Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COURSE OUTLINE
Atty. Marie Joyce Manongsong
2nd Semester, AY 2015-2016
Far Eastern University-Institute of Law
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COURSE OBJECTIVE: This course aims to provide guidance to students on ethical rules of behavior involving members of the
legal profession. It aims to acquaint students on usual ethical violations of lawyers and the resulting administrative liabilities based
on available rules and jurisprudence. It seeks to help students to formulate their own set of ethical standards in adjudging propriety
of certain act/s or behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
1.
The advertisement was a brazen solicitation of business from the public. The law is a profession, not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
2. Linsangan v. Tolentino
(advertisement a calling card, not clear if lawyer was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of the cards thus, court did not rule upon it)
Ambulance Chasing solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment
R.1.03 proscribes Ambulance Chasing as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty
A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in a reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) Lawyers name
(b) Name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) Address;
(d) Telephone number, and
(e) Special branch of law practice.
It is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by
the SC.
4. Re: Application for admission to the Philippine Bar v. Vicente d. Ching, Bar Matter no. 914
(Ching was not allowed to take the oath for not having chosen upon his reaching legal age, Filipino citizenship)
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the legal profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. (Canon 1, R. 1.01; Canon 16, R. 16.01)
6. In the matter of the admission to the bar and oath-taking of successful bar applicant Al C.
Argosino
(bar applicant was convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence due to the death of a person due to hazing. After conviction and sentencing, he filed
application for probation which was granted and is now asking if he could take take oath after passing the bar exam which the Court denied)
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed
to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of
them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
For Mr. Argosino to prove his Good Moral Character, he must submit to the Court (for its examination and consideration), evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of GMC through the ff. evidence:
a. Sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered.
b. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community
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at large.
In other words, Mr. Argosino must submit relevant evidence to show he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
A plenary pardon granted to respondent during the pendency of the disbarment proceedings is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint considering that an absolute pardon
obliterates the crime and effects of conviction upon which the complaint for disbarment was based.
In Re: Lontok [Effects of Absolute Pardon]
the SC held that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense." If granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity." This doctrine applies to
disbarment as well as non-disbarment cases.
8. In re: Atty. Jose Avancea, A.C. No. 407, August 15, 1967
(lawyer was given a conditional pardon by the President, he is now contending that the pardon should bar the disbarment decision against him which the Court disagrees
with.)
The conditional pardon has no effect whatsoever to the decision disbarring him from the legal profession. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had
been convicted by final judgment.
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights;
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
10. Josefina Mortel v. Aspiras, G.R. No. L-9152, December 28, 1956
(WON the dismissal based on a motion to withdraw without court order is valid and the court said yes.)
A motion to withdraw or dismiss the complaint filed before service of the answer advises the defendant of the plaintiffs desire to withdraw. It amounts, therefore, to a notice of
dismissal contemplated by Sec. 1 of Rule 30, and the matter may stand dismissed without the necessity of a court order. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice. However, a court order may subsequently be entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal without thereby throwing the matter out of the scope of
said section.
It may be stated that in this connection that we are all the more inclined to permit this new litigation, because in another expediente we have just decided, (of which we may
take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs. Aspiras), evidence has been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal had been prepared at the request
of defendant Anacleto Aspiras who promised plaintiff full support, and that there is prima facie merit to her claims for annulment and damages.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the purpose of assisting the parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
controversies without regard to technical objections that do not square with the ends of justice.
The contract is invalid. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First
Instance, constituted private practice of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as
an attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position. It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a
contract, whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered inexistent and void from the beginning.
12. Atty. Procopio s. Beltran vs. Elmo s. Abad, Bar Matter No. 139 October 11, 1984
(SC prohibited respondent, who is not yet a lawyer, from practicing law yet he still did so after the order of the SC not to.)
The actuations of respondent as shown from the foregoing constitute contempt of court that should be punished more severely considering his temerity in still continuing the
practice of law despite the decision of March 28, 1983. He is debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such a
member.
The IBP elections were annulled and the by-laws of the IBP were amended.
[Rule 6.02]
(Complainant came to respondent (a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land) to plead for help in preparing a Petition for Review and the Respondent,
seeing an opportunity, led complainant to believe he has influence and connections in the court and that it would be easy for him to help respondent. Thus, SC dismissed him
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from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
GOCCs. )
Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressing
once again that public service requires utmost integrity and the strictest discipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers
and employees, particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of dedication often even beyond personal interest.
(Atty. Macalino, as lawyer for an Insurance Co., appeared for the insured Porac Trucking as counsel in a suit for damages but he should not have done so.)
As an officer of the court, Atty. Macalino should have known better than to appear in a case on behalf of another at the mere prodding of his client.
The lawyer of the insurance company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the insured in all subsequent litigations arising from the accident.
6. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
(A legal clinic (not licensed to practice law) has an advertisement wherein the message conveyed was that Filipinos can avoid legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by going to Guam for a divorce)
Practice of Law
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law.
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
When not in practice of law:
A person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
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All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
7. Lee vs. Abastillas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994
(Lawyer admitted having bribed a judge to get a favorable decision)
Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as
bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I
considered that particular moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist," he added
Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.
Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to
come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones tasked with the
sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing
Judge Abastillas.
Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.
8. Re: Request Of National Committee On Legal Aid O Exempt Legal Aid Clients From Paying Filing,
Docket And Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009,
(The Misamis Oriental Chapter of IBP promulgated Resolution No. 24 requesting the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from
the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.)
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of
IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these
twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is
no remedy at all
(counsel of private respondents employed improper and unethical language in his pleading and motions filed before the court regarding the counsel for petitioner
describing her to be a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury
and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar. That her motive for the case was [T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the
readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco and that she is "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard," and a
"horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please
and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at
her behind her back.")
In Romero v. Valle, we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments,
both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his
use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.
3. Royong vs. Atty. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963
(complainant charged respondent lawyer with rape he got disbarred)
Contention of lawyer: he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because
he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds
upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred.
SC Answer: it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively
prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. he moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so
phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability,
as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
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(lawyer filed multiple complaints against another party whereby court found his act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait Got suspended)
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as
a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.
9. Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-23467, March 27, 1968
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An agreement that a union president should share in the attorneys fees for legal services is illegal where the union president is not a lawyer on the case.
Where the pleadings were filed by an association of two lawyers who later break-up during the pendency of the case, their fees must be shared in amounts to be determined
by the trial court.
10. Foodsphere, Inc., v Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. Gabriel vs. CA, G.R. No. L-43757-58 July 30, 1976
11. Paas v. Almarvez, A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003
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Facts
Respondent Rosario JUNO engaged the services of Atty. Salvador GRUPO for the redemption of a parcel of land registered to the name of her parents.
She entrusted Atty. GRUPO Php25K in cash to be used in the redemption of said land. Atty. GRUPOs receipt of said cash was evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt.
Petitioner GRUPO did not redeem the property which resulted to the loss of the redemption right of the client.
When she demanded for the return of the money, Atty. GRUPO did not return it without justifiable cause. He continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him.
That based on this, he did not ask for any fee. His services were then purely gratuitous and that his acts were his own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not
even charity; it was simply an act of a friend for a friend.
o
He recognizes that he failed in paying for the money he borrowed for despite the client sisters demands for the money, he could not due to circumstances provide for the
payment.
That his non-payment does not mean he will not pay for it.
Case was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Investigating Commissioner: Atty. GRUPOs liable for violation of R.16.04 of the CPR which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latters interests are
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
He failed to pay his client for money borrowed.
Due to his admission of liability recommends Atty. GRUPO to simply be REPRIMANDED and ordered to pay Php25K plus interest at legal rate.
IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved Investigating Commissioners findings with certain modifications.
Modifications:
But notwithstanding the same and his firm promise "to pay Mrs. Junio on or before January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to his creditor,
although admittedly "there w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant," worse, "the passage of time made
respondent somehow forgot about the obligation."
JUNO allowed Atty. GRUPO to borrow the money due to her acceptance of the promissory note.
What Atty. GRUPO failed to do was to give adequate security for the loan and the subsequent failure to settle his obligation.
o
2. Hilado vs. David et al, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS. "To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults
with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . ."
ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting
on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule
123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT IS SACRED. Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and
to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the
essential security in, the relation of attorney and client.
ID.; ID. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information
was received by him from his first client.
ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC POLICY. The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.
It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation
to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."
ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm.
ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces
authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and
policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand
unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration.
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. Attorneys are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the
administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their
clients.
Although he handled some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, she had also engaged the services of various counsel to represent her
in several criminal and civil cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems
and court cases.
Further, he only appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock and not as TIANAs counsel.
He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another
lawyer, and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case.
He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a document which supported her claim, over the property in question.
o
Ocampo, after going over the document, expressed his doubts about it authenticity.
o
This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months.
TIANIA didnt fulfill her obligation and to make matters worse, she sold the contested property to a 3 rd party after an alias writ of execution had been ordered to transfer the property to
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10
Mrs. Blaylock.
Further, petition herein was field 5yrs after receiving NOTICE to VACATE
AC No. 2302 (Sps ANGEL)
Sps sold their house in favor of Mrs. BLAYLOCK for Php70K.
OCAMPO acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
Sps ANGEL bought another land using money from BLAYLOCK which OCAMPO prepared the documents for.
a.
Deed of Sale
b.
Real Estate Mortgage of the property purchased from Laura DALANAN
c.
