularity) anticlimactic, but reinforce liberal
prejudices. Nozicks are clever, clear, and crisp, but challenge those
prejudices. Nothing more need be said.
Posted by Edward Feser at 2:06 PM
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20 comments:
On some alleged quantifier

shift fallacies, Part I...
Daniel Smith said...
Routledge Handbook
I really like the way you dissect arguments and expose logical
fallacies Dr. Feser! As an amateur philosopher, it is my goal to
some day be proficient enough to do that.
Nozicks Tale of the Slave
That said, I hope you'll forgive me for crashing this thread but I
asked a question in the On Aristotle, Aquinas and Paley thread
that got overrun by another discussion and I'm hoping you will
answer it here.
On Aristotle, Aquinas, and

Paley: A Reply to Marie...
It is basically this:
Meyer and fusionism

Blogging note
OBrien and Koons on

metaphysics and morality
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If teleology is inherent in nature (even if God put it there),

doesn't it logically follow then that nature could continue to
exist even if God ceases to exist?
Singer in a state of flux

May (10)
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Thanks in advance!
March (10)
June 23, 2011 at 4:42 PM
February (11)
Jinzang said...
My problem with the extreme libertarianism position, such as
Nozick argues for, is that I feel it leads to immoral conclusions.
The libertarian considers it more odious to impose a tax to pay
for the care of an orphan than to let the orphan starve.
January (12)
2010 (154)
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June 23, 2011 at 4:51 PM

Jinzang said...
After reading Metcalf's article, I agree with his main point,
which is that it is pretty audacious to believe that you can
derive the rules for a just society by arguing from first
principles.
June 23, 2011 at 5:04 PM
Jinzang said...
Matt Yglesias gives his opinion on the Wilt Chamberlain
argument.
June 23, 2011 at 5:14 PM
Iain said...
"The libertarian considers it more odious to impose a tax to pay
for the care of an orphan than to let the orphan starve."
Actually the belief is is that good people like yourself will
willingly provide for that orphan without being forced by the
government.
I'd like to know what "natural law considerations" Professor Feser
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means when he says he rejects libertarianism because that

makes no sense.
June 23, 2011 at 8:01 PM
Solomon's Chariots said...
Iain, yes it is true that people will in most cases fill that role. I
don't think Dr Feser is arguing against that.
However the libertarian would object to being forced to provide
for the starving orphan in the situation that nobody does it
willingly.
If you want to know what the natural law considerations are,
you can actually read the blog posts and articles
which Dr Feser has repeatedly given links to (for example in this
very blog post he has a link to
https://portfolio.du.edu/portfolio/getportfoliofile?
uid=157552), instead of not reading them and then insinuating
that he is not making sense.
June 23, 2011 at 8:22 PM
Pattsce said...
This was a great read; thank you.
Lain,
I don't understand your response; he posted a link to his views
on natural law, property rights, and taxation in the blog post.
June 23, 2011 at 8:22 PM
Anonymous said...
Solomon's Chariots: "However the libertarian would object to
being forced to provide for the starving orphan in the situation
that nobody does it willingly."
Do such "what if" scenarios that are not based in the concrete
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everydayness of life need to be taken seriously when

constructing a moral/political philosophy? This modus operandi
seem to be of the same intellectual value as that of what passes
for "academic moral philosophy" these days, in which a fictitious
scenario involving some kind of dilemma is thrown up ("10
shipwrecked sailors are on a small lifeboat and they must either
cannibalize one member or all die," "nuke this country within
one day or the Earth will explode!," etc.), and any moral
philosophies which cannot answer the dilemmas are deemed to
be worthless, regardless of the fact that the posed scenarios are
completely overthetop and never actually obtain in the
concrete, everyday world.
"Everyone neglecting the orphans in a society in which Christian
morality is still very much alive" is something that will not play
out at any time within the foreseeable future, and hence I don't
see the need to give the notion much attention, as far as
determining what is and isn't a sound moral/political philosophy
is concerned.
If I should, though, would someone mind explaining why?
June 23, 2011 at 9:13 PM
Anonymous said...
Great post, Prof. Feser.
I'd like to know your thoughts on HansHermann Hoppe's work. Of
all the modern libertarian thinkers, he's probably the brightest
(and, certainly, the most controversial).
June 23, 2011 at 9:31 PM
Solomon's Chariots said...
Hi Anonymous June 23, 2011 9:13 PM,
Firstly, I would question whether the situation I outline is
actually a thought experiment, I think it happens regularly that
persons in emergency need such as starving orphans are left
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without help from the community/charity. There are at least a

