Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
(Sgd.)
WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA
Acting Presiding Judge 1
EN BANC
PUNO, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10 which imposed the penalty of death on accusedappellant, Pedro Malabago y Villaespin, in Criminal Case No. 6598, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Pedro Malabago guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined and penalized
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. With reluctance and a
heavy heart therefore, inspired by the personal feeling and view of the
undersigned with respect to the wisdom of the penalty of death for any
crime, the court finds itself with no other alternative but to impose the
penalty provided for by the express mandate of the law which is now
restored under Republic Act No. 7659. The accused (Pedro Malabago y
Villaespin) is hereby sentenced to DEATH for the terrible crime he has
committed and, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P50,000.00 conformable to the recent jurisprudence on the matter
(People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643).
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DIPOLOG CITY, Philippines, this 10th day of May 1994.
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parricide considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as demonstrated by:
(b) The prosecution's failure to prove the fact and cause of death;
The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994 convicted
accused-appellant of parricide and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659.
Before us appellant assigns the following errors:
I
The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an
unconstitutional penalty for being violative of fundamental human rights
and is, thus, null and void.
II
The judgment of conviction is null and void for having been rendered by a
trial court ousted of jurisdiction because of the grave violations of the
appellant's rights to due process committed by no less that the presiding
2
judge himself as shown by his conduct at trial.
III
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of
jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant of
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(c) The prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody over the
alleged instrument of death;
IV
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of
jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant when
it arbitrarily and selectively gave full weight and credence only to
Guillerma Romano's inculpatory but inconsistent and inadmissible
testimony and disregarded her exculpatory statements.
V
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of
jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in peremptorily dismissing the
appellant's defense of alibi as inherently weak.
VI
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the
trial court nevertheless gravely erred in appreciating the existence of
treachery as an aggravating and qualifying circumstance.
VII
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the
trial court nevertheless gravely erred in refusing to consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant, despite the
prosecution's failure to contradict and challenge the appellant's claim of
this mitigator.
VIII
Assuming without conceding that it was not ousted of jurisdiction, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in awarding civil indemnity arising from
the death of Letecia Malabago considering that the prosecution failed to
prove said death as a fact during trial. 10
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A I thought it was a slap on the face but she was hit by a bolo.
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. 13 In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to. 14
Guillerma Romano testified on direct examination that:
PROSECUTOR MAH:
Q On January 5, 1994 at about 7:00 in the evening, can you still recall
where you were at that particular time?
A I was in my store.
Q While you were in your store at that particular time and date, can you
still remember if there was an unusual incident [that] happened?
A Yes, sir.
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Q How many times did the suspect hack his wife, Letecia R. Malabago?
A Twice, hitting the victim on the right side of her face and on the neck
resulting in her instantaneous death.
Q But then you were legally married by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor
Barinaga?
A Yes, your honor.
Appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the fact and
cause of Letecia's death because Dr. Dominador Celemin, the City Health
Officer who signed the death certificate, did not personally examine her
cadaver. 20 It is contended that the content of the death certificate issued
by Dr. Celemin is hearsay. 21
Letecia's death certificate is not the only proof of her death. Guillerma, in
her affidavit, stated that her daughter died as a result of the hack
wounds. 22 Called also as a hostile witness for the defense, she testified:
COURT
A Yes, sir.
Q Who solemnized the marriage?
Q At that time, you actually saw the accused hacked (sic) the bolo to (sic)
your daughter?
Q When?
Q In fact, you witnessed the blood oozing on the face of your daughter?
Q And the cause of death of your daughter was the hacking of Pedro
Malabago?
Accused-appellant also claims that the trial court showed partiality to the
prosecution by unduly interfering in the presentation of evidence. By
asking questions, the judge allegedly elicited prejudicial admissions from
witnesses without affording appellant's counsel the right to examine them
on their answers to the court, in violation of appellant's constitutional right
to due process and right against self-incrimination. 25
The records disclose that the questions the trial judge propounded were
made mainly to clarify what the prosecution and defense witnesses had
testified on direct and cross examinations. The essential elements of the
crime of parricide like appellant's marriage to Letecia, the cause of
Letecia's death and appellant's participation therein were facts already
established by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. Using his
discretion, the trial judge questioned the witnesses to clear up obscurities
in their testimonies and sworn statements. 26 The wise use of such
discretion cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
A judge is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.
