Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EXHIBIT 1
(Petition for Writ of Mandamus)
EXHIBIT 1
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CA No. 17-______
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Petitioners
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA,
Respondent,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Real Party in Interest.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS ............................................ ii, iii, iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. viii
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
RELIEF SOUGHT .....................................................................................................3
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....................................................................3
FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUE PRESENTED .............4
I. The Bunkerville Standoff Becomes a Subject of National Media Attention
and Leads to the Indictment of Nevada Rancher Cliven Bundy and Eighteen
Other Individuals .............................................................................................4
II. The Government Proposes an Overbroad Protective Order .......................5
III. The Proposed Protective Order Faces Overwhelming Opposition ...........6
IV. The Government Files a Motion For a Protective Order. .........................8
V. The Magistrate Judge Enters a Protective Order Severely Curtailing
Access to Discovery And Providing for Automatic Sealing. ..........................9
VI. Petitioners Object to the Protective Order, Which the District Court
Subsequently Affirmed. .................................................................................12
VII. The Government Backs Away From Associating the Bundy Defendants
With the Murder of Two Las Vegas Police Officers.....................................14
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CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................30
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ..................................................................30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................31
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of California, 705 F.2d 1143
(9th Cir. 1983) .............................................................................................. passim
Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1997).......................... 17, 29
Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).... 18, 19, 23
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir.1995). ..............................24
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 96 (1982) ......................... 27, 28
In re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2016) ..............................................................4
In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.1982) .................... 16, 17
Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). ...............20
Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). .......................................19
Oregonian Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Oregon, 920 F.2d 1462
(9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................................... 17, 18
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994) ...............................19
Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206
(9th Cir. 2002) ......................................................................................................24
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 156 F.3d 940,
(9th Cir. 1998). .................................................................................................1, 18
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................22
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ..........18
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d
1096 (9th Cir. 1999). ..................................................................................... 16, 24
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Star Editorial, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 7 F.3d 856
(9th Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................................16
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). ...............................22
United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)............................... 26, 27
United States v. OrozcoSantillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.1990). .........................22
United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D. N.Y. 2013). ..............................19
Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. U.S. Dict. Court, 915 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) ..............16
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Nevada, 798 F.2d 1289,
(9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................................................17
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) ...................................................................21
Statutes
18 U.S.C. 111 ..........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 115 ..........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 1503 ........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 1951 ........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 1952 ........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 371 ..........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 372 ..........................................................................................................5
18 U.S.C. 924 ..........................................................................................................5
Other Authorities
Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963) ...................................20
Rules
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 ........................................................ 7, 12, 19
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INTRODUCTION
This case has been a fixture in local and national media since its inception.
Issues pertaining to criticism of the governments handling of Nevada lands
controlled by the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM) are at the forefront, and
the government has been criticized for its confrontations with defendants in this very
case. A key issue in this case is where the line between free speechspeech that
happens in this case to be critical of the governmentand true threats that fall
outside the First Amendment should be drawn.
First Amendment issues are also implicated by the protective order this writ
seeks to address. One of the most enduring and exceptional aspects of Anglo
American justice is an open public trial. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist.
Court for Dist. of Arizona, 156 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1998). While the public
should have reasonable access to all criminal proceedings in our public, taxpayerfunded courts, transparency is especially important here because the public has a
keen interest in evaluating the governments actions and motivations, and in whether
some defendants contentions that these are retaliatory prosecutions have any merit.
This need for transparency underpinned the decision of the magistrate judge
assigned to this case to grant Petitioners request to oppose the Governments
Motion for a Protective Order. (See Exhibit (Ex.) 14, Petitioners Appendix
(PA) 228, ll. 4-23.) The court found that allowing intervention will promote
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transparency and the integrity of the judicial proceedings in this case. (Id. at ll. 2021.) Despite this recognition, the court failed to sufficiently take transparency into
account. Instead, the court improperly relied on the limitations of criminal discovery,
the governments assertions regarding danger, and the purported need to protect
government actors from public ridicule. However, the government failed to meet its
burden of showing a nexus between the purported danger and the broad swath of
materials which will now be kept under lock and key. Further, the examples cited as
evidence of danger in fact constituted free speech, and the alleged need to protect
government actors from public ridicule does not constitute good cause. Thus, while
the protective order does ensure that the government cannot treat public domain
documents as Confidential, it remains too broad. (Ex. 17, PA 274-77.)
