No.

11,1986

PEACE RESEARCHER'
RCHER
p.a. BOX19683,
CHRISTCHURCH

. �

Whipple, Lyttelton 1984. Sign of things to

come?
U.S. Officers watch over New Zealand
IN THIS ISSUE :
ports - Destabilisation - Intelligence and the
American Connection.
NEW ZEALAND/UNITED STATES SECRET
AGREEMENT HAS AMERICAN
OFFICERS WATCHING OVER LYTTELTON
AND WELLINGTON.
A document recently put into the hands -of
'PEACE RESEARCHER' reveals that the United
States Navy has currently posted at two of our major
ports officers whose responsibility it is to assess
available facilities for use in wartime. The document,
published by the U.S. Naval Control of Shipping
Organisation and entitled 'Annual Inspection of Port
Level Elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet', says that
Reptofs or reporting officers are stationed (presum­
ably at the Operation Deep Freeze base) to look over
Lyttelton and (at the O.S. Embassy) to look over
Wellington. The document includes an annual inspec­
tion checklist which refers to wartime expansion
plans.
And according to the New Zealand Ministry of
Defence in a letter to 'PEACE RESEARCHER',
dated May 23, 'the Naval Control of Shipping Organ­
isation for the Pacific Ocean was established in 1951
under the secret Radford-Collins Agreement, an
extremely sensitive allied arrangement involving all
three ANZUS partners. The New Zealand Ministry of
Defence has said it regards the functions of the
Radford-Collins Agreement as secret and, when
questioned by 'PEACE RESEARCHER', has invoked
Section 6 a & b o f the Official Information Act to
prevent public disclosure. However, information
relating to the significance of the maritime surveill­
ance arrangement has trickled in via mainly
Australian sources. The most alarming aspect is that
under the arrangement New Zealand is under certain
conditions expected 'to secure New Zealand's key air
a'nd naval support facilities and their approaches
against the contingency of United States or allied
use'. (For further information refer to issues 5, 7
and 9 of 'PEACE RESEARCHER').
'PEACE RESEARCHER' has written to the Naval
Attache at the United States Embassy seeking his
comments on the above but at the time of writing
this article no reply has been forthcoming. 'PEACE
RESEARCHER' is seeking further explanations about
the postings from the New Zealand Ministry of
Defence.
Meanwhile 'PEACE RESEARCHER' has been
assembling information on the Naval Control of
Shipping Organisation. A U.S. Naval Control of
Shipping Manual for 1983 provides some disturb­
ing in sights into the allied (read New Zealand)
participation. The document says "world-wide naval
control of shipping should be exercised as required
through agreements with allied Governments by the
Allied High Command." lIowever, the document
cQntinues, "(t)here can be no dividing lines between
the allied and U.S. aspects of the Naval Control of
Shipping Organisa Hon, particularly in the lower
echelons, since the same organisations serve both
functions and use the same reporting systems." A
map of the world in the manual setting down 'U.S.
Operational Control Authority Areas' places New
Zealand under the control of the Commander of th.e
NA V AL
in this area of the Pacific arc inextricably enmeshed
and the United States naval authorities expect to
operate here should United States interests (such as
the Deep Freeze facility) be put under threat.
Elsewhere in the document under the heading
'Local Port Facilities' the duties of the U.S. Naval
Officers are set down in detail leaving little doubt as
to their intentions in the event of a crisis. The docu­
ment says "(t)he wartime mission of the NCSO
(Naval Control of Shipping Officer) requires a
thorough knowledge of the local port(s) and port
facilities in his assigned area of responsibility . .. An
NCS Officer that is well acquainted with the avail­
able port facilities ... will be in the best position to
expand and assume its wartime mission with
minimum delay." Further, the 'Annual Inspection'
document refers to potential dispersal anchor�ges,
plans for the control of fishing vessels and small
craft as well as the availability of secure communica­
tions facilities.
While the New Zealand Ministry of Defence is
adamant that no more information will be disclosed
about the Radford-Collins Arrangements, United
States Naval Authorities are likewise as insistent that
pertinent documents will not be released. 'PEACE
RESEARCHER' requested the U.S. Department of
the Navy to release manuals referred to in the
'Annual Inspections' document which specifically
mentioned New Zealand and which, presumably,
established methods to be used within the New
Zealand area. However, the U.S. Department of the
Navy has replied that these manuals will remain .
classified.
And confirming United States Naval interest in
data on New Zealand port facilities (as well as the
New Zealand authorities' readiness to comply) is a
recently released list of intelligence material supplied
by the New Zealand intelligence services to their
American counterparts. The list includes particulars
of facilities at 26 New Zealand ports including aerial
photographs, particulars of petroleum jnstallations,
railway bridges and transportation systems.
Sources;
'Naval Control of Shipping', a document prepared by
the NCSO (U.S.) 1983.
'Annual Inspection of Port Level Elements of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet', instruction manual, United Stales
Pacinc Fleet, 1984.
Memorandum, New Zealand Joint Intelligence
Bureau (1954).
Letter to 'PEACE RESEARCHER' by N.Z. MoD,
May 1986.
Letter to 'PEACE RESEARCHER' by U.S. Depart-
DEEP FREEZE
SKI PLANES
A BARGAIN
by Bob Leonard
We have continued to probe the question of
ownership of the ski-Hercules aircraft that serve
Operation Deep Freeze. As we reported in the last
issue of 'Peace Researcher', the question is of interest
because the title for seven aircraft was deliberately
changed from the US Navy to the National Science
Foundation (NSF) between 1973 and 197 9. When we
asked both agencies why the title change was made,
wc got no answers. We suspect that the change ":,,as
purely for cosmetic purposes � to give OperatIOn
Deep Freeze a lower military profile, while changing
nothing with respect to military operation and
control of the Hercules.
In lieu of direct answers to our questions, we have
resorted to requesting various documents that arc
cited in other documents we have managed to obtain.
Recently, we received some specific items requested
from the National Science Foundation containing
information about the purchase of the Deep Freeze
LC-130 Hercules. We have been attempting to deter­
mine how much the NSF paid for ownership of the
seven Hcrcules now used by the foundation in the
Antarctic service,
Four documents were released. The first, dated
31 October 1972, is a single page supplement
appropriate act (1) in which, under the title 'National
Science Foundation' we find a single sentence: "For
an additional amount for 'Salaries and expenses', to
be used for the purchase of lhree ski�equipped C�130
transport aircraft, aircraft spares and repair parts,
$19.7 40.000 (US dollars), to remain available until
expended." The price per plane was thus $6. 58
million,
How was this money spent? The answer was in a
companion document of some 9 pages .- an inter­
agency agreement between the Navy and the NSF(2).
The following statement is on page 3: "'In accord­
ance with the Presidential guidance and DOD/NSF
Memorandum of Agreement (NSF-CA55) the
Foundation looks to the Department of Defense
(DaD) to provide support including the
procurement of aircraft and other essential logistic
support." So the money was allocated by Congress to
the NSF but tlIe Navy did the buying. And the Air
Force was involved too, through the Air Force
Systems Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio. The delivery schedule for the three new
planes to the Navy was October 197 3, November
1973 and February 1974.
The next two planes were purchased under an act
appropriating $18,000,000 as of 17 October 1975. In
a letter from the NSF to the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy(3) the appropriation is described as part of
the 'Department of Housing and Urban Redevelop­
ment Independent Agencies Appropriations Act
1976', At $9 million each the planes were to be
delivered to the Navy in April and May 197 7 .
Thus we have documentation of the planned
purchase of five new LC-130 Hercules by the Navy
under the curious categories of 'salaries and expenses'
and 'housing and urban redevelopment', And the
prices per aircraft seem rather low in comparison to
the price of a new plane cited for 1985(4): $7 5
million. That is 1140% inflation between 1973 and
1985, and 833% between 1977 and 1985.
This leaves two NSF Hercules to account for. The
cover letter to 'Peace Researcher' from Dr Peter
WHkniss, Director of Polar Programs of the NSF,
stated, "In addition you request.ed copies of docu­
ments rehlling to purchase of the two older LC-130
aircraft. Our records renect only a transfer of
ownership of those two aircraft as shown in the copy
enclosed" ,
The copy was of a brief telex(5) whose cOlltent,
including military abbreviations to save money, was
simply: "Pursuant to recommendations contained re[
a transfer ownership of subj acft from Navy to
 National Science Foundation effective 1 October
1979. Acft will continue lo be operated by VXE-6: l11ent5, which the Department of Defen5e will
' continue to carry in its budget .. . " The documents
and funded by Navy on a reimbursable basis." The l
two aircraft arc LC-130F Bureau Numbers 148319 say civilian (NSF) allocations provide the aircraft; the
and 148320. expert witness says the military budget does it. But,
The NSF thus filled out its Hercules fleet at the I in the gigantic Washington Budgetary laundromat it
doesn't seem to matter much what the public laws

