Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato
dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for
certiorari, injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint
therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the
court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order
of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted
by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting
the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal,
Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda
Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and
Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively.
The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21,
1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus
made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee members
along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the
place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiffpetitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May
21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the
teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose
the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave
abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other
defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and
Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had
been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero
Elementary School, while Patricia Ligat (second placer in the disputed
ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before,
except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had
been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by
the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and
tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who
became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in
the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the committee
referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was
composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides
that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of
all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial
matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents
have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the
changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina
and Patricia Ligat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving
petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there
has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of
the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers'
daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which
were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings,
whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division
Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were
not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and
understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice
the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect
score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's
certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second
place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses
committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of
honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter
to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic
Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay
his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late,
there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court,
among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of
the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and,
during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from
officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils
in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to
hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for
was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said
court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set
on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same
would be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the
community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that
yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero
Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21,
with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the
petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to
dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper,
and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question
brought before the court had already become academic. This was
opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents
was granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper
and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the
Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency
of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of
certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of
discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These
allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3
alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely contending
for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores
Dalican and Patricia Ligat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once
second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times
second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third
place (grade I).
Patricia Ligat once third place (grade V); and once second place
(grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Ligat is given second place
while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is the
ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of
1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the
sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against
her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee
on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual
For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the
teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence
showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat
from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which
ratings were partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect
pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner
the word "First Place" was erased and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school
authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1.
Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the
law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly
one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of
Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for determination
was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award
of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared
that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of
judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in
literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was
reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by
schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical
competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the
College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded
to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as
members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few
verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have
sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever
presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
DESPITE:
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III.
PETITIONERS FINDING, THAT RESPONDENT VETERANS BANK
IS ENGAGED IN INSURANCE BUSINESS, IS IN ACCORD
WITH LAW.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the petition for
declaratory relief is proper.
We rule in the negative.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for
declaratory relief, viz.:
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FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970,
Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights
over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The
transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and
Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the
consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed
the performance of the vendee's obligations under the
original contract, including payment of his predecessor's
installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo
Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance
with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to
Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the
period up to, and including, the month of August 1972
and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due
thereafter Clause 17 reads:
Clause 17. SUBDIVISION
BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty
of the subdivision in line with the modern
trend of urban development, the
SELLER hereby obligates itself to
provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with
quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring
to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. The
National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance
with the provisions of this decree
(emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory
authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the
second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute
which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal
that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water systems lighting systems and
other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming
magnitude also show cases of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same
subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value . (emphasis
supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasijudicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave
abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction
when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell
between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than
a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just
noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the
Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and
under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure
that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied
the right to due process. This assertion lacks substance.
The record shows that a copy of the order denying the
Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the
complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly
served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the
annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy
indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if
it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner,
nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law
abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity
to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its
side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion
to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16
SO ORDERED.
GANCAYCO, J.:p
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local
Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the
barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of
Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed
of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents
of the Association of Barangay Councils in their
DAVAO VS COSLAP
Tinga, J.:
This is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction with temporary
restraining order to annul
the Resolution of public respondent
Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No.
98-343 and to restrain COSLAP from
enforcing the same for lack of
jurisdiction.
Subject of the instant petition is a huge
tract of land consisting of 131.2849
hectares situated at Sto. Nio, Tugbok,
Davao City, which was a portion of a
bigger landholding belonging to the late
Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged
the property to the Philippine Banking
Corporation (Bank), which, after
emerging as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its
ownership over the property and
subdivided the land into two parcels,
namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T162663; and the second, covered by TCT
No. T-162664, which is the property
subject of the instant dispute (Cuison
property).
Sometime in 1989, the government
acquired the Cuison property for
distribution to the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Among the beneficiaries were
....
