JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS
and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL
G.R. No. 136368
January 16, 2002
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Jaime Tan, for a consideration of
P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the property,
parcel of land, with an area of 34,829 square meters, situated in
Bunawan, Davao City in his name, in favor of spouses Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into
another agreement whereunder Tan given one (1) year within which
to redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to
exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the property until his
death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the Regional Trial
Court at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation
of instrument. The complaint alleged that, while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute
sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped 'received,'
the Magdangals were able to have Tan's title over the lot in
question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470.
This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later
substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a
supplemental complaint. On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered judgment finding for
Tan, Jr. wherein the judgment was rendered that the plaintiff is
ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of
this decision.
The Magdangals appealed to this Court and in a decision
promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru its then
Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the
lower court.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the
Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision has, on October 21, 1995,
become final and executory.
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court
a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein
alleging that they did not appeal from the aforesaid decision of this
Court, adding '[T]hat the appealed judgment of the Court of
Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October 5,

1995 or up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption

period commences.
In opposition to this motion, Tan, Jr. alleged, among other
things, that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the
Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the
appealed decision of the court a quo in this case cannot be
considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing
Cueto vs. Collantes, infra., would then assert that the period of
redemption on his part commenced to run from receipt of entry of
judgment.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March
27, 1996, which he filed directly with this court, prayed this court to
direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution
of the civil case. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the court a quo of
his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact
that, on such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the
repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original decision.
By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the Magdangals be ordered to
claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the Magdangals,
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided
by the respondent judge denied the motions for lack of merit.
The respondent judge wrote in the same order:
'Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et
al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120 days period for plaintiff to pay the amount
of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned from the date
of Entry of Judgment x x x which was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff
made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period
mandated by the decision of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration.
However, the respondent judge denied the motion for being
proforma and fatally defective.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably
obtained in the trial court by the petitioner.
RULING:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the
rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. - If no appeal or
motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time

provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall

forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
(2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall
be accompanied by a certified true copy of the entry of judgment
or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate officer for its
enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal
is filed in the Court of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of
the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting
such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from which the
case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment
or final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of
origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes
as follows:
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the
lower court that plaintiff can still exercise his right of redemption
notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day period fixed in the
original decision and, therefore, defendants should execute the
deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants contend
that, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals having been
entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day period for the exercise of the
right of redemption has long expired, it appearing that plaintiff
deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only on
October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee
brands this computation as erroneous, or one not in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by the rules of court.
Appellee's contention should be sustained. The original decision
provides that appellee may exercise his right of redemption within
the period of 90 days from the date the judgment has become final.
It should be noted that appellee had appealed from this decision.
This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals and final
judgment was entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the
judgment became final on that date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a
decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals a party may appeal

therefrom by certiorari by filing with the Supreme Court a petition

within 10 days from the date of entry of such decision (Section 1,
Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final,
i.e., upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the
parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as modified by a resolution of the
Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice Moran
has said, 'such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved party's right
of filing a petition for certiorari under this section,' which means
that 'the Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the lower court
for the execution of its judgment, only after the expiration of ten
(10) days from the date of such judgment, if no petition for
certiorari is filed within that period.' (1 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that the
date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is suspended
when a petition for review is filed to await the final entry of the
resolution or decision of the Supreme Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review
within the reglementary period, which was dismissed by resolution
of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for reconsideration the
entry of final judgment was made on August 7, 1953, it follows that
the 90-day period within which appellee may exercise his right of
redemption should be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And
appellee having exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by
depositing the redemption money with the clerk of court, it is
likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of such right
is well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower
court."
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the
rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as
follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration
of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought
to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse
party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution."
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D.
Regalado as follows:

