What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

What Are the Arguments against MindBrain Dualism?

Mind-brain dualism generally holds that mental events are non-physical and that they
causally interact with physical events (Mills 1996, 105). A paradigmatic case of the
doctrine is Ren Descartess interactionist substance dualism (Descartes 1996, 16-23;
Descartes 1996, 50-62; Heil and Robb 2013; Kim 2011, 32-5). According to his view,
minds and bodies are completely distinct kinds of substanceon the one hand, bodies
are spatially extended ones and are not capable of feeling or thinking; but on the other
hand, minds are non-spatial, feeling and thinking onesbut they causally influence
each other (Bennett 2007, 318-22; Heil and Robb 2013; Kim 2011, 32-5). There are two
clear issues (Fodor 1994, 25; Mills 1996, 105): the first is the conceptual difficulty in
describing how these radically different entities could actually interact; and the second
is that the dualist assumption is inconsistent with some premises of the empirically wellestablished causal argument for physicalism, a theory claiming that the mental is
physical (Brewer and Crane 1995, 212; Charles 1992, 265; Crane and Mellor 1990,
185-7; Pettit 1993, 213-23).
The aim of this essay is to explain and assess the causal argument for
physicalism against mind-brain dualism. The paper is divided into three parts: the first
outlines a structure of the causal argument; the second evaluates the argument; and in
the final section, I shall conclude that some premises of the causal argument are
problematic, and hence the argument cannot be easily offered to criticise mind-brain
dualism.

It is commonly accepted that the causal argument for physicalism consists of three
crucial premises (Papineau 2002, 17-8). The first is what is known as the principle of

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

mental influence (Papineau 1993, 22) (MI for short), holding that [e]very mental event
causes some physical effect (Papineau 1993, 22). The second is a doctrine, which
David Papineau calls the completeness of physics (Papineau 1993, 16) (CP for short).
It considers physics to be complete, in a sense that all physical events are determined,
or have their chances determined, by prior physical events according to physical laws
(Papineau 1993, 16) and hence claims that all physical effects have sufficient physical
causes which are enough to bring those effects about (Crane 2001, 49). The third
supposes that mental and physical causes do not overdetermine their physical effects
(Crane 2001, 49): this is the principle of no overdetermination (NO for short). In short,
a physicalist is then motivated to argue that these three premises entail the statement
that all physical effects are due to physical causes, and thus that anything having
physical effects must be physical (Papineau and Spurrett 1999, 25)this is the causal
argument for physicalism, which imposes a serious challenge to mind-brain dualism.

In spite of the prima facie plausibility of the causal argument for physicalism, it still is
not clear why it should be believed, and the following sections therefore focus on
further examinations to each premisenamely, the MI, CP and NO.
Firstly, although the MI is critically dependent on what the word cause
actually means, the principle does not provide any direct explanation about kinds of
things that can feature as causes (Papineau 2002, 18-9). There seem to be at least two
candidates: the one is that the causes are facts, or instantiations of properties; and the
other is that they are events, or basic particulars, which are abstracted from any given
mental or physical properties that they have (Papineau 2002, 19). On the one hand, if
one chooses the former that the causes are instantiations of properties by concrete
particulars (Kim 1993, 170; Kim 1973, 235; Schneider 2015), then, because it follows
that mental propertiesbeing in pain, for instanceare identical with physical
propertieshaving a certain neurophysiological featureand thus that mental facts are
identical with physical facts, the causal argument requires that these two facts cannot be
identical unless the properties that they involve also are identical (Papineau 2002, 19).
On the other hand, nevertheless, if one chooses the latter that the causes are basic
particulars (Davidson 2001, 187), then it is told only that the mental and physical
properties are instantiated in the same basic particular and not that these properties

