GR No.

45685 People vs Vera

Summarized by Francis and Sarah
Tired of Mariano Cu Unjiengs delaying tactics, the City Fiscal of Manila and private prosecutor HSBC filed a
petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to put an end to the endless motions for
reconsideration and finally put MCU to jail.
Important People: Judge Jose O. Vera, Mariano Cu Unjieng, HSBC, Fiscal of the City of Manila
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

October 15, 1931 A criminal case was filed against Mariano Cu Unjieng (MCU) with the Court of First
Instance. (Note: the decision did not specify what crime it was.)
January 8, 1934 The Court of First Instance convicted MCU and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the
costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC.
March 26, 1935 On appeal, the court modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years, 6
months and 27 days of prision correccional to 7 years, six months and 27 days of prision mayor, and
affirmed the judgment in all other aspects.
December 17, 1935 The court denied MCUs motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial.
December 18, 1935 The court rendered its final judgment.
November 24, 1936 The Supreme Court denied MCUs petitions to file more motions for reconsideration
and for a new trial and remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
November 27, 1936 MCU filed an application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of
the Philippine Legislature.
The Court of First Instance of Manila referred the application to the Insular Probation Office, which
recommended the denial of the same.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on
April 5, 1937.
The Fiscal of the City of Manila and the private prosecution filed their opposition to granting the probation
to MCU. The private prosecutors alleged that Act No 4221 is unconstitutional for the following reasons:
- Act No. 4221 violates the Equal Protection clause because its applicability is not uniform
throughout the country
- Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 endows the provincial boards with the power to make the said law
effective or otherwise in their respective provinces. They contend that this is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.
June 28, 1937 Judge Vera promulgated a resolution finding that MCU is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of but denied his application for probation.
MCU filed several motions for reconsideration. (Basically, MCU was trying to delay the execution of
judgment.)
The Fiscal of Manila and the private prosecutors filed their opposition to MCUs motions and their motion
for the issuance of an order of execution of judgment.
Judge Vera set a hearing for MCU and the prosecutions motions, but the petitioners went to the Supreme
Court and filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First
Instance to put an end to the interminable proceeding and to execute the final judgment on MCU. They
alleged that Judge Vera acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction based on the following:
- Judge Vera lacks the power to place MCU under probation because Act No. 4221 does not
apply to the City of Manila
- Judge Vera acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in entertaining MCUs motions and
failing to commit him to prison after he denied MCUs application for probation

Judge Vera made a finding that MCU is innocent, despite already being convicted by the
court.
15. Furthermore, petitioner HSBC contended that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in
number 10.
16. The Fiscal concurred with HSBC and further contended that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore
Act No. 4221 is an encroachment on the power of the Executive to grant pardons and reprieves.

ISSUE(s):
1. Whether or not the constitutionality if Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, given that the same issues are still pending resolution
in the trial court.
- Whether or not the private prosecution has legal standing to intervene in probation proceedings.
- Whether or not the City Fiscal and the Solicitor General are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Act.

2. Whether or not Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional

- Whether or not Act No. 4221 violates the Equal Protection clause
- Whether or not Sec 11 of Act No. 4221 is an undue delegation of powers
- Whether or not Act No. 4221 encroaches on the Chief Executives powers to grant pardons and reprives
HOLDING:

Whether or not the constitutionality if Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings.
o Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, given that the same issues are still pending
resolution in the trial court.
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not
plain, speedy and adequate.
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine
Supreme Court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first
instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first
instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the
criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be
carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. Where the
inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from
enforcing that statute.
o

Whether or not the private prosecution has legal standing to intervene in probation proceedings.
The constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that
since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction
of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the

constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by
persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.
The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations and McGlue vs. Essex
County, as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on
the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation.
Since the private respondent will not be impaired or sustain injury from the said
Act, it does not have legal standing.

Whether or not the City Fiscal and the Solicitor General are estopped from questioning the
validity of the Act.
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of
the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged
rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates
the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
If Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.

Whether or not Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional

o Whether or not Act No. 4221 violates the Equal Protection clause
It is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. One province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the
former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within
the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province
while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. The Court is of the opinion that section 11
of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law.
o Whether or not Sec 11 of Act No. 4221 is an undue delegation of powers
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it
left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. The general rule, however, is limited by another
rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What
is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality

leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the
provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has
to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This,
according to the Court, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards, and an undue delegation of power.
Whether or not Act No. 4221 encroaches on the Chief Executives powers to grant pardons and
reprieves
The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet
pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his
rearrest and imprisonment.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally
and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law
inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact
that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be
definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after
the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have
submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with
the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation,
remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the
court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation
and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally
imposed upon him.