SO ORDERED.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ANTONIO, J.:
In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction,
petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the
"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of
said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule
likewise provides that "all judgments determining the
merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him." These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the
registration of a mark or trade name, interference
proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark,
trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of
registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the
Patent Office.
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following
opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in
said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282,
247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267,
111, 400, 324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the
Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the
above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice
in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:
168. Original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceeding. the Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings. In the
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the
rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request
for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of
the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the
action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's
revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of
Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If
the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even
during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant
and wayward course be laid.
SO ORDERED.
xxx
xxx
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted
and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
1.THATTHEPETITIONER(DARAB),BEINGAFORMAL
PARTY,SHOULDNOTHAVEFILEDCOMMENTTOTHE
PETITIONANDINSTEAD,ITSHOULDHAVEBEENCO
RESPONDENTLANDBANK,THEFINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARYOFCARP;
2.THATPETITIONERHASNOJURISDICTIONOVERDSCA
0252WHICHISAPETITIONFORCERTIORARI;AND
3.THATWRITOFPRELIMINARYINJUNCTIONISSUEDBY
DARABINDSCA0252WASNULLANDVOIDFORHAVING
BEENISSUEDINVIOLATIONOFTHETEMPORARY
RESTRAININGORDERITISSUED.[25]
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition
for certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. [26] It is
settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance
conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are
expressly designated.[28]
Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229
and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A, the DARAB was created to
act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of
R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the
DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it
was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian
Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require
submission of reports, compel the production of books and
documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through
sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to
adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases before it.[29] Section 13
of E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its
adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices.
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure,
where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority
to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within
their assigned territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a
specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial
body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction
over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Neither the quasijudicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power
justifies such self-conferment of authority.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the
extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency.[31] The grant of
original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.
There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory
powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies,
bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class
of cases within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In
conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the
legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of
justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers
inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a
quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include
authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an
express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No.
129-A.
In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure allows a party who does not agree with the
RARADs preliminary valuation in land compensation cases
fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to bring the matter to the
proper special agrarian court, thus:
SECTION11.LandValuationandPreliminaryDeterminationand
PaymentofJustCompensation.ThedecisionoftheAdjudicatoron
landvaluationandpreliminarydeterminationandpaymentofjust
compensationshallnotbeappealabletotheBoardbutshallbe
broughtdirectlytotheRegionalTrialCourtsdesignatedasSpecial
AgrarianCourtswithinfifteen(15)daysfromreceiptofthenotice
thereof.Anypartyshallbeentitledtoonlyonemotionfor
reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this
Court affirmed the dismissal of a landowners petition for judicial
determination of just compensation for its failure to file the
petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided
under Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the
RARAD order denying its motion for reconsideration on March
26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation
with the special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is
doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus,
the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in
accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land
Banks recourse to the special agrarian court.
DARAB takes exception to the general rule that
jurisdiction over special civil actions must be expressly
conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance
thereof. It believes that this principle is applicable only in cases
where the officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof
are not within the administrative power/competence, or in any
manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing
authority.
This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ
of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the
instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the
writ of execution upon the belief that its decision had become
final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its
petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from
implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual
power of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within
the bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her
from committing grave and serious disservice to the Program.
[34]
DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it
perceived as an abuse of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own
admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors
of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts
by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative
enactments.
This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the
DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs,
but the same should be exercised within the context of
administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that the
RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions,
nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own
rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion
to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from
jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a
court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action.
Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive.
They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.[35]
While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should
not have participated in the proceedings before said court by
filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court
considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has
a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB
pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time
not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the
senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main
policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the
DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal
but also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly
considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking
an active part in the proceedings.
S.
Y.
S.
S.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing,
on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent,
competent and impartial tribunal.
SOORDERED.[4]
SOORDERED.
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial
court that Cario had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked
for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex
parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.