Of even more concern is the fact that all documents defined as Confidential
must automatically be filed under seal without further application by the filing party.
(Id. at PA 276, 7.) This portion of the Order ignores this Courts precedent that a
party seeking to keep court filings secret and hidden from the public bear a heavy
burden in establishing that sealing is necessary, as well as its precedent rejecting
such automatic sealing orders as violative of the publics First Amendment right of
access to criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court for
Cent. Dist. Of California, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
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RELIEF SOUGHT
The Las Vegas Review-Journal, the Associated Press, and Battle Born Media
(hereinafter Petitioners), respectfully request that this Court issue a writ of
mandamus ordering the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to
vacate the protective order entered by the district court limiting public access and
allowing for automatic sealing in the matter of United States v. Cliven Bundy, et al.,
U.S. Dist. Court Case No. 2:16-cr-00046-GMN-PAL, a criminal case of extreme
public importance.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that good cause supported the
entry of a protective order that effectively treats all documents produced by the
government as confidential;
(2) Whether the district court clearly erred in issuing a protective order which
requires parties to automatically submit any protected materials under seal without
requiring the parties to make a particularized showing of good cause, and without
providing any procedural mechanism for challenging the sealing of documents; and
(3) Even if there were good cause, whether the district court erred by not considering
less drastic alternatives to automatic sealing.
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have been widely covered in local and national media. As this Court discussed in In
re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2016), this case has its roots in a decades-long
dispute between defendant Cliven Bundy and the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) over cattle grazing fees and the use of public lands around Bunkerville,
Nevada. On April 5, 2014, the BLM began a massive effort to round up
approximately 500 head of Cliven Bundys cattle.1 While the BLM was conducting
its roundup, hundreds of supporters converged on the area around Cliven Bundys
Bunkerville ranch to protest the governments actions. In re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034
at 1036. In the days leading up to the roundup, the BLM took several controversial
steps that drew criticism from individuals and state leaders such as Nevada Governor
Brian Sandoval, including setting up a First Amendment Area meant to corral
protesters into a small area, and having a large armed force present for the roundup.2
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discovery the government obtained from open social media sources such as
Facebook and YouTube to protection.
III.
Because there are in excess of 1,300 docket entries as of the date of the filing of
this petition, Petitioners have only included relevant pages of the docket to
demonstrate the defendants overwhelming opposition to the protective order. (See
Exh. 29 at docket entries 322 (Defendant Delemus Joinder); 325 (Defendant Engel
Joinder); 330 (McGuire Joinder); 335 (M. Bundy Joinder); 337 Woods Joinder); 338
(additional Woods Joinder); 340 (OShaughnessy Joinder); 342 (Parker Joinder);
343 (Cooper Joinder); 344 (A. Bundy Joinder); 368 (Cavalier Joinder); 370 (Engel
Joinder).)
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Facebook posts to protection, the defendants will be left to wonder whether they
face sanction if they share this information with anyone. Extending the [proposed
protective order] to Facebook materials would be at best pointless, and at worst a
means for the government to chill legitimate defense investigation and protected
speech. (Ex. 11, PA 189, ll. 9-12.) Cliven Bundy also opposed the governments
request to limit public access to the discovery materials in this case. (Ex. 8, PA 112,
ll. 2-5 (we want the press to shine the light of truth on this case so that the
government cannot hide its misdeeds by burying those deeds ).)
Petitioners filed a motion to intervene and a memorandum opposing the
proposed protective order. (Ex. 10, PA 152-82 (Amended Motion to Intervene and
Proposed Objections).) Petitioners expressed concern about the First Amendment
implications of the governments overbroad protective order, which would severely
curtail the publics access to information about the governments activities in this
extremely high-profile prosecution. (PA 168-72.) Petitioners argued that, contrary
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), the government had failed to
establish sufficient good cause to justify the entry of such a broad protective order.
(Ex. 10, PA 163, PA 172-75.) Petitioners also objected to the proposed order because
it lacked appropriate procedural safeguards such as mechanisms to challenge
confidentiality designations (PA 175-77), and failed to allow for other, less extreme
means of protecting sensitive information, including redaction. (PA 175-76.)
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IV.
with a lightly revised version of its proposed protective order. (Ex. 9, PA 114-51.)
