Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
Vitug,
SO ORDERED.[6]
The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on
September 27, 1999.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a
complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of
Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of
the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that
due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint
and summons on her because she was in Oslo,
Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130316
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
lawphil.net
"In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he
was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was
deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat,
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002]
REBECCA
T.
CABUTIHAN, petitioner,
vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Reconsideration
challenged Order.[3]
was
denied
in
the
second
The Facts
Culled from the pleadings, the facts of this case are
as follows.
On December 3, 1996, herein respondent
Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation,
represented by Wilfredo B.Maghuyop -- entered into an
Agreement[4] with Petitioner Rebecca Cabutihan.The
Agreement stipulates:
WHEREAS, [respondent corporation], x x x is the
absolute owner, x x x of a parcel of land situated at Kaybiga, Paranaque, Metro Manila covered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (S-30409) (partially cancelled by
TCT Nos. 110001 to 110239) and particularly described
as follows:
A parcel of land (Plan Psu-80206, Case No. 290,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 2291), situated in the Barrio of
Kay-biga, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of
Rizal. Bounded on the NE., by properties of Eulogio
Cruz and Isidro Alano; on the E., by property of Justo
Bernardo; on the SE., by properties of Marcelo
First Issue:
Proper Venue
Maintaining that the action is in personam, not in
rem, petitioner alleges that the venue was properly
laid. The fact that she ultimately sought the conveyance
of real property not located in the territorial jurisdiction
of the RTC of Pasig is, she claims, an anticipated
consequence and beyond the cause for which the action
was instituted.
On the other hand, the RTC ruled that since the
primary objective of petitioner was to recover real
property -- even though her Complaint was for specific
performance and damages -- her action should have
been instituted in the trial court where the property was
situated, in accordance with Commodities Storage & Ice
Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals.[16]
We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Court provide an answer to the issue of
venue.[17] Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions,
Third Issue:
WHEREFORE,
the
hereby GRANTED, and
Orders REVERSED and SET
Petition
is
the
assailed
ASIDE. The
case
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad, on official leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32170. March 31, 1971.]
CITIZENS SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, SANTIAGO DACANAY,
and JOSEFINA DACANAY, Respondents.
Dayos, Tesoro & Gloria, Jr. for Petitioner.
Respondent Judge for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ACTION IN
PERSONAM; PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS
REQUIRED. We agree with respondent Judge
that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in
personam, the Court could not validly acquire
jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent
a personal service of summons within the forum.
We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon v.
and effective.
But because debtors who abscond and conceal
themselves are also quite adept at concealing
their properties, the dismissal of the case below
by respondent Judge should be set aside and the
case held pending in the courts archives, until
petitioner as plaintiff succeeds in determining the
whereabouts of the defendants person or
properties and causes valid summons to be
served personally or by publication as the case
may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period
of prescription for as long as the debtor remains
in hiding would properly be a matter of court
records and he can not emerge after a sufficient
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
profit from his own misdeed and claim
prescription of his just debt.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the case
issued by the Court below is hereby set aside, and
in the interest of justice, the proceedings are
ordered suspended, to be held pending until the
plaintiff petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the
whereabouts of the defendants and/or locating
properties of the same, to enable proper
summons to be issued conformably to this
Opinion. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156187. November 11, 2004]
Before
Us
is
a
Petition
for
Review
[1]
[2]
on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62625, the
decretal portion of which reads:
of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by
Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused
to return the same and proceeded to have the two (2)
pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July
1997 and caused the registration thereof before the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September
1997.
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage[7] covered by TCT No. 64070, for
nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage.
As a result, the public auction sale of the mortgaged
property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and
damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against respondent
bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan,
Francisco C. Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward
E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G. San
Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, docketed as Civil
Case No. 67878. The complaint was subsequently
amended[8] on 22 May 2000. The amended complaint
alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner
Jimmy T. Go is a co-owner of the property covered by
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146089. December 13, 2001]
(Acting
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
respondent of all their claims against petitioners; and (e) nonjoinder of indispensable parties.
On August 7, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a
motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defenses. In an Order dated August 11, 1998, the trial court
denied the motion, ruling as follows:
EN BANC
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
RESOLUTION
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
GANCAYCO, J.:
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered
the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it
did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to
the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of
court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and
reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to
P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one
for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was
found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not
a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the
judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default
for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent
filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter
including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional
defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment
of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of
the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify
the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred
Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there
was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private
respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of
this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5wherein this Court held that
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket
fee paid was insufficient.
petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the
filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953
produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May
23, 1956.
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the
recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and
that as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the
damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the
damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc.
The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum
of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question,
the attachment of such property of defendants that may be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and,
after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money
of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to
pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may
be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also
asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of
payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount
of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to
reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the
claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental
complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three
(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 )
were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3)
defendants, docketed as follows:
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda
was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his
ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous
owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by
mere tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property, Pineda
had made demands on the defendants to vacate the property and
pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands had been
refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year
prior to the commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the
same reliefs, to wit:
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus
be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the
dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired
by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an
action for specific performance with damages is presented by
this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for
specific performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case
as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee
and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the
body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5,
1989. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was
likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this
petition.
THIRD DIVISION
e.
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be
verified
is
merely formal
and
not
jurisdictional. The court may give due course to
an unverified pleading where the material facts
alleged are a matter of record and the questions
raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for
certiorari.[4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition
for Certiorari clearly legible and duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the judgment
or final order or resolution of the court a quo
and the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and such material portions of the record as
would support the petition.[5]
3. Substantial compliance of the rules,
which was further supplied by the petitioners
subsequent full compliance demonstrates its
good faith to abide by the procedural
requirements.[6]
4. The resolution of the important
jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner
before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would
justify a relaxation of the rules.[7]
SEC.
4. Verification.Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
respondent
in Sun
Insurance
Office,
Ltd.
(SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees
required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to
the case at bar, since Campos deliberately concealed
his claim for damages in the prayer.
Second,
complainant's
counsel
in Manchester claimed, in the body of the
complaint,
damages
in
the
amount
of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its prayer
in order to evade the payment of docket fees.
Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in
the instant petition.
Finally, when
the
court
took
cognizance of the issue of non-payment of
docket fees in Manchester, the complainant
therein filed an amended complaint, this time
omitting all mention of the amount of
damages being claimed in the body of the
complaint; and when directed by the court to
specify the amount of damages in such
amended complaint, it reduced the same
from P78,750,000.00
to P10,000,000.00,
obviously to avoid payment of the required
docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme
is wanting in the case at bar.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005]
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman),
Callejo,
Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Sr.,