He may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite
and prevent unnecessary waste of time 27 and clarify obscure and
incomplete details after the witness had given direct testimony. 28 After all,
the judge is the arbiter and he ought to satisfy himself as to the respective
merits of the claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands
of due process. 29 In the case at bar, the trial judge had strong reasons to
question the material witnesses who executed affidavits of desistance
contradicting their previous stance. If to the mind of the parties, the trial
judge was unduly interfering in their presentation of evidence, they were
free to manifest their objection. They were likewise free to ask redirect
questions from their witness after interrogation by the trial court. In the
instant case, however, they never manifested that the questions of the
trial judge had traversed the allowable parameters. Even assuming that
some of the questions were incriminating, we cannot hold that the
witnesses were compelled to incriminate themselves. The records show
they answered the questions of the court freely and voluntarily and
without any objection from their respective counsels.
The prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma
Romano. Nonetheless, her testimony is clear, spontaneous and
We agree with the trial court that appellant's defense of alibi is weak and
unconvincing. Appellant was positively identified as the one who hacked
his wife to death. Moreover, it was not physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime on that fateful evening. The poblacion of Dipolog
City is merely four kilometers from Barangay Gulayon and this distance
may be traversed within a few minutes by motorized vehicle. 33
Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be present, two
conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which
would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory
acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and
(b) the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender. 34 It is true that appellant hacked his
wife who was then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend herself.
However, the evidence does not show that appellant deliberately and
consciously employed this particular mode of attack to ensure the killing
of the victim. The unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked his
wife in the midst of a sudden, unscripted heated argument. This
precludes the idea that appellant priorly planned to kill his wife. Indeed,
appellant was not carrying his bolo at that time. The bolo was hanging in
its usual place on one of the posts of the sari-sari store. 35 Treachery, to
be appreciated, must spark an attack that is deliberate, sudden and
unexpected not where it is prefaced by an unforeseen heated
6 argument
with the victim standing face to face with her assailant. 36
The trial court also erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. In answer to questions by the trial court, appellant
declared:
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assault. In People v. Cruz (213 SCRA 611), we held that there was
treachery if the commission of the crime was sudden and unexpected
even if the armed attack was made face to face. Thus, under the
circumstances, the victim was clearly not in any position to defend himself
to the unreasonable and unexpected attack of the accused-appellant.
There was also, in my view, no voluntary surrender on the part of
accused-appellant as to entitle him to the mitigating circumstance on this
score. He did not voluntarily surrender. He was fetched by the police
authorities in the house of Dodong Opulentisima. In People
v. Flores, 2 the Court stated:
Neither can we accept accused-appellant's plea of voluntary surrender.
He did not surrender to the police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows
that it was the police authorities who came to the factory looking for him.
It was there that accused-appellant was pointed to them. Seeing that the
police was already approaching him, accused-appellant did not offer any
resistance and peacefully went with them. With the police closing in,
accused-appellant actually had no choice but to go with them. To be sure,
no surrender was made by accused-appellant.
By this senseless and brutal killing of his wife, the mother of his three (3)
children, accused-appellant, in my opinion, has lots the right to live.
Society will be far better off without him around. While compassion is, in
itself, a virtue, it cannot and should not replace justice under the law, in
this particular case, justice to the victim and her three (3) orphaned
children.
PEOPLE vs PEDRO MALABAGO y VILLAESPIN
Facts:
a.
b.
c.
The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994
convicted accusedappellant of parricide and sentenced him to
death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659.
Guillerma turned away but heard the couple's altercation over money
and appellant's jealousy of someone.
e.
Guillerma heard Letecia cried out "Agay. She saw Letecia's face
bloodied with a slash along her right ear. Appellant was facing
Letecia, and with a bolo in his hand, struck her again, this time hitting
the lower left side of her face, from the lips down to the neck. Letecia
fell to the ground. Guillerma rushed towards her daughter and
shouted for help. She was lifeless.
g.
d.
f.
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That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH
gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a
consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO
and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death
of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their
death.
xxx xxx xxx
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo,
Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for
the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
9
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing
the
penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or
not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance
therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue
with the case by way of an appeal.
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to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not
leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the
residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his
residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley
Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The
accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the
house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30
p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at
V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He
proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley
Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh
was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp.
34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29,
tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized
and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17,
1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not
able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the
same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the
dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
10
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It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the
above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants
a privilege or benefit amounting practically to an exemption from an
adequate punishment to a legally married person or parent who shall
surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused who
would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide,
murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is
intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment.