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

themselves are identical (Papineau 2002, 19). The problem here is that the causal
argument may lose its explanatory power when the term cause is defined as an event or
basic particular. An apparent solution to the issue for the proponent of the MI simply is
to abandon the latter conception and to identify the causes as facts or instantiations of
properties. Nonetheless, I shall still find this claim for property identity between the
mental and physical problematic, since it is so vague that it could not appropriately
designate which mental properties are exactly identical to which physical properties. In
response, some proponents of the MI may argue that what the premise says indeed only
is that each mental property must be identical with some physical properties and that the
MI does not aim to demonstrate any precise identification between them (Papineau
2002, 20). To sum up, the issue of the ambiguous meaning of the causes in the MI can
be resolved, if they are defined as facts or instantiations of properties, and there still is a
room to maintain the premise.
Secondly, one of the central difficulties in defending the CP is an obvious
dilemma about what the term physics means in the assumption (Papineau 1993, 29),
and this problem is widely known as Hempels dilemma (Stoljar 2009). A sketch of
the trouble is this: if a defender of the CP considers physics to be contemporary
physics, then such current physics is not adequate at all in certain respects, and in
particular in failing to identify all the antecedents for certain physical effects (Papineau
1993, 29); and even if it defines physics as some ideal future physics, then it is
uncertain whether physical categories, which will be assumed by such physics, will be
capable of sufficing for complete explanations of all physical effects (Papineau 1993,
29). In response to this objection, Papineau, a prominent defender of the CP, argues that
a possible way out of this dilemma is to identify physics purely in terms of
completeness, and to avoid any contentious suppositions about contemporary or future
ideal physics (Crane 1991, 34; Papineau 1993, 29-32; Papineau 1990, 66-71). He then
proposes that, for the purposes of the argument, we simply define physics as the
science of whatever categories are needed to give full explanations for all physical
effects (Papineau 1993, 29-30). Whilst Papineau attempts to give a solution to the
problem, some of his opponents seem to be unconvinced. Tim Crane, for example,
claims that Papineaus conception of physical science, what Crane labels PHYSICS,
does not fully explain why it will not incorporate the mental (Crane 1991, 35). Crane

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

states that PHYSICS will be a science of all the laws and properties that are required to
describe paradigmatically physical effects (Crane 1991, 35). If the CP is identified in
terms of PHYSICS, then the CP implies that all paradigmatically physical events are
fully determined by other PHYSICAL events according to PHYSICAL lawsbecause
PHYSICAL events are events which fall under PHYSICAL laws; PHYSICAL laws are
laws that incorporate PHYSICAL properties; and PHYSICAL properties are properties
that are needed for a complete set of laws which cover paradigmatically physical effects
(Crane 1991, 35). Although the CP thus is true by definition if it is understood in terms
of PHYSICS, he argues that this does not mean that the CP immediately rules out the
possibility of mental laws and properties being PHYSICAL (Crane 1991, 35). In short,
Cranes objection to Papineaus characterisation of the CP, according to which
PHYSICS is complete, is trivial and may undermine his argument itself (Crane 1991,
35; Papineau 1991, 37-40).
Thirdly, the last premise of the causal argument for physicalism, which is
based on the NO, often is a popular target of an opponents criticism (Sturgeon 1998,
411). The distinctive feature of the premise of course is the denial of causal
overdetermination, but perspectives differ over whether overdetermination just does not
occur or cannot happen, even amongst the defenders of the NO (Brewer and Crane 1995,
215; Sider 2003, 719-26). Jaegwon Kim, for instance, argues that the idea that the
mental cause and the physical cause are each an independent sufficient cause of the
physical effect (Kim 1993, 280) suggests that the physical effect is overdetermined
(Kim 1993, 281), but this picture is simply absurd (Kim 1993, 281); and Christopher
Peacocke more cautiously says that the possibility of such overdetermination is what
we ordinarily takes to be false, and it is not clear why we should change the belief
(Peacocke 1979, 135). However, Crane, in response, claims that it is not easy to deny
the metaphysical phenomenon and rather there are apparently possible cases in which
overdetermination happens (Brewer and Crane 1995, 215). He offers an occurrence of
the assassination of a tyrant by two assassins: each one shoots the tyrant at the same
time and so is a cause of the death of the tyrant; the assassination is given in such a way
in which the shootings are independent, and this means that either would have killed the
tyrant even if the other assassin had failed to do so; and the tyrants death is hence
overdetermined by the shootings (Crane 2001, 49). This objection from the genuine

