[G.R. No. 135496.

July 30, 2002]

LONGOS RURAL WATERWORKS AND SANITATION ASSOCIATION, INC.
(LRWSAI) represented by MIGUEL ORTEGA and ANDRES D. MANUEL,
SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman; VIRGILIO ORTEGA, AMANDO BORLONGAN, JR., ARMANDO
SILOT, SERVANDO SANTOS, EVELYN AQUINO and VIRGILIO
AQUINO, respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which we will treat as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Resolution of the
Ombudsman (OMB) dated May 29, 1998 ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint
filed against the private respondents and the Resolution dated August 14, 1998 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Facts:
Acting on the recommendation of Ombudsman-Luzon, an Information was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 22) charging herein private
respondents Barangay Captain Virgilio Ortega and other barangay officials,
namely: Amando Borlongan, Jr., Armando Silot, Servando Santos, Evelyn Aquino and
Virgilio Aquino, with Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act[1] as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, public officers, committing the crime herein charged in relation to
their official functions and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith did then and there
willfully, unlawfully take-over the operation and management of the Longos Rural
Waterworks and Sanitation Association, Inc. (LRWSA) from the de facto Board of Directors
of LRWSA, thereby causing undue injury to the said de facto Board of Directors and to the
public as well and at the same time giving themselves unwarranted benefits to the
damage and prejudice of the de facto Board of Directors.
Private respondents moved for a reinvestigation of the case claiming that they are
going to present additional documentary evidence and other witnesses which are in the
nature of newly discovered evidence. The RTC granted the motion, thus, the case was
referred back to OMB-Luzon for reinvestigation. Further hearing of the case was held in
abeyance. In an Order dated November 24, 1997, OMB-Luzon reversed its prior
recommendation calling for the indictment of private respondents and ordered the
dismissal of the case. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioners Miguel

Ortega and Andres Manuel, Sr., OMB-Luzon denied the same and the Order of dismissal is
affirmed. Consequently, petitioners filed an appeal-request with the Office of the
Ombudsman, Central Office which denied the same, ratiocinating thus:
It is submitted that with the indorsement (to the Office of the Provincial prosecutor of
Bulacan, for appropriate action) by this Office of its resolution (as far back as January of
this year) recommending the withdrawal of the information against the accused, this
Office is therefore constrained not to act on the request of herein complainants for, as
earlier stated, there is no indication on whether: (a) the court has (already) acted on the
(OMB-Luzon) recommendation to withdraw the information or if (b) complainants
sought leave of court before filing instant motion for reconsideration cum-letter-appeal,
in view of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information. In turn, as above stated, the filing of the said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission
of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations
of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.[2]
The Motion for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction to public
respondent Ombudsman, petitioners filed the present petition arguing:
1) that leave of court is not necessary before they could file a Motion for
Reconsideration from the November 24, 1997 Order of the OMB-Luzon inasmuch
as the said Order was not yet final; and
2) that respondents were not duly clothed with authority at the time they forcibly
took the operation of the LWRSA from the petitioners.
In support of their first argument, petitioners insist that there is nothing in Crespo v.
Mogul[3] which required that the court should first act on the recommendation of the
Ombudsman to dismiss the case or that prior leave of court should be made before
petitioner can move for a reconsideration of the decision of the OMB-Luzon.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pursuant to the aforestated
OMB Resolution. But the RTC was informed of the present petition, thus, it issued an Order
holding in abeyance the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss pending the outcome of herein
petition.
As we stated in the Crespo case: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal
for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the Information in the proper