According to the government, the protective order was necessary to protect victims,
witnesses, law enforcement officers, and investigators associated with the case from
threats, intimidation, and harassment from supporters of the Bundy defendants.
(Ex. 9, PA 116, ll. 17-20.) To support its proposed protective order, the government
primarily relied on twenty-two examples of social media postsmost of which were
more than two years old, and almost all of which discuss law enforcement officers
who appear to have been involved with the April 2014 events described in the
indictment. (Ex. 9, PA 132-51.) Some posts included the names and contact
information of law enforcement officers and witnesses, and encouraged Bundy
supporters to contact individuals involved in the April 14, 2014 cattle seizure. (See
generally id.)
The government reiterated its inchoate concerns about law enforcement and
witness safety in its opposition to Petitioners motion to intervene (Ex. 12, PA 194210.) It cited examples of social media posts by Bundy supporters (including a post
referencing the Courts order denying an appeal of a pretrial detention order (id. at p.
10), phone calls officers received (id. at pp. 12-13), and allegedly threatening mail
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PA 224-29.) Subsequently, on July 15, 2016, the court issued an order granting in
part the governments request for a protective order. (Ex. 16, PA 251-73.) The court
found that the government had made a sufficient threshold showing of actual and
potential threats, intimidation, and harassment to victims, witnesses, and law
enforcement officers to show good cause for a protective order restricting
dissemination of pretrial discovery. (PA270, ll. 22-24.) The court acknowledged
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that the bulk of the governments twenty-two examples of alleged threats were over
two years old, but nevertheless found that [c]umulatively, the 22 examples are
sufficient to establish a credible risk that public disclosure of broad discovery the
government has agreed to produce before trial may be used for the improper purpose
of threatening, intimidating, or influencing potential witnesses, or, at a minimum,
chilling their willingness to testify. (Id. at PA 270-71.)
The order noted a social media posting by an unidentified person urging
Bundy supporters to contact individuals involved in the April 2014 events in
Bunkerville to express their dissatisfaction. (See PA 256-57 (citing Ex. 9, PA 149,
Example 19 [EVERYONE PLEASE CALL They need to know that they are
doing is NOT right and that we notices [sic] it and we are a shamed [sic] of them!]).)
The magistrate judge also cited angry, but ultimately speculative posts that allegedly
could be construed as threatening or intimidating. (Ex. 16, PA 257 (citing Ex. 9,
PA 143, Example 13 (Sounds like to solve the problem a lqnd [sic] owner will,
have to take out an AR 10 and put a bullet in -head to save the other land owners to
stop this, if I had land. i will now, kniw [sic] who to shoot first.)).
The court rejected the governments proposed order, finding it lack[ed]
clarity and may lead to confusion, unintentional violations, and collateral litigation.
(PA 272 at ll. 3-4.) The magistrate judge found nearly all of the social media posts
had been available to the public for over two years, and that the government had
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failed to explain[] how Defendants and their counsel would be able to determine
what internet and social media materials the government received from search
warrants and court orders, and what discovery materials were already available to
the public. (Id. at ll. 13-16.) The court entered its own protective order governing
the dissemination of discovery (Exh.17, PA 274-77), which clarified that
[i]nformation and documents in the public domain are not confidential documents
(PA 274 at ll. 23-24.)
However, the court found that discovery should be subject to protection, citing
the unusual scope and complexity of the discovery in this case. (PA 272, ll. 3-6.)
Rather than require the government to make a particularized showing of good cause,
the court reasoned that a protective order was necessary to facilitate the exchange of
discovery and prevent the court from having to resolve collateral litigation over
individual documents. (Id. at ll. 7-10.) The court also justified the need for a
protective order by noting that the government had agreed to disclose discovery the
Defendants would not normally have access to prior to trial. (Id. at ll. 14-17.)
The order sharply curtailed dissemination and copying of discovery. The
materials deemed confidential under the protective order includes virtually every
document produced by the government, including grand jury transcripts, witness
statements, memoranda of interviews, and any documents and tangible objects
produced by the government. (PA 274 at ll. 20-24.)