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

case of overdetermination (Kim 2011, 216) challenges the defenders of the NO, but
there still is a solution to avoid itthey can believe in the counterfactual account of
causation, which holds that one event causes another just in case, if (contrary to the
facts) the former had not occurred, the latter would have not occurred (Kim, Korman
and Sosa 2012, 347). If the account is applied to Cranes example, then the
counterfactual analysis of causation entails that neither the assassins shot can be a
cause of the death of the tyrant, because, of neither shooting is it true that if it had not
been done, then the tyrants death would have never happened (Crane 2001, 49). In this
instance, those who support can thus conclude that, if the counterfactual analysis is true,
then causal overdetermination like that in the case cannot actually occur (Crane 2001,
49-59), but this course of the argument is not entirely sufficient to secure the NO. For
example, Eugene Mills appeals to the counterfactual account of causation for defending
the mental-physical overdetermination as a route for mind-brain dualism to take (Heil
and Robb 2013; Mills 1996, 105). He states that causal overdetermination is plausible,
if, for any behavioural effect B, both a mental cause M and a physical one P satisfy the
following counterfactual conditionals: if M had happened in the absence of P, then B
would have still happened; and if P had happened in the absence of M, then B would
have still happened. Mills thus claims that, if the dualist can reasonably argue that both
of the conditionals are true, then this will make a strong prima facie case for
overdetermination (Heil and Robb 2013; Mills 1996, 106-12). In other words, Cranes
and Millss critiques against the defenders of the NO show that the possibility of
overdetermination cannot be immediately rejected, and leave the important problem in
the metaphysics of causation.

In conclusion, it is now evident that the premises of the causal argument for physicalism
to against mind-brain dualism, especially the CP and the NO, have some critical
drawbacks and issues: the first trouble is that the CP faces a serious dilemma due to its
ambiguous designation of how the word physics should be understoodthis implies
that the defenders of the CP cannot simply rule out the fact that the mental can be the
PHYSICAL; and the second concern is that the NO is inconsistent with the
metaphysical possibility that there are a number of genuine instances of
overdetermination, and that the counterfactual analysis of causation to respond to the

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

objection does not always work and it can rather become a philosophical device to
motivate the mind-brain dualists argument. These consequences of the examinations of
the causal argument suggest that it cannot be easily offered as a counter-argument
against mind-brain dualism and that further defences and supports are clearly required.

(2042 words)

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What Are the Arguments against Mind-Brain Dualism?

Bibliography

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318-22. Accessed October 10, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.17479991.2007.00063.x.
Brewer, Bill and Tim Crane. Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes 69 (1995): 211-53. Accessed October 11,
2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4107076.
Charles, David. Supervenience, Composition, and Physicalism. In Reduction,
Explanation, and Realism, edited by David Charles and Kathleen Lennon,
265-96. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Crane, Tim. Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001.
and D. H. Mellor. There is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99, no. 394
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185-206.

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. Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience. Analysis 51, no. 1 (January 1991):
32-7. Accessed October 11, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328628.
Davidson, Donald. Essays on Actions and Events. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2001.
Descartes, Ren. Second Meditation: The Nature of the Human Mind, and How It Is
Better Known Than the Body. In Meditations on First Philosophy: With
Selections from the Objections and Replies. Edited and translated by John
Cottingham, 16-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
. Sixth Meditation: The Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction
Between Mind and Body. In Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the
Objections and Replies. Edited and translated by John Cottingham, 50-62.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Fodor, Jerry. The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the
Current Debate. Edited by Tadeusz Szubka and Richard Warner, 24-40.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

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Heil, John and David Robb. Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Last

modified

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14,

2013.

