15

350002
18859174693
nwulwj2004@163.com

13BGL046
F239.4F230

Jones

Does local governors accountability audit of natural resource affect earnings

management for listed companies?
Abstract: Based on analytical framework of political cost hypothesis and utilizing the event that
some areas carry out pilot of local governors accountability audit of natural resource, this paper
investigates whether it will affect earnings management for resource-based and heavily polluting
companies. Measuring earnings management using performance-matched Jones model and
adopting DID model regression, this paper find local governors accountability audit of natural
resource does not affect earnings management for reducing profits, but reduce the degree of
earnings management, including suppressing manipulating profits up and down. In addition, there
are no significant difference in size between different companies and property companies for the
above impact, but it has a greater earnings management degree in areas with poor institutional
environment. This study shows that the political costs may improve the company's earnings
quality, enrich the understanding of the political cost, but also to raise understanding the impact
local governors accountability audit of natural resource

Keywords: local governors accountability audit of natural resource; political cost; earnings
management

2013 11
2014
2016 6 12

Watts and Zimmerman(1978)

20082015
pm2.5
2012

pm2.5

2014
DID
Jones

Jones

2014

2015

2014
2014

Watts and Zimmerman(1978) political cost

hypothesis

Zimmerman,1983

Zimmer1986

Jones
1991 Hall and
Stammerjohan(1997)Damage Awards
Han and Wang1998 1990

Ramanna and Roychowdhury2010 2004

Duh et al.(2015)
FDIPiotroski et al.(2015)

2000
2000
2008
2012

2015 pm2.5
pm2.5 pm2.5

2014

2014
2015

2015

1988
2008 2012

2013 11
GDP

2014 12

10

2004

H1
H1

GDP

2014 2015 2016

2014
1 2014

2012-2015 2419 142 2277
CSMAR
Cluster
12014

1
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11

2014.3
2014.4
2014.7
2014.5
2014.7
2014.7
2014.6
2014.11
2014.7
2014.3
2014

1.
Kothari 2005 Jones

TAit
REVit
PPE it
1
1
2
3
it
Ait 1
Ait 1
Ait 1
Ait 1

1 TAit i t
2015 2016
2014

TAit-1 i t-1 REVit i t t-1

PPEit i t it

OLS 123 1 2 3 2

NDAit 1

REV REC
PPE
1
it
it
it
2
3
Ait 1
Ait 1
Ait 1

2NDAit RECit i t t-1

3

DAit

TAit
NDAit
Ait 1

DAit ROA DAjt

ABSDA
2.

ABSDA 0 1TREAT 2 POST 3TRRAT POST 4 SIZE 5 LEV

6 ROA 7 GROWTH 8 CFO 9 LOSS 10 CI 11 INDSPE 12 BIG 4 4

IND YEAR
DID4
ABSDA DA
TREAT
TREAT 1
TREAT 0POST 1
0 TREATPOST
Dechow,1994Ashbaugh et al.,2003
2012
SIZE

LEVLEV
ROA
ROA
GROWTH GROWTH
CFO
CFO
LOSS LOSS 0LOSS
1 0
CICI

INDSPEINDSPE

BIG4
BIG4 1 0

INDYEAR

2 ABSDA 0.1179
0.0694SIZE 21.9499 21.7842LEV 0.4163 0.4037
41.63%ROA 0.0396 0.0294
3.96%GROWTH 1.9716
0.0243CFO 0.0489 0.0424LOSS 0.1662
16.62%CI 0.0170 0.0040
INDSPE 0.0692 0.0464
BIG4 0.0537 5.37%