I
bargain cost of zero dollars. We ask you, why would
the Navy give two multi-million dollar aircraft to the say about who gets what funds. What counts is who
NSF? We believe the answer is that the Navy gave. controls the hardware that gets bought.In the case'
nothing away except some pieces of title paper. Our I of the ski-Hercules, the Navy is in control not the
·· '
suspicion that the title changes were for cosmetic NSF.
purposes, to demilitarize the Hercules, is borne out i
by the doc.uments we have described.
To provide un independent check on the purchase
prices of Herculcs in the 19705 we have written to the
References.
NZ Department of Defence about C-130 purchases for
(1) Public LIW 92-607, 92nd United States Congress, 31
the RNZ Air Force. October 1972.
As a final fillip to this edition of the continuing (2) Interagency Agreement NSF CA-I01 between the
Hercules saga, we note some confused testimony by a Department of Defense and the NSF, 1972.
Dr Owen before a US congressional committee in (3) Letter from NSF to Navy designated Interagency
1972. Dr Owen, apparently speaking on behalf of the Agreement No. NSF-7604397 concerning procure­
Department of Defense, said, "As you know Mr ment of aircraft, 19 November 19 75.
Chairman, NSF has assumed responsibility ' for (4) 'The Star', Dr WiIkniss cited in Christchurch ' 20 June
funding the logistics element as well as science in the 1985.

US Antarctic program. Excluded are aircraft replace- (5) Navy (CNO) message of 2 October 1979.