court. In turn, the filing of said Information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case,
at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation, the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper
in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. [4]
In the present case, it is the RTC not the OMB which ordered the reinvestigation upon
motion for reinvestigation filed by respondents. The RTC referred the case back to OMBLuzon.[5]The RTC was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material
evidence and determine whether the Information it had filed should stand. [6]
Thus, there should be a final resolution of the OMB on the matter. In other words, there
is no need to seek permission from the court to file a motion for reconsideration for this
remedy is allowed by the Rules of OMB.[7]
However, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was not based on this
technicality alone but the OMB proceeded to delve on the merits, thus:
The basis for the indictment of respondents-accused was the alleged forcible takeover of
LRSWA [sic] operations and its premises, which occurrence was entered in to the police
blotter of Balagtas, Bulacan. However, as discussed in the November 24, 1997 of GIO II
Gongon, when respondents took over the water system in the barangay, they were duly
clothed with authority.. by the LRWSA. Complainants under the facts as ascertained no
longer have the authority to continue operating the water system as their de facto position
had already been superseded with the election of the regular members of the Board of
Directors of LRWSA. x x x There is the absence in this case of any act where respondents
caused injury to complainants(o)n the other hand, complaints have not established their
rightful authority to operate the water system which apparently they had lost.
Anent the charge that respondent barangay officers forcibly destroyed the lock of the door
of the pumping station, suffice it to say that with the sworn statement of Genario Ambrocio
stating that it was he alone who unlocked the said door (accompanied by other LRWSA
members and without interference from the barangay officials), said allegation has been
substantially controverted.[8]
The above findings are now being questioned by petitioners arguing that there is
enough evidence to warrant indictment of respondents.
We are not persuaded. The assailed findings is a factual finding which deserves due
respect.[9] In Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. [10] we had the occasion to rule that we
cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the respondents:

As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our
duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions[11] to this rule, none of
which are obtaining in the case now before us.
The exceptions to the rule are as follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v.
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v.
Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
62);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil.
62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962;
Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied. [12]
We do not find in this case any of the exceptions enumerated above. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to warrant a deviation from the general rule.

Since the Information has already been filed, the final arbiter on whether or not to
proceed with the case is the RTC as earlier discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150925

May 27, 2004

SPOUSES JAMES TAN and FLORENCE TAN, petitioners,

vs.
CARMINA, REYNALDO, YOLANDA and ELISA, all surnamed MANDAP, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 dated August 10, 2001, of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59694, which affirmed in toto the decision,2 dated March 25, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 89-50263. The trial court
declared the sale of properties between Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and the spouses Crispulo
and Elenita Vasquez simulated and thus void, and hence, the subsequent sale between the
Vasquez spouses and petitioners herein, the spouses James and Florence Tan, similarly
void. Likewise assailed by the petitioners is the resolution 3 dated November 23, 2001 of
the appellate court, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
The respondents are the legitimate children of the marriage of Dionisio Mandap, Sr.,
and Maria Contreras Mandap. When the Mandap spouses parted ways, their children
opted to stay with Maria. To help support the children, Maria filed Civil Case No. E02380 in the former Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for the
dissolution and separation of the conjugal partnership.
Two separate lots, each with an area of 88 square meters covered by TCT Nos. 44730 and
55847, respectively, located in Felix Huertas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, with improvements
thereon, were adjudicated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in favor of
Dionisio Mandap, Sr.
Meanwhile, Dionisio Mandap, Sr., until his death on October 2, 1991 at age 64, lived with
Diorita Dojoles, with whom he had two children. He suffered from diabetes since 1931,
became totally blind in 1940, and was crippled for about 10 years until his death.
However, before his death on May 25, 1989, he conveyed the subject properties to his

common-law wifes sister, Elenita Dojoles Vasquez; and her husband, Crispulo Vasquez. As
a result of this sale, TCT Nos. 44730 and 55847 were cancelled and TCT Nos. 186748 and
186749 covering the subject properties were issued in the name of Elenita Vasquez
married to Crispulo Vasquez.
On September 11, 1989, the Vasquez spouses conveyed the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 186748 in favor of petitioners. TCT No. 188862 covering the subject lot was then
issued in favor of the latter.
On September 5, 1989, prior to the sale to petitioners, the respondents filed an action for
cancellation of title with damages, before the RTC of Manila against Diorita Dojoles and the
Vasquez spouses, alleging that the sale of subject properties by their father was fictitious,
and without any consideration. Further, the consent of their father was vitiated due to his
physical infirmities. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-50263.
On February 15, 1991, respondents filed a supplemental complaint, this time against the
spouses Tan, for the nullification of the sale to the latter of subject lot.
On March 25, 1998, the trial court decided Civil Case No. 89-50263 in favor of the herein
respondents. The decretal part of its judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 89-50263
1. Declaring the Deeds of Sale (Exh. "A" and "A-1"; "B" and "B-1") both dated
May 25, 1989 executed in favor of Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo
Vasquez as null and void and of no legal force and effect whatsoever;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 186748 (Exh.
"K" to "K-2") and TCT No. 186749 (Exh. "L" and "L-1") registered in the name
of Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo Vasquez having been issued thru a
void and inexistent contract; further ordering the reconveyance of said title to
the Estate of Dionisio Mandap, Sr.;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs or the Estate of Dionisio Mandap, Sr., to reimburse or
return the sum of P570,000.00 representing the purchase price of the subject
lot, plus legal rate of interest starting from the rendition of this decision until
fully paid;
4. Ordering the defendants Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez and Diorita
Dojoles to jointly and severally reimburse or return the fruits or earnings in
the mentioned lots in the form of rentals which is hereby fixed at P10,000.00
per month from the date this complaint was filed until defendants restore
and/or surrender the subject premises to the Estate of Dionisio Mandap, Sr.;

