Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JURISDICTION CASES:
PEOPLE v. MARIANO
71 SCRA 600
FACTS:
Accused Mariano was appointed as
Liaison Officer by the then
incumbent
Municipal
Mayor,
Constantino Nolasco, acting for
and in behalf of the municipality of
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and
authorized to receive and be
receipted for US excess property
of USAID/NEC for the use and
benefit
of
said
municipality.
Mariano, instead of delivering it to
the
Office
of
the
Mayor,
misappropriated, misapply and
converteed the said items for his
personal benefit.
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan filed an Information
accusing
private
respondent
herein Hermogenes Mariano of
estafa.
Mariano filed an MTQ
claiming that the items which were
the
subject
matter
of
the
Information against him were the
same items for which Mayor
Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose
del Monte, province of Bulacan,
was indicted before a Military
Commission under a charge of
malversation of public property,
and for which Mayor Nolasco had
been found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment in as much as the
case against Mayor Nolasco had
already been decided by the
CASSY C. BARRAS
PEOPLE vs.
SCRA 838
CHUPECO,
10
FACTS:
In the City of Manila, the accused
Jose L. Chupeco executed a
Chattel mortgage as to some of his
properties located at sitio Saguing,
Dinalupihan, Bataan in favor of
Agricultural and Industrial Bank,
whose capital, assets, accounts,
accused guilty
charged.
of
the
offense
vs
FACTS:
Action brought by the plaintiff
Manila Railroad Company in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna
for the purpose of condemning
certain parcels of land which will
be used in the extension of its
railway line from Calamba to Santa
Cruz.
Plaintiff began an action in CFI
Tarlac for the condemnation of
certain real estate, stated by the
plaintiff in his complaint to be
located in Tarlac. It is alleged in
the complaint that the plaintiff is
authorized by law to construct a
railroad line "from Paniqui to
Tayug in the Province of Tarlac,"
and it is for the purpose of
condemning
lands
for
the
construction of line that this action
is brought.
The complaint states that before
beginning the action the plaintiff
had caused to be made a thorough
search in the office of the registry
of property and of the tax where
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CFI Tarlac
can take cognizance of an action
by a railroad company for the
condemnation
of
real
estate
located in another province.
HELD:
1. Yes, CFI Tarlac has power and
authority to take cognizance of
condemnation
of
real
estate
located in another province.
Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No.
136 of the Philippine Commission
confer
perfect
and
complete
jurisdiction upon the CFI of these
Islands with respect to real estate
HELD:
No. The Court found nothing
in the direct or cross-examination
of Yu to establish that he gave any
money to Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect to
the subject aluminum scrap wires
inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter.
Territorial
jurisdiction
in
criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the
offense
allegedly
committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore,
the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense
was
committed
somewhere
else, the court should dismiss
the
action
for
want
of
jurisdiction.
must
be
information.
alleged
in
the
remit
the
premiums
caused
damage
and
prejudice
to
respondent in Manila. Besides,
estafa is a continuing offense
which may be prosecuted at any
place where any of the essential
elements of the crime took place.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as
Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I,
Camarines
Sur,
ARISTON
ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA
and JOSE ANADILLA
FACTS:
The complainant Jose Dadis filed a
case for the attempted homicide
against
Ariston
and
Rafael
Anadilla. While
the
case
is
pending, Jose Dadis filed an
affidavit of desistance and was no
longer
interested
in
the
prosecution
of the
case. Jose
said that he had forgiven the
accused and that his material
witness could no longer be
contracted the court then lifted the
order of arrest, cancelled the bail
bond and ordered the release
of the accused. The Provincial
Fiscal
moved
for
the
reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, which was denied,
hence this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo may
dismiss a criminal case on the
basis of an affidavit of desistance
executed by the offended party, but
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused
can seek judicial relief if he does
not submit to the jurisdiction of
the court
HELD:
As a general rule, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction
of
the
court.
Seeking
an
affirmative relief in court, whether
in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance
There is, however, an exception to
the rule that filing pleadings
seeking
affirmative
relief
constitutes voluntary appearance,
and the consequent submission of
one's person to the jurisdiction of
the court. This is in the case of
pleadings
whose
prayer
is
precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are: (1) in civil
cases, motions to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included; (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash
a warrant of arrest. The first two
are consequences of the fact that
failure
to
file
them
would
constitute a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. The third is a consequence
of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the
information
filed
before
the
Sandiganbayan. The complaint
alleged that the accused, a public
officer, being then the mayor of
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking
advantage of his public position
and which offense was committed
in relation to his office, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take over the operation
and control of the gasoline station
owned by Pedro Par, sell the
gasoline therein to the public
issuing the invoices of said
gasoline station and some pieces
of yellow pad paper for the
purpose, and padlock dispensing
pump thereof without authority of
law, depriving Pedro Par of the
possession and exercise of a lawful
trade or occupation. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash the
information principally on the
ground that the respondent court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
case and that it should have been
filed with the ordinary courts in
Marinduque where the alleged
crime was committed. However
the Motion to Quash was then
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The crime for which petitioner
is charged, grave coercion, is
penalized by arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding P500.00 under
the first paragraph of Article 286
of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Respondent
court,
FACTS:
HELD:
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
HON.
ASUNCION, MANIO
G.R. No. L-108208 March 11,
1994
TOPIC: Venue/Jurisdiction
FACTS:
Private
respondent
Alexander
Dionisio y Manio, a member of the
PNP assigned to the Central Police
District Command Station 2 in
Novaliches, Quezon City, was
dispatched by his Commanding
Officer to Dumalay Street in
Novaliches to respond to a
complaint that a person was
creating trouble there. Dionisio
arrived ath the plance and shot to
death a man. Pursuant to Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed with the RTC of Quezon City
an Information charging Dionisio
with the crime of homicide. The
respondent Judge dismissed the
criminal complaint "for re-filing
with the Sandiganbayan" on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan,
and not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over the case for crimes committed
by public officer when penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is
higher than prision correccional.
Private prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal,
citing the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice that "crimes committed
by
PNP
members
are
not
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan"
because "they fall within the
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
the
regular
courts"
and
"the
Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special court."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over offenses
punishable by prision correctional
or higher commited by public
official.
HELD:
No. If the crime committed by the
public officer is not related to his
public function, then the RTC has
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
the
offense. There is no indication at
all that the trouble-maker was the
victim and that he was shot by the
private respondent in the course of
the latter's mission. However, it
may yet be true that the crime of
homicide charged therein was
committed
by
the
private
respondent in the course of his
public
mission,
which
fact,
however, was not alleged in the
information.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving: (1) Violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other
offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including
those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with
other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than
prision
correccional
or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
PEOPLE v. VANZUELA
G.R. NO. 178266, JULY 21, 2008
Topic: Venue/Jurisdiction
FACTS:
Veneranda is the wife of the late
Dionisio Paler, Sr. who is the
registered owner of a parcel of
irrigated
Riceland.