,WHIT E ME N IN TIES DISCUSSING M ISSILE SIZE

: : . ......... ... . . ., ....- . ....... ..... ... . ... ... . . . . . . .
. . . .. .... , . . . .
 DES TABllISATION : USIS, SIS, CIA and ASIO
by Nuclear Free Kiwis
The United States Information Service (USIS) has
recently stepped up its subversive operations in.Ne:v
Zealand. With the opening this year of a new offlce III
Christchurch, the Service may be expanding its base
to repeat its performance of the Vietnam War era.
It is worth recalling the Service's activities at that
time. The Campaign Against Foreign Control of
Aotearoa (CAFCA) provided the material for an in­
depth article io The Press' (1). CAFCA member,
Owen Wilkes, had obtained m Denmark an Amencan
Document titled "USIS Wellington Country Assess­
men t" for 1965 which had been sanitized and de­
classified in 197 9.
To quote one particularly in�eresting section:
"USIS/Wellington believes that its close support of
the Anti-Communist Committee and various other
similar groups with every fonn of assistance avaHable
t o us helped to tip the scales in the right direction in
the greatest divisive issue that has dIsturbed NZ
politics and philosophy in the past thirty years"(l).
CAFCA asked the Security Intelligence Service
(SIS) for all material held on the "Anti-Commun
Committee and simHar pro�Vletnam War groups, WIth .
particular ernphasis on forms of assistance given them
by the U.S. Embassy and the USIS in 1965. The SIS
Director, Mr J.L. Smith, replied that the SIS was not
aware of any Anti-Communist Committee. It knew of
two similar organizations but refused any more
information on the grounds that this would other­
wise be likely to prejudice security.
CAFCA then asked: does the SIS confirm that the
U.S. Embassy and the USIS provided "every form of
material support" to such groups in 1965, and if sn
what was that support, and did it include financ1al
support? Again, the SIS declined further comment.
Munay Horton, CAFCA's secretary, has rightly
raised the question as to how 1965 material can
possibly prejudice the security of New Zealand. He
pointed out that official U.S. dIplomatIC documents
showed that the U.S. had interfered 111 NZ domestIc
politics. Surely, it was the SIS's job to monitor and
analyse such interference as it would do so m relat�on
to interference by a traditionally suspect power Irke
the Soviet Union. What then was there to hide?
According to formerly secret 1960s U.S. State
Department documents made public this June in NZ
by CAFCA, the U.S. objectives included influencrng
trade unionists and "young and potentIal leaderslup
in all circles in NZ to further their understanding and
support of U.S. policies .. . "(2) One section of a
1966 report is headed "Build up the internal and
external prestige of the NZ Government". Obviously,
the reverse of this maxim would be operative today.
Various deletions had been made in the declass­
ified documents. including a section on the SlS.
However, it is kI10wn that links between the CIA and
the SIS were close throughout this period. The CIA
helped train SIS officers and advised NZ on the
operation of its security service(3). In 1972 the then
director-general of the CIA, Richard Helms, even paJd
a visit here.
Given the documen ted history of US intervenHon
in NZ politics through the USIS and, possibly the
CIA, along with the record of close CIA-SIS ties, one
cannot help but feel anxious about the present rel­
ationship of our SIS to US agencies. What does the
claimed cut-off in US intelligence really mean?
According to a former Depty Director of the CIA,
Dr Ray Cline: ".. . when Whitlam came to power
there was a period of turbulence to do with Alice
Springs. . . the CIA would go so far as to provide
information to people who would bring it to the
surface in Australia .. , say they stumbled onto a
Whitlarn error which they were willing to pump into
the system so it might be to his damage... if we
provided a particular piece of information to the
Australian intelligence services, they could make use
of il."(4)
Cline is now head of an ANZUS think tank based
at Gcorgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
It is ltighly significant that visiting public lecturer,
Ralph McGehee, an ex-CIA agent, warns that the
leaking of politically embarrassing information (or
the planting of disinformation) is part of a typical
CIA destabilization programme. Likewise, another
part of such a programme is the establishment of a
right-wiog think tank like that headed by Cline. Thus,
it is ominous that Cline has admitted that he visited
NZ in 1985 but his NZ contacts, except [or a couple,
remain murky.
Amusingly enough, one of Cline's ANZUS think
tank members. Dr Dalton West of Massey University,
once challenged the peace movement to provide
evidence that the CIA was out to "destabilize" the
NZ Government(5). As a member himself of a CIA
linked right wing think tank, Dr West - knowingly
or unknowingly -- is part of the typical CIA
sponsored dcstabilizatlon programme as outlined by
Mr McGehee. Dr West is a Research Associate for
1986 at Cline's Georgetown Centre. McGehee has
described how the members of such a CIA-backed
right wing think tank aim to get a lot of news media
coverage and Dr West has certainly succeeded well at
this in the past in NZ.
If Cline could reveal how the CIA used ASIO to
help destabilize the Whitlam government, the
implications of CIA links to the SIS must raise some
very serious questions indeed. Another former CIA
official, Mr Victor Marchetti, who had been executive
assistant to the Deputy Director of his time, has
claimed there is circumstantial evidence to suggest the
agency had a hand in the 1975 sacking of the
Whitlam government(6). Mr Marchetti also said that
any interference with the Labour government had the
