People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, et al.

685 SCRA 264

FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National
Polices Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task
Force Habagat, then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the
police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers
involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered
the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack
of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting
Lacsons petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter
directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao.
Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of
probable cause.On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal
actions on the ground of lack of probable cause.
HELD:
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of
warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see
if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own
witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for
Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to
hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the
witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held that the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present
additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish

probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to
the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. That is
the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against
the respondents.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple
murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

People vs. Alunday

Summary: A suspected marijuana plantation was the subject of a raiding operation when
the alleged marijuana grower was caught cutting and gathering marijuana. Further, when
taken
to
a
nearby
hut,
an
unlicensed
firearm
was
found.
Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting
to
commit
an
offense.
Facts: The Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of the Mountain Province
received a report from a confidential informant that there was an existing marijuana
plantation within the vicinity of Mt. Churyon. After a series of validations, the existence of the
subject
plantation
was
finally
confirmed.
The Police Director ordered a contingent of policemen to the subject plantation and upon
arriving at the area saw Ricardo Alunday (D) cutting and gathering marijuana leaves. The
police took Alunday (D) to the hut where they saw a woman, an M16 riffle and some dried
marijuana
leaves.
Issues: Is

the

warrantless

arrest

valid?

Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court refers to
arrest
in flagrante
delicto.
Furthermore, the Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of
his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a
number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.

Herein, Alunday (D) went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only
during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect
by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his
arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before
his arraignment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS

(G.R. No. 191061 February 9, 2011)

markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine

Hydrochloride (shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.
For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case
was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but Roselle.
She narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

The RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced
her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to
undergo rehabilitation for not less than six months at a government drug rehabilitation
center subject to the provisions of R.A. 9165 for her violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A.
9165.

FACTS:
An appeal was made by Roselle to the CA but the latter affimed the decision of the RTC.
PO1 Esguerra testified that they received information that Roselle was selling illegal drugs
at her house in Makati City. Esguerra then conducted a test buy and received from her one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he returned
to his office, Esguerra marked the sachet with "@ Tisay" then sent it to the laboratory for
testing. Before receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was
going to leave her house, prompting Esguerras team to conduct a buy-bust operation.

Hence, these appeal.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselles case;

Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier
that day. She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he wanted
to buy another pack for P300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the house.
While waiting and looking in, Esguerra spotted two women6 inside using shabu with the
asset by their side, apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the
sachet, Esguerra signaled his team. They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights.
Esguerra immediately marked the sachet with "RPS".

After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with "@ Tisay" and "RPS"

2) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the prosecution evidence
established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since
they arrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person
taken into custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide. 7 But Roselle raised this issue

only during appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to
have waived any question as to the legality of her arrest.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being
the fruit of the poisonous tree.
HELD:

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The court held that the petitioners failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest
before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the lower court
estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.
The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.

Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the
crime9 charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of
the allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen
after the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of
custody should be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and
eventually marked until the same is presented during trial.

Taking into account the above reasons, the SC finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of
Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must
prevail.

Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 182178
August 15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA 9165.
Facts state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received information
from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded to the reported
place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic allegedly containing shabu. The police
officers arrested petitioner and seized the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the
petitioners possession.
Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasnt doing anything illegal and so
the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized should be
inadmissible since it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the warrantless arrest of petitioner
effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.
The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu,
the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police
officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the
items veracity was well established.
The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

PEOPLE v. DORIA [301 SCRA 668 (1999)]

Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway
in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant
alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person hetrans acted with, and when the latter
was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was
suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened , yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The
team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in
the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was charged in two separate
informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section
11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II,
R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest
and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

November 10, 2010

?
Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun was engaged in
illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrenst Jun in a buybust operation.

?
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the marked bills and Jun
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate.

?
When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic upon which PO3
arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun revealed that
he left the money at the house of his associate named neneth

Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein
was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit
an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant , appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have
been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the
arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical
description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19),
there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.

?
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dinin
table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the box.

?
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and found that it ha 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

?
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth. The
policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun, together with the coz, its contents
and the marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters,

Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is Violata Gaddao.

?
They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to
another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as
amended by RA 7659

Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable

?
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused &
partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance.

?
American federal courts and state courts usually use the subjective or origin of
intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determine whether entrapment actually occurred.
The focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to commit the offense is charged,
his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.

?
Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is whether the conduct
of the law enforcement agenst was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other
than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.

?
The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly & adequately shown. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validty of the defense of inducement.

?
In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing
any crime. Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee
from the policement to justify her arrest in hot pursuit

?
Neither could her arrest ne justified under second instance of personal knowledge
in Rule 113 as this must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
indentification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct
examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his query as to
where the marked money was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If
there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own
right, knowledge of the acts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

?
Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in
Gaddaos house does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

?
The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in the
sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson
Kirby Dichaves were abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.
Nimfa was able to recognized one of the kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen
the latter in her employers office.
Thekidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls
of the kidnappers,
Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business
transactions. After numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of
P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.
Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes
Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked,
and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt.
Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to

take photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with
appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then
apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along
South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper
seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was
heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it
reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to
be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They
managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun
inside the bag.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?
DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b) When
an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court which states:

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited
above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Records show
that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively
consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is
sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours
long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper.
This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. Likewise, the search
conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can
still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for
the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.