The
respondents allegedly failed to pay
the rentals since 1997. Initially,
Veneranda brought the matter
before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Office in Surigaodel
Norte, but no amicable settlement
was reached by the parties. Thus,
Veneranda
filed
a
criminal
complaint for estafa against the
respondents.The RTC dismissed
the criminal case contending that
the instant case pertains to the
non-payment of rentals by the
accused
to
the
private
complainant, involving a lease of
an agricultural land by the former
from the latter. This being so, the
controversy in the case involves an
agrarian dispute which falls under
the primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian
Reform
Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC of Surigao
City has jurisdiction over the
charge for estafa even if it involves
agricultural tenants of the private
complainant.
HELD:
It is a well-entrenched doctrine
that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal
over
the
subject
matter of an action is conferred
by law. It is determined by the
material allegations of the
complaint or information and
the law at the time the action
was
commenced.
Lack
of
jurisdiction of the court over an
action or the subject matter of an
action, cannot be cured by the
silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent of the parties.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action and
the subject matter thereof cannot
be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or
upon
a
motion
to
dismiss;
otherwise,
the
question
of
jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant. Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same
is retained up to the end of the
litigation. The RTC likewise
acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents
because
they
voluntarily
submitted
to
the
RTCs
authority. Where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of
the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial
jurisdiction,
the
court
necessarily
exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that
the law requires the court to
resolve.
It is worth stressing that even the
jurisdiction over the prosecution of
criminal offenses in violation of RA
6657 per se is lodged with the
SACs and not with the DARAB.
While indeed, the parties admit
that there is an agricultural
tenancy relationship in this case,
ZALDIVIA v. REYES
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
Topic: Prescription
FACTS:
The petitioner is charged with
quarrying for commercial purposes
without a mayor's permit in
violation of an ordinance of the
Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal. The offense was
allegedly committed on May 11,
1990. The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990. The
corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. The petitioner
moved to quash the information on
the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was
denied. The petitioner argues that
the charge against her was
governed by Sections 1 and 2 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure
and
Act.
No.
3326.
The
prosecution, on the other hand,
contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her
with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the Solicitor
General invokes Section 1, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that for
offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal
action interrupts the period of
prescription
of
the
offense
charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said offense
had already prescribed.
HELD:
Under Section 9 of the Rule on
Summary
Procedure,
"the
complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need
of a prior preliminary examination
or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor
from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in
court,
whether
or
not
the
prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary
investigation.
This
means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date
before that.
This
interpretation
is
in
consonance with the afore-quoted
Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party."
The proceedings referred to in
Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," The Court feels that
if there be a conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between
Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its
FACTS:
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of
the criminal cases for Inciting to
Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, the general rule is
that criminal prosecution may not
be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final.
There are however exceptions,
among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to
the constitutional rights of the
accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial
question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under
an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent;
g. Where the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution;
i.
Where
the
charges
are
manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied.
k. Preliminary injunction has been
issued by the Supreme Court to
prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners.
not
has
the
the
private
legal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Anti-Graft
League has the standing to
commence
the
series
of
prosecutions
not
being
the
offended party.
HELD:
The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines is not an "offended
party" within the meaning of Sec.
2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court
ALBANO EMDI
RODRIGUEZ v. GADIANE ET AL
GR NO. 152903, JULY 17, 2006
FACTS:
The Court is called upon to resolve
the question of whether a private
offended party in a criminal
FACTS:
Juan Bautista and Nenita Marquez
filed with the office of the City
Fiscal a complaint against Estrada,
Banigued, and F. Bautista for
estafa thru falsification of public
document. The assistant Fiscal
dismissed the case for lack of
prima facie evidence. Bautista did
not move for the reconsideration of
the fiscal's resolution; neither did
he appeal to the Ministry of
Justice. Instead, Mr. Bautista filed
a new complaint with the City
Court of Dagupan against the
same respondents, charging them
with the same offense. The City
Court found that an offense has
been
committed
and
the
respondents therein are probably
guilty thereof. Accordingly, a
warrant for their arrest was issued
and an order directing respondent
city fiscal to file the corresponding
information.
However,
the
respondent city fiscal, through
Assistant Fiscal Manaois, filed a
manifestation with the city court
that he will reinvestigate the case
in view of his prior resolution.
After reinvestigation, the city
Fiscal, filed a motion to dismiss the
case but was denied by the City
Court. Thereafter, the city court
again forwarded the records of the
case to respondent city fiscal for
the filing of the information. In
turn, respondent city fiscal filed a
manifestation informing the city
court of his inability to prosecute
the case because of his sincere and
honest belief that he has no prima
facie
case
to
warrant
the
prosecution of the accused. The
court
filed
a
petition
for
Indeed,
how
can
the
prosecuting fiscal secure the
conviction of an accused on
evidence beyond reasonable
doubt when he himself is not
convinced that he has a prima
facie case against him.
But then, let's say that the
fiscal simply refuses to institute
a case against a respondent
even
if
the
evidence
is
sufficient to warrant the filing
of an information. As stated
above, the remedy is appeal to
the Ministry of Justice (then
Department of Justice) and, if
there
is
evidence,
administrative
complaint
against the prosecuting officer
for ignorance of the law,
neglect
of
duty,
partiality
and/or bribery.
CRESPO v. MOGUL
53373, JUNE 30, 1987
NO.
L-
FACTS:
The Assistant Fiscal with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for
arraigment the accused filed a
motion to defer arraignment on
the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed
with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of
the information. However, the
presiding judge, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. So the
accused filed a petition for
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petition was dismissed.
The rule therefore is that once a
complaint or information is filed in
the Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
The Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal
55
FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a criminal
complaint for libel in the Municipal
Court of the Municipality of
Batangas presided over by the
respondent Judge. The accused
named therein was Serafin D.
Cruz. There was the corresponding
preliminary examination of the
witnesses for the complainant with
respondent Judge finding that
there was reasonable ground to
believe that such offense was
committed by the person named.
After respondent Cruz posted the
corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty, the respondent
Judge set the case for hearing on
the merits on July 13, 1964, at 2:30
o'clock in the afternoon. When that
time came, complainant, now
petitioner,
through
counsel
manifested in open court that
under Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, respondent Judge was
devoid of jurisdiction to do so.
There was, as noted, a negative
response. After hearing arguments
on such motion for desistance
including memoranda submitted
by both sides, respondent Judge
issued
an
order
denying
petitioner's verbal motion to have
JOCEL ESPINOLA
Sta. Rosa Mining Co. vs Zabala
G.R. No. L-44723, August 31,
1987
Topic: Prosecution
(Rule 110)
of
Offenses
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for
attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron)
forming
part
of
the
installations on its mining property
in Camarines Norte against private
respondents with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal. A preliminary
investigation was then conducted
and thereafter, a resolution was
issued recommending that an
information for Attempted Theft be
filed against private respondents
on a finding of prima facie case
which resolution was approved by
the Provincial Fiscal. Private
respondents
sought
reconsideration of the resolution
but the same was denied. An
information was filed with the
Court for the same crime. Private
respondents then requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of
the resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal. The Secretary reversed the
findings of the Secretary and
directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal
of the criminal case. The motion
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for
mandamus should be granted.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that
once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
of
Offenses
Facts:
Petitioners were the accused in
sixteen (16) cases for Estafa filed
by the private respondents.