p25

p75

ABSDA
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4

2419
2419
2419
2419
2419
2419
2419
2419
2419
2419

0.1179
21.9499
0.4163
0.0396
1.9716
0.0489
0.1662
0.0170
0.0692
0.0537

0.1655
1.2453
0.2298
0.0718
12.9764
0.0882
0.3723
0.0390
0.0652
0.2256

0.0327
21.1198
0.2304
0.0058
-0.1759
0.0003
0
0.0013
0.0153
0

0.0694
21.7842
0.4037
0.0294
0.0243
0.0424
0
0.0040
0.0464
0

0.1377
22.5764
0.5878
0.0695
0.2385
0.0968
0
0.0137
0.1151
0

3
T 3
ABADA 0.088
0.149 5%

SIZE
ROA

GROWTH GROWTH
5%


ABSDA
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4

1146
1146
1146
1146
1146
1146
1146
1146
1146
1146

0.09
21.881
0.425
0.04
2.365
0.048
0.162
0.018
0.068
0.051

73
73
73
73
73
73
73
73
73
73

0.104
21.602
0.395
0.049
1.289
0.044
0.151
0.015
0.055
0.027

-0.014
0.279*
0.03
-0.009
1.076
0.004
0.012
0.003
0.013*
0.024

1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131

0.149
22.055
0.411
0.037
1.718
0.05
0.172
0.016
0.072
0.059

69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69

0.088
21.737
0.388
0.054
0.303
0.053
0.159
0.018
0.064
0.029

0.061**
0.318**
0.023
-0.016*
1.415
-0.004
0.012
-0.002
0.008
0.030

****** 1%5% 10%

DA 3 1 TREATPOST

21
TREATPOST DA

3
3
TREAT
POST
1%
TREATPOST 1%

3 43
3 56 DA

TREATPOST

SIZE LEVROA
LOSS
4

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST

(1)
DA

(2)
DA

(3)
ABSDA

(4)
ABSDA

-0.0440
(-1.51)
0.0191
(0.34)
0.0255

-0.0565
(-1.42)
0.0197
(0.37)
0.0296

0.0242
(1.12)
0.0968***
(7.94)
-0.0719***

0.0212
(1.16)
0.1032***
(8.41)
-0.0739***

4 4

(5)
(6)
ABSDA(DA>0) ABSDA(DA<0)
-0.0022
(-0.11)
0.1225***
(6.68)
-0.0739***

0.0367
(1.26)
0.0350***
(3.71)
-0.0588*

(0.64)

(0.63)
-0.0042
(-0.28)
0.0707
(0.75)
0.9533***
(2.75)
-0.0016*
(-1.73)
-1.4848***
(-3.56)
0.0152
(0.50)
-0.4309
(-1.31)
0.2295
(1.41)
-0.0443
(-0.93)
0.1715
(0.50)

2,419
0.042

SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.0172
(-0.66)

2,419
0.004

(-3.28)

0.0448*
(1.71)

2,419
0.139

(-3.75)
-0.0093**
(-2.08)
0.0771***
(3.10)
0.3230***
(3.17)
0.0007**
(2.39)
-0.0684
(-1.10)
0.0347***
(2.97)
0.0532
(0.60)
-0.0311
(-0.65)
-0.0114
(-0.74)
0.2422**
(2.46)

2,419
0.162

(-3.49)
-0.0094
(-1.44)
0.0869***
(2.82)
0.5923***
(4.56)
0.0002
(1.06)
-0.5550***
(-6.61)
0.0475***
(3.04)
-0.0187
(-0.13)
-0.0103
(-0.16)
-0.0264
(-1.30)
0.2361*
(1.75)

1,234
0.246

T *** 1%** 5%* 10%

1.
2014 11
2014

5 5
5

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST

(1)
ABSDA

(2)
ABSDA

-0.0202*
(-1.70)
0.0981***
(7.99)
-0.0396**
(-2.41)

-0.0161
(-1.28)
0.1038***
(8.46)
-0.0430***
(-2.59)

(-1.80)
-0.0075
(-1.16)
0.0593
(1.51)
0.0287
(0.18)
0.0018**
(2.06)
0.3724***
(3.80)
0.0187
(1.14)
0.0714
(0.67)
-0.0564
(-0.96)
0.0038
(0.16)
0.1433
(1.12)

1,185
0.171

SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CIW
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0377***
(2.59)

2,366
0.147

-0.0077*
(-1.75)
0.0662***
(2.81)
0.2778***
(2.76)
0.0007**
(2.31)
-0.0541
(-0.84)
0.0320***
(2.67)
0.0409
(0.46)
-0.0373
(-0.75)
-0.0136
(-0.88)
0.1666*
(1.87)

2,366
0.164

2.

4
6
6

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV

(1)
ABSDA

(2)
ABSDA

-0.0050
(-0.47)
0.0902***
(6.98)
-0.0437***
(-3.35)

-0.0020
(-0.19)
0.0955***
(7.47)
-0.0503***
(-3.76)
-0.0045
(-1.01)
0.0572**
(2.45)

ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0740***
(12.11)

1,952
0.158

0.2740***
(2.86)
0.0011**
(2.51)
-0.0331
(-0.47)
0.0274**
(2.02)
0.0448
(0.41)
-0.0196
(-0.36)
-0.0221
(-1.31)
0.1464
(1.55)

1,952
0.175

3. Jones
Jones
Jones
7 7
7Jones

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO

(1)
ABSDA

(2)
ABSDA

0.0073
(0.78)
0.0364***
(5.95)
-0.0255**
(-2.02)

0.0046
(0.50)
0.0408***
(6.77)
-0.0268**
(-2.17)
-0.0084***
(-3.31)
0.0500***
(3.97)
0.3036***
(5.11)
0.0006***
(3.82)
-0.0741*

LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0521***
(5.75)

2,419
0.088

(-1.69)
0.0445***
(6.91)
-0.0417
(-0.87)
-0.0132
(-0.40)
0.0075
(0.87)
0.2283***
(4.01)

2,419
0.146

4.