TheCourtisinfullaccordwithpetitionerscontentionthatRep.Act
No.4670otherwiseknownastheMagnaCartaforPublicSchool
Teachersistheprimarylawthatgovernstheconductofinvestigation
inadministrativecasesfiledagainstpublicschoolteachers,withPres.
DecreeNo.807asitssupplementallaw.Respondentserredin
believingandcontendingthatRep.Act.No.4670hasalreadybeen
supersededbytheapplicableprovisionsofPres.DecreeNo.807and
Exec.OrderNo.292.UndertheRulesofStatutoryConstruction,a
speciallaw,Rep.Act.No.4670inthecaseatbar,isnotregardedas
havingbeenreplacedbyagenerallaw,Pres.DecreeNo.807,unless
theintenttorepealoralterthesameismanifest.AperusalofPres.
DecreeNo.807revealsnosuchintentionexists,hence,Rep.ActNo.
4670stands.Intheeventthatthereisconflictbetweenaspecialanda
generallaw,theformershallprevailsinceitevidencesthelegislators
intentmoreclearlythanthatofthegeneralstatuteandmustbetaken
asanexceptiontotheGeneralAct.TheprovisionofRep.ActNo.
4670thereforeprevailsoverPres.DecreeNo.807inthecomposition
andselectionofthemembersoftheinvestigating
committee.Consequently,thecommitteetaskedtoinvestigatethe
chargesfiledagainstpetitionerswasillegallyconstituted,their
compositionandappointmentbeingviolativeofSec.9ofRep.Act.
No.4670henceallactsdonebysaidbodypossessnolegalcolor
whatsoever.
The Issues
Anentpetitionersclaimthattheirdismissalwaseffectedwithoutany
formalinvestigation,theCourt,afterconsiderationofthe
circumstancessurroundingthecase,findssuchclaim
meritorious.Althoughitcannotbegainsaidthatrespondentshavea
causeofactionagainstthepetitioner,thesameisnotsufficientreason
todetractfromthenecessityofbasicfairplay.Themannerof
dismissaloftheteachersistaintedwithillegality.Itisadismissal
withoutdueprocess.Whiletherewasasemblanceofinvestigation
conductedbytherespondentstheirintentiontodismisspetitioners
wasalreadymanifestwhenitadoptedaprocedureprovidedforby
law,byshiftingtheburdenofprooftothepetitioners,knowingfully
wellthattheteacherswouldboycotttheproceedingstherebygiving
themcausetorenderjudgmentexparte.
TheDISMISSALthereforeoftheteachersisnotjustified,itbeing
arbitraryandviolativeoftheteachersrighttodueprocess.Due
processmustbeobservedindismissingtheteachersbecauseitaffects
notonlytheirpositionbutalsotheirmeansoflivelihood.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepresentpetitionishereby
GRANTEDandallthequestionedorders/decisionsofthe
respondentsareherebydeclaredNULLandVOIDandarehereby
SETASIDE.
Thereinstatementofallthepetitionerstotheirformerpositions
withoutlossofseniorityandpromotionalrightsishereby
ORDERED.
Thepayment,ifany,ofallthepetitionersbacksalaries,allowances,
bonuses,andotherbenefitsandemolumentswhichmayhaveaccrued
tothemduringtheentireperiodoftheirpreventivesuspensionand/or
dismissalfromtheserviceisherebylikewiseORDERED.
SOORDERED.[5]
From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
raising the following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring
appellants as in default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the
proper substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A.
No. 4670, otherwise known as Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, should govern the
conduct of the investigations conducted.