After
the
petitioners
were
arraigned and entered their plea of
not guilty, they filed a Motion to
Dismiss the aforementioned cases
on the ground that the filing of the
same was premature, in view of
the failure of the parties to
undergo conciliation proceedings
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The municipal trial court issued an
Order, denying petitioners Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that they
failed to seasonably invoke the
non-referral of the cases to
the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat
ng
Tagapagkasundo. It added that
Issue:
Whether
or
not
an
order
dismissing a case or action without
prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary
period.
Topic: Prosecution
(Rule 110)
Held:
Yes. The Court held that a "final
order" issued by a court has been
defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing else to
be done but to enforce by
execution
what
has
been
determined by the court. As
distinguished
therefrom,
an
"interlocutory order" is one which
does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon.
An order dismissing a case without
prejudice is a final order if no
motion for reconsideration or
appeal therefrom is timely filed.
Roberts vs CA
G.R. No. 11390, March 5, 1996
of
Offenses
Facts:
Petitioner cites DOJ Department
Circular
No.
70,
specifically
paragraph 2 of Section 9 thereof,
which provides that the appellant
and the trial prosecutor shall see
to it that, pending resolution of the
appeal, the proceedings in court
are held in abeyance. Somehow,
petitioner is of the opinion that the
suspension of proceedings in
court, as provided in the said
circular, includes the suspension of
the implementation of warrants of
arrest issued by the court.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
a
pending
resolution of a petition for review
filed with the Secretary of Justice
concerning a finding of probable
cause
will
suspend
the
Ledesma vs. CA
G.R. No. 113216, September 5,
1997
Topic: Prosecution
(Rule 110)
Facts:
of
Offenses
of
Offenses
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Paraaque
filed an Information for Estafa
against private respondent Ma. Fe
Barreiro
based
on
the
complaint filed by Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc.
Before the scheduled arraignment
of private respondent could take
place, respondent court issued an
Order, resetting the arraignment
of private respondent on the
ground that private respondent
had filed an appeal with the
Department of Justice. Respondent
court further
deferred
the
IN
THE
Facts:
Accused-appellant was convicted
by the RTC for the crime of
qualified rape. He raped the 15year old daughter of his commonlaw spouse.
The victim was alone in their
house when appellant suddenly
embraced her from behind and
dragged her towards the bedroom
despite her vigorous attempts to
free herself from his clutches.
Appellant
repeatedly
slapped
Estrella, forcibly stripped her of
her clothing, mounted her and
then inserted his penis into her
vagina. Estrella could not tell how
long the appellant stayed on top of
her but after a while, he put on his
clothes and ordered her to do the
same. He warned her not to tell
anybody about the assault or he
would kill her. Four days later, she
revealed the harrowing experience
to her cousin who accompanied
her to the barangay captain.
Appellant raised the defenses of
denial
and
alibi.
Issue:
Whether or not minority and
relationship should be alleged.
Held:
The Court held that Minority and
relationship
constitute
special
qualifying circumstances, which, in
accordance with the settled rule,
must be alleged in the information
and proven during trial.
People vs. Manggasin
Facts:
Accused-appellant Juan Manggasin
was found guilty of two (2) counts
of rape by the RTC.
The complainant was coming back
from the river to get her brothers
clothes to do some laundry.
When she arrived in their house,
she was allured/hypnotized by
accused-appellant,
which
rendered her unconscious. When
she woke up, she felt some pain in
her
vagina,
which
was
bleeding. When
she
asked accused-appellant what had
happened to her, he warned her
not to tell anyone what had been
done to her, otherwise he would
kill her and her mother. She also
claimed that accused-appellant
then dragged her and embraced
her so tightly that both of them fell
down. He then touched her private
parts and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After he was through,
accused-appellant
told her
she
would be killed if she told anyone
about the incident.
Complainant claimed that she had
been sexually assaulted several
times.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual findings
of the trial court is binding upon
the appellate court.
Held:
Yes. The Court held that the
evaluation of the testimonies of the
B. DUPLICITY OF OFFENSES
Sanchez vs. Demetriou
G.R. Nos.111771-77, November
9, 1993
Topic: Duplicity of Offenses
Facts:
Informations were filed against sev
eral
persons, including Mayor Antonio
L.Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, in c
onnection with the rape-slay
of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the
killing of Allan Gomez. Upon
invitation
to
appear
for
investigation,
Sanchez
was
identified as one of the principals
of the crime charged and was then
placed on arrest status after
which a warrant of arrest was
issued against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a
Preliminary Investigation impair
the validity of the information or
the jurisdiction of the court
Facts:
Eight (8) informations were filed
with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, charging petitioners
Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Pion
and
Rosendo
Pion
as
coconspirators in the crime of estafa.
They
moved
to
quash
the
informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 on the
ground of duplicity of offenses
charged therein. The same was
dismissed by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy
would set in.
Held:
No. The Court held that where the
ground of double jeopardy was not
raised in the motion to quash
before the trial court, then it is
unpardonably absurd to claim that
its
non-application
would
constitute
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
C. CONTINUING CRIMES
Held:
No. The
absence
Santiago vs Garchitorena
G.R. No.
28, 1975
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to enjoin
the
Sandiganbayan
from
proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 on the ground that said case
was intended solely to harass her
as she was then a presidential
candidate.
Public
prosecutors
filed
32
Amended Informations
against
petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would
only file one amended information.
Facts:
Private respondent Benjamin Lu
Hayco was a former employee of
petitioner company in its optical
supply business. One hundred
twenty-four (124) complaints of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1-b
of the Revised Penal Code were
filed against him by the petitioner
company with the Office of the City
Fiscal
of
Manila.
After
the
procedural
preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City
Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases
of
estafa
against
private
respondent before the City Court
of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the concept of a
continuing crime is applicable in
crimes penalized under special
laws.
Held:
The Court held that, technically,
there was only one crime that was
committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one
information to be file against her.
The concept of Delito Continuado
is applicable to crimes penalized
under special laws. The concept of
delito continuado, although an
outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code,
has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws.
Where only one single criminal act
was committed on the same period
of time, several informations
should be consolidated into only
one.
Gamboa vs. CA
L-41054,
November
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
basic
accusations contained in the
seventy-five
(75)
informations
against
private
respondent
constitute but a single crime of
estafa.
Held:
The Court held that Delito
continuado or continuous crime
is a single crime consisting of a
series acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. For Cuello
Calon, when the actor, there being
unity of purpose and of right
violated, commits diverse acts,
each of which although of a
delitual
character,
merely
constitutes a partial execution of a
single particular delict, such
masked
gunman
fired
at
Ferdinand. As the gunman fired,
the cover on his face fell off.
Ferdinand recognized the assailant
as Adly Hubilo, also a resident of
the same locality and known to
him since he reached the age of
reason. Ferdinand pleaded for his
life. Hubilo, however, squeezed the
trigger again but this time the gun
did not fire Ferdinand seized his
chance to escape death and ran
away. Hubilo tried to pursue
Ferdinand. Ferdinand was able to
elude him, and saw Hubilo
approach fire at the tricycle many
times.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a complex
crime.