active support of ASIO. He has suggested elsewhere
that the CIA and ASIO were up to dirty tricks against
Wltitlam(7 ).
What criteria of national security are the SIS
following now in monitoring current threats to our
securHy? The present SIS Director has stated his
service's position on disclosure of information in so
far as USIS activities and right wing groups were,
concerned in the Vietnam war period. What is the
agency's attitude to U S IS activity when USIS opera­
tions are directed against our government's nuclear
free policy? Certainly, the SIS's role in the Rainbow
Warrior affair - unclear as it is - has provoked
doubts as to how far the service would be prepared to
jeopardize links with certain other Western intelligence
organizations. Apparently, it failed to detect the
French saboteurs in time to prevent the bombing.
What then of Cline's visit? The Labour government
had already made clear its negative view of CHne's
think tank (8) and Labour Government members had
expressed concern about possible CIA covert action
(9). Did the SIS apply its form entitled 'Visa Applica­
tions: Visitors of Security Interest'(10) in Cline's case
and was our prime Minister fully apprised of Cline's
movements and contacts?
It was revealed in May of tItis year that the VSIS
was jnstructed by the President's National Security
Council to lead a public relations campaign against
our nuclear free policy, a policy endorsed by most
New Zealanders. A report about this campaign was
even headlined in the conservative Chrlstchurch
'Press' as: "V.S. Campaign to Subvert N.Z. N-Policies"
(II). Surely, the SIS should be interested in mo!utor­
ing tills sort of subversion by a foreign government if
its concern about subversion is to mean anything in
terms of the democratic freedoms it is meant to be
safeguarding.
A major element in USIS operations is the pay­
ment and organization for trips to the US by NZ
journalists, politicians, and other selected people
under a visitor programme. There can be some very
provocative associations arising from this programme.
The president of the 'Christchurch based' Plains
Club, which received some publicity early this year,
is known to have gone on a 'USIS sponsored' trip tn
the United States (12). Secretary of the Plains Club,
Terry a'Cain, is also a spokesman for the recently
formed anti-peace movement Campaign for a Soviet
Free New Zealand.
The creation of anti-communjst hysteria and the
smearing of the peace movement is a major compon­
ent of a CIA destabiIization campaign as described by
Mr McGehee. CIA connections cannot be demon­
strated in the formation of these new pro-nuclear
and anti-peace movemenl groups but there is the
USIS link and the pattern seems to duplicate the
Vietnam war era activity of this US agency.
The Plains Club is also linked to the mysterious
Dunedin-based 'Senate'(13) which tried to smear
peace activist Allan Cumming. The Club has been
carrying on with the anti-Cumming campaign and
spreading further disinformation( 14). Since the
'Senate' seemed to have acquired some very confid­
ential information on C1)mming, a link to the SIS
has also been suggested(15)." Calls for a public
,
investigation into the affair have however been
smothered in a blanket of official silehce.
It is pertinen t to note that serious questions have
been raised in Australia about ASIO's connection
with right-wing organi. zations and individuals,
as with the CIA(l6). Interestingly, Bruce Larsen, the
NZ far-right est member of Cline's ANZUS think
tank, is on record as strongly defending the SIS
against criticism(17).
Another newly formed pro-ANZUS group has also
had what suspiciously sounds like the USIS connec­
tion. The secretary of the Wairarapa-based group,
Collective Security Inc., has recently returned from a
month's study tour of the US(I8). USIS junketeers
generally go on 30-day trips. In all then, at least three
pro-ANZVS pressure groups formed this year, can be
linked to probable American support.
But it is the links between the CIA, USIS and
other US agencies with domestic establishment
groups with strong military and intelligence associa­
tions which should arouse the most concern in the
NZ context. In AustraUa for years before the Whitlam
Labour government "won the December 1972
election, highly-placedAustralian defence, intelligence
and foreign affairs officials had been scaring their
American counterparts with tales of what a nightmare
a Labour victory would be for the 'Alliance' "(19).
Later, "egged on by deeply conservative members of
the Australian intelligence community, various Cold
War warriors started to ring . the alarm bells in the
CIA" (19).
At one point in the saga, John Walker, CIA station
chief, pressed the head of ASIa, Peter Barbour, to
accuse Whitlam of lying to Parliament about
Attorney-General Lionel Murphy's 'raid' on ASIO
headquarters(19), Barbour refused, and this affair
led to hostility against Barbour by the CIA and
sections of ASia. Barbour, incidentally, was later
sacked by Whitlam.
It was late in 1975 - just before the seemingly
doubtful renewal of the CIA's Pine Gap base lease at
Alice Springs - that the CIA put real pressure on the
Australian intelligence community to do something
about Whitlam if the Australians wanted to preserve
their links with the CIA. Earlier pressure had included
the reduction of some of the flow of intelligence to
Australia (20). This has an obvious parallel in NZ
today.
Final urgent pressure was admir ustered by CIA
covert action boss, Ted Shackley, in the now
infamous telex to ASIO headquarters on November 8,
1975(19). By this time various CIA officers in
Australia were having their cover blown and CIA
relations with Australian defence and intelligence
were severely strained.
The behaviour of the Australian defence and