5. Ordering the defendants Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez and Diorita
Dojoles to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs of this suit.
IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AGAINST SPOUSES JAMES AND FLORENCE TAN
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1989 (Exh. "Q" and "7",
Tan) executed by Elenita Vasquez married to Crispulo Vasquez as null and
void and of no force and effect whatsoever, the vendor having no valid title to
dispose of the same;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 188862 issued
in the name of James Tan, the source of which having been declared null and
void;
3. Ordering Spouses Crispulo and Elenita Vasquez to return the sum
of P1,000,000.00 representing the purchase price of the lot covered by TCT
No. 188862 with legal rate of interest from the date of this decision;
4. Ordering defendants James and Florence Tan to jointly and severally pay
the sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
IN BOTH CASES THE COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.4
From the above judgment, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59694 on the ground that the trial court erred in not declaring them to be buyers in good
faith and in not sustaining the validity of their title, TCT No. 188862.
In its decision dated August 10, 2001, the Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of
merit and affirmed in toto the lower court decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeals interposed by appellants Dojoles, Sps. Vasquez and Sps.
James and Florence Tan is without merit; the Decision of the lower court dated
March 25, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court.
Hence, this petition for review, submitting the following issues for our resolution:

I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
INSTANT PETITION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE BETWEEN MANDAP SR. AND THE VASQUEZES IS VALID.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE BETWEEN THE VASQUEZES AND PETITIONERS IS
VALID.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS [FEES] HAS LEGAL BASIS. 6
Anent the first issue, the petitioners submit that having been made parties-defendants by
respondents via the supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50263, they have the
right to appeal to this Court the adverse ruling of the appellate court against them, even if
their co-defendants did not appeal the said ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Respondents counter that petitioners have no legal personality to appeal the decision of
the appellate court voiding the sale between Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and the Vasquez
spouses. They contend that inasmuch as the latter did not appeal the questioned decision,
it had become final and executory. Respondents contend that petitioners, not being privy
to said sale, cannot invoke its validity.
We find for petitioners on this issue. The trial court voided the petitioners sale of subject
lot, and on appeal that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, as aggrieved
parties, petitioners may elevate to the Supreme Court the controversy within the
prescriptive period for appeal.7 They possess locus standi, or legal personality, to seek a
review by this Court of the decision by the appellate court which they assail. Note that
while petitioners elevated the trial courts decision to the appellate court, their codefendants in Civil Case No. 89-50263 did not do so. Thus, the trial courts decision
became final and executory only as to petitioners co-defendants in the trial court who did
not appeal, namely Diorita Dojoles and the Vasquez spouses.
With regard to the second issue, the petitioners insist the essential requisites of a contract
of sale have been satisfied, namely, (1) consent of the contracting parties, (2) object
certain, and (3) cause or consideration therefor. They have been satisfied first in the sale
by Mandap, Sr., of the lots to the Vasquez spouses and subsequently, in the sale by the
Vasquezes to petitioners. Hence, petitioners contend that it was error for the appellate
court to declare the sale to them of the subject lot null and void.