rights.Asitwas,thetemporarystoppageofclassesresultingfrom
theiractivitynecessarilydisruptedpublicservices,theveryevil
soughttobeforestalledbytheprohibitionagainststrikesby
governmentworkers.TheiractbyitsnaturewasenjoinedbytheCivil
Servicelaw,rulesandregulations,forwhichtheymust,therefore,be
madeanswerable.[12]
In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the
private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which
may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already
observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the
question of due process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but
whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged
proscribed activity, their right to due process has been
violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted
out any penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable
guarantee
of
honesty
as
well
as
impartiality; and (4) a
finding by
said tribunal which
is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.[13]
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers
administrative
proceedings
involving
public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec.8.SafeguardsinDisciplinaryProcedure.Everyteachershall
enjoyequitablesafeguardsateachstageofanydisciplinaryprocedure
andshallhave:
a.therighttobeinformed,inwriting,ofthecharges;
b.therighttofullaccesstotheevidenceinthecase;
c.therighttodefendhimselfandtobedefendedbyarepresentative
ofhischoiceand/orbyhisorganization,adequatetimebeinggivento
theteacherforthepreparationofhisdefense;and
c.therighttoappealtoclearlydesignatedauthorities.Nopublicity
shallbegiventoanydisciplinaryactionbeingtakenagainstateacher
duringthependencyofhiscase.
Sec.9.AdministrativeCharges.Administrativechargesagainsta
teachershallbeheardinitiallybyacommitteecomposedofthe
correspondingSchoolSuperintendentoftheDivisionoraduly
authorizedrepresentativewhowouldatleasthavetherankofa
divisionsupervisor,wheretheteacherbelongs,aschairman,a
representativeofthelocalor,initsabsence,anyexistingprovincial
ornationalteachersorganizationandasupervisorofthe
Division,thelasttwotobedesignatedbytheDirectorofPublic
Schools.Thecommitteeshallsubmititsfindings,and
recommendationstotheDirectorofPublicSchoolswithinthirtydays
fromtheterminationofthehearings:Provided,however,Thatwhere
theschoolsuperintendentisthecomplainantoraninterestedparty,all
themembersofthecommitteeshallbeappointedbytheSecretaryof
Education.
The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of
Policy of the statute; that is, to promote the terms of
employment and career prospects of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees formed by
DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly,
these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and
a real opportunity to be heard.[14]
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9
of RA 4670, because all the teachers who were members of
the various committees are members of either the Quezon City
Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City
Elementary Teachers Federation[15] and are deemed to be the
representatives of a teachers organization as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make
them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be
usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in
said committee.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations,[16] RA 4670 is
applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by
the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it
been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on
the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be
overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in
repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as
much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve
doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence. [17] Thus, a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.[18]
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore,
reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
administrative
proceedings
involving
public
schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents right to due
process of law requires compliance with these requirements
laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court,
perceptively and correctly stated:
RespondentappellantsarguethattheMagnaCartahasbeen
supersededbytheCivilServiceDecree(P.D.No.807)andthat
pursuanttothelatterlawtheheadofadepartment,liketheDECS
secretary,oraregionaldirector,liketherespondentappellantNilo
Rosas,canfileadministrativechargesagainstasubordinate,
investigatehimandtakedisciplinaryactionagainsthimifwarranted
byhisfindings.Respondentappellantsciteinsupportoftheir
argumentthefollowingprovisionsoftheCivilServiceDecree(P.D.
No.807):
Sec.37.DisciplinaryJurisdiction.
xxxxxxxxx
b)Theheadsofdepartments,agenciesandinstrumentalitiesxxxshall
havejurisdictiontoinvestigateanddecidemattersinvolving
disciplinaryactionagainstofficersandemployeesundertheir
jurisdictionxxx.
Sec.38,.ProcedureinAdministrativeCasesAgainstNon
PresidentialAppointees.
a)AdministrativeProceedingsmaybecommencedagainsta
subordinateofficerortheemployeebytheheadofdepartmentor
officerofequivalentrank,orheadoflocalgovernment,orchiefsof
agencies,orregionaldirectors,oruponsworn,writtencomplaintof
anyotherpersons.