intelligence community clearly has lessons for NZ.
Defence Minister, Frank O'Flynn� has had an embarr­
assingly public clash with some of his own top
defence staff - among other obvious difficulties. In
the meantime, the mobillzation of retired military
officers in opposition to the nuclear free zone
concept has caused further problem$ for the govern­
ment. McGehee's warnings about American indoc­
trination of military and intelligence personnel ought
to be heeded. McGehee also pointed out that about a
third of US Embassy staff are CIA personnel and that
the CIA certainly has links to the USIS.
Not only can Australia give us lessons about CIA
dirty tricks but ASIO itself would seem a probable
threat. After all, as Brian Toolley, editor of 'The
National Times' , has indicated, in the CIA's own
intelligence community by respected establishment
analysts, Dr Jeffrey Richelson and Dr Desmond Ball.
This study details various serious abuses of demo­
cratic freedoms by Western intelligence agencies.
The te�t for our democracy is whether certain very
conservatlVc elements in the NZ establishment can
recognize foreign-inspired subversion from the right
as well as from the left of the political spectrum. In
the NZ settmg nght-wing subversion of our demo­
cratic freedoms must always represent by far the
gr
NZ. hIstory, tradItIO , associations and experience
. ?
testIfy to the truth of this proposition.
References
(1) 'The Press', Sept. 19, 1984.
(2) 'NZ Times', June 8, 1986.
(3) 'NZ Sunday Times', August 3, 1986.
(4) Richelson, J.T. and D. BalL 1985. "The Ties That
Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA
Countries", Alien & Unwin, Boston. p.267.
(5) 'The Press', March 20 1985.
(6) 'The Star', Sep!. 22, 1983.
(7) e.g., "Nuclear Countdown: Journal of Pacific Resist-
.

ance". Vol. 2, No.1 1980. p.16.