After careful consideration of the submission of the parties, we find in favor of

respondents. Petitioners contentions lack merit.
At the time Dionisio Mandap, Sr., purportedly sold the lots in question to the Vasquez
spouses, he was already totally blind and paralyzed. He could not possibly have read the
contents of the deeds of sale. He could not have consented to a contract whose terms he
never knew nor understood. It cannot be presumed Mandap, Sr., knew the contents of the
deeds of sale disposing of his properties. Article 1332 of the Civil Code is applicable in
these circumstances, to wit:
ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract
must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
As the party seeking to enforce the contract, the petitioners should have presented
evidence showing that the terms of the deeds of sale to the Vasquez spouses were fully
explained to Mandap, Sr. But petitioners failed to comply with the strict requirements of
Article 1332, thereby casting doubt on the alleged consent of the vendor. Since the vendor
in this case was totally blind and crippled at the time of the sale, entirely dependent on
outside support, every care to protect his interest conformably with Article 24 of the Civil
Code must be taken. Article 24 is clear on this.
ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Petitioners presented no evidence disproving that (1) Mandap, Sr. was totally blind and
suffering from acute diabetes such that he could no longer discern the legal consequences
of his acts, and (2) that undue influence was exerted upon him, which vitiated his consent.
It is true that he who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it. However, since fraud
and undue influence are alleged by respondents, the burden shifts 8 to petitioners to prove
that the contents of the contract were fully explained to Mandap, Sr. Nothing, however,
appears on record to show that this requirement was complied with. Thus, the
presumption of fraud and undue influence was not rebutted.
More important, evidence on record, in our view, prove the existence of fraud. On August
1, 1990, commissioners appointed by the lower court conducted an ocular inspection
concerning the physical condition of Mandap, Sr. He stated on that occasion that he
received P550,000 as first payment, another P550,000 as second payment,
and P1,550,000 the remaining balance of the total selling price of what was loaned to the
vendees. However, in the deeds of sale covering the subject properties, the prices
indicated were P250,000 and P320,000, respectively or a total of only P570,000. This
inconsistency in the amount of the consideration is unexplained. They point to fraud in the
sale of the subject properties, to the prejudice of Mandap, Sr.

Petitioners do not dispute the fact that the notary public who notarized the deeds of sale
was not duly commissioned. But they contend the deeds validity were not affected.
However, it bears stressing that even an apparently valid notarization of a document does
not guarantee its validity.9 The crucial point here is that while Mandap, Sr., testified that he
executed the deeds of sale in Las Pias, the said documents were actually notarized in
Manila. Mandap, Sr., did not personally appear before a notary public. Yet the documents
stated the contrary. Such falsity raises doubt regarding the genuineness of the vendors
alleged consent to the deeds of sale.
Petitioners also claim the purchase price was not grossly inadequate so as to invalidate
the sale of subject properties. True, mere inadequacy of the price does not necessarily
void a contract of sale. However, said inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in
the vendors consent.10 More important, it must be pointed out that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals voided the sale of the subject properties not because the price was
grossly inadequate, but because the presumptions of fraud and undue influence exerted
upon the vendor had not been overcome by petitioners, the parties interested in enforcing
the contract.
On the third issue, petitioners argue that since the sale of subject properties by Mandap,
Sr. to the Vasquez spouses is valid, it follows that the subsequent sale of the property by
the latter to petitioners is also valid. But this contention cannot be sustained, since we find
that based on the evidence on record, the sale in favor of the Vasquez spouses is void.
Hence, it follows that the sale to petitioners is also void, because petitioners merely
stepped into the shoes of the Vasquez spouses. Since the Vasquezes as sellers had no
valid title over the parcel of land they sold, petitioners as buyers thereof could not claim
that the contract of sale is valid.
On the last issue, petitioners contest the award of attorneys fees. Indeed, no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate, and not every winning party is entitled to an
automatic grant of attorneys fees.11 The party must show that he falls under one of the
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In this particular case, the award of attorneys fees is just and equitable, considering the
circumstances herein. The court a quos order to pay P15,000 as attorneys fees does not
appear to us unreasonable but just and equitable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 10, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59694, which sustained the decision dated March 25,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE
OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA.
PILAR
SANTIAGO
CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,
Petitioners,

and

- versus -

G.R. No. 179859

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,** and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD

SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF
RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
TOMAS SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO,
ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,
GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION SOCO,
Oppositors.