ThereisreallynorepugnancebetweentheCivilServiceDecreeand
theMagnaCartaforPublicSchoolTeachers.AlthoughtheCivil
ServiceDecreegivestheheadofdepartmentortheregionaldirector
jurisdictiontoinvestigateanddecidedisciplinarymatters,thefactis
thatsuchpowerisexercisedthroughcommittees.Incasesinvolving
publicschoolteachers,theMagnaCartaprovidesthatthecommittee
beconstitutedasfollows:
Sec.9.AdministrativeCharges.Administrativechargesagainsta
teachershallbeheardinitiallybyacommitteecomposedofthe
correspondingSchoolSuperintendentoftheDivisionoraduly
authorizedrepresentativewhowouldatleasthavetherankofa
divisionsupervisor,wheretheteacherbelongs,aschairman,a
representativeofthelocalor,initsabsence,anyexistingprovincial
ornationalteachersorganizationandasupervisoroftheDivision,the
lasttwotobedesignatedbytheDirectorofPublicSchools.The
committeeshallsubmititsfindings,andrecommendationstothe
DirectorofPublicSchoolswithinthirtydaysfromtheterminationof
thehearings:Provided,however,thatwheretheschool
superintendentisthecomplainantoraninterestedparty,allthe
membersofthecommitteeshallbeappointedbytheSecretaryof
Education.
Indeed,inthecaseatbar,neithertheDECS[s]ecretarynorthe
DECSNCRregionaldirectorpersonallyconductedtheinvestigation
butentrustedittoacommitteecomposedofadivisionsupervisor,
secondaryandelementaryschoolteachers,andconsultants.Butthere
wasnorepresentativeofateachersorganization.Thisisaserious
flawinthecompositionofthecommitteebecausetheprovisionfor
therepresentationofateachersorganizationisintendedbylawfor
theprotectionoftherightsofteachersfacingadministrativecharges.
ThereisthusnothingintheMagnaCartathatisinanyway
inconsistentwiththeCivilServiceDecreeinsofarasproceduresfor
investigationisconcerned.Tothecontrary,theCivilServiceDecree,
[S]ec.38(b)affirmstheMagnaCartabyprovidingthatthe
respondentinanadministrativecasemayaskforaformal
investigation,whichwaswhattheteachersdidinthiscaseby
questioningtheabsenceofarepresentativeofateachersorganization
intheinvestigatingcommittee.
Theadministrativecommitteeconsideredtheteacherstohavewaived
theirrighttoahearingafterthelatterscounselwalkedoutofthe
preliminaryhearing.Thecommitteeshouldnothavemadesucha
rulingbecausethewalkoutwasstagedinprotestagainstthe
proceduresofthecommitteeanditsrefusaltogivetheteachers
counselacopyoftheguidelines.Thecommitteeconcludedits
investigationandorderedthedismissaloftheteacherswithoutgiving
theteacherstherighttofullaccessoftheevidenceagainstthemand
theopportunitytodefendthemselves.Itspredispositiontofind
petitionerappelleesguiltyofthechargeswasinfactnotedbythe
SupremeCourtwheninitsresolutioninG.R.No.101943(Rosario
Septimov.JudgeMartinVillarama,Jr.)itstated:
Thefactsandissuesinthiscasearesimilartothefactsandissuesin
Hon.IsidroCario,etal.v.Hon.CarlosC.Ofilada,etal.G.R.No.
100206,August22,1961.
AsintheCariov.Ofiladacase,theofficialsoftheDepartmentof
CultureandEducationarepredisposedtosummarilyholdthe
petitionersguiltyofthechargesagainstthem.Infact,inthiscase
SecretaryCario,withoutawaitingformaladministrativeprocedures
andonthebasisofreportsandimpliedadmissionsfoundthe
petitionersguiltyaschargedanddismissedthemfromtheservicein
separatedecisionsdatedMay16,1991andAugust6,1991.The
teacherswenttocourt.TheCourtdismissedthecase.[19]
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard
the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It
is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide.[20]
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and
ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents
and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and
other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire
On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been
the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled
state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the
writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution
dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which
imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to
annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997 sustaining the trial courts
denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated
13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the
court a quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of
action.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA VS MOLINA
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by
Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity as President and
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance
System, or GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina
(Molina) and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In G.R. No.
157383, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated January 2, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated
March 5, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No.
