Professional Documents
Culture Documents
P.D. 1508 was repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160)
Introduced substantial changes not only in the authority granted to the Lupon Tagapamayapa but
also in the procedure to be observed in the settlement of disputes within the authority of the
Lupon
Amicable settlement of disputes wherein the disputing parties are encouraged to make mutual
concessions to obtain a peaceful resolution of the dispute without formal adjudication
Lupong Tagapamayapa
What
(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, composed of
Who
(b) Any person
How
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon
appointment as may have been made within the period of posting, the Punong Barangay
(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay for the
entire duration of their term of office; and
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local
systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without prejudice
to the applicable provisions of this Code.
Vacancies.
Punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired
portion of the term.
provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters
relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes,
to enable various conciliation panel members to share with one another their
observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law
or ordinance.
(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves the chairman and
the secretary.
Pangkat Secretary Functions
The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody that is not by law
otherwise declared confidential.
whenever necessary
in the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay.
Venue.
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where
such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.
OBJECTIONS to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed WAIVED.
Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day
summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their
witnesses
to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests.
If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the
parties before him
he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat.
While dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for
offenses and cause of action INTERRUPTED upon filing the complaint with the punong
barangay. Period RESUMES upon receipt by the complainant of the complainant or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary:
Interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.
The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution
on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman
to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for
amicable settlement.
For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties
and witnesses before it.
If party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias,
interest, or any other similar grounds discovered AFTER the constitution of the pangkat,
the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose
decision shall be final.
Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein
provided for.
(e) Period to arrive at a settlement Within fifteen (15) days from the day the pangkat convenes in accordance with this section. This period is
extendible at the discretion of the pangkat, which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly
meritorious cases.
Form of settlement.
and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be.
When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement
shall be written in the language known to them.
Conciliation.
(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.
No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat
and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
Arbitration.
(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the
arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat.
Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date thereof
for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed.
Arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within
ten (10) days thereafter.
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When the
parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in the language
or dialect known to them.
unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
This provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon, in which case the
compromise or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval
thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.
Execution.
The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement.
After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court.
Repudiation.
Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same
Appropriations.
Such amount as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay
shall be provided for in the annual budget of the city or municipality concerned.
CASES :
AQUINO V. AURE
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino
before the MeTC, alleging that they acquired the subject property from the spouses Aquino by virtue of a
Deed of Sale. However, after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the
subject property, they refused to vacate the same. In her Answer, Aquino countered that Aure Lending do
not have any legal right over the property, as per their Memorandum of Agreement, Aure shall secure a
loan from a bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn
over the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan,
the spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
MeTC decided in favor of Aquino on the ground of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation
process. RTC Affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals REVERSED and reasoned that the
failure of Aure to undergo barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the
sufficiency of Aures Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.
HELD: The primordial objective of barangay conciliations is to reduce the number of court litigations and
prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts. To ensure this, the law requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case.
This has been declared compulsory in nature.
However, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant; in other words, the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a
quo.
In the case at bar, Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted
herself voluntarily thereto. An examination of Aquinos Answer before the MeTC shows that there is utter
lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its
jurisdcition. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of
no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her
Answer. Thus, although Aquinos defense is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available
for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss the case motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only
three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim. It is clear that a court may not motu
proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation,
this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own
initiative.
MORATA V. GO
Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners Morata
for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the
parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as ground the
failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process
required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.
HELD: Except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to
settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage the court should neither add nor
subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does
not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
The conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in
court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice
dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by
the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the rule on Venue, which looks to the location
of the real property in the determination of venue, for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,
jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city
and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or
the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis
that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Lastly, the circular issued by then Chief Justice embodying the directive "to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of
first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now
known as regional trial courts. This clearly shows that conciliation process at the barangay level,
prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases
falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
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