Held:
No.
The
Court
held
that
Irregularity
in
preliminary
investigation is waived by posting
bail
and
submitting
to
arraignment.
Where several shots hurt several
victims, the crime is not a complex
crime.
When
the
evidence
presented by the prosecution did
not show that a single shot had
slain three (3) different persons,
appellant is properly held liable for
three (3) separate murders.
D. COMPLEX CRIME
PEOPLE V. VICTOR, 181 SCRA 818
Facts:
When Victor went to Boljoon to
visit his wife, Guneda met him at
the market place and proposed to
him a plan to rob the residence of
an American named Myles Castle
and the cottage of Charles Turner,
an
American
Peace
Corps
Volunteer
assigned
in
the
Municipality of Boljoon The two
agreed to execute their plan on
Oct. 16, 1984. As planned, Victor
went to Boljoon in the afternoon of
October 16, 1984, together with
Montebon, who brought with him a
.38 caliber homemade revolver.
They proceeded to the store of a
certain Josefina Romero along
McKinley Street, where Victor
used to leave his things intended
for his wife everytime he came to
Boljoon. They passed the time
there drinking "tuba" and eating
bread while they were conversing
in subdued voices. At past 6:00
o'clock that afternoon,Victor and
Montebon left and proceeded
towards a bridge where they were
subsequently joined by Guneda,
who led them to the house of
Myles Castle along Rodriguez
Street. As they entered the gate of
Castle's house, a maid went out to
get the clothes which were being
hanged
to
dry.
Forthwith,
Montebon held her and said:
circumstance of treachery
is
present when the offender employs
means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime which tend
directly and especially to insure its
execution without risk to himself
arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim
might make. The settled rule is
that treachery can exist even if the
attack is frontal if it is sudden and
unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to repel it or defend
himself. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without
the slightest provocation from a
victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.
In the case at bar, treachery is
present for there was a sudden
attack against the unarmed Sotto.
When Sotto and his friends
encountered appellant on the road,
they were in a "jovial mood" as
they just came from a drinking
spree. Although they saw appellant
carrying an armalite, they did not
suspect anything untoward to
happen. However, without any
provocation, appellant shot Sotto.
The fact that the attack was frontal
cannot negate treachery. The
shooting was unexpected. There is
no showing that the alleged
warning given by appellant to
Sotto afforded the latter sufficient
time to defend himself. Indeed,
WITH
DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED
MURDER defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 7659
otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law, the offense having
been a complex crime the penalty
of which is in the maximum, and
with the attendant aggravating
circumstances
of
evident
premeditation
and
abuse
of
superior
strength,
hereby
sentences
him
the
ultimum
suplicum of DEATH to be executed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177
known as the Lethal Injection Law,
to pay the heirs of the deceased
RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE
ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and
SANDRA MONTANO and the
injured
victims
WILLIAM
MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred when it
allowed itself to be carried away
by the erroneous Information filed
by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor charging the complex
crime of multiple murder and
double frustrated murder.
Held:
When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum
period. The case at bar does not
RULE 111
PROSECUTION
ACTION
OF
CIVIL
the other a civil case for quasidelict - without violating the rule
on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other.
The commencement or prosecution
of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasidelict. The only limitation is that
the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. In most
cases, the offended party will have
no reason to file a second civil
action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing
of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a
civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused
of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111
which states that the counterclaim
of the accused may be litigated in
a separate civil action. This is only
fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting
up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is
therefore
forced
to
litigate
separately
his
counterclaim
against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasidelict is filed. Second, the accused,
who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Held:
The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bum check a malum
prohibitum, an act proscribed by
legislature for being deemed
pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. The gravamen of the
offense under this law is the act of
issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. Thus,
even if there had been payment,
through compensation or some
other means, there could still be
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
No application of payment
was made as to which check was
to be paid. These factual findings
should be accorded respect and
finality as the trial court is in the
best position to assess and
evaluate questions of fact. These
findings will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court
overlooked
certain
facts
or
circumstances
that
would
substantially affect the disposition
of the case
IAN PANGAN
further
hearing.
Hence,
this
petition.
ISSUE: Is the award proper?
HELD:
No.
In
automatically
granting the civil aspect of the
case by ordering petitioner to pay
for
her
purchases
from
complainant JY Brothers even
before they could adduce evidence
thereon, she is patently denied of
her right to due process.
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
Bautista vs. Sarmiento e. al.
L-45137, September 23, 1985
FACTS: An information charging
Fe Bautista and Teresita Vergere
with Estafa was filed before the
sala of Judge Sarmiento. Teresita
Vergere was granted separate
trial. To prove its case, the
prosecution presented in the trial
private complainant Leticia Yap as
the only witness. The petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the case
by way of demurrer to evidence.
Petitioners
alleged
that
they
receive the jewelries on a purchase
and sale arrangement and that the
prosecution
failed
to
prove
misappropriation made by them.
These allegations however were
controverted by the prosecution by
presenting the demand letter of
private complainant Leticia Yap.
Thus, respondent judge Sarmiento
denied the demurrer. In view of the
denial
of
the demurrer, Fe
Bautista, et. al. brought the
present petition for certiorari
claiming that there was only prima
facie case of estafa against them
and there was no proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Considering that the
denial of petitioners demurrer is
merely interlocutory, is the present
petition for certiorari proper?
HELD:
No.
The
respondent
judges order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss the complaint by
way of demurrer to evidence is
merely an interlocutory order. It
cannot be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. What they could
People vs Villanueva
L-56443, December 19, 1981
FACTS: Rogelim Yee, with the
deliberate intent of bringing one
Ofelia Torralba, a 4th year student,
into disrepute wilfully attacked
and assaulted her and inflicted
contusions in her face in the
presence of her visitors and
classmates
to
her
great
embarrassment. Having conducted
the
required
preliminary
investigation and having found
probable
case
or
reasonable
ground to believe that there exist
probable cause for serious slander
by deed, the city fiscal of Butuan
City filed in the city court an
information or the said offence.
The
respondent
judge,
instead of issuing a warrant of
arrest conducted his ex parte
preliminary
investigation
to
determine once more the existence
of probable cause and thereafter
concluded
that
the
offense
committed is either slight slander
by deed of slight physical injuries
ISSUE: Whether or not the fiscals
preliminary
investigation
precludes
the
judge
from
exercising his legal duty to
exercise his judicial power of
determining before issuing the
corresponding warrant of arrest
the existence of probable cause.
HELD: No. The respondent judge
is clothed with the prerogative of
ascertaining probable cause as
provided in the Bill of Rights which
provides that no warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the
in
any
official
investigation,
proceeding or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer.
Urbano vs. Chavez
L-87977, March 19, 1990
FACTS: Petitoners Urbano and
Acapulco filed a criminal case with
the Ombudsman against Secretary
Luis Santos of the Department of
Local Government for alleged
violation of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt
Practices
Act.