billion people in the world suffering from chronic starvation.
Most libertarians would (and do) rule out government
intervention in this situation even if they recognised that it
could save x number of starving orphans that otherwise aren't
being saved from prolonged death.
Secondly, isn't the idea that in a universe where there is no
government intervention (or minimal government), there are no
starving orphans that aren't cared for itself indulging a "what if"
scenario even more?
"Everyone neglecting the orphans in a society in which Christian
morality is still very much alive" is even more indulging in what
if scenarios even more, it's a situation which doesn't actually
happen in the real world. But what is worse is that you would
claim in the situation that an orphan does starve unaided in
such a society, that it has failed to meet the grounds to be
considered a society in which "Christian morality is still very
much alive" and thus beg the question against the critic of
libertarianism.
Basically I think you need to recognise that this isn't just a case
of talking about hypotheticals (as talking about super nuke
terrorists would be).
June 23, 2011 at 10:27 PM
DNW said...
"Firstly, I would question whether the situation I outline is
actually a thought experiment, I think it happens regularly that
persons in emergency need such as starving orphans are left
without help from the community/charity. There are at least a
billion people in the world suffering from chronic starvation.
Most libertarians would (and do) rule out government
intervention in this situation even if they recognised that it
could save x number of starving orphans that otherwise aren't
being saved from prolonged death."
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18.07.2016
If you can say why you believe the "starving orphans" should be
saved, you may have gone some way to clarifying the question
for yourself by laying out your presuppositions.
Oh and professor Feser, I agree about Rawls. I read A Theory ...

many years ago; and when not flinging the book across the room
in exasperation at Rawls circular logic, I was marveling at his
baseless ex cathedra style pronouncements.
Even his prescriptive hypothetical formulations left me asking
why I should affirm the antecedent.
He should have just become a Unitarian minister and left it at
that.
June 24, 2011 at 7:11 AM
Lorenzo said...
Nicely argued post. This is connected to the question of why we
do not allow voluntary slavey, or people to otherwise capitalise
their labour services, and whether the employment contract is a
form of unacceptable alienation of self. I take a somewhat more
propertyandperson analysis of these questions here but there
is some overlap with your points.
June 24, 2011 at 7:16 PM
DNW said...
Speaking of Rawls, the following has to be one of the most
annoying passages in his "Justice" text, even though it is couched
parametrically ( "in justice as fairness") in terms of an implied
conditional.
" In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate. In

designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the
accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so
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is for the common benefit" (A Theory of Justice, pg 102)

Geez. We agree to share each other's fate. Remind me why,
again? At least Christians promise you some kind of prospective
reward for putting up with what may be, when analyzed
unemotionally and in minimalist terms of objectively
maintaining a critical mass of worthwhile associative
arrangements, those unnecessary bonds and claims made by
persons less endowed by happy "accidents of nature".
All Rawls promises is that you will perpetually experience more
of precisely the same kind of shackles you submit to.
No wait that isn't quite true.

He does realize that "justice as fairness" may induce unpleasant
stresses, despite the fact that,
"It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered
judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of
native endowments, anymore than one deserves one's initial
starting place in society" (pg 104)
[Please refrain from asking those obvious questions regarding
the incoherence of Rawls' notions. Such as for example, through
probing Rawl's idea of "distributing" traits. These manifestations
of the organism itself, he treats conceptually as if they are
instead socially produced pills poured unequally into fungible
receptacles. Nor should you ask how it is that the denial of one's
deservingness of such manifest talents, then logically implies a
complementary obligation to provide them to someone else who
doesn't have them. If A doesn't deserve what A has in the way of
natural endowments, how does B which would not deserve
having such talents either, then come to deserve the product of
A's undeserved talent?]
Anyway, Rawls has a solution to it all. Fraternity motivated
Eugenics. Trim a bit off the bottom here and there, and
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18.07.2016
eventually, maybe even little off of the top ...

"In the original position then, the parties want to ensure for
their descendants the best genetic endowment (assuming their
own to be fixed). The pursuit of reasonable policies in this
regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones,
this beings a question that arises between generations. Thus
over time a society is to take steps at least to preserve the
general level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of
serious defects. ...
I mention this speculative and difficult matter to indicate once
again the manner in which the difference principle is likely to
transform problems of social justice. We might conjecture that
in the long run, if there is an upper bound on ability, we would
eventually reach a society with the greatest equal liberty the
members of which enjoy the greatest equal talent. But I shall
not pursue this thought further" (A Theory of Justice, pg 108,
Harvard University Press 1971)
Welcome to the fraternal termite heap.
No need to ask what is "good" though.
Fraternity is "good" enough ...
June 27, 2011 at 11:51 AM
Chuckp123 said...
I haven't been able to find much useful information on Nozick's
contract theory, so I can't really speak to the validity of your
criticisms from a Nozickian standpoint.
However, Rothbardian libertarians have used Nozick's "Tale of
the Slave" as an exercise as well (most recently, Thomas Woods
has used it in many of his speeches). And from a Rothbardian
standpoint, your criticisms fail at proposition #1. Based on the
Title Transfer Theory of Contract, contractual obligations do not
trump the inalienable right of free will. Even having agreed to a
contract, one of the parties is perfectly at liberty to leave the
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18.07.2016
agreement and is not "obligated" to continue against their will.