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Finally, the order provided for the automatic sealing of documents designated
as confidential:
Confidential documents, as defined by this order, shall not be filed on
the public docket by any party seeking the courts review of such
confidential documents as an exhibit to a motion or brief. Instead, the
party shall (i) file its underlying brief or motion in CM/ECF on the
public docket, and (ii) separately file the confidential documents in
CM/ECF under seal as Sealed Exhibit(s) and link the sealed
exhibit(s) to the underlying brief or motion. This order authorizes filing
confidential documents under seal and no further application for a
sealing order shall be required.
(PA 276 at ll. 12-18.) Thus, contrary to this Courts precedent, the protective order
requires the parties to submit confidential documents under seal without requiring the
submitting party to make a particularized showing that good cause exists to seal.
VI.
request the district court granted. (Ex. 619, PA 278-305 (minute order granting
Petitioners leave to object).) In their objections,7 Petitioners asserted the order
partially granting the governments request for a protective order was clearly
erroneous because: (1) contrary to the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1), the
government had failed to establish good cause for the protective order (PA 314-18);
and (2) the protective orders automatic sealing provision ran afoul of longstanding
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precedent from this Court that requires a party seeking to file documents under seal
to make a particularized showing of good cause for each document. (PA 318-20.)
Petitioners also noted that the order failed to consider other, less restrictive
alternatives to automatic sealing of discovery, including redaction of personal
identifying information. (PA 318.)
Shortly after Petitioners submitted their objections, Defendant Peter Santilli
moved the court to modify the protective order. (Ex. 22, PA 361-69.) In his motion,
Mr. Santilli requested the court modify the definition of protected discovery to
include only documents, videos, audio, or other items that contain personal
identifiers. (PA 362, ll. 22-24.) Rather than automatically sealing such documents
in toto, Mr. Santilli proposed redacting personal identifying information from
discovery documents prior to filing. (PA. 362, ll. 23-25.)
On November 20, 2016, the district court entered an order affirming the
magistrate judges order and protective order. (Ex. 25, PA 380-89.) Applying a
deferential clear error standard of review, the court found that the magistrate judge
applied the correct legal standard in finding that the Government satisfactorily
demonstrated good cause based on the alleged threats and harassment of victims,
witness, and law enforcement officers. (PA 385, ll. 1-4.) The court also found that
there was a credible risk that the supporters of Cliven Bundy and his co-defendants
will continued to resort to the intimidation of victims, witnesses, and law
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First, prior to the hearing, Defendant Ryan Payne had filed a motion to transfer
venue based on the extensive pretrial publicity in this case. (PA 391 (referencing
argument on motion to transfer venue; see also Ex. 28, PA 448-62 (Order on Motion
to Transfer Venue).) On December 9, 2017, the court and the parties discussed the
media coverage of the Bunkerville standoff, including what was purported to be the
most inflammatory and potentially prejudicial coverage that the government has
previously tied to Cliven Bundy and his co-defendantsthe June 2014 murders of
two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers and a civilian bystander by
Jared and Amanda Miller. (PA 461, ll. 3-7.) Although the government relied on the
Millers to establish good cause (see, e.g., Ex. 12, PA 204-05), at the December 9
hearing, the government stepped away from linking the Millers to the Bundy
defendants, telling the magistrate judge that it had no intention of attempting to
introduce evidence linking the Millers to any of the defendants. (PA 461, ll. 16-18.)
Second, this matter is proceeding to trial. After hearing argument on the
governments motion to sever (Ex. 26, PA 391), the court issued an order on
December13, 2016 separating the defendant into three tiers based on their alleged
roles and setting trial dates with the allegedly least culpable defendants proceeding
to trial first. (Ex. 27, PA 421-44.) The first trial is set to begin February 6, 2017. (PA
447.) The Tier Two defendants will proceed to trial 30 days after the conclusion of
the Tier Three defendants, and the Tier One defendants will proceed to trial 30 days
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would repeatedly evade review because of the collateral nature of the issue. In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982). Petitioners have
satisfied these factors.
II.
held that the press lacks standing to bring a direct appeal and, therefore, must seek
review of orders denying it access to judicial proceedings or documents by petition
for writ of mandamus. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Oregon,
920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Second, Petitioners need
access to the materials subject to the protective order to provide the public with this
information during the trials in this case. The first round of trials is set to begin on
February 7, 2017. Delaying in resolving this serious issue will prejudice Petitioners
in a way not correctable on appeal. Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court
for Dist. Of Nevada, 798 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Bauman, 557
F.2d at 654).