"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on

whether it is used on the issue of appealability or on the issue of
binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it
disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order
which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053,
Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be
subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been
perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf.
Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987;
Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure
certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the appellate
court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of
origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without
waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That
motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing
when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any
objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters
which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and
which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the
judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due
to the experience of the appellate courts wherein the trial court, for
reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly
delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for execution
or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the
records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same
have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate court can
direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely
in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power to
require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of
judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property within the 120day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry
of judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old
rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied
the new rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the
case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given
retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well-delineated
exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and
forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying

laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules
of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law,
they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been
held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a
new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past.
Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes." The general rule against giving statutes
retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application
of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new
statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable
to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending
actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule does not
apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or
where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested
rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so
would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural
laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts."
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should NOT be given retroactive effect in this case as it
would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively
would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is
difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural
rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with

the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and
the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but
as petitioner claims, "it is the only property left behind by their
father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassin's
bullet."
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it
because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the
period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to
do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is
already vested.
The decision of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC of Davao City are REINSTATED.
Principle in this Case:

G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014

MARYLOU CABRERA, Petitioner, v. FELIX NG, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated October 21, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated March
26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03392. The
CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by Marylou Cabrera
(petitioner), which assailed the Order4 dated December 19, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in Civil
Case No. MAN-4773.
The Facts
On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for
sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner and her husband
Marionilo Cabrera (spouses Cabrera), alleging that the latter issued
to him the following: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0244694 dated June
30, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-One Thousand Pesos
(P31,000.00); (2) Metrobank Check No. 0244674 dated August 9,
2002 for the amount of Thirty-Eight Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos
and Seventy-Six Centavos (P38,074.76); and (3) Metrobank Check
No. 0244745 dated August 15, 2005 for Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). That when presented for
payment, the said checks were all dishonored as the accounts from
which
they
had
been
drawn
were
already
closed.

The spouses Cabrera admitted that they issued Metrobank Check

No. 0244694 and Metrobank Check No. 0244674 to the respondent
and that the same were dishonored when presented for payment.
However, they claimed that they paid the respondent the amount
represented by the said checks through the latters son Richard Ng.
Further, they deny having issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to
the respondent, alleging that the said check was forcibly taken from
them
by
Richard
Ng.
On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, 5 which ordered
the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent the following: (1) Two
Million Five Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos
(P2,569,074.00) plus legal interest from inception of the obligation
until fully paid; (2) moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00); (3) attorneys fees of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00); and (4) litigation expenses in the amount of Ten
Thousand
Pesos
(P10,000.00).
On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC
Decision dated August 7, 2007. On August 14, 2007, the spouses
Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, 6 which they
set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses
Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the
respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received by the
respondent
on
August
21,
2007.
The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on
August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court
had just assumed office. On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a
notice,7 which set the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on
September
25,
2007.
On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition 8 to the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The
respondent alleged that the said motion for reconsideration is a
mere scrap of paper since it violated the three-day notice
requirement. The respondent pointed out that the spouses Cabrera
sent to him a copy of their motion for reconsideration, which was
set for hearing on August 17, 2007, via registered mail on August
14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only on August
21, 2007 - four days after the scheduled hearing thereon.
It appears that the scheduled hearing of the spouses Cabreras
motion for reconsideration on September 25, 2007 did not push
through. Consequently, on September 26, 2007, the RTC issued
another notice,9 which set the said motion for reconsideration for

hearing

on

October

26,

2007.

On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order,10 which directed the
parties to file their additional pleadings, after which the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera would be deemed
submitted
for
resolution.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order 11 which denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The RTC
pointed out that the spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that every motion required to
be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three days before the
date of hearing. Thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, the court
opines that the motion was filed beyond the reglementary three (3)
[-]day
period.
As the records bear out, the instant motion was mailed to the
plaintiffs counsel on August 14[, 2007] and was set for hearing on
August 17, 2007. However, the copy of said motion had reached
plaintiffs side and a copy of which was received by plaintiffs
counsel only on August 17, 2007[,] four (4) days late after it was
supposed to be heard. Hence, a clear blatant violations [sic] of the
rule on notice and hearing.12crallawlibrary
The RTC further opined that a motion, which fails to comply with
the three-day notice requirement is a mere scrap of paper; it is not
entitled to judicial cognizance and would not toll the running of the
reglementary period for filing the requisite pleadings. Accordingly,
the RTC held, its Decision dated August 7, 2007 had already
become final for failure of the spouses Cabrera to comply with the
three-day
notice
requirement.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari13 with the CA,
alleging that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying her
motion for reconsideration. The petitioner pointed out that the RTC
did not actually conduct a hearing on her motion for
reconsideration on August 17, 2007; that her motion for
reconsideration was actually heard on October 26, 2007, after the
respondent had already filed his opposition thereto. Thus, the
petitioner claimed, the issue of her failure to comply with the threeday notice requirement had already been rendered moot. In any
case, the petitioner asserted, the RTC should have resolved her
motion for reconsideration on its merits rather than simply denying
it
on
mere
technicality.

