Spec pro digest

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file
the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus,
a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the
Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be

alleged and proved.Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

19. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA

JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

FACTS

Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law

wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her
mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC
of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two
children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was

able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992.
For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the
Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is

the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence,"
in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot
be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested
right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the
law.
56- Agtarap v Agtarap (June 8, 2011)

FACTS:

Decedent Joaquin left (2) parcels of land with improvements. He contracted

(2) marriages.

With Lucia (W1), who died 1924; three children, Jesus (+), Milagros (+),
Jose (+)
o Then with Caridad (W2), with three children, Eduardo, Sebastian,
Mercedes
Son Eduardo (W2) filed petition for settlement of Joaquins intestate estate.
RTC issued resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.
The RTC issued an Order of Partition on Oct 23, 2000 which ruled that bulk of
estate property were acquired during the existence of 2 nd marriage, TCTs
showing Joaquin married to Caridad.
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph & Teresa (Jose children) filed their
respective motions for reconsiderations. The RTC
o Denied Eduardo & Sebastian MRs
o Granted MR of Joseph & Teresa
o Declared real properties belonged to conjugal partnership of Joaquin &
Lucia and directed Oct Partition to reflect correct sharing of heirs
Eduardo & Sebastian both appealed to CA before RTC could issue new order
of partition. The CA dismissed the appeals and affirmed the RTC resolution.
The CA also directed the partition of Joaquins properties. Aggrieved,
Sebastian and Eduardo filed separate MRs which were denied. They filed
separate petitions for review which were eventually consolidated.
Sebastian contended that
o Joseph & Teresa failed to establish that they are legitimate heirs of
Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin
o Certificates of title of subject property indicate Joaquin married to
Caridad which is conclusive proof of ownership, and thus not subject
to collateral attack
Eduardo alleged
o CA erroneously settled Joaquins estate together with the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria and Milagros in one proceeding
o Estate of Milagros cannot be distributed, since a proceeding was
already conducted in another court for the probate of Milagros will,
thus violating the rule on precedence of testate over intestate
proceedings.
o RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction has no
jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership which belongs to
another court with general jursdiction
o

ISSUE:

RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of real

properties?
CA settlement of Joaquin estate together with the estates of the other heirs
Legitimacy of Joseph & Teresa

HELD:

Eduardos petition granted. Sebastians petition denied. CA affirmed with

modification that the
o share awarded in favor of Milagros shall not be distributed until the

final determination of the probate of the will .

Sebastian to be represented by wife and children, given demise in
2010
Case remanded to RTC for further settlement of Joaquins estate.
RTC has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of the real properties.
o Gen Rule: Jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with probate of will and or
settlement of estate of deceased persons and does not extend to
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.
o Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:
Probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
testate proceeding the question of inclusion or exclusion, from
inventory of a piece of property w/o prejudice to final
determination in a separate action
If interested parties are all heirs or question is one of
collation/advancement or parties consent to the assumption of
of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of 3P are not impaired
Estate is settled and distributed among heirs only after payment of debts of
the estate, funeral charges admin expenses, allowance to th widow, and
inheritance tax. Records show these were not complied with in 1965.
Sebastian did not present evidence to support averments to exclude Joseph
and Teresa as heirs.
CA disposition related only to the estate of Joaquin.
o Sec 1 Rule 90: RTC granted jurisdiction to determine lawful heirs of
Joaquin as well as respective shares in the payment of obligations
o The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes and Gloria was merely a
necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate, they
being his legal heirs.
o

LEE VS RTC

Facts:
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on 1956. At the time
of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate
children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed
Ortaez). <3 Peaches <3
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the companys
outstanding capital stock.
Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to FLAG.
The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate
among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by them.
The lower court declared the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in
the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the insurance company. Enderes filed an action
at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored the orders nullifying the sales of the
shares of stock. <3 Peaches <3
Issue:
WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void. (YES)

Ruling:

YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that

o (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and
o (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under NCC 533 which provides
that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of
death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him
in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication , that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may
only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. <3 Peaches <3

It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners
non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its
controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN
RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
[G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996, PUNO, J.:]
FACTS:
1. Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs
a. Edmond Ruiz only son
b. Maria Pilar Ruiz adopted daughter
c. Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all
daughters of Ruiz
2. Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
3. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among
Ruiz and respondents.
4. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
5. 4 years after Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the
deceaseds will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz
a. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence.
6. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons.
7. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit
and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property.
8. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate.
a. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00
9. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will
a. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00

10. Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds
a. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court
b. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters
c. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to
Edmonds lack of opposition
d. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as
may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible
from their share in the inheritance
11. CA sustained probate courts order.
ISSUE: W/N the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority:
1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren - NO
2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
HELD:
1. grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate.
a. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to
the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity
b. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of
the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations
3. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors
a. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
b. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make
such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.

4. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles
only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law
a. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his
motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August
26, 1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and
legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs
of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court
shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
5. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it
is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.
a. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of
court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair
and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real
estate taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release of additional funds for
the same reasons he previously cited
i. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of
the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favour
ii. petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income
from the Valle Verde property.
iii. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the
estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.

UNIONBANK V SANTIBANEZ
ISSUE: W/N the suit for collection of sum of money is mandatory or not?
HELD:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW (ATTY. RUBEN BALANE)

ARTICLES 774/776
Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228 |
Abu
FACTS:On
May
31,
1980,
the
First
Countryside
Credit
Corporation(FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan
agreement in theamount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended
for the paymentof one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view
thereof,Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annualamortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into
anotherloan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600
andone unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed
apromissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
laterloan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Testateproceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund
wasappointed as the special administrator of the estate. During
thependency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmundand his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein
theyagreed to divide between themselves and take possession of
thethree (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for
Florence.Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
fatherto FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Bank,wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to
UnionBank.Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund,
butthe latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bankfiled a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
EfraimSantibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City.Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
forEdmund was not served since he was in the United States andthere
was no information on his address or the date of his return tothe

Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the

loandocuments did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto.Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brotherEdmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null
andvoid; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the
jointagreement.Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased
hadpassed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
providedin Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional
signingof the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she
cannotdeny her liability under the said document.In her comment to
the petition, Florence maintains thatUnion Bank is trying to recover a
sum of money from the deceasedEfraim Santibaez; thus the claim
should have been filed with theprobate court. She points out that at
the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an
existing probateproceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement
wasvoluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should
stillhave been subjected to the approval of the court as it
mayprejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.ISSUE:W/N the
claim of Union Bank should have been filed with theprobate court
before which the testate estate of the late EfraimSantibaez was
pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund andFlorence (which
was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was voidconsidering that it had
not been approved by the probate court.W/N there can be a valid
partition among the heirs before the will isprobated.HELD:Well-settled
is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, todetermine whether they should or
should not be included in theinventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court isprimarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation anddistribution of the estate.In our
jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no validpartition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. Inthe present case, Efraim
left a holographic will which contained theprovision which reads as
follows (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own andmay
be discovered later after my demise, shall bedistributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediatelypreceding paragraph in favor
of Edmund and Florence, mychildren. The above-quoted is an allencompassing provisionembracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might haveescaped his mind at that time he was
making his will, and otherproperties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are thethree (3) subject tractors. This being so, any

partition involving thesaid tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreementexecuted by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors amongthemselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of
itsexecution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probateof their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by thedecedent. The
bank, purportedly a creditor of the late EfraimSantibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probatecourt in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money
claim against the decedents estate inthe probate court is mandatory.
This requirement is for the purposeof protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executoror administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him toexamine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper onewhich should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule isthe speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the earlydelivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs.Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein
could holdFlorence accountable for any liability incurred by her late
father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissorynotes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed andsigned only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. Asthe petitioner failed to file its money claim with the
probate court,at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedentunder the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.