III.
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557
F.2d at 654-55. As detailed below, the order is clearly erroneous in three respects.
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First, the courts finding of good cause was clearly erroneous because the speech the
government contended was illegal and threatening were protected speech. Second,
the automatic sealing provision is contrary to this Courts precedent that a party must
make a particularized showing of good cause to seal each document. See, e.g. Foltz
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the
automatic sealing provision is directly contrary to this Courts opinion in Associated
Press v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of California, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983),
in which this Court found that an automatic sealing order in a criminal case that
actually provided more procedural protections than the one at issue here violated the
publics First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.
A.
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[C]ourts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records and documents. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
Of course, the presumed right of access to judicial records is not absolute. As
the Supreme Court held in Nixon, courts may exercise their supervisory powers to
limit access where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. Notwithstanding these supervisory powers, an order
precluding the parties or other persons from disclosing discovery materials to third
persons, the public, or the press must be supported by good cause. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16(d)(1). The party seeking the protective order bears the burden of establishing
the existence of such good cause. United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512
(S.D. N.Y. 2013). Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work
a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The injury must be
shown with specificity. Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific
examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing. Pansy v.
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994); accord United States v.
Wecht, 484 F. 3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
With regard to public filings, this Court has held that there is a strong
presumption in favor of access. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). Given this presumption, a party seeking to seal
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strike the proper balance between the rights of the defendants, the witnesses and law
enforcement in this case, and the publics right to learn about this case.
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accord United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011).
Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is
governed by an objective standardwhether a reasonable person would foresee that
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. Planned Parenthood
of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th
Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. OrozcoSantillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir.1990)). Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual
context, including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners. Orozco
Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265. [C]ontext is critical . . . and history can give meaning
to the medium. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078. Predictive or exhortative
statements do not qualify as threats. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1119; see also id. at
1122 (holding that a defendants statements about then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama did not qualify as threats because one is predictive in nature and the
other exhortatory).)
None of the threatening statements relied upon as good cause for the
protective order constitute actual threats. In fact, several of the statements are merely
exhortatory in nature. They are protected expression of some individuals frustration
with what they believe to be acts of government overreaching. At most, the examples
of threatening speech are vague and predictive.
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Additionally, the court cited the potential for public ridicule of law
enforcement and witnesses as a basis for good cause. (Ex. 25, PA 385 at ll. 22-24.)
Criticizing the performance of law enforcement officers, however, is squarely
protected speech. Taken to its logical end, the courts order could be interpreted as
an indication that, any time an individual is vocally critical of a government officials
actions, good cause exists for a protective order. Accordingly, the court erred in
finding good cause for a protective order.
C.
The court also erred in requiring the parties to file automatically file all
confidential documents attached to briefs under seal without a particularized
showing of good cause for each document it seeks to file under seal.
The court noted public access to discovery materials is more limited than to
court proceedings. (Ex. 16, PA 263-65.) However, in allowing the materials deemed
Confidential to be automatically filed under seal, the court misapplied the lesser
standard for access to criminal discovery to judicial filing. The law of this Court and
the common law start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.
Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003). Given
this presumption of public access, this Court requires a party to make a
particularized showing of good cause for each document it seeks to file under seal.
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Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131; see also San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court.,
187 F.3d at 1102 (holding that to gain a protective order the party must make
particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document).
If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the
public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether the
information should be filed under seal. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson,
56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir.1995)). Entering a blanket protective order and then
allowing all documents subject to that order to be filed under seal improperly evades
the requirement to establish particularized harm for each document kept secret.
Indeed, the protective order subverts longstanding principals that (1) court
records are presumptively public, and (2) depriving the public of access to public
records requires a careful balancing of the private and public interests at stake.
Instead, with little in the way of good cause to support a protective order, the court
has mandated that all confidential documents attached to motions and pleadings
must be filed under seal without requiring the filing party to show why sealing is
necessary. This runs contrary to this Courts law, and should not be the standard for
filing documents under seal. Instead, this Court should follow the guidance of the
Ninth Circuit and require parties to establish that submitting discovery documents
in a public filing will result in a specific, particularized harm. In addition, the party
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Upon request for reconsideration from members of the media, the district
court modified its order regarding the automatic sealing. While all documents would
still be submitted to the court in camera, the court set forth a specific procedure that
in part allowed the parties and members of the media to weigh in on whether sealing
was appropriate. Id. at 1145. Pursuant to the courts revised order, after receiving a
document in camera, the parties had 48 hours to submit written comments on
propriety of sealing the document. Id. After the 48 hour period, the court would then
promptly rule upon the unsealing or sealing of the subject document. Id. The court
also reserved the authority to order unsealing of the document if it determined
sealing was unnecessary. Id. The Associated Press and other news organizations
subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. Id.