(People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than
serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned
therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to
result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral
elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to
plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an
interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much
less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the
crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense"
should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance
which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not
being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of
defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil.,
368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when
we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was
found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering
crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that
as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a
distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does
not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious
physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the
physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who
were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The
Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder
against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense,
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the
Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable
for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was
not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased.
Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.
12 We cannot
therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free
from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be
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entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased,
he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is not enough
a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados.
We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him
liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The
records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and onehalf months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to
the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in
confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate
estimating her recovery period.)
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore
impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver
penalty (than destierro).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months
of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement
shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore
ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00
as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement
as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this
case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught
his wife with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct
by-product of Abarcas rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death
of Koh.
People of the Philippines vs Francisco Abarca
153 SCRA 742 Criminal Law Crimes Against Persons Article 247
Death Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife
having sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca
residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh
grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca,
armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually
stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the adjacent
room. These two other persons survived due to timely medical
intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime
of murder with frustrated double murder.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other
persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for
frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other
two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when he was
firing his gun at Koh it being under Art. 247. Abarca was however
negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical
injuries through simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two
other persons who were in the adjacent room when the incident
happened.
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Legal Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his
criminal liability?
Legal Facts
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte
Philippines, the accused Francisco Abarca went to the bus station and
travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in the morning.
Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to catch
the trip plus the engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his
fathers house, and then later went home. When he reaches home the
accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley
Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her wife
push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the builtin cabinet in their room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the
PC soldiers house to where he got the M-16 rifle. The accused lost his
wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to a
mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh with
several bullets on his different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley
Kohs instantaneous death. By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had
inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr. Amparados one
and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious
hospitalization and the latters wife who had slighter physical injuries from
the incident. The RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with
double Frustrated Murder and must indemnify the Amparado Spouses
and Heirs of Kho.
RULING: The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro
to arresto mayor from the lower court sentencing four months and 21
days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado spouses for
expenses and damages.
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado
couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the
consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done amounts
to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility
performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot
be entirely without fault. It appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him
for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution
which
14
should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence,
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will; nonetheless, the Court finds negligence on his part. He is liable
under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is less serious
physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the
separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the
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15
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some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY PEACE OFFICERS WHEN MAKING
ARREST AND WHEN CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. In Morales vs.
Enrile, in the light of the said Section 20, prescribed the procedure to be followed by peace
officers when making an arrest and when conducting a custodial investigation. Thus: "7. At
the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the reason arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation
of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHRASE "RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF SUCH RIGHTS" EXPLAINED;
CASE AT BAR. In People vs. Nicandro, this Court declared that one's right to be informed
of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." Thus, is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the
person under investigation the provisions of section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects
of such provision in practical terms e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may
not do - and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right "to be informed" carries
with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject's understanding of what
is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence and
other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In further
ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he
should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask
for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his request. If he decides
not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore,
chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be
made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. . . . the kind of "advice"
proffered by the unidentified interrogator belongs to that stereotyped class a long
question by the investigator informing the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic
16
answer which this Court has condemned for being unsatisfactory. The investigator
gave
his advice perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner, obviously to pay mere lip service to the
prescribed norms. As this Court observed in People vs. Newman, this stereotyped "advice":
" . . . has assumed the nature of a 'legal form' or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding
on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up
of a right is missing."
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DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder
with Arson in a criminal complaint 1 filed on 24 March 1986 with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the
Province of Negros Oriental for having allegedly killed the spouses
Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and
for having burned the said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a
consequence of such fire, the spouses' other daughter, Manolita, was
burned to death.
On 31 March 1986, the MCTC issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused; no bail was recommended. 2 It appears, however, that the
accused had earlier been apprehended on 6 March 1986 by elements of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Civilian Home Defense Forces
(CHDF) and were detained at the Pamplona municipal jail.