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Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 8 (April 1973): 217-36. Accessed April 28,
2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025096.
, Daniel Z. Korman and Ernest Sosa. Introduction. In Metaphysics: An
Anthology, 2nd ed. Edited by Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Z. Korman and Ernest
Sosa, 347-9. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2012.
. The Myth of Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Supervenience and Mind:
Selected Philosophical Essays, 265-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
. Philosophy of Mind. 3rd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2011.
. Postscripts on Supervenience. In Supervenience and Mind: Selected
Philosophical Essays, 161-71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Mills, Eugene. Interactionism and Overdetermination. American Philosophical
Quarterly 33, no. 1 (January 1996): 105-17. Accessed October 19, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009850.
Papineau, David and David Spurrett. A Note on the Completeness of Physics.
Analysis 59, no. 1 (January 1999): 25-9. Accessed October 11, 2014.
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. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.
. The Reason Why: Response to Crane. Analysis 51, no. 1 (January 1991): 3740. Accessed October 14, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328629.
. Thinking about Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
. Why Supervenience? Analysis 50, no. 2 (March 1990): 66-71. Accessed
October 11, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328848.
Peacocke, Christopher. Holistic Explanation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Pettit, Philip. A Definition of Physicalism. Analysis 53, no. 4 (October 1993): 213-23.
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Schneider, Susan. Events. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed April 28,
2015. http://www.iep.utm.edu/events/.

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Sider, Theodore. Whats So Bad about Overdetermination? Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 67, no. 3 (November 2003): 719-26. Accessed
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411-32. Accessed October 11, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659884.

I-9

Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

Explain Disjunctivism and Outline Its

Philosophical Advantages and
Disadvantages.

It is commonly accepted that a central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception

concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience (Byrne and Logue 2009, vii;
Crane 2011). Primarily inspired by the works of J. L. Austin (1962) and J. M. Hinton
(1967a; 1967b), but often unshared into the mainstreams by Paul Snowdon (2008; 2005),
John McDowell (2008; 1998; 1996; 1988) and M. G. F. Martin, a number of different
approaches are developed under the disjunctivist label (Soteriou 2014). One of the
sophisticated accounts is

Martins phenomenal disjunctivism (Haddock and

Macpherson 2008, 13), which, not exclusively but predominantly, investigates the
nature of the phenomenology of perception (Haddock and Macpherson 2008, 13).
The aim of this essay is to explain disjunctivism and outline its philosophical
advantages and disadvantages. The paper is divided into three parts: the first addresses
two tasksmaking two preliminary remarks that are necessary to capture a core of
disjunctivism and expounding Martins phenomenal disjunctivism; the second explores
its philosophical advantages and disadvantages; and in the final section, I shall conclude
that, although Martins phenomenal disjunctivism has certain strengths, the theory itself
seems to be rather philosophically problematic.

Firstly, I shall make two preliminary remarks that are necessary to capture a core of
disjunctivism. The first is about a philosophical assumption that perceptual experiences
can be divided into the following three broad categories: a veridical perception, illusion
and hallucination (Soteriou 2014). A case of perception is veridical, or fully successful
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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

(Fish 2010, 3), if and only if an object is seen and seen correctly or as it is (Fish
2010, 3); that is illusionary if and only if a physical object is actually perceived, but
that object perpetually appears other than it really is, for whatever reason (Smith 2002,
23); and that is hallucinatory if and only if it seems to the subject as though something
is seen but in fact nothing is seen (Fish 2010, 3). The second is about what William
Fish calls the Common Factor Principle (Fish 2010, 4) (CFP for short). A distinctive
characteristic of the disjunctive theory of perception lies in its rejection of the CFP (Fish
2010, 87), which holds that phenomenologically indiscernible veridical perceptions,
illusions and hallucinations have an underlying mental state in common (Fish 2010, 4).
Secondly, I shall expound Martins phenomenal disjunctivism. An important
aspect of his disjunctivist proposal is that it is designed to save Nave Realism (Martin
2004, 38) (NR for short). Martin considers NR to be the view that mind-independent
objects are present to the mind when one perceives, [and] that when one has such
experience, its object must actually exist and genuinely be present to the mind (Martin
2002, 393). In defence of the doctrine, he claims that NR is the best articulation of how
our experiences strike us (Martin 2004, 42) and appeals to an argument from
phenomenal transparency (Haddock and Macpherson 2008, 13). Martin says:

At heart, the concern is that introspection of ones perceptual experience reveals only
the mind-independent objects, qualities and relations that one learns about through
perception. The claim is that ones experience is, so to speak, diaphanous or
transparent to the objects of perception, at least as revealed to introspection. (2002,
378)