OSG
appeared as counsel for the
respondents
as
far
as
the
preliminary investigation of the
case is concerned. Petitioners
sought to enjoin the Solicitor
General and his associate from
acting
as
counsel
for
said
respondents in the course of the
preliminary
investigation
contending that in the event that
the corresponding information is
filed against the respondents with
the
Sandiganbayan
and
a
judgement
of
conviction
is
rendered by the said court, the
appearance of OSG on behalf of
respondents
during
the
preliminary investigation will be in
conflict with its role as appellate
counsel of the People of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Can a the OSG represent a
public officer in the preliminary
investigation of a criminal action
against him or in a civil action
against him?
HELD: No. There will be a clear
conflict of interest, where the OSG
as counsel for the public official,
defends
the
latter
in
the
preliminary investigation stage of
a criminal case, and where the
same office, as appellate counsel of
preliminary
investigation
was
conducted and that probable cause
was found to exist as against those
charged in the information filed.
This Statement is an admission
that the respondent judge relied
solely to the certification made by
the fiscal that probable cause
exists as against those charged in
the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on
the sole basis of the prosecutors
findings and recommendations.
Therefore, respondent judge has
abdicated his duty under the
constitution to determine on his
own the issue of the existence of
probable cause prior to issuing
warrant.
FACTS:
This controversy arose
from a heated altercation and
physical
assaults
amongst
neighbors. Based on the collated
complaints of both parties, in
October 1980, at the house of
PacitaTandoc,
respondents
Cancino,
Arnulfo
Payopay,
ConradoPayopay, Sr. and several
others intruded the sari-sari store
and house of the former and an
altercation ensued. In the middle
of the verbal joust, Arnulfo and
Beda Acosta picked up stones and
hurled them unto Pacita, though,
the projectiles instead hit the
latters helpers who sustained
physical injuries. Four days later,
respondents
filed
complaints
against Tandocs party with the
same fiscals office, however, the
latter found them merely as
belated countercharges meriting
dismissal, except the trespass to
dwelling charged against Pedro
Tandoc.
Displeased
with
the
fiscals resolution, in July 1981,
Payopays party directly lodged
their complaints with City Court
San Carlos (CCSC), where the
criminal cases initiated by the
Tandocs against them are pending.
Subsequently, the CCSC issued
several Orders which are the
subject
of
this
Petition
for
Certiorari, whereby the said court,
after
conducting
preliminary
examination
of
Payopays
complaints
found
reasonable
ground to believe that the offenses
charged may have been committed
by the accused, herein petitioners.
The
Tandocs
moved
for
reconsideration
and
reinvestigation of the complaints by
the city fiscal, insisting that the
prosecutory
power
of
the
Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and that the Ombudsman has no
authority to prosecute cases falling
within the jurisdiction of regular
courts.
ISSUE:
WON Ombudsman can
conduct preliminary investigation
HELD: Yes. The law recognizes
the concurrence of jurisdiction
between
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
and
other
investigative
agencies
of
government in the prosecution of
cases cognizable by regular courts.
The Ombudsman is therefore
clothed with authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and to
prosecute
all
criminal
cases
involving
public
officers
and
employees, not only those within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of the regular
courts as well.
The
Office
of
the
Special
Prosecutor is merely a component
of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its
power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is
limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It must be clarified that the
authority of the Ombudsman to
prosecute cases involving public
officers and employees before the
regular courts does not conflict
with the power of the regular
prosecutors under the Department
of Justice to control and direct the
prosecution of all criminal actions
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation.
HELD: No. The authority of the
Ombudsman
to
investigate
offenses involving public officers
or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly
authorized
agencies
of
the
government. The
salary
grade
position does not by itself remove
from the DOJ Panel the authority
to investigate the charge of coup
d'etat
which falls under the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, the DOJ
Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation for complaints filed
with it. Thus, there is not even a
need to delegate the conduct of
the preliminary investigation to an
agency, which has the jurisdiction
to do so in the first place.
However, the Ombudsman may
assert its primary jurisdiction at
any stage of the investigation.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95001 is merely an internal circular
between the DOJ and the office of
the
Ombudsman,
Outlining
authority
and
responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and
of the office of the Ombudsman in
the
conduct
of
preliminary
investigation.
Moreover, the Constitution, the
Ombudsman
Act
of
1989,
Administrative Order No. 8 of the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman,
prevailing jurisprudence, and the
Revised
Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure
all
recognize
and
uphold the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to
conduct preliminary investigation
They
were
arrested
in
connection with the killing of 2
capcom soldiers
Dural
was
captured
and
identified 1 day after the
incident because he needed
medical care
Although
Dural
was
not
arrested DURING the shooting,
he was arrested the day after.
BUT court said the Dural was
Roque v. De Villa
Anonuevo v. Ramos
arrested.
Hence,
warrantless arrest
lawful
No preliminary investigation
was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and
she refused to waive the
provisions of Article 125 RPC.
Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Roque claim that the firearms,
ammo and subversive docs were
all planted illegal arrest.
Ocaya v. Aguirre
Espiritu v. Lim
Petitioner
Secretary
is
the
of
General
the
PinagkaisahangSamahanngTsup
er at Operators Nationwide
(PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public
service
vehicles
in
the
Philippines, organized for their
mutual aid and protection.
The
respondents
claim,
however, that the detention was
justified
in
view
of
the
information filed against him
before the RTC of Manila,
charging him with inciting to
sedition.
Since
the
arrest
of
the
petitioner without a warrant
was in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b)
of the Rules of Court and that
the petitioner is detained by
virtue of a valid information
filed with the competent court,
he may not be released on
habeas corpus.
Nazareno
Commander
v.
Station
SAGAUINIT FERDIMAR
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. MARI MUSA
G.R. NO. 96177, JANUARY 27,
1993
TOPIC: ARREST (RULE 113)
FACTS:
Lastly,
Burgos
was
not
informed of his right to remain
silent, to counsel, or to waive his
right
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures. Hence, the
Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the RTC and acquitted
Burgos.
personally
determine
after
examination
under
oath
or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Supreme Court said that
mere reliance on the resolution or
recommendation of the prosecutor
is not enough to issue a search
warrant or warrant of arrest since
the prosecutor and the judge have
different
roles
in
the
administration of justice. The
prosecutor only verifies if there is
reason to file a case against the
accused or hold him for trial while
the judge has the obligation to
determine probable cause and the
guilt of the accused. It is not
enough that a recommendation
was made by the prosecutor but at
least a personal evaluation of the
evidence by the judge is done to
determine probable cause to
satisfy
the
constitutional
requirement. Hence, the court
declared the warrant of arrest
issued against petitioner as null
and void.
GILBERT
ZALAMEDA
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 183656, SEPTEMBER
4, 2009
HELD:
FACTS:
On
about
5:15am
of
September 14, 2003, a concerned
citizen
contacted
SPO4
PEOPLE v. MANLULU
G.R. NO. 102140, 22
1994
APRIL
headquarters
incident.