On 15 April 1986, the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation
3 which prompted the MCTC, the following day, to order the clerk of court
to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. 4
Meanwhile, on 14 August 1986, the Integrated National Police (INP)
Station Commander of Pamplona amended the complaint by including
therein the name of another victim, Manolo Toting, who suffered second
and third degree burns because of the burning of the house. 5
On 11 December 1986, the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental an
Information for Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson 6
against the accused. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
xxx xxx xxx
"That on or about March 4, 1986, at sitio Tigbao, Barangay Banawe,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and acting in common accord, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stab and hack with the use of a
bolo and sickle, with which the accused were then respectively armed
and provided, one ZOSIMO TOTING, SR., thereby inflicting upon the
victim hack wound, neck posterior area 5" long, 3" depth, hack
17 wounds,
left upper back 3" long, 4" depth, stab wound, thru and thru, lower
abdomen, 4" width , exit lower back 1" width, 90% 2nd and 3rd degree
burns of the body, and which wounds caused the death of said Zosimo
Toting, Sr., immediately thereafter; one BEATRICE TOTING, thereby
inflicting upon the victim hacking (sic) wound, neck posterior area, 5"
long, 6" depth, incised wound, epigastric area 11" long, 4" depth,
CRIM2
exposing vital organs, lower abdomen, 11" long, 4" depth exposing
intestines, 90% 2nd and 3rd degree burns of the body, and which wounds
caused the death of said Beatrice Toting immediately thereafter; one
BOMBIE TOTING, thereby inflicting upon the victim infected hack wound
from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid-abdomen, inguial area
left to the medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic transected
muscle, and which wounds caused the death of said Bombie Toting
shortly thereafter; and in order to cover-up the heinous crime committed,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
acting in common accord, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously set to fire the house of the aforesaid victim (sic) spouses
Zosimo Toting, Sr. and Beatrice Toting, thereby razing it to the ground,
and as a consequence thereto MANOLITA TOTING suffered Third degree
burns, all burn (sic) body, head, extremities or 100% burns, and which
wounds caused the death of said Manolita Toting immediately thereafter
and also causing injuries to MANOLO TOTING, to wit: 20% 2nd and 3rd
degree burns on the upper extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder, left and
back, and which wounds would have caused the death of victim Manolo
Toting, thus performing all the overt acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator,
that is, the timely medical assistance extended to said Manolo Toting
which prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Articles 6, 48 and 50 of the Revised
Penal Code."
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7411 and was raffled off to
Branch 40 of the said court.
After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on
23 February 1987, 7 trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented Dr. Edgardo Barredo, MCTC Judge Teopisto Calumpang,
Jaime Saguban, Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao, Dr. Edgar Gantalao and Dr.
Lucio Togonon as its witnesses for the evidence in chief, and Judge
Calumpang and Elpedio Catacutan in rebuttal; for its surrebuttal, Pfc.
Urbano Cavallida was presented. On the other hand, the accused
testified for the defense together with witnesses Joven Lopez and
Maxima Basay. Accused Ramirez took the witness stand again in
surrebuttal.
(2) Beatrice Toting, hack wound, neck posterior are . . . incised wound,
epigastric area . . . exposing vital organs, lower abdomen . . . exist (sic)
lower back, 90% second and third degree burns of the body;
(3) Bombie Toting, inflicted hack wound from the anterior lumbar area
transecting mid-abdomen, inguial area left to the medial thigh left, through
and through, with necrotic transected muscle;
The prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder With Arson
against accused Jaime Ramirez (sic), this Court finds him GUILTY to (sic)
said crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as his civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED." 9
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is
summarized in detail in the trial court's decision and is further condensed
in the Appellee's Brief 10 as follows:
"On March 6, 1986, Zosimo Toting Jr. reported to the Nabalabag
Philippine Constabulary Patrol at Pamplona, Negros Oriental, that his
parents had been killed and their house at Tigbaw, [Pamplona] Negros
Oriental, burned. This prompted PC Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao, Sgt.
Nestorio Rubia, Jaime Saguban and three members of the Civilian Home
Defense Force to go to Tigbaw, [Pamplona] Negros Oriental, to
investigate the incident (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 5).
Upon arriving at Tigbaw, they found a burned house and several dead
bodies. The trial court identified the four (4) fatalities and their injuries as
follows:
18
(1) Zosimo Toting, Sr., with hack wound neck, posterior area, . . . hack
wound, left upper back . . . stab wound, through and through, lower
abdomen, . . . 90% second and third degree burns of the body;
CRIM2
(4) Manolita Toting, third degree burns, all burned body, head, extrimities
(sic) or 100% burns;
Manolo Toting did not die but suffered 20% second and third degree
burns on the upper extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder, left and back
(Records, p. 213).