(8) 'The Star', Dec. 4, 1984. Prime Minister tange
described the think tank as a "right wing fundament­
alist" group and its members as "relics",
(9) 'NZ Times', Oct. 14, 1984.
(10) 'The Evening Post', May 8 1986.
(11) 'The Press', May 22, 1986.
(12) 'Wellington Confid�ntiat', No : 27, April-May, 1986.
P.O. Box 9034, Wellington. A vital resource.
(13) 'NZ Times', MaTch 9, 1986.

"yVm YES. nil: CH. DID MT
ASSASSINATION AlTEMf'15 ON
VARIOUS RJLlTlCAL LEADfR�,
sur TJ.itRE WAG CERTAINLY IV
MRM INTENDEt/.
assessment, Prime Minister Bob Hawke was "the best­
qualified candidate to succeed Whitlam"(l 9).And to
date, as Toohey aptly observes, the CIA has had little
cause to be disappointed in its judgment.
In conclusion, it seems eminently reasonable to be
deeply concerned for the future of NZ's nuclear free
policy. Historical precedents and reasoned consider­
ation of the evidence suggest a whole range of factors
whieh could implicate the USIS, CIA, SIS, and ASIO,
right-wing pressure groups, and other agents � in
varying degrees of participation � in a campaign to
destabilize the NZ government. Sceptics should refer
to 'The Ties That Bind', a major study of the UKUSA
(14) In a press release for the Campaign For a Soviet-Free NZ
dated July 28, 1986, Mr Terry O'Cain falsely claimed
.
tilat All an Cuountng was the publisher of 'Peacelink
.
the preSident of the NZ Council for World Peace and �
membe: of the Workers Communist League. The ;e false
accusatlO !,s were recycled by National MP, Roger
�cL ?-:(, III the 'Taupo Weekender', Aug. 15, 1986.
SIgnIficantly, McLay is linked to the fascist World
Anti-Communist League; see 'NZ Times' Sept 22
'
1985, and The Press' Gct 30, 1985. WACL in tur� ha�
close links with Cline's ANZUS think tank.
(15) e.g., 'The Star', lan 29, 1986· 'NZ Times" Feb 2 and
June 8, 1986.
'
(16) 'The Star', May 18, 1983: Reference to a series in the
Australian 'National Times'.
(17) 'Heed', Vo!. 1, No. 3, April-May, 1976, p.3.
(18) 'Truth', July 29, 1986.
(19) 'The National Times' (Australia), Nov. 8-14, 1985.
(20) 'The Press', Feb. 28, 1985.
Nuclear frec Kiwis
P.O. Box 2
Lincoln College
Canterbury.
Our focus is to monitor and counter threats to New
Zealand's nuclear free zone,

A FOOTNOTE:
.our own government is stonewalling on the list of
USIS visitor grantees too. We were aware that Mr
Geoffrey Pall11er had requested such information
from the Americans at the time of the National
� e�urity Council 'subversion' headlines. We requested
ll1formation and assistance from Mr Palmer. He
replied that he is "not at liberty to disclose the
details" of an oral briefing by Ambassador Cleve­
land. The NZ government seems blind to potential
.
thrcals to Its own well-being.
 DIG IN YOUR TOES, NEW ZEALANDERS
preserve our nucI ear free zone