On October 21, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed

Decision,14 denied the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner.
The CA opined that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera since it
merely applied the three-day notice requirement under Section 4,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It appears that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was set for
hearing on 17 August 2007. A copy thereof was mailed to private
respondent on 14 August 2007, and private respondent actually
received his copy only on 21 August 2007 or four (4) days after the
set date of hearing; and thus, depriving him of the opportunity to
oppose the motion. Respondent court, therefore, correctly held that
such motion violated the three (3)-day notice rule; the essence of
due process. Respondent court had applied said rule to the given
situation, and of no doubt, mere adherence to the rules cannot be
considered grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
court. x x x.15 (Citation omitted)
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated
October 21, 2009 but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution16 dated
March
26,
2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred
in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.
The Courts Ruling
The

petition

is

meritorious.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide

that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every
written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing
on
shorter
notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed

to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion. (Emphasis ours)
The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in
motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory.
It is an integral component of procedural due process. 17 The
purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was
established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the
adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it
sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the
arguments
interposed
therein.18crallawlibrary
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court
has no authority to act upon. 19 Being a fatal defect, in cases of
motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to
appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency. 20crallawlibrary
Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and
fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the
opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the
pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the
three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the
requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied
with. Thus, in Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation,21 the Court ruled that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of
the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal
observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse
party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed,
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules
should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate
rather
than
promote
substantial
justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there
was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if
the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the
adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved
until after several postponements of which the parties were duly
notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,

the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion
for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had
the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to
the motion. The Court held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the
requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to
comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice
of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due process,
the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended
for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for
the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon
the adverse party, who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of
the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity
to
be
heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well
as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x
x x22 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration
filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due
notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that the
motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two
months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the
said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The
respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and
to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed,
the respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September
20,
2007.
Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said
motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the
spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process
was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his
position. Thus, the RTC erred in denying the spouses Cabreras

motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply

with
the
three-day
notice
requirement.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2009
and the Resolution dated March 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03392, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the spouses Cabrera on the merits within five (5) days from
the finality of this Decision.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450
- - April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in
the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin
Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to
the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took
effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction
over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more
than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and
throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never raised the
question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals'
adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court
is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the
pendency
of
the
appeal
will
prosper.
RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in

different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel
in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not
be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).
And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963
(supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs.

Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al.,

vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of
the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on
its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire
record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better
than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution
against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity
Company, Inc.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
LUCIABAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
bondingcompany and defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against
spouses Sibonghanoyto recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00
with legal interest. A writ of attachment was
issued by the court against the defendants properties but the
same was soon diss