Zosimo Toting, Sr, Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting
were found near the vicinity of the burned house. About forty (40) meters
away, the investigating officers found six year old Bombie Toting suffering
from serious hack wounds (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18). The young girl
said that she had been in this condition for one and a half days already.
Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00
o'clock in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents
and burned their house (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18, Records, p. 9).
On the same day the investigating officers went to the appellant's house.
They saw appellant fixing the roof of his house and when appellant saw
them, he went down and tried to ran (sic) away (TSN, January, 20, 1988,
p. 22). Appellant was turned over to the Pamplona Police Station (TSN,
January 20, 1988, p. 25).
Bombie Toting was brought to the hospital but due to the gravity of her
injuries she died on March 7, 1986 at 1:40 P.M. (Records, p. 12, Exhibit I).
Appellant was brought into the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang,
the municipal circuit trial judge of Pamplona, Amlan, and San Jose, on
March 14, 1986. He was accompanied by Mr. Elpedio Catacutan who
acted as appellant's counsel (TSN, June 6, 1988, p. 6). They brought with
them an affidavit previously typed by a police investigating officer. The
Judge then made the court interpreter translate the allegations of the
sworn statement into the local dialect for appellant (TSN, June 6, 1988).
his claim that he had only finished Grade II and that he does not know
how to read. He, however, understands the Cebuano dialect. 14
The Exhibit "F" referred to above is the Sworn Statement, 15 in English,
of accused Jaime Ramirez taken in the Pamplona police station on 7
March 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on 14 March 1986 before
Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang of the MCTC of Pamplona-Amlan-San
Jose. The trial court described this document as the Extra-Judicial
Confession 16 of Ramirez.
The Joint Waiver (Exhibit "G") mentioned the testimony of Jaime Ramirez
is in the Cebuano dialect and was signed by accused Basay and Ramirez
on 7 March 1986. Both accused state therein that for their safety and
security, they voluntarily decided to be detained and that they killed the
spouses Zosimo Toting and Betty Toting and thereafter burned the
spouses' house; this fire resulted in the death of one and the
hospitalization of two Toting children. 17
The trial court disregarded this Joint Waiver insofar as it tended to
incriminate the accused "because when they signed said Joint Waiver,
they were not represented by counsel;" thus, the same was prepared in
violation of "Section 12, Article 3 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution." 18 There being no other evidence against Basay, the trial
court acquitted him. However, it admitted in evidence the so-called extrajudicial confession of Jaime Ramirez, considered as part of the res gestae
the alleged statement given by Bombie Toting to PC Sgt. Reynaldo
Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying Ramirez and Basay as the
perpetrators of the crime and considered as flight which is indicative of
guilt Ramirez's running away when he saw the law enforcers on 6
March 1986. It further ruled that the latter signed the extra-judicial
confession voluntarily and in the presence of Elpedio Catacutan, the
COMELEC registrar of Pamplona "a barister (sic) who appeared as
counsel for accused Jaime Ramirez;" hence it is admissible against the
latter. 19
On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of Bombie
Toting as a dying declaration but merely as part of the res gestae
because the prosecution failed to prove two (2) of the requisites for the
admissibility of a dying declaration, viz., that the statement was given
under consciousness of an impending death and that Bombie Toting is a
competent witness. 20
ANSWER Yes.
1. Question If so, please state your name, age and other personal
circumstances?
CRIM2
Q You are also informed that whatever statement you may offer in this
investigation it (sic) might be used as evidence in your favor or against
you in the future, do (sic) you aware of this this (sic)?
A Yes.
Q After you have informed (sic) of your rights are you willing to
proceed with this investigation of yours even if you have no counsel of
your own choice that will assist you in this investigation?
A Yes. I don't need any counsel in this investigation because I will just
tell the truth.
21
CERTIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have personally examined the affiant and that I
am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit.
CRIM2
not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the
former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms
e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do - and in a
language the subject fairly understands. The right "to be informed" carries
with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the
subject's understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension
that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence and other
relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is
informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the
same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or
that one could be provided him at his request. 35 If he decides not to
retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid
and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel. 36 That
counsel must be a lawyer. 37
The foregoing pronouncements are now synthesized in paragraphs 1 and
3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"SECTION 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
The adjectives competent and independent, which qualify the kind of
counsel an accused is entitled to during investigation, were not found in
the previous Constitution. Their incorporation in the 1987 Constitution
was thus meant to stress the primacy of this right to counsel.
" . . . Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however,
the Court must be cautious in appreciating said testimony where the
person had a serious wound and had not eaten for one day and one
night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as
to who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own
brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and
Jaime Ramirez who killed her parents and her brother and sisters and
burned their house. . . . The Court cannot understand why P.C. Sgt.
Tabano did not ask Bombie Toting questions concerning the commission
of the crime by the accused. Neither did the P.C. or (sic) the police take
any statement from her on her way to the hospital or at the hospital.
Surprisingly, Bombie Toting did not even tell her own brother, Zosimo
Toting, Jr. that it was the accused who committed the crime. Had the
statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to the barangay
captain or to any reputable member of the community where the incident
happened, the Court will have to put weight and consider her statement
as a dying declaration. Our experience has shown that persons in
authority are prone to fabricate or misrepresent the facts to serve their
own purpose. Innocent people had been charged in Court simply by the
false statements of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be cautious
when these peace officers testify in Court." 49
In the second place, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial
court completely disregarded Bombie Toting's so-called statement as
against Teodoro Basay. We therefore see neither rhyme nor reason for
the trial court's admission of the same as against the appellant.
3. While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the
armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them. This act should
not be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt. The appellant
had not left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime
was committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the
intention to flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner
and should not have remained in his house. Besides, if indeed his running
away could be construed as flight, it could only be considered as
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be insufficient for a
conviction. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in order that
circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction, there must, inter alia,
be more than one (1) circumstance. No other circumstance was
established in this case.
Hence, the appellant's guilt was not established with moral certainty. He
should be acquitted.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 112620-21. May 14, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOLI
PAGAL y LAMQUI and ADOLFO LAMQUI y
NATIVIDAD, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before this Court comes a case replete with all the elements of a
blockbuster action movie: Violence, motives and alibis. The law in
dispensing justice is, however, constrained to detach itself from
sensationalism and, instead, look at the facts dispassionately as
presented and proven in a court of law.
This is an appeal from the decision dated September 23, 1993, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51,
convicting accused Noli Pagal and Adolfo "Boy" Lamqui of the crimes of
murder and attempted murder and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua and imprisonment of two years, ten months and twenty days
of prision correcional, as minimum, to eight years and twenty days
of prision mayor, as maximum, respectively.
The two cases were initially filed before the RTC of Lingayen as
Criminal Case No. L-4253, for murder, and Criminal Case No. L-4252 for
frustrated murder. Upon motion of the prosecution, the cases were later
transferred to the Tayug RTC and respectively re-docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. T-1086 and 1061.
The relevant facts gathered from the records follow:
the gunmen were at the right side of the victims is belied by the gunshot
wounds located in front of the bodies of the victims, indicating a face-toface encounter.[14] Medrano, however, testified that accused-appellants
were already firing at him and Rebujio from a distance of three meters
while on board the moving motorcycle. [15] That they were moving targets
would explain the different locations of the wounds in their bodies.
SO ORDERED."[8]
We disagree.
To begin with, the adverse presumption arising from suppression of
evidence is not applicable when the evidence is merely corroborative or
cumulative and/or likewise available to the defense, as in the case at bar.
[16]
Furthermore, there is no suppression of evidence to speak of insofar
as the ballistic examination of Pagal's firearm is concerned. The
prosecution has established, and Pagal has admitted, that he is a
member of the CAFGU and was issued an armalite rifle with serial
number 629161. Exhibit "E" for the prosecution is the original of the
memorandum receipt dated March 21, 1989, showing the issuance to Noli
Pagal of one U.S. rifle 7.62 MN M14 with serial number 629161. Exhibit
"F" is NBI Forensic Chemistry Report No. C-90-388 in regard to a
specimen known as one M14 armalite rifle with serial number 629161
submitted on April 10, 1990, and indicating the following findings:
"Chemical and microscopic examinations conducted on the abovementioned firearm showed the presence of soot, black particles and
nitrates. Test firing showed that the firearm could have been fired more
than two (2) weeks prior to the date of examination on April 11, 1990." [17]
Lastly, accused-appellants assail the admission by the court of
Rebujio's statement as his dying declaration when such was not given
under the consciousness of an impending death.
This argument is off-tangent and without basis.