Promulgated:
August 9, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana Lopez, the
second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore

two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio

and

his second wife

had

six

offsprings,

Tomas,

Cipriano,

Ricardo,

respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente,
and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second
marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan [2] a
petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The will was
admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:

xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at
mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at
lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang MalolosPaombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na
nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit
ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang
kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat bahay sa
Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.

f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay

ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo,
Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang
pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa
araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at
pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang
ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon,
bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang
ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa
kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at
kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia
Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang parepareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng
pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong
(20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma.
Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing
mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga
gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping
manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)[3]
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife, were, on
their motion, allowed to intervene.[4]
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will,[5] the probate court approved the will by Order
of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register
the certificates of title indicated therein. [6] Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837,
7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the
name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente. [7]
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention [8] with the probate court,
alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with whom he
had no child; and that Basilios will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code. [9]
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous
approval of the Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance with the Will. [10]

The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for

completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562M-90,[11]against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that
they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their legitime was reduced. [12]They
thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be
conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all
the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of
Civil Case No. 562-M-90.[13]
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime) in favor
of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by Decision of
January 25, 2002,[14] annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC Branch
17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978
Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case
No. 562-M-90.[15] Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Appeal
is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is
hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of
Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts decision in CA

G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which this Court
denied.[17] The denial became final and executory on April 9, 2003.[18]
In

the

interregnum,

or

on October

17,

2000,

respondent-heirs

of

the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
Names of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged
that:

x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject

properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should
have ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16,
1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to the named
legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named
legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also
rendered an accounting of their administration from such death of the
testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its
administration to the said legatees.
x x x x[20]

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

1)

To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their

names to [the] Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the
names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)

2)

To peacefully surrender possession and administration of

subject properties, including any and all improvements thereon,
to said legatees.

3)

To render an accounting of their administration of said

properties and other properties of the testator under their
administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago
on September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession
and administration thereof is transferred to said legatees. [21]

Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the subsequent
issuance of certificates of title covering the properties involved, the case had long since
been closed and terminated.[22]
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the
motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,[23] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of
the Legatees dated October 3, 2000filed by some heirs of the testator
Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix
[sic]
Ma.
Pilar Santiago and
Mr.
Clemente
Santiago
are
hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.)

To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their

names to this Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the
names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament,
to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3).
Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia
9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties including any and all improvements thereon,
to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject
properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to said
legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the abovementioned estate of the testator or all the above said lots
including the rice mill, animal feedsFACTORY , and all
improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the
parties may actually partition or adjudicate all the above said
properties including the properties already in the name of all the
said legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to
cancel and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No.
837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No.
836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof

in the names of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago,

Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago,
Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to
cancel and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No.
131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of
Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia
Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma.
Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco,
dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[24]

Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and
terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject
properties cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the
death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that
something more has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting,
Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September
16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16,
1993. Movants cause of action accrues only from the said date and for
which no prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present
probate proceeding which is continuing in character, and
terminates only after and until the final distribution or settlement
of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the
provision of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978
refers only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the
deceased for the period covering from the date of the filing of the petition
for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the
said August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of
petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and
administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of
those properties which were prohibited by the testator to be partitioned
within 20 years from his death. Since then up to the present, Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor and
administrator of the estate of the deceased and as such, they are required
by law to render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978 up to the
present; there is also now a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid

properties as the prohibition period to do so has elapsed. (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)[25]

Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration, [26] which
the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed
it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, [27] hence, the
petition[28] which raises the following grounds:
I.
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH

ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND
SAME PROPERTIES;
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT
AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA;
C.
IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO.
83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE
COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO
TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004
TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR,
RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO.[29] (emphasis in the original)

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R.
NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the
subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied inSECTIONS

Rule

39

of

the

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

[30]

The

first,

known

47 (b) and 47 (c) of

as

bar

by

prior

judgment, proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or
cause of action already settled in a prior action. [31] The second, known as conclusiveness of
judgment, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a formerSUIT

cannot again

be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.[32]
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present
case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the reduction of their legitime
in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety
of the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim,
demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, conclusiveness of
judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only
serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and
reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked,
in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the judgment in
G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The records reveal,
however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate court in this case
and were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in CA G.R.
No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the interference of the
oppositors

in

the

distribution

of

Basilios

estate

and

does

not

pertain

to

respondents supervening right to demand the termination of administration, accounting

and transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting respondents
Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the

Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary continuation of the August 14,
1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As
did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become
final pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this
case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to
partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by
TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would
contravene the testators intent that no one is to own the same.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house
and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only,
and that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na
2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak
sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan
kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa
medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang itoy walang magmamayari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa
aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at
katabing mga lunsod x x x x[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a
statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate
court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494,
870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition
to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty
(20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the
indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to
public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly
mandated by the Civil Code x x x x[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.