olved.After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs and after the same hadbecome final and executor, the
court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. Thewrit
being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of the writ
of execution against
the Suretys bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the
writ on the ground that the
same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the
RTC. The Suretyappealed in the CA, which was denied. This time,
the surety just asked for an extension inorder for them to file the
motion for reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion
forreconsideration, it filed a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue
of R.A. 296 which is theJudiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section
88 of which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil action where the value of the subject matter
does notexceed P2,000.00. The Court of First Instance therefore has
no jurisdiction over the case. Thequestion of jurisdiction was filed
by the Surety only 15 years from the time the action
wascommenced in the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK
OF JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on themerits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court. The ruleis that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by
law asby law and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of thecase, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. However, considering thefacts and
circumstances of the present cases, a party may be barred by
laches frominvolving this plea for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of annulling everything done
in the case. A party cannot invoke a courts jurisdiction and later on
deny it to escape a
penalty.
Figueroa vs.People
Facts: Figueroa, convicted for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide in RTC Bulacan, questioned the trial courts jurisdiction
first time on appeal before the CA. CA affirmed conviction. It said
that Figueroa actively participated in RTC trial, hence, he is already
estopped
by
laches.
Issue: Whether or not Figueroa can no longer question jurisdiction
of
the
RTC.
Held: Yes.

Jurisdiction

may

be

questioned.

The general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason
is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment
on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the
averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no
way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. At
that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
attach. The principle in Sibonghanoy case does not apply.
We note that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law. It is to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and
only
in
extraordinary circumstances.
The doctrine must
be appliedwith great care and the equity must be strong in its
favor.
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESJULY 14, 2008NACHURA,
J.SUBJECT AREA:
Estoppel by laches
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. TheRTC found him guilty. In his appeal before
the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questionedRTCs jurisdiction
on the case.The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that
the principle of estoppel by laches hasalready precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein
and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.The
petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absentherein, the
principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case,constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid
down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding thefact that said
issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA
HELD:
No.
RATIO:

Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a
general rule, the issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or by
estoppel.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to
that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for
the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
that is,lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that theparty entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a
stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA.
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional casebecause of the presence of
laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in
Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the
receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt,promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
said courts jurisdiction based onprocedural infirmity in initiating
the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive
toshow cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a
single piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as an
active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to
disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
consequences that impelled her to comply.
The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in
his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, noconsiderable
period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is
dismissed.
CALIMLIM
Vs HON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may e
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said
corporation. Not eing the registered owner and the title not
eing in his possession! Manuel Magali failed to comply with the
order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This
prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an e"#parte

petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new

title in its name. The said petition was granted y the respondent
Court and the $egister of %eeds of &angasinan issued a new title in
the name of the corporation! TCT No. 8(8. &etitioner! upon
learning that her husand's title o)er the parcel of land had een
cancelled! filed a petition with the respondent Court! sitting as a
cadastral court! praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 8(8 ut
the court dismissed the petition.&etitioner thereafter filed in the
*$C $ecord No. 39+9, for the cancellation of TCT No. 8(8 ut the
same was dismissed therein. &etitioners then resorted to the filing
of a complaint in for the cancellation of the con)eyances and sales
that had een made with respect to the property! co)ered y TCT
No. 9138! against -rancisco $amos who claimed to ha)e ought the
property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. &ri)ate
respondent -rancisco $amos! howe)er! failed to otain a title o)er
the property in his name in )iew of the e"istence of an ad)erse
claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein
petitioners. -rancisco $amos filed a Motion to %ismiss on the
ground that the same is arred y prior udgement or y statute
of limitations. $esol)ing the said Motion! the respondent Court
dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel y prior udgment.
Issue
/0N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel y
prior udgment No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the
petition filed y the herein petitioner in *$C $ecord No. 39+9, for
the cancellation of TCT No. 8(8 as a ar y prior udgment
against the filing of the suseuent ci)il case. In order to a)ail of
the defense of res udicata! it must e shown! among others!
that the udgment in the prior action must ha)e een rendered
y a court with the proper urisdiction to ta2e cogniance of the
proceeding in which the prior udgment or order was rendered. If
there is lac2 of urisdiction o)er the suect#matter of the suit
or of the parties! the udgment or order cannot operate as an
adudication of the contro)ersy. This essential element of the
defense of ar y prior udgment or res udicata does not e"ist
in the case.The petition filed y the petitioners in *$C $ecord No.
39+9, was an apparent in)ocation of the authority of the
respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. $eliance was
apparently placed on 4ection 11, of the *and $egistration 5ct
wherein it pro)ides that a Court of -irst Instance! acting as a land
registration court! is a court of limited and special urisdiction. 5s
such! its proceedings are not adeuate for the litigation of issues
pertaining to an ordinary ci)il action! such as! uestions in)ol)ing
ownership or title to real property.
CALIMLIM