In reviewing that automatic sealing orderwhich provided more procedural
protection than the order at issue herethe Court first held that its ruling in United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1982), that the First Amendment
right of access to pretrial proceedings (such as suppression hearings or detention
hearings) also extends to documents filed in connection with pretrial proceedings.
Id. The Court explained this is so because pretrial documents, such as those dealing
with the question whether [a defendant] should be incarcerated prior to trial and
those containing allegations by [a defendant] of government misconduct, are often
important to a full understanding of the way in which the judicial process and the
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As discussed above, the motivation for the automatic sealing provision in the
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protective order was not a concern for the defendants Sixth Amendment rights.
Rather, the motivation for the order was the governments speculative concern for
witness and law enforcement safety. Nevertheless, this Courts reasoning in
Associated Press applies with equal force to the instant protective order.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the automatic sealing provision directly
contravenes the publics presumed First Amendment right of access to documents
submitted in connection with pretrial proceedings. As this Court explained, there are
two principal justifications for this First Amendment right: [f]irst, the criminal trial
historically has been open to the press and general public, and [s]econd, the right
of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of
the judicial process and the government as a whole. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper
Co., 457 U.S. at 605-06). This access to criminal trials proceeding and documents is
particularly critical where, as here, both the defendants and the general public have
been critical of the governments actions at the Bundy ranch both before and during
the BLMs cattle round-up, and have also been critical of the governments
prosecution of the defendants. Given the local and national interest in this case, it is
vital that the public be allowed to view pretrial and trial documents.
Second, the protective order at issue here is even more troublesome than the
one this Court declared unconstitutional in Associated Press. In Associated Press,
the district court permitted each party and the media the opportunity to stake out
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their respective positions regarding the sealing of pretrial documents. Id. at 1145.
While the Court ultimately found this provision violated the First Amendment, it
was at least an attempt by the district court to determine whether sealing was
appropriate.
Here, by contrast, the sealing of documents containing information the court
has deemed confidential is automatic, and provides no procedural mechanism
whatsoever for the parties to challenge the sealing of documents. Certainly, if the
order in Associated Press was offensive to the First Amendment, it is even more
offensive here given the lack of any procedural safeguards. Accordingly, the court
clearly erred in entering the protective order.
IV.
that a district courts order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of
first impression. Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir.
1997). Certainly, this Court has addressed to propriety of protective orders in a
variety of cases and contexts. Indeed, as discussed above, the Court has certainly
considered protective orders entered in criminal cases that included an automatic
sealing provision. However, the Petitioners were unable to locate any case decided
by this Court dealing with this precise issue: namely, whether, in a criminal case, a
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court can enter a protective order intended to protect witnesses and others that (1)
mandates automatically filing any pleading containing confidential material under
seal without establishing that actual good cause required the entry of a protective
order (2) requires parties to submit any documents containing information
designated as confidential under without demonstrating good cause; and (3) provides
no procedural mechanism for challenging sealing. Thus, this case presents a unique
set of issues that appear to be of first impression for this Court. Accordingly, a writ
of mandamus is necessary in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners request that this Court grant its petition for a writ of mandamus.
Absent relief, the district courts erroneous and controversial ruling will evade review.
DATED this 20th day of January, 2017.
/s/ Margaret A. McLetchie
Margaret A. McLetchie, Nevada Bar No. 10931
Alina M. Shell, Nevada Bar No. 11711
MCLETCHIE SHELL, LLC
701 E. Bridger Ave., Suite 520
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 728-5300
Counsel for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that she is an employee of the law firm,
McLetchie Shell, LLC, and is a person of such age and discretion as to be competent
to serve papers.
That on January 20, 2017, she has provided a paper copy of the above and
foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS to all interested parties via
postage fully prepaid First Class United States Mail to the persons below:
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