Martin here seems to have two rivals in mind that he attempts to undermine: namely,
sense-datum theories holding that mind-dependent objects, sense-data, are perceived
when one has experiences, and intentional theories maintaining that experiences have
intentional contents that represent the world (Brewer 2011, 54; Martin 1994, 464).
Martin assumes that the argument can offer some reasons to reject them. This is because,
on the one hand, the former denies that we have genuine awareness of objects in the
world around us (Martin 2004, 42) and hence introduces a veil of perception; and on
the other hand, the latter also contradicts with his idea that our sense experience of the
world is non-representational (Martin 2004, 39) and the objects of perceptionthe
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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake inare constituents of
the experience (Martin 2004, 39). According to Martin, another motivation for saving
the view arises from his solution to reconcile an inconsistency between NR, the CFP
and Experiential Naturalism (Martin 2004, 39) (EN for short), which suggests that
our sense experiences are subject to the causal order, and in this case are thereby
subject just to broadly physical causes and psychological causes (Martin 2004, 3940). The issue is as follows (Byrne and Logue 2009, xviii): given NR, at least one is in a
veridical case, an object of the perception is a direct constituent of the ones experience;
given the CFP, however, the one could be under a threat of the possibility of
hallucination, which is subjectively indiscriminable by its own introspection; and given
EN, the one could also see the hallucinatory image of the object through suitable
manipulation of mind and brain (Martin 2006, 358), despite there being no such object
at all. As Martin is in favour of defending NR, he then needs to rule out either the CFP
or EN (Byrne and Logue 2009, xviii). Martins response to the problem is to simply
exclude the CFP and to remain committed to the broad empirical assumptions and
methodological presuppositions which lead one to endorse (Martin 2004, 43) EN. A
motivation for this rejection seems to be based on his observation that the opposing
views of NR may also violate EN: the sense-datum theorists, for example, are often
sceptical about the causal completeness of the physical and open to posit the existence
of a range of strange items, which are extra to and outside what EN tells (Martin 2004,
43). Similarly, some of the intentional theorists, who are particularly called
phenomenology-first intentionalists (Fish 2010, 67) and hold that experiences have
representational content in virtue of their phenomenology (Fish 2010, 67), need to
provide a they of the phenomenal features of the experiences, typically endorsing the
existence of qualia, or intrinsic non-representational properties that are also additional to
what EN explains (Fish 2010, 68; Tye 2013). In short, Martins strategy to argue for his
phenomenal disjunctivism in defence of NR is to insist that experiences, involved in
veridical perception, illusion and hallucination, belong to different fundamental kind
(Martin 2002, 404).

In this section, I shall explore philosophical advantages and disadvantages of Martins

phenomenal disjunctivism.

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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

One clear strength of the theory is that it can block, at least in the case of
veridical experience, scepticism about the external world (Logue 2012, 213). This is
because Martins disjunctivist approach allows him to claim that what tells the
phenomenal character of ones experience in the case of veridical perception is entirely
distinct from what explains it in the illusionary one (Haddock and Macpherson 2008,
16). In the former, it is told by actually perceived mind-independent objects; but, by
contrast, in the latter case, there is no successfully perceived mind-independent objects,
and the phenomenal character itself is simply explained by the fact that the perceptual
state is introspectively indiscernible from another situation, in which the one veridically
perceives such objects (Haddock and Macpherson 2008, 16). Martin says:

A common explanation is not offered of the three caseswe explain the veridical
perception by reference to the relational properties it alone possesses, and we explain
the other two by reference to their indiscriminability from this. So, the particular
situation of veridical perception is fundamental to the explanation of the character of
all cases of perceptual experience. (2002, 402)

Another benefit of his phenomenal disjunctivism is that it offers a metaphysically

simpler account than other non-NR theories of perception, and it appeals to an ordinary
intuition to perceptual experiences (Conduct 2006, 206-7). Comparing with the
intentional theories of perception, Martin also asserts:

According to the disjunctivist, the phenomenological character of all perceptual

experience requires us to view the transparency and immediacy of perceptual
experience as involving actual relations between the subject and the objects of
perception and their features. (2002, 402)

To sum up, Martins disjunctive theory of perception has its philosophical advantages in
the two senses: on the one hand, it may close the sceptical gap between a perceiving
subject and mind-independent physical objects in the external world by virtue of the
direct, immediate and transparent contact of them in perception; and on the other hand,
the ontological simplicity of the approach appeals to common-sense understanding of
the nature of perceptual experiences.