8
TREATPOST

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO

(1)
ABSDA

(2)
ABSDA

0.0165
(1.61)
0.0105**
(2.38)
-0.0217
(-1.53)

0.0182*
(1.84)
0.0120***
(2.72)
-0.0223
(-1.58)
-0.0126***
(-5.56)
0.0676***
(5.90)
0.5575***
(10.82)
0.0002**
(2.14)
-0.0897**

LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0810***
(8.52)

5,876
0.129

(-2.41)
0.0463***
(6.65)
0.0274
(0.64)
0.0504
(1.54)
-0.0011
(-0.12)
0.3015***
(6.58)

5,876
0.172

5. placebo test

201020112012 2013
2012 2012 2013
2010 2011
9
TREATPOST
9

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS

(1)
ABSDA

(2)
ABSDA

0.0028
(0.14)
-0.0189***
(-2.99)
0.0097
(0.43)

0.0040
(0.22)
-0.0147**
(-2.33)
0.0029
(0.12)
-0.0067***
(-2.63)
0.0556***
(4.39)
0.3837***
(6.52)
0.0003
(1.00)
-0.0067
(-0.14)
0.0454***

CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant

0.1591***
(8.19)

2,035
0.041

Observations
R-squared

(5.07)
-0.0033
(-0.17)
0.0179
(0.35)
-0.0042
(-0.40)
0.1713***
(3.31)

2,035
0.106

6.
2015

10
TREATPOST

10

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

(1)

(2)

0.0091
(0.49)
0.1301***
(7.04)
-0.0513**
(-2.46)
0.0057
(0.94)
0.0227
(0.68)
0.0777
(0.70)
0.0010**
(2.12)

0.0246
(1.03)
0.0324***
(3.43)
-0.0832***
(-3.17)
-0.0360***
(-3.89)
0.0834***
(2.94)
0.4443***
(3.03)
0.0003
(0.94)

CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant
Wald 2

Observations
R-squared

0.0165
-0.1092
(0.20)
(-1.25)
0.0183
0.0474***
(1.13)
(2.72)
-0.1054
0.2002
(-0.92)
(1.13)
-0.1715**
0.0569
(-2.51)
(0.91)
-0.0369**
-0.0225
(-2.46)
(-0.24)
-0.1266
0.8223***
(-0.99)
(4.34)
chi2 = 0.73

1,209
1,210
0.215
0.151

7.

2015

11
TREATPOST

11

TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE

(1)

(2)

0.0148
(1.08)
0.0350***
(3.57)
-0.0665***
(-2.94)
-0.0051

0.0170
(0.63)
0.0843***
(4.07)
-0.0639**
(-2.15)
-0.0136**

TREAT_POST

(-0.86)
0.0600**
(2.19)
0.1684
(1.48)
0.0009*
(1.83)
0.0779
(0.91)
0.0188
(1.50)
0.1017
(0.85)
-0.0996
(-1.57)
-0.0047
(-0.24)

LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CI
INDSPE
BIG4
Wald 2
Constant

(-1.99)
0.0920**
(2.45)
0.4599***
(3.07)
0.0006
(1.59)
-0.1494*
(-1.70)
0.0497**
(2.29)
0.0255
(0.20)
0.0082
(0.13)
-0.0136
(-0.60)
0.00

Observations
R-squared

0.1412
(1.03)

966
0.194

0.3450**
(2.55)

1,199
0.132

8.

2014

(2011)
12
TREAT_POST
TREAT_POST 1%
TREAT_POST 5%

12


TREAT
POST
TREAT_POST
SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
CFO
LOSS
CIW
INDSPE
BIG4
Constant
Wald 2

Observations
R-squared

(1)

(2)

-0.0132
(-0.95)
0.0886***
(5.72)
-0.0281
(-1.40)
-0.0103*
(-1.68)
0.0623**
(2.33)
0.1978**
(2.18)
0.0017**
(2.27)
-0.0557
(-0.75)
0.0427**
(2.36)
-0.0823
(-0.65)
0.0492
(0.70)
0.0004
(0.02)
0.2352*
(1.84)

0.0608**
(2.09)
0.1228***
(6.21)
-0.1182***
(-4.02)
-0.0099
(-1.61)
0.0844**
(2.34)
0.4680***
(2.73)
0.0003
(1.31)
-0.0727
(-0.74)
0.0341**
(2.04)
0.1534
(1.24)
-0.1281*
(-1.91)
-0.0239
(-1.07)
0.1996
(1.62)
5.23**

1,249
0.171

1,170
0.181

GDP

2014

[1] . [J]. , 2014, 6: 3-9.

[2] , . [J]. , 2014, 5: 3-9.
[3] , , . 2011 [M].
.
[4] , . [J]. , 2015, 1: 37-43.
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, 2015, 5: 26-33.
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86 [J]. : , 2014, 4: 49-62.
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[9] . --[J]. , 2000, 12:
31-40.
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104-120.
[11] , . [J]. , 2012, 2:
67-74.
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[J]. , 2015, 2: 14-20.
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[J]. , 2004, 6: 33-40.
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