174137, petitioner assails the CA Decision[3] dated December
7, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75973.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the
GSIS, received two separate Memoranda[5] dated May 23,
2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the
following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some
alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest
actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and
the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the
concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22,
2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound; and 3)
continuously performing said activities despite warning from
his immediate superiors. [6] In addition to the charge for grave
misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco
was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on
Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his
supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for
persistently disregarding petitioners instructions that Velasco
should report to the petitioners office.[7] These acts, according
to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the
confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance
of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In
the same Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to
submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours.
Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner
ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety
(90) days without pay, effective immediately.[8] The following
day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges
against respondents.
In their Answer[9] dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the
charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was
motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them
falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for
lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their
opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and
judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order.[10] They contended that the acts they
allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could
not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same
II.
Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's
subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had
rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several
inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12
November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;
2
and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's
wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its
plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater,
80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining
20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's
non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis
of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of
pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under
P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26
September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was
received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with
prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September
1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated
24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable
the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of
Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the
Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/
NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30)
days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's
petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the
xxx
Best usage
xxx
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
Station 1 Station 1
100 a) Color units 250
125
(Apparent
Color)
6- b) pH
8.5
Tempera- 40 c) Temperatur
ture in C
e
(C)
Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1
mg./1.
Suspende 75 e) Suspended
d
solids in
solids in
mg./1.
mg./1.
BOD in
80 f) BOD (5mg./1.
day)
mg./1
oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
in mg./1.
mg./1.
Detergents 5 h) Detergents
mg./1."
mg./1.
MBAS
i) Dissolved
oxygen,
mg./1.
j) Settleable
Matter,
mg./1.
k) Total Dis
solved
Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids
m) Turbidity
9.3
8.7
340
80
1,100
152
2.93
0
0.4
1.5
800
610
1,400
690
NTU /
70
ppm, SiO3
xxx
Class D
xxx
a) Color in
platinum
cobalt
units
b) pH
xxx
(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater
treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:
"Inland
Waters
(Class C & D7
Novembe Septembe
r
r
1986
1988
Report8
Report9
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
liters/daybyjustifyingthatthiswasbeingusedbythe4vehicles
issuedtohisoffice.Besideshealsoadmittedhavingsignedthe
receipts.
Respondentsactindefraudingthegovernmentofaconsiderablesum
ofmoneybyfalsifyingreceiptsconstitutesnotonlyDishonestyofa
highdegreebutalsoacriminaloffenseforMalversationthrough
FalsificationofOfficialDocuments.
Thiscommitteelikewisefindsthattherespondenthave
(sic)unliquidatedcashadvancesintheyear1989whichisin
violationofestablishedofficeandauditingrules.Hiscashadvances
totallingtoaboutP116,000.00wereproperlydocumented.The
requestsforobligationofallotmentsandthevoucherscoveringthe
amountswereallsignedbyhim.Themerecertificationissuedbythe
AdministrativeOfficeroftheDARCARcannotthereforerebutthese
concreteevidences(sic).
Onthethirdcomplaint,thiscommitteelikewisebelievesthatthe
respondentsactinrelievingthecomplainantofherfunctionsasa
RegionalCashieronDecember1,1989wasanactofharassment.It
isnotedthatthiswasdonebarelytwoweeksafterthecomplainant
filedchargesagainsther(sic).TherecommendationofJoseG.
MedinaoftheCommissiononAuditcameonlyonMay11,1990or
almostsixmonthsaftertherespondentsorderrelievingthe
complainantwasissued.Hisactinharassingasubordinateemployee
inretaliationtoacomplaintshefiledconstitute(s)GrossMisconduct
onthepartoftherespondentwhoisaheadofoffice.
TheaffidavitsofJosephInuyayandJosefinaGutingareofnohelp
totherespondent.Infact,thisonlyshow(s)thatheiscapableof
givingbribesifonlytohavethecasesagainsthimdismissed.He
couldnothavegivenacertainBenignoAquinoIIIthesum
ofP10,000.00foranyotherpurpose.