The contract will specify the penalties for a breach, since the
failure of one party to fulfill their end of the deal could amount
to theft if they've already been compensated per the terms of
the contract by the other party. So there is no slavelike
obligation to do something, whereas in the case of the state or
the 10,000headed employer, there would be.
I love the blog, Edward. Take care.
July 9, 2011 at 6:50 PM
Anonymous said...
How much difference does the option to emigrate actually make?
Would it not be slavery if I captured Ed Feser and told him "You
must do what I say or I'll beat you, and I'll track you down
anywhere within the country. But please don't think of this as
slavery. If you manage to leave the country, you're a free man."
July 26, 2011 at 7:51 PM
Pedro Eidt said...
I agree it's a problem for nozickian libertarians, but not for most
libertarians.
Most libertarians defend inalienable rights, that is, every
contract that would require enforcement by means of using
force against someone's body or mind is invalid. That's why in
most libertarian's views, specific performance cannot be
enforced. That's why rothbard made a titletransfer theory of
contract, in which in case you breach the contract, the
enforcement occurs by means of material compensation only,
never by using force against yourself.
So, continued consent is required, otherwise a sex contract
would validade what we would obviously call rape.
That invalidates your first point, at least when dealing with
other libertarians.
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18.07.2016
I don't see the relevance of your second and third points. The
point is that we only have enforceable obligations not to aggress
against other people, i.e., treat them as mere means. That is
perfectly compatible with nozick's tale of the slave. In other
words, we can use force to stop an initiation of force, but we
can't initiate force.
That shows that even to a nozickian libertarian that wouldn't be
a problem, since it's the contractviolator that is initiating
force, and the enforcement would be the defensive force.
Your fourth point is very strange. How come the contractor did
not consent to being obligated to do whatever he consented to
do? I suppose you are arguing that there is no continued
consent, but 1 I don't think how that invalidates the tale of the
slave in a nozickian framework. If you contracted to do X, when
you don't do X, you've breached the contract, thereby initiating
force, so the enforcement is nothing else than defensive force.
and 2 In other libertarian's frameworks there wouldn't be such
problem.
In other words, the whole point is that your positive enforceable
obligations are necessarily *derivative* from negative
enforceable obligations. Something that holds for the tale of the
slave, but wouldn't hold for someone demanding that I do X with
no previous contract or without there being a negative right's
violation.
January 11, 2013 at 2:50 AM
Pedro Eidt said...
What you say about being allowed to leave the state also strikes
me as utterly missing the point, though nozick indeed doesn't
make such provision. Anyway here it goes: The slave master lets
you leave his command if you want, but he demands that, if you
leave, you'd have to give him some set of property that you
justly acquired (your house or some money, for example), and if
you leave, you'll anyway end up in the command of another
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18.07.2016
slave master, or in conditions in which is nigh impossible to