-."" ��-"
----
V

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COMMENT:
INTELLIGEN CE AN D THE AMERI CAN CONNE C TION
by Warren Thomson
Concern has been voiced in 801110 quarters about
the reduction in the flow of American intelligence to
New Zealand. But the real implications of such a
reduction for our security can be positive, While
<establishment' intelligence officers maintain that
"Intelligence agencies in Washington and London . . .
have provided decision-makers with reliable and
accurate date . .."(1) there is plenty of evidence
for arguing the opposite is the case, A recent review
of "The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation
Between the UKUSA Countries " "- a comprehen­
sive survey of Western intelBgence practices � aptly
describes the content of the book as ".. . a sobering
reminder that many activities of our secret agencies
are either irresponsible, or ineffective, or both."(2)
An examination of publicly available material on
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
other US intelligence organisations, offers consider­
able evidence for the case that reliance on informa­
tion from .these sources is not always in our best
interests, and that dependence on Washington's
collection and interpretation of data leaves us very
vulnerable to intelligence failure, political distortion,
and indJrect complicity in a long history of morally
dubious covert activity. Perhaps in the extreme case,
our security is itself threatened by sllch organisa­
tions, as aspects of the Whitlam dismissal in Australia
suggest.(3)
Certainly over the years our intelligence and bur­
eaucratic structures have become heavily imbued with
American perspectives. This dependence on US
intelligence sources and assessments, both direct and
indirect, gives us little capability to make sound
defence and foreign policy analysis of NZ interests in
some important areas.
If NZ's strategic interests are to be clearly indentif�
ied there is a compelling need to ensure that our
intelligence assessments become more independent.
As Justice Hope pointed out in a royal commission in
Australia, "Australia's (read NZ's) intelligence
interests do not, and cannot, coincide with those of
any other count ry."(2)
Colonel William V. Kennedy, conservative former
US Air Force intelligence omcer, says that while
the American intelligence service is good on 'current
information', in his experience it was often the case
that the 'New York Times' presented better analysis
than the intelligence service which is 'weak' on long­
range intelligence and over ly prcoC(;upieJ wilh cuverl
action.(4) And long-range intelligence is precisely the
type of information needed by NZ to make sensible
defence decisions.
The charge that US intelligence organizations are
obsessed with covert action, to the extent that the
analysis of infonnation becomes secondary and of
very poor quality, is also made by other insiders,
including former CIA director, Admiral Stansfjeld
Turner(5), and ex-CIA agent, Ralph McGehec(6).
Recent press reports from the Philippines show Wash­
ington was taken by surprise with the chaUenge to
Marcos(7), and this latest episode is just one of a long
line of intelligence failures.
Of the greatest concern to NZ defence planners
and foreign affairs personnel should be the comments
of long-serving CIA operatives who have highlighted
the duplicity behind intelligence reporting and
briefings. Frank Snepp says ". . .
Congressmen) were orchestrated to convey the exact
impression desired by the Chief of Station, one
having little foundation in [act. "(6) Ralph McGehee
writes "As in Iran, Vietnam, Latin America, and
other areas of the world, we only wanted intelHgence
that told us our policies were correct . . . The CIA,
apart from its vast covert operations, had trans­
formed itself largely into a government news report�
ing service reporting only that information which
justitled
. those covert operations."(6)
Kennedy, Turner, and other knowledgeable
commentators believe the emphasis on covert opera­
tions has become even more marked under the present
administration, consolidating doubts about the value
of intelligence that comes from such sources. Political
distortion is now evident pervasively within US
Intelligence.
It has been reported that the present Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) has on occasion even
personally intervened to influence the content of
analysis from the organizations he oversees. A corres­
pondent in the journal 'Foreign Policy' has stated
". .. senior carcer officers have complained, and some
have resigned, in response to pressures exerted (by
Casey) to reshape National Intelligence Estimates for
political effect."(8) According to 'The Nation'
another top analyst resigned in 1 984 when the DCI
insisted on doubling the number of Cubans calculated
to be in Grenada. The estimate of the analyst, one
John Horton, was later proved to be close to correct.
(9)
While public evidence of the breadth and effects of
misleading American information is inevitably limited
in certain respects, it is still reasonable to suggest that
our foreign policy and defence planners need to have
adequate recourse to independent sources of informa­
tion. Those who lament the present loss of intelligence
information from the US have responsibility t o
demonstrate that we will suffer greatly from such a
decoupling. There is in 1986 at the very least a good
case to be made that much morc reliance on our
own perception and illterpretaUon of the world will
not damage our interests any more than dependence
on US intelligence with its long history of failures and
dubious integrity.
Moreover, we should take into account the critical
problem of loyalty for secret service personnel.
Within the intelligence and securHy organizations
upon which governments depend for briefings, there
is a considerable potential for conflict of interest
between obligations to the organization and obliga­
tions to the political authority.
Richelson and Ball, in "The Ties That Bind",
suggest that members of the intelBgence service 'club'
make their own rules based on a 'higher loyalty' than
mere government policy or national interest.(I0) If
we in NZ rely heavily on such a club for information,
analysis, and to some extent training, the possibil­
ities for situations of divided loyalties become very
real. How do intelligence and security personnel solve
conflicts of interest between a Labour Government
seen as 'anti-American' and links in kindred organ­
izations which supply them with large amounts of
material?
One British writer who comments extensively (and
conservatively) on intelligence issues says (in relation
to the UKUSA Agreement): "...dependence is so
tion, the Australians were being cut out of the
process.(3) Such accusations demand serious consid­
eration in relation to the NZ facility at Tangirnoana.
Overall then, the recent process whereby the US
has limited its contacts and contribution to NZ
information-gathering should be seen as a positive
development for this country. A policy for the future
which strengthens our internal intelligence capability
would mean more control over our decision-making,
better safeguarding of our interests, and greater
independence for peace initiatives.
REFERENCES
(1) Mathams, RJ. 1982. "Sub Rosa: Memoirs of an Austral­
ian Intelligence Analyst". Alien and Unwin, Sydney.
p 115.
(2) 'National Times', article by William Pinwall. Dec 13-19,
1985.p 22.