PEOPLE v. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 127755, 14, APRIL
1999
TOPIC: ARREST (RULE 113)
FACTS:
Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was
charged with Violation of Section
8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, before
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. The conviction of
the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver Paul
Vincent Alonzo. Alonzo stopped his
tricycle by the side of Nita's
Drugstore, General Luna St.,
Cabanatuan City. Parked at a
distance of about one and a-half
meters in front of him was a
tricycle driven by accused Joseliton
del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo
saw two men thereafter named
Dodong Visaya and Jun Marquez
and a woman named Virginia
Bernas grappling for possession of
a bag. After taking hold of the bag,
Jun Marques started chasing a
man who was trying to help the
woman, while Dodong Visaya
kicked the woman sending her to
the ground. Soon after, Jun
Marquez returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he
shot her on the head. The bag was
brought to the tricycle of accused
del Rosario where Boy Santos was
inside to receive it. When the
tricycle sped away Alonzo gave
chase and was able to get the plate
number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which
he went to the nearest police
and
reported
the
PEOPLE v. KIMURA
G.R. NO. 130805,
2004
07
APRIL
not
Kimuras
HELD:
No. SPO1 Delfin, one of
those who arrested appellant
Kizaki, admitted that they did not
have a warrant of arrest when his
group arrested Kizaki on the night
of June 29, 1994. Rule 113, Section
5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace
officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person
only under the circumstances
given by law.
The alleged crime happened
on June 27, 1994 and appellant
Kizaki was arrested on June 29,
1994 or two days after the subject
incident. At the time appellant
Kizaki was arrested, he was at a
restaurant having dinner with a
group of friends, thus, he was not
committing
or
attempting
to
commit a crime. Neither was he an
escaped prisoner whose arrest
could be effected even without a
warrant. It bears stressing that
none of the arresting officers of
appellant Kizaki was present on
the night of June 27 where
appellant Kizaki allegedly sold and
transported
marijuana
and
DOJ v. JIMENEZ
G.R. NO. 148571, SEPTEMBER
24, 2002
TOPIC: BAIL
FACTS:
In an earlier case entitled
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C.
Lantion,
the
United
States
provision,
in
matter
of
the
immediate
arrest.
Extradition
proceedings are summary. The
silence of the law and the treaty
leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
Section 2 of Article 3 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution does not
require a notice or hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
II. No. He is not entitled to
bail and to provisional liberty. Bail
is generally available only for
persons arrested or detained for
the violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render
judgments
of
conviction
or
acquittal. Even if the offenses he
committed are bailable in United
States law, such is not a valid
argument to grant him one in the
present case.
PADILLA v. CA
G.R. NO. 121917,JULY 31, 1996
TOPIC: BAIL
FACTS:
Appellant Robin C. Padilla
was charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866 for the illegal possession
of
firearms.
Pending
trial,
appellant was released on bail.
Appellant was then convicted and
meted an indeterminate penalty of
17 years, 4 months and 1 day as
for
bail,
holding
that
the
prosecution did not show that the
evidence of guilt is strong. He,
however, gave the prosecution 10
days to file its motion for
reconsideration.Before
such
motion could be filed, the accused
were already released, through the
order by Judge Alberto Banesa, the
designated pairing judge of Judge
Bongolan, which he issued based
on seeing that Judge Bongolan
already approved the motion for
bail. Judge Bongolan was unaware
of the accused release since he
was in the hospital. Subsequently,
Judge
Bongolan
denied
the
prosecutions
motion
for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Judge
Bongolan correctly granted the
accused motion for bail before
hearing the bail application
HELD:
No.
Judge
Bongolan
incorrectly granted the accused
motion
for
bail.
Complaints
involving irregular approval of
bailbond and issuance of order
release appear to be a common
offense of judges. A bail hearing is
necessary to give the prosecution
reasonable opportunity to oppose
the application by showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong.
It is true that when asked by
Judge Bongolan whether the
prosecution
would
present
additional evidence, Prosecutor
Gayao responded in the negative.
Subsequently,
however,
the
prosecution changed its mind
when it stated in its Opposition
that a resolution of the Motion for
admission to bail would be
premature since it has additional
witnesses to present.
PEOPLE v. FITZGERALD
GR NO. 149723, OCTOBER 27,
2006
TOPIC: BAIL
FACTS:
Respondent
Victor
Keith
Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen,
was charged with Violation of
Article 3, Section 5 (a)(5) of
Republic Act No. 7610 when he
allegedly
lured
and
drugged
complainant AAA, a 13 year old,
to engage in prostitution and
thereafter, having sex with her.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
found the accused guilty of
violating
said
law.Respondent
applied for bail, which the RTC
denied,
holding
that
the
circumstance of the accused
indicates probability of flight and
undue risk that he may commit a
similar offense. Subsequently, his
appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA) was denied, where the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling, with
modifications on the duration of
his sentence.
Respondent filed for motion
for
new
trial
including
a
supplemental on the ground that
new and material evidence not
duration of
RTC, which
untouched.
cannot be
PEREZ PATTY
E
RUL
116
Held:
Yes.
Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation prior
to and during the administrative
inquiry
into
the
discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in
which he appeared to have had a
hand. Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him
on
the
first
day
of
the
administrative investigation and
agreed
that
the
proceedings
should be recorded. The note that
Ramos sent his superiors offering
to settle his liability was a free and
even spontaneous act on his part.
They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to
Ramos.
The
right
against
selfincrimination, mentioned in the
Constitution is accorded to every
person
who
gives
evidence,
whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding.
It
prescribes
an
"option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." It simply
secures to a witness, whether he
be a party or not, the right to
refute to answer any particular
incriminatory question. However,
the right can be claimed only when
the incriminatory question is
actually put to the witness. It does
not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial,
hearing or investigation, any
affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against selfincrimination.
The
rights
in
custodial
investigation apply to persons
"under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by
police authorities; and this is what
makes these rights different from
that
against
self-incrimination
which, applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative.
A defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not
under custodial interrogation. His
interrogation by the police, if any
there had been, would already
have been ended at the time of the
filing of the criminal case in court.
ANCIRO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-107819 Dec. 17,
1993
Topic: Right to cross-examination
Doctrine:
The right of confrontation thus
guaranteed and secured to the
accused is a personal privilege
which can be waived.
The
fact that
the crossexamination of the complainant
was not formally terminated is not
an irregularity that would justify a
new trial. The right to confront the
witnesses may be waived by the
accused
expressly
or
by
implication.
Facts:
Efren Anciro was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the Regional Trial Court for the
rape of Gloria Dalin on February
23, 1979 in Carmona, Cavite.
that
the
witness
(private
complainant) will be leaving the
Philippines on said date, counsel
was fully aware and was ready to
take on another witness. The
testimony
of
the
private
complainant must stand. The
petitioner had not only been given
sufficient opportunity to finish the
cross- examination of the private
complainant, by his conduct he
has, as well, waived his right to
further cross-examine her. His
constitutional right to meet the
witness face to facewas not
impaired. Furthermore, there is
enough evidence on record to
prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner committed the
crime of rape.
UY v. ADRIANOG.R NO. 159098,
OCTOBER 27, 2006
TOPIC: ARRAIGNMENT AND
PLEA (RULE 116)
Doctrine:
Speedy trial is a relative term
and necessarily a flexible concept.