Accordingly,
the
investigating
committee
recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation,
former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V.
Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the
filing of the affidavit of desistance [11] would not prevent
the issuance of a resolution on the matter considering
that what was at stake was not only the violation of
complainants (herein private respondents) personal
rights but also the competence and fitness of the
respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He
opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call
for a punitive action against the respondent on the
initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion
for reconsideration of the findings of the Committee
with the DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra
indorsed the motion to the investigating committee.
[13]
In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member
investigating committee informed Undersecretary
Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to
act on the same (motion for reconsideration)
considering that the matter has already been
forwarded to the Office of the President and that their
authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased
when they transmitted their report to the DOJ.
[14]
Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra
informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee
could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also
prematurely filed because the Office of the President
(OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos
himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52),[16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with
forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
Thatthereceiptsweremerelyturnedovertohimbyhisdriversand
thattheauditorandaccountantoftheDARCARshouldbetheones
tobeheldliableisuntenable.Thereceiptsinquestionweresignedby
respondentforthepurposeofattestingthatthosereceiptswere
validlyissuedbythecommercialestablishmentsandwereproperly
disbursedandusedintheofficialbusinessforwhichitwasintended.
ThisOfficeisnotabouttoshifttheblameforallthesetothedrivers
employedbytheDARCARasrespondentwouldwantustodo.
The OP, however, found that the charges of
oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not
satisfactorily established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President
Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position with all the benefits accorded to him by law
and existing rules and regulations. This petition was
basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27,
1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver
of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored
the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to
petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had
no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were altered.[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for
the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he
was denied the constitutional right to counsel during
the hearing.[19] On May 19, 1994,[20] however, before
his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On
September 28, 1994,[21] Secretary Quisumbing denied
the second motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Hence,
the
instant
petition
for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal
of the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O.
No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the
payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law,
payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the
period he was dismissed from service up to the time
of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for
its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in
writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
that the committee should have suspended the
hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time
within which to secure a counsel of his own. If
suspension was not possible, the committee should
have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless
the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right
and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners
invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings
to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of
any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if
he could be held administratively liable under the law
for the complaints filed against him. The order issued
by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states
thus:
Intheinterestofthepublicserviceandpursuanttotheprovisionsof
existinglaws,aCommitteetoconducttheformalinvestigationofthe
administrativecomplaintforoppression,dishonesty,disgracefuland
immoralconduct,beingnotoriouslyundesirableandconduct
prejudicialtothebestinterestoftheserviceagainstMr.ARSENIOP.
LUMIQUED,RegionalDirector,DepartmentofAgrarianReform,
CordilleraAutonomousRegion,isherebycreatedxxx.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the
investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced
when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it
hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation
through falsification of public documents in its report
and recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the
investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued appears
to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system,
[26]
conducting criminal investigations is not its sole
function. By its power to perform such other functions
as may be provided by law, [27] prosecutors may be
called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance
with the rules therefor.
While
investigations
conducted
by
an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel,irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondents capacity to represent
himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.[28] In an
administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32,
Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 [29] (otherwise
known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292[30] (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued [31] clearly
show that he was confident of his capacity and so
opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel
is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution
No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the
Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative
Investigation stating that a respondent in an
administrative complaint must be informed of his right
to the assistance of a counsel of his choice, [32] is
inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is
applicable only to cases brought before the Civil
Service Commission.[33] Secondly, said resolution,
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen
days following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation,[34] much later than the July 1992
hearings of the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same
committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding
Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3,
1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of
his option to secure services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against
Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued
is present. The complainant is present,
Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has
just been furnished with a copy of the
counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do
you have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
RSP EXEVEA:
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
So, we will proceed with the hearing
even without your counsel? You are
willing to proceed with the hearing even
without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able
to represent yourself?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
CP BALAJADIA:
That is my concern.[35] (Underscoring
supplied)
In the course of private respondents damaging
testimony, the investigating committee once again
reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really
wish to go through with this even
without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have
been warning you to proceed with the
assistance of counsel but you said that
you can take care of yourself so we
have no other alternative but to
proceed.[36] (Underscoring supplied)
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that
we are waiting for the supplemental
affidavit you are going to present to us.