vs
.
HON. RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 118 SCRA 399
VASQUEZ,
J.:
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said
corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being
in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of
the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted
Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to
declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its
name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name
of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that
her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed
a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court,
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court
dismissed the petition. Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record
No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was
dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a
complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that
had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No.
9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the
property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over
the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse
claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein
petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of
limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court
dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment
Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the
herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of
TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the
subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res
judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the

prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior
judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or
order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This
essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case. The petition filed by the
petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of
the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration
court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the
litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as,
questions involving ownership or title to real property.
Mangaliag v. Pastoral
Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the
RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint
alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious
injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their
tricycle with the petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump
truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses
amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by
way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost
income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested
his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the
principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls
within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the courts
jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual
damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral,
exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for
damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to
be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He
relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . .
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of

jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He

contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and
legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was
denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense
of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses,
excluding moral, nominal damages and attorneys fees, which
determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO
Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no
judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact,
as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to
dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent,
the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy.
What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of
jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is
an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this
case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of
jurisdiction: The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent
seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but
also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to
permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular
accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case
falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides
for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing
physical injuries. Private respondents claim for moral damages of
P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a

consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and

distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It
springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or
her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and
assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be
considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim
for actual damages and must be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of
quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the
claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it
can only award moral damages in an amount within its
jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of
the law.
(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but
was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether
a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from
the order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is
highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court,
the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court
of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition.
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual
allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the
trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of
these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the
parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not
triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy

of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the

appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law
involving the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order
to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow
petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first
instance.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was
filed from the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to
dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for
damages.)
Apolonia Banayad Frianela v. Servillano Banayad Jr.
Doctrine
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of
Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it
cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The lower court therefore
committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed
jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before
it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should
have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it
noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu
proprio by the courts.
Facts:
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad,
petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, for the
allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the
decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left
to her the following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated
in Pasay City and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741;
(2) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and
(3) all personal belongings.
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and
counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills
of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated
September 28, 1989.
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered
its Decision declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as

having revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former,
and appointing respondent as administrator of Moisess estate.
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision, modified
the decision of the trial court and ruled that the September 27,
1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18, 1985 will
insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real property
was concerned.
Issues: Won the lower courts have jurisdiction over the matter.
Held: IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack
of jurisdiction.
Ratio:
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and
void. With the above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
Sec. 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P) 129, is the applicable law,
which confers the jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate
proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which
must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of
Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it
cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed
gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite
the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset,
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the
dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the
courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case
on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned
by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Note: I know the facts does not provide any information regarding
the matter but rest assured the case did not provide for any facts
other than those that are copied and pasted.

The SC disregarded everything and focused on the fact that the

initial petition did not provide estimation of the estate to confer
jurisdiction to which court, making the petition void.
Boston equity v CA
(jurisdiction over the person)
Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo.Herein
respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May
1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in
which she alleged, among others, that her husband and codefendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result,
petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require
respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel.Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his
children as party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial
court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent
was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September
2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen
days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7
October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********; (2) that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3)
******
The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed
out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court
which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals
alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the petition.
Issue
W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo)
person?
Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired
through a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.
Citing the case of Sarsaba:
The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over ones person is a
defense which is personal to the person claiming it.Obviously, it is
now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his

death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of

Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed
against all of the defendants.
Boston equity v CA
Facts: ----- supra----Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?
Held:
Rule
3,
Section
7
of
the
1997
Rules
of
Court
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-ininterest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is

clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the
collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel
and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent
and
respondents
husband,
on
the
other,
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn)
promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x xx the sum of
PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x xx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable provision in this matter.