In determining whether the right
of the accused to a speedy trial
was violated, the delay should be
considered, in view of the entirety
of the proceedings
The right to speedy trial cannot
be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial
of due process to the prosecution
it should not operate in depriving
the
State
of
its
inherent
prerogative to prosecute criminal
cases generally in seeing to it that
all of those who approach the bar
of
justice
is
afforded
fair
opportunity to present their side.
reasonably
attributed
to
the
ordinary processes of justice, and
that petitioners suffered no serious
prejudice beyond
that which
ensued after an inevitable and
ordinary delay. Furthermore, the
right to speedy trial cannot be
invoked where to sustain the same
would result in a clear denial of
due process to the prosecution. In
the case at bar, the delay cannot
only
be
attributed
to
the
prosecution and that the MTC did
not have exclusive jurisdiction over
the case before it was forwarded
to the RTC. There was no showing
failed that the delay in bringing
petitioners to trial in a court of
competent
jurisdiction
caused
them any prejudice tantamount to
deprivation of their right to a
speedy trial. In asserting a delay to
their right to a speedy trial, it
should be based on specifics and
not merely vague assertions.
Failure to present evidence defeats
their claim that their right has
been violated.
People v. Nuelan
G.R. No. 123075, Oct. 8, 2001
Topic: Improvident plea of guilty
Doctrine:
An arraignment is the means of
implementing the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him so that he
may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he
has to face.
spent
by
the
court
and
prosecution. Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence in hand,
the respondent judge's acceptance
of the private respondent's change
of plea is improper and irregular.
As to Manuels allegation of double
jeopardy, the Court ruled that it
has no basis. Sec. 7 Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court states that
conviction of the accused shall not
be a bar to another prosecution for
an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information
under any of the following
instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty
to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the Fiscal
and of the offended party. Hence,
Manuel could still be prosecuted
under the original charge.
People v. Espidol
G.R. No. 150033, Nov. 12, 2004
Doctrine:
Sec. 3 Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure
states:
When
the
accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a
searching
inquiry
into
the
voluntariness
and
full
comprehension
of
the
consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The
accused
may
present evidence in his behalf.
Even if the trial court is satisfied
that the plea of guilty was entered
with full knowledge of its meaning
and consequences, the Court must
RULE 117
MOTION TO QUASH
Pacoy v. People
G.R. No. 157472, Sept. 28, 2007
Topic: Amendment or substitution
of Information; Motion to quash
Doctrine:
Pursuant to Sec. 14 Rule 110
and Sec. 19 Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court, the change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder
is merely a formal amendment and
not a substantial amendment or a
substitution. The only change
made was in the caption of the
case;
and
in
the
opening
paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out
of
word
Homicide
and
its
replacement by the word Murder.
There was no change in the recital
of facts constituting the offense
charged or in the determination of
the jurisdiction of the court.
Pursuant to Sec. 3 and Sec. 7 Rule
117 of the Rules of Court,
dismissal
of
the
first
case
presupposes
a
definite
or
unconditional
dismissal,
which
terminates the case. And for the
dismissal to be a bar under the
jeopardy clause, it must have the
effect of acquittal. Judge Cajigals
Order dated Sept. 12 was for the
trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information but not to
dismiss the same upon the filing
of a new Information charging the
proper offense
Facts:
On or about Mar. 18, 2002 in
Tarlac, SSGT. Jose Pacoy shot his
commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick
Escueta with his armalite rifle that
caused multiple gunshots wounds
and led to Escuetas instant death.
Pacoy was charged with homicide
with aggravating circumstance of
disregard
of
rank.
Upon
arraignment on Sept. 12, 2002,
Pacoy pleaded not guilty. On the
same day and after arraignment,
Judge
Afable
Cajigal
issued
another
order
directing
the
prosecutor
to
change
the
Information from homicide to
murder as he (Cajigal) considered
disregard of rank as a qualifying
circumstance. The prosecutor then
crossed out the word homicide and
instead wrote the word murder in
the caption and opening paragraph
of
the
Information
without
changing anything in the body.
Pacoy was to be re-arraigned on
Oct. 8, 2002, but his counsel
objected that Pacoy would be
placed in double jeopardy since
the complaint for homicide was,
according to counsel, dismissed as
it was terminated without Pacoys
express consent. Pacoys counsel
filed a Motion to Inhibit and a
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
Cajigal denied the former and
granted the latter, and reinstated
the original Information charging
Pacoy of homicide. Cajigal realized
that disregard of rank is a generic
and not a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and should not
elevate the classification of crime
from homicide to murder.
Issues:
I. The respondent judge gravely
abused
his
discretion
and
exceeded
his
jurisdiction
in
ordering the amendment of the
information from homicide to
murder.
II. The respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion and violated
the law in denying the motion to
quash the information for murder.
III. The respondent judge gravely
abused
his
discretion
and
exceeded his jurisdiction and
violated the law in ordering the
reinstatement of the information
for homicide which was already
terminated
Held:
The petition has no merit.
I. Pursuant to Sec. 14 Rule 110
and Sec. 19 Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court, the change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder
is merely a formal amendment and
not a substantial amendment or a
substitution. The only change
made was in the caption of the
case;
and
in
the
opening
paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out
of
word
Homicide
and
its
replacement by the word Murder.
There was no change in the recital
of facts constituting the offense
charged or in the determination of
the jurisdiction of the court.
II. Pursuant to Sec. 3 and Sec. 7
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
dismissal
of
the
first
case
presupposes
a
definite
or
unconditional
dismissal,
which
(c)
is
otherwise
dismissed
or
terminated without his express
consent.
Jeopardy does not attach in
favor of the accused on account of
an order sustaining a motion to
quash, anchored on the ground
that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense is not a bar
to another prosecution for the
same offense.
Motion to quash is a mode by
which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the
Information.
Facts:
Petitionercharges
Bigamy
against Leo R. Beronilla before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City. She alleged that her
marriage with respondent in 1978
had not yet been legally dissolved
when the latter contracted a
second marriage with one Cecile
Maguillo in 1991.
Pending the setting of the case for
arraignment, herein respondent
moved to quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense. He
informed the court that his
marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the RTC;
that the decision became final and
executory; and that
The delimitation of the grounds
available in a such decree has
already been registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar. He
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition mainly arguing that there
is a violation of the rule on double
jeopardy as the dismissal of the
subject
criminal
case
is
tantamount to an acquittal based
on the trial courts finding that the
first essential element of bigamy,
which is a first valid marriage
contracted by private respondent
is wanting.Petitioner filed her
comment/opposition
to
private
respondents motion to quash
before the trial court issued its
Order dated September 20, 2007
dismissing the information. Hence,
if there is no denial of due process,
there can be no grave abuse of
discretion that would merit the
application of the exception to the
double jeopardy rule.
Issues:
Is the filing of this petition is in
violation of the respondents right
against double jeopardy on the
theory that he has already been
practically acquitted when the trial
court quashed the Information?
Did the trial court act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion when it
sustained respondents motion to
quash on the basis of a fact
contrary to those alleged in the
information?