The record does not show that the trial court considered the
statement of Rebujio as a dying declaration. In fact, it was expressly
disqualified as such and was instead admitted as part of the res gestae,
as sanctioned by Section 36 (now Section 42), Rule 130 of the Rules of
CRIM2
The evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand, is solid and
convincing. Medrano was not only an eyewitness to the incident but was
a victim himself. He has categorically identified accused-appellants as
those who staged the ambush because he saw their faces clearly when
he slowed down to avoid a road obstruction which, in all probability, was
deliberately placed by the latter who were crouching in the canal on the
left side of the road before splattering their victims with a volley of gunfire.
[24]
At a distance of approximately three meters only, it is not impossible
for a man of clear eyesight to positively identify persons at such range
especially in broad daylight, persons who are not casual acquaintances
but kinfolk and former business partners of the victims.
The testimony of Medrano is supported by the physical evidence and
the separate testimonies of Dr. Bulosan, Rebujio's widow, and Pat.
Arciaga. The ante-mortem statement, admitted in evidence as part of
the res gestae, further revealed that the late Rebujio named one of the
assailants as "Boy" Lamqui, which was never disputed by the defense
throughout the entire proceeding, hence, proving familiarity between
accused-appellants and their victims.
The Court agrees with the trial court that for the death of Rebujio,
accused-appellants are guilty of murder. The allegations of treachery,
evident premeditation, and craft charged in the information were duly
proved by the prosecution and never refuted by the defense. The court
a quo also correctly convicted them for attempted murder of Paquito
Medrano, instead of frustrated murder as charged in the information,
because the injuries sustained by Medrano were merely superficial and
not capable of causing his death even without timely medical intervention.
No mortal wound having been inflicted upon the victim, the offenders
failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the
felony. They are, therefore, guilty only of attempted murder.[25]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification as to the award of moral damages which is hereby
reduced to P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. T-1061 and to P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. T-1086.
SO ORDERED.
March 1, 2001
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERT NUEZ y LAGASCA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision1 dated May 26, 1993, of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, convicting appellant of the
crime of qualified illegal possession of firearms, sentencing him to life
imprisonment, and ordering him to pay the costs.
The facts are as follows:
29
CRIM2
The victims were brought to the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital for
treatment. Teofilo Pacquing5 reported the incident to the police. SPO1
Ernesto C. Gancea, a member of the Investigation and Intelligence
Operations of the Philippine National Police (PNP) investigated the
incident. Teofilo Pacquing informed him that it was appellant who fired at
them. Thereafter, SPO1 Gancea, accompanied by PO3 Asterio
Dismaya, and SPO1 Henry R. Kang proceeded to the scene of the
incident. When they arrived at appellant's house, SPO1 Gancea talked
to appellant who readily admitted that he was the one who shot Pacorza.
SPO1 Kang recovered a caliber .22, long rifle, "Squibman," model 116
MK with serial no. A-320554 with telescope from appellant. When asked
for the permit for the firearm, appellant could not produce any. Appellant
was thereafter brought to the Urdaneta Police Station for investigation. He
refused to give any statement to the police. The incident was entered in
the police blotter by desk officer Romulo Dutong.6
For the shooting of Almendrez and Pacquing and the death of Pacorza,
appellant was charged under four (4) separate Informations for (1)
homicide, (2) frustrated homicide, (3) frustrated homicide and (4) illegal
possession of firearms docketed as Criminal Case No. U-6449. The
cases were raffled to the different branches. Only the Illegal Possession
of Firearms case is before us.
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms reads: 7
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1992, at barangay Palina Sur,
municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody one (1) Caliber .22 Rifle 116MK, bearing Serial No.
A320554, with trademark "Kassnar Squibman" and with magazine and
nine (9) live ammunition, without first securing the necessary permit or
license from lawful authorities, which said firearm was used by the
accused in the commission of the crime of homicide and double frustrated
homicide against the persons of Calixto Pacursa (sic), Jerry Armendez
30
(sic) and Teofilo Pacquing.
CONTRARY to Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, June 16, 1992.
CRIM2
tree, then the six men left the place boarding on the same tricycle and
proceeded towards the west. In the afternoon between 3:00 and 4:00
o'clock of the same date, while he is unloading tobacco leaves, Gerry
Almendrez and his companions came back and they shouted at him and
he heard one gunshot so he ran inside the compound where his
grandfather's house were being constructed and that was then the time
that Cesar Celeste and Juanito Nuez went to town to report the said
incident.
