G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.

*
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
FACTS:
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. RupertoVillareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.
ISSUE:
What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known?
Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution or are they considered
public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.
RULING:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the
subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED.
No. L-46729. November 19, 1982.*
AYOG, petitioners, vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I, respondents.MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, intervenors.
FACTS:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc.
on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio
Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August
30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their
improvements. No appeal was made from that decision.
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on
February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit
(accionpubliciana).
ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a
private corporation from purchasing public lands) is applicable in the case at
bar.
RULING:
NO. There is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional
prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of
the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case
and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.

Lee Hong Kok V. David (1972)

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972 Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

Imperium v. Dominium
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government
FACTS:
Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and
for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.

On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on
August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga
City on October 21, 1959.

Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
always sustained the public character for having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)

The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:
1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO
2. W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made
in his favor by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and
the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are
not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as
their private property.

Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered
property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has
likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5 years.

Imperium v. Dominium
1. Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty
Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Republic vs. CA
Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La Rosa G.R. No. L-43938, April 15,
1988
Cruz, J.:
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose
de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated
in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of
prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22,
1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of
the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its
annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover,
by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of ownership.

Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The
land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is
true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but
this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by
the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such
as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this
by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the subsurface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not
only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to
be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if
only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not
of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both
mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in
the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose
that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of
course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Carino V. Insular Government

(1909)
212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909 Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution
FACTS:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his
petition for application

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by
the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts andused parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for
pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only established
possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts
the Province of Benguet among others from its operation
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration. HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as
to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas,
which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh
Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh
Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs: Whether or not Oh Cho had title Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of
registration
HELD: Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the
lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not
entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa
decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the
land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most
they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to
Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by
prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by
prescription.