survive.
So, I don't see how this provision invalidates the tale of the
slave. Yes, I would remain living in my house, earning my money
in a job I already have instead of going to another slave master.
Would that mean I gave partial consent to what he's doing?
OF COURSE NOT! He does not own the territory in which I live
and do my stuff. The fact that I remain because I'm face with
some even worse alternatives doesn't mean I'm giving any
consent whatsoever. It just means I prefer to be have my rights
violated in some ways, instead of facing some even worse
options. Would you say that, when a robber demands my wallet
and I give it to him, I have thereby given him partial consent? I
think that would be absurd! But that was, in your sense, an
"enforceable positive obligation".
Suppose that robber say: "if you enter territory X, if I see you, I
will demand your wallet again."
Would you say I have given him partial consent to that in case I
enter territory X (which, by the way, is thousands and thousands
of kilometers and it's not his property) to visit my family? That
also seems completely absurd.
You seem to say that if I choose doing X (which is not a rights
violation) even when faced with a threat that by doing X I'll
suffer Y, then by doing X I have partially consented to Y. But
WHY would you think that?!
But let's go on: You're making a complete mess with the "non
consensual" stuff, so let's use a different terminology. What the
libertarian says amounts to slavery is when you treat other
people as your property, i.e., you use initiatory force against
someone.
So, when you say this: Any demands made on us that are odious
and nonconsensual amount to slavery
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One can clearly see how the libertarian would answer: Of course
there are demands that don't depend on your consent and which
do not amount to slavery. Those are exactly the claims that say
that *you cannot use initiatory force against me*. But every
claim that involves iniatory force will be a claim that violates
that, and so *those* will amount to slavery.
Ok. I'm done with criticising now. To end in a positive
commentary, I also endorse aristoteleanthomistic natural law.
January 11, 2013 at 2:50 AM
Geoff said...
"To see how, lets first alter the thought experiment a little bit
by supposing that the 10,000headed master emancipates you,
but that, for whatever reason, you go on voluntarily to sign an
employment contract with this group of people."
You just contradicted the nature of the state, thus making your
"addition" a dropping of the context Nozick was addressing.
May 7, 2013 at 12:07 PM
Joe C said...
I want to read the article about Rawls "flatulent tautologies" but
the link doesn't work. Prof. Feser, can you fix the link? Or does
anyone else have the link? Thank you.
July 25, 2015 at 8:02 AM
Anonymous said...
I disagree with your point about that government making
expressly accepted demands on the population doesn't equate to
slavery. Consider the EU where you have the Brits deciding
whether to remain part of it or to leave it. When you talk to
people on the remain side they view remaining as part of the EU
as being "european" completely oblivious of the fact that the EU
was designed specifically to rob citizens of what liberties they
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had. The only democratic "lever" at an EU level is the European

Parliament. A body who cannot propose any legislation
whatsoever and can be overruled by the European Council (a
group of unelected officials put in place by the elite) on what
few matters they are allowed to vote.
As an example, consider the fact that an unnamed bureaucrat,
EU Health and Food Safety Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis
decides to renew the license of glyphosate without conditions
despite a petition containing more than 1.4 million signatures
for banning it, a letter from 32 highly respected scientists, and
an european parliamentary vote early in April, by 374 votes in
favor to 225 votes against, to impose several restrictions on
glyphosate based on the precautionary principle. Even now
the member states refused to renew it (since those who voted
for it's renewal would have been exposed) but Mr. Andriukaitis is
pushing it through. That's only a minor but very serious examples
since glyphosate is a well known endocrine disruptor at very low
levels of exposure that is connected with diseases as diverse as
autism, birth and growth defects basically anything associated
with the endocrine system. That's just a small example. Once the
Brexit vote is over, more serious examples will come in the form
of forcing through the managed trade agreement, TTIP and TISA
as well basically stripping individuals of any semblance of
democratic rights or even property rights. But yet you think that
EU citizens are not slaves?!?
May 29, 2016 at 1:03 PM
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18.07.

Nozicks Tale of the Slave

I am a writer and philosopher

Now, lets consider Nozicks closing question: Which transition in the

to sign an employment contract with this group of people.

Archive of Public Discourse

1. A person can be obligated to do something even if, at the time he

place to do what you have consented to doing? The answer cannot be

2. A person can have enforceable obligations to others that he did not

Now the circumstance described in 2 is itself something a person

3. It is possible for a person who is not a slave nevertheless to have

Notice further that these obligations may not be merely of a negative

is only partial. That means that the Nozickian libertarian is

AristotelicoThomism and Neo

Center for Thomistic Studies

So, whatever it is about case 9 that is supposed to amount to slavery,

Thomas International Project

Major premise: Slavery is odious and nonconsensual.

Minor premise: The demands imposed on us by democratic and other

Conclusion: So demands of this sort amount to slavery.

Minor premise: The demands imposed on us by democratic and other

Conclusion: So demands of this sort amount to slavery.

Fr. Ray Blake

Fr. John Hunwicke

But as we have seen, the Nozickian libertarian is committed to

reconsider his commitment to 3 and 4, so as to be avail himself of the

Roman Theological Forum

On some alleged quantifier

Daniel Smith said...

Nozicks Tale of the Slave

On Aristotle, Aquinas, and

Meyer and fusionism

OBrien and Koons on

If teleology is inherent in nature (even if God put it there),

Singer in a state of flux

June 23, 2011 at 4:42 PM

June 23, 2011 at 4:51 PM

means when he says he rejects libertarianism because that

everydayness of life need to be taken seriously when

without help from the community/charity. There are at least a

Oh and professor Feser, I agree about Rawls. I read A Theory ...

" In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate. In

is for the common benefit" (A Theory of Justice, pg 102)

No wait that isn't quite true.

eventually, maybe even little off of the top ...

agreement and is not "obligated" to continue against their will.

slave master, or in conditions in which is nigh impossible to

had. The only democratic "lever" at an EU level is the European

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