Held:
The Orders of the RTC as
well as the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals were set aside.
The criminal case isremandedto
the
trial
court
for
further
proceedings.
1. Well settled is the rule that for
Contrary
to
the
petitioners
contention, a reading of the
information will disclose that the
essential elements of the offense
charged are sufficiently alleged.It
is not proper therefore to resolve
the charges at the very outset, in a
preliminary hearing only and
without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The issues require a fuller
examination.
GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR v.
DINDO VIVAR Y GOZONG.R.
NO. 134744. JANUARY 16, 2001
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MOTION TO
QUASH/LACK
OF
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
NOT
A
GROUND FOR MOTION TO
QUASH
Doctrine:
Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. It is a a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial. To deny their
claim
to
a
preliminary
investigation would be to deprive
them of the full measure of their
right to due process.
The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective, and
the
trial
court,
instead
of
dismissing the information, should
hold in abeyance the proceedings
Issues:
A. Whether or not the court
motupropio
order
the
dismissal of the two (2)
criminal cases for serious
physical injuries and grave
threats on the ground that
the public prosecutor failed
to conduct a preliminary
investigation?
B. Whether or not the failure of the
public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary
investigation
be
considered a ground to quash the
criminal informations for serious
physical injuries and grave threats
filed
against
the
accusedrespondent?
Held:
A. No, the absence of a
preliminary
investigation
does not impair the validity
of
the
information
or
otherwise
render
it
defective. Neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the
court or constitute a ground
for
quashing
the
information. The trial court,
instead of dismissing the
information, should hold in
abeyance the proceedings
and
order
the
public
prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary
investigation.
Hence, the RTC in this case
erred when it dismissed the
two criminal cases for
serious physical and grave
threats on the ground that
the public prosecutor had
failed
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation.
Furthermore, the Supreme
implead
the
People
of
the
Philippines as respondent in the
RTC and in the CA to enable the
public prosecutor or Solicitor
General, as the case may be, to
comment on the petitions. The
failure to implead is fatal to
petitioners cause.
Facts:
Private respondent Janice
Young-Chua and her husband,
Eduardo
Chan-Chua,
filed
a
complaint
for
replevin
and
damages
against
petitioners
William Madarang and Evans Kho
in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, and raffled to Branch
84.The complaint alleged that
private respondent is the owner of
a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car,
evidenced
by
Certificate
of
Registration and that petitioners,
through force and intimidation,
took possession of the subject car
by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale
dated December 3, 1993 allegedly
executed by private respondent in
favor of petitioner Madarang.
Upon
complaint
of
private
respondent, petitioner Madarang
was charged with Falsification of
Public
Document
in
the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (MeTC) and on the same day,
petitioners were charged with
Grave Coercion in the same MeTC
which was then raffled to the same
branch
.The
cases
were
consolidated and jointly tried.
Branch 84 then dismissed the
complaint for replevin upon finding
that the deed of sale is genuine
and
that
private
respondent
voluntarily surrendered possession
of the car to the petitioners, but
120
of
JUDGMENT
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
petitioners actions are tenable
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
petitioner may still file a motion
after a final judgment has been
rendered by the Court
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
petitioners may be convicted of a
different crime charged in the
information?
appellant
were
inside
the
bedroom, he went on top of her
and rubbed his penis against her
vaginal orifice until he ejaculated.
She likewise stated in open court
that on May 27, 2001, while inside
their comfort room, appellant
rubbed his penis against her
vagina while they were in a
standing
position.
In
both
instances,
there
was
no
penetration, or even an attempt to
insert his penis into her vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant
are covered by the definitions of
"sexual abuse" and "lascivious
conduct" under Section 2(g) and
(h) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases promulgated to
implement the provisions of R.A.
7610. Following the variance
doctrine, appellant can be found
guilty of the lesser crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against
a child.
Appellant is likewise guilty of
two
counts
of
Acts
of
Lasciviousness under Section 5(b),
Article III, R.A. 7610 committed
against AAA on the second week of
August 1999 and on the first week
of September 1999. AAA testified
that in August, appellant, with
lewd design, inserted his hands
inside her shirt then fondled her
breasts; and in September, he
forced her to hold his penis until
he ejaculated.
The
Supreme
Court
is
mindful of the fact that appellant
was specifically charged in an
Information
for
Acts
of
Lasciviousness
defined
and
Dinglasan,
Appeals
Jr.
vs.
Court
of
Philippine Rabbit
Inc., vs. People
Bus
Lines,
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
employer may appeal the judgment
of conviction independently of the
accused.
Magestrado v. People
G.R. No. 148072
July 10, 2007
Topic: Appeal
Doctrine: Certiorari generally lies
only when there is no appeal nor
any
other
plain,
speedy
or
adequate remedy available to
petitioners.
Ruling:
The
Supreme
Court
affirmed the decision of CA.
Resolution or dismissal in
special civil actions, as in the
instant petition, may be appealed
under Section 10, Rule 44 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
not by petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the same rules.
The Supreme Court said that
correct procedural recourse for
petitioner was appeal, not only
because RTC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners Petition for
Certiorari in but also because RTC
Order of dismissal was a final
order from which petitioners
should
have
appealed
in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Court. An
order or a judgment is deemed
final when it finally disposes of a
Ruling:
The
Supreme
Court
granted the Motions to Withdraw
Appeal of the accused-appellants.
3. Uy de Baron vs CA and
People
G.R. No. 140719, Oct. 26,
2001
Doctrine:
The Court held that there
was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals
when it reinstated the appeal
which it earlier dismissed.
Grave abuse of discretion
implies
such
capricious
and
whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
or in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. But where
the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the orders or
decision
upon
all
questions
pertaining to the cause are orders
or decisions within its jurisdiction
and however erroneous they may
be, they cannot be corrected by
certiorari.
It cannot be said that
respondent Court of Appeals acted
capriciously,
arbitrarily
and
whimsically considering that "the
rule is always in favor of liberality
in construction so that the real
matter
in
dispute
may
be
submitted to judgment of the
court. Imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure should
be disregarded, unless substantial
rights
would
prejudiced.
otherwise
be
unreasonable
searches
seizures may not be made.
6. Advincula vs CA
G.R. No. 75310, Jan. 16,
1987
Doctrine:
In securing and transferring
court
stenographic
notes,
it
devolves upon the Government and
not on the defendant to cause to be
kept, and in case of an appeal by
the defendant, to be sent to the
Appellate Court, a complete record
of the proceedings in the Court of
First Instance. When the record so
sent is deficient the appeal will not
be dismissed on motion of the
Government. When the record sent
in a criminal case does not contain
all the testimony given in the Court
below, and the testimony lacking
cannot be obtained, the case must
be remanded to the Court below
for a new trial to the extent of the
missing evidence.
Topic: Search and Seizure
1. People vs. Aruta
G.R. No. 120915, April 3,
1998
Doctrine:
Search warrants to be valid
must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The
purpose of this rule is to limit the
things to be seized to those and
only those, particularly described
in the warrant so as to leave the
officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize to the end that
and