Promissory Notes (in favor of BLAYLOCK)
The Sps didnt realize the nature of the documents unitl they received a complaint naming them Defendeants in a COLLECTION SUIT filed by OCAMPO for Commercial Corp. of
Olongapo headed by BLAYLOCK
Sps were reassured by OCAMPO there was no need for them to look for a new counsel and that he will take care of everything.
Sps received NOTICE TO VACATE on basis of the 2 documents they signed when they bought the land.
SOL. GEN: charged OCAMPO with MALPRACTICE and GROSS MISCONDUCT punishable under Sec. 27 of R.138, RoC and Violation of his oath of office as an Attorney
Basis:
a) Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 11 04-0, the respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and while appearing for the same, gave advice and warnings to the defendant which
paved the way for an amicable settlement and which may have prejudiced the defendant's rights.
b) Administrative Case No. 2302
(1) Respondent while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation; also acted as counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel when he
prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot for Mrs. Angel in favor of Zenaida Blaylock, daughter of Concepcion Blaylock.
(2) Respondent, while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation, also acted as counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded to Cavite
and paid Salud Jimenez the sum of P22,000.00 for Dalanan's Kessing Property.
(3) Respondent was representing conflicting interests when he simultaneously prepared the Deed of Sale of the Kessing property in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate
Mortgage for the same property to be signed by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation.
(4) Respondent used Mrs. Angel by pretending to protect her interest as his client in Civil Case No. 2020-0, when admittedly he was only "forced to help and assist Mrs. Angel in
said case to protect the property of Mrs. Blaylock."
Issue: Was OCAMPO guilty of representing conflicting interests?
SC: guilty of MALPRACTICE and GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of he CPR (R.15.03)
Penalty Suspended from the practice of law for 1yr
Rule 15.03
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
4. B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
Facts
Reyes (deceased) filed an action for damages with CFI against Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.
TC: found Petitioner liable for damages and absolved defendants.
Petitioners counsel (law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Assoc.) timely appealed adverse decision to CA. But during the appeal, Plaintiff-Appelle Reyes died.
REYES was substituted by his heirs.
The law firm received notice to file Appellants Brief but it was not filed. It was further asked to show cause why appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file Appellants Brief but the
same was not complied with.
Thus, CA dismissed the appeal through a resolution.
The petitioner, through the firm, filed MR alleging that due to the death of their senior partner, Atty.Crispin BAIZAS, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose
Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Alberto (one who established her own law office); Further, Atty. ESPIRITU (one who handled this case in the TC and who is believed to have
also attended to the preparation of the Appellants Brief) also left the firm.
CA: denied petitioners motion to reinstate appeal dismissed for failure to file Appellants Brief
Considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-) months since counsel received copy of the resolution
requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied.
Records of the case got remanded to the court of origin of the execution.
TC: Issued a Writ of Execution wherein an Auction Sale was eventually scheduled.
Petitioner filed with CA Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was denied by the CA
Petitioner then files a case against the CA, Eulogio Reyes, Nicanor Salaysay as Provincial Sheriff and Antonio Marinas as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of
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a TRO.
Issue: WON the death of the Senior Partner is sufficient excuse for their failure to file Appellants Brief which is the reason for the denial of their MR.
SC: NO, the death of the senior partner is not a sufficient excuse. It was the firm, not the senior partner, who was counsel of petitioner. What happened was there was simple negligence
on the part of petitioners counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.
As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief but it failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it.
Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the
reglementary period but petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also
received. Then, later, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution. Nothing more was heard from
petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for
the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief.
With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file
Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner
could contract the services of a new lawyer.
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10. PNB vs. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
11. Pasay Law And Conscience Union, Inc vs. Atty. Paz, A. M. No. 1008 January 22, 1980
12. Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123810. January 20, 1999
13. Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa vs. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
104600 July 2, 1999
14. Del Rosario vs. CA, G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994
15. Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991
16. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA , G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
17. Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc vs. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
18. Law firm of Armovit vs. Gines, G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991
19. Aro vs.Naawa, G.R. No. L-24163, April 28, 1969
20. Miranda v. Carpio, A. C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
CANON 1, NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
14
4. Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Edmundo T. Acua, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July 28,
2005
5. Dawa vs. Judge Asa, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144. July 22, 1998
6. Padilla vs. Zantua, A.M. No. MTJ-93-888 October 24, 1994
7. J. King & Sons vs. Hontanosas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004
8. Macias vs. Araula, Adm. Matter. No. 1895-CFI July 20, 1982
9. Carual vs. Brusala, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999
Cases:
1. Villanueva v. Judge Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, November 22, 2010
2. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-072063/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066. June 26, 2009,
3.
Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2026. March 4, 2009,
4.
Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014. March 4, 2009,
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Lawyers
Study Rule 139-B
Cases:
1. Aludo, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006
2. Fortun v. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013
3. Lahm v. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012
B. Judges, Justices
Study Rule 140
Cases:
15
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