great and cooperation so close that I am convinced (3)
security chiefs would go to any lengths to protect the
link-up . . "(1 I) New Zealand has been a party to the
. Committee, p.a. Box 18541, Christchurch.
UKUSA Agreement since 1947.(12) For a Labour (4)
Government with objectives that do not run parallel
to those of Washington, the implications are serious.
There is little doubt that we are securely tied into
(5)
the Western intelligence system (albeit with some
(6)
changes since the government's contretemps with the
US over ship visits). Our participation in Signals
Intelligence in particular means we work within a (7)
very tight and extremely secret system. Tangirnoana, (8)
the NZ Signals Intelligence station west ofPalmerston
North, is a significant contributor to this network. (9)
Nathan, James. 1982-83. "Dateline Australia: America's
foreign Watergate". 'Foreign Policy' No. 49, Winter.
Item No. 6-38 ($1.20), NZ Nuclear Free Zone
Kennedy, Col. William, ed. 1983. "The Intelligence War:
Penetrating the Secret World of Today's Advanced
Technological Conflict". Salamander Books, London.
p19.
Interview in 'The Progressive'. Aug. 1985. pp 34-37.
McGehee, Ralph. 1983. "Deadly Deceits: My 25 years
in the CIA". Sheridan Square Publications, New York.
pp 165, 180, 18!'
For example, 'The Press' Feb. 25, (1986). p 8.
Goodman, Allan. 1985. Letter in 'Foreign Policy'
No. 58. Spring. p 177.
'The Nation' March 23, 1985. p 329.

But amongst both NZ dOzens and government
decision-makers there is little knowledge of the
implications of our involvement, and no control at all
over various significant end uses of the intelligence
outside NZ. Christopher Boyce, jailed for revealing
top secret CIA information, claims that in spite of an
agreement to share data from the Pine Gap installa-
(10) Richelson, J.T. and D. Ball. 1985. "The Tics That
Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA
Countries". Alien and Unwin, Sydney.
(11) Pincher, Chaprnan. 1982. Quoted in "The Puzzle
Palace" by J ames Barnford. Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
p 309.
(12) See 'Peace Researcher' No. 3 for an in-depth descrip�
tion of the UKUSA Agreement.

Intelligence
RESOURCES

AVAILABLE

fROM 'PEACE RESEARCHER'

The following articles are recommended and

available from 'PEACE RESEARCHER' at 10c. per
page plus postage.

'Contingency Overseas Deployments of Nuclear

Weapons: A Report', by William M. Arkin. 20 pages.

'The Soviet Union as a Pacific Mi li tary Power' by

prominent and respecteu Australian defence analyst
Paul Dibb. G pages.

'Australia Bites Off More Than The RAN Can Chew'

by Thomas-Duffell Young. On Australia's commit­
ments through the Radford-Collins Agreement. 3
pages.

'Nuclear War at Sea' by Desmond Ball of the Austral�

ian National University. An analysis of the current
high risks of nuclear war by accident at sea. 31 pages.

* 'NAVAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC, AMERICA'S

SEARCH FOR ALLIES', Dr GeofTrey Till, Armed
Forc0s Journal, An Assessment of the naval role of
allies in the Pacific (Chi1la & Japan), 5 pages.

* Articles on secret US-UK arrangements giving

priority to American military requirements in War­
time, including requisitioning of land around
military bases, civil airports, transport resources and
impressed civilian labour to be made available to US
forces.

'Secret Laws for Wartime Britain', and 'If War

Came Close We Would Have New Masters', Duncan
Campbell and Patrick Forbes in the New Statesman,
September 1985, both 3 pages.

* 'New Zealand's Dilemma',. Thornas-Durell Young

in US Naval Proceedings, August 1985. Contains
further insights into New Zealand's ASW activities
and respollsibilities in the Pacific and how this has
directed Government policy including training and
equipment of Our Armed Forces. 6 pages.

* 'Briefing Papers' provided to the New Zealand

Select Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control
(e. 1982), 17 pages.
*
'Comlllunicating with Submarines" Jane's Defence
Weekly, an artjcle Oil the jmportance of Extremely
Low Frequency (ELF) communications' 'particul,lrly
useful ... throughout the spectrum or lilllited nuclear
operations and in a llUClc.:lr or non-nuclear war (It
sea' '. 5 pages.