Do you have any request from the
panel
of
investigators,
Director
Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since
the lawyer I requested to assist me and
was the one who prepared my counteraffidavit is already engaged for a
hearing and according to him he is
engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why dont you engage the services of
another counsel. The charges against
you are quite serious. We are not
saying you are guilty already. We are
just apprehensive that you will go
through this investigation without a
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED
and Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the
President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
EDUARDO B. PRANGAN, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MASAGANA
SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, and/or
VICTOR C. PADILLA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Private respondent, a corporation engaged in providing
security services to its client, hired petitioner on November 4,
1980 as one of its security guards. Thereafter, he was
assigned to the Cat House Bar and Restaurant with a monthly
salary of P2,000.00 until its closure on August 31, 1993.
On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint [1] against
private respondent for underpayment of wages, non-payment
of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay
for holiday, rest day, night shift differential, uniform allowance,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year
1990 to 1993.
Private respondent, in its position paper,[2] rejected
petitioners claim alleging it merely acted as an agent of the
latter in securing his employment at the Cat House Bar and
Restaurant. Thus, the liability for the claims of the petitioner
should be charged to Cat House Bar and its owner, being his
direct employer.
In resolving the dispute in a decision dated May 31, 1995,
the Labor Arbiter brushed aside the private respondents
contention that it was merely an agent of the petitioner and
concluded:
[3]
MANAGEMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C.
CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by
some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of
Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and
some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers
cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision [1] of
the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called
Win-Win
Resolution[2] on
November
7,
1997,
substantially modifying its
earlier
Decision after
it
had already become final and executory. The said
Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to
agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44)
hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all
the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come
to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win
Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is:
What is the legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by
the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the
same subject matter, which had already become final and
executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from
the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered
by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 [3] of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation
to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease
expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
the land value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February,
1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives
to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the
subject land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR
Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992,
directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38
filed
motion
for
[33]
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in
the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals:[56]
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
RES JUDICATA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48766. February 9, 1993.]
GODELIVA S. DULAY, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party
and in his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his
Official Capacity, and ANGELES DICO, in her Private
Capacity, Respondents.
Rodrigo B. Lorenzo for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.
Bonaparte E. Terrazona, Pedro A. Gison & Artemio
Rodriguez for A. Dico.
SYLLABUS
Applicant-Appellant v.
Juan Quibete, ClaimantAppellee (Annex `F) 2
"The facts of the case are as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
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Nueva Ecija informed them that unless they gave him five
thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.
Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be
transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and
respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire
Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to
pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain
"Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give
only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to
direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When
they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued
instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.3
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CSCRO Ruling
Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July
2004,21 finding petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service, and ordered his dismissal from service.
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CA Ruling
Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision,64 denied
petitioner's appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the lettercomplaint filed by respondents that commenced the
administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was
the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The
letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO's fact-finding
investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by
the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a
certification of non-forum-shopping.65
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CSC Ruling
Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its
Resolution No. 080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC
Resolution).50 It ruled that there was no forum-shopping
committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence
existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
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Issues
Based on the submissions of both parties, the following main
issues are presented for resolution by this Court:
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xxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal. (Emphases supplied)
This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC
and the CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The
conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved
after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well
as their consideration of the evidence presented before them
and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA
must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this
Court.
We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the
service would not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In
People v. Dominguez,98 this Court had occasion to rule that
even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself suffice to
discredit a witness; the testimony of that witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the
testimonies of other witnesses must be examined for their
relevance and credibility.99 In Gomez v. GomezSamson,100 this Court echoed its previous pronouncement that
even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying as
long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others." 101
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SO ORDERED.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if
it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such
as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence.107 (Emphasis supplied)