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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

A variety of objections, nevertheless, are available to his phenomenal

disjunctivism. The first attack on Martins approach is a causal argument against
disjunctivism, which is famously proposed by Howard Robinson (Soteriou 2014).
According to Robinsons formulation, this argument is a combination of what he calls
the original causal argument (Robinson 1994, 151) and the argument from
hallucination, which can be stated as follows:

(1) It is theoretically possible by activating certain brain processes involved

in a specific type of perception to cause a hallucination which exactly
resembles that perception in its subjective character (Robinson 1994,
151).
(2) It is necessary to give the same account of both veridical perception and
hallucination, when they have the same neural cause (Robinson 1994,
151).
So, from (1) and (2),
(3) Perceptual processes in the brain produce an object of awareness, which
cannot be identified with any features of the external world (Robinson
1994, 151).

In other words, the disjunctivist statement that veridical perception and hallucination are
the different mental states or different fundamental kind (Martin 2002, 404)
potentially is in conflict with the prima facie causal facts about perceptual experiences
(Fish 2010, 89). A possible response to the conviction is to simply deny the underlying
principle that a same proximate cause creates a same immediate effect (Soteriou 2014).
He can alternatively insist that in a case of veridical perception, even if an object of
perception are distal causes of the subjects phenomenal experience, they are also figure
non-causally as essential constituents of itthe occurrence of the relevant brain
processes are not sufficient to generate the kind of mental event involved in perception
(Soteriou 2014). In spite of the reply being consistent with its denial of the RP, an issue
left here is that rejecting the RP may contradict to what contemporary empirical
sciences in general tell. The second influential critique is that the disjunctive theory
cannot adequately account for subjective indistinguishability of changes in perceptual

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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

states (Byrne and Logue 2009, xix). Imagine that, for example, during ones seeing an
ordinary physical object such as a table, an evil demon removes the table from in front
of the perceiver, whilst preserving its proximal neural effects in its brain (Byrne and
Logue 2009, vii): the perceiving agent is surely incapable of detecting any changes
((Byrne and Logue 2009, xix). Try as you might (Johnston 2004, 122), as Mark
Johnston puts it, you would not notice any difference, however closely you attend to
your visual experience (Johnston 2004, 122). In this case, the perceivers pre-removal
veridical experience is subjectively indiscriminable from the ones post-removal
experience of the hallucination (Byrne and Logue 2009, xix). The difficulty seems to
naturally arise from Martins rejection of the CFP, and he, in fact, seriously takes this
charge:

The challenge is just that, if something really is an essential aspect of the conscious
or phenomenal character of an experience, the what is true of it should be true of any
state of mind indistinguishable from it for the subject: for what more can there be to
the character of conscious state of mind than a subject can herself discern when she
reflects upon them? (2009, 98)

In short, there are two prominent disadvantages for Martins phenomenal disjunctivism:
the former is that it faces the challenge from the causal argument against his theory; and
the latter is that the disjunctivist cannot appropriately account for the problem of the
subjective indiscernibility.

In conclusion, it is now evident that, though Martins phenomenal disjunctivism has the
certain advantages, the theory itself seems to be rather philosophically problematic. This
implies that there are three courses to go: firstly, one can elaborate to diagnose the
disadvantages of the disjunctivist approach and defend the standpoint (Brewer 2008,
179; Fish 2008, 166); secondly, one can also abolish disjunctivism and pursue
alternative frameworksfor instance, what Alex Byrne and Heather Logue call
moderate view (Byrne and Logue 2008, 69); and the last option, which I shall suggest,
is to cast a serious doubt on the current philosophical fashion itself that divides human
perception into the three categories and to found a new theory on the one united nature
of perception.
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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

(2089 words)

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Disjunctivism and Its Advantages and Disadvantages

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