Calixto Pacursa armed with a .38 caliber met the accused-appellant so he
ran towards the house of his aunt Magdalena Celeste and hide (sic)
inside the bathroom since Calixto Pacursa continued chasing him. When
Calixto Pacursa was about to go the second floor, he saw the .22 caliber
that was placed on top of the bed of Cesar Celeste and he got the said
firearm and when he went out he was still holding the .38 caliber and at
the same time holding the .22 caliber firearm. When the accusedappellant saw Calixto Pacurza tucked his .38 caliber firearm in his waist
and loaded the .22 caliber rifle that was the time accused-appellant went
out from the bathroom and grappled with Calixto Pacurza and the
accused-appellant was able to retrieve the subject firearm from Calixto
Pacurza. The accused-appellant move two steps backward but Calixto
Pacurza drew his .38 caliber firearm from his waist and that was the time
that accused-appellant fired the .22 caliber rifle at Calixto Pacurza. The
accused-appellant and Gerry Almendrez had a misunderstanding
because the former noticed that some parts of the motorcycle driven by
the latter had been replaced.
The testimony of herein accused-appellant were corroborated by
Salvador Paz, a laborer in the on-going construction of the house of
Alvaro Nuez, and Eugene Nuez, who at that time were inside the
kitchen of Magdalena Celeste, the former was pouring hot water in a
thermos while the latter went inside the kitchen to light his cigarette.
Cesar Celeste declared that he is the owner of the subject firearm and he
brought outside the said firearm when Teofilo Pacquing and his
31
companions arrived and stoned the houses in their compound.
And
before he and Juanito Nuez went to town to report to the police
authorities, he left the licensed firearm on top of his bed. He applied a
license to possess the firearm through First Continental Co., Inc., and had
paid the firearm bond.
CRIM2
appellant, and it was SPO1 Kang who got the rifle from appellant. SPO3
Dismaya, however, testified that appellant was actually in the yard when
they arrived and that appellant was the one who got the rifle from the
house and handed it to SPO2 Kang. SPO2 Kang testified during direct
examination that it was appellant who gave him the gun, but during
rebuttal, he said that it was one of appellant's cousins who handed to him
the gun.
In support of his third assignment of error, appellant claims that it was
error for the trial court to shift the burden of proof to the defense when he
invoked self-defense.
In support of his fourth assignment of error, appellant contends that his
alleged "extrajudicial confession" to SPO1 Gancea is inadmissible since
he was not assisted by counsel at the time it was made. Further, the rifle
was seized without a search warrant and therefore, inadmissible in
evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, points out that it is
of no moment who among the responding policemen received the fatal
weapon. What is important is that he admitted possession of the firearm
at the time the victim was shot. His conviction was based not on his
alleged "extrajudicial confession," but on his admissions in open court.
The rifle was not seized from appellant, but was surrendered by him to
the policemen.
Simply put, the issues pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of
witnesses, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of
the crime charged.
It is well-settled that, generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the
judgment of trial courts in passing upon the credibility of the witnesses
unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight
and significance which the trial court has overlooked or the significance of
which it has misapprehended or misinterpreted. 22 After a careful
32
examination of the records of the case, we are inclined to give credence
to the version of the prosecution. The alleged inconsistencies as to who
recovered the firearm from appellant, in our view, do not pertain to a
material matter. What is important is that one of the police officers
recovered the firearm from appellant, who does not deny his possession
of said firearm. Further, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions, insofar as the policemen are concerned, has not been
CRIM2
there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately
tried.29 Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide
cases were neither adopted nor presented before the trial court trying the
illegal possession case. For this reason, there is a dearth of evidence on
record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated homicide.
Accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A. No.
8294, being favorable to the accused, should be applied
retroactively.30 Under R.A. No. 8294, the penalty for simple illegal
possession of a low-powered firearm is prision correccional in its
maximum period, which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than P15,000.00. It will not be amiss
to point out that R.A. No. 8294 contains the proviso: "Provided, That no
other crime was committed." However, as explained earlier, the facts
obtaining in this case do not indubitably prove the frustrated murder
cases or the murder case in relation to the illegal possession case.
Hence, we find it proper to convict appellant only of the crime of simple
illegal possession of firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellant should be sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four
(4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as
maximum, and ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. U-6449, is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby convicted of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional maximum as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine
of P15,000.00 and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur. 33
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