incorporating

SPECIAL ARTICLE:
(see page 2)

THE FAILED STRUGGLE

BY NZ CIVILIAN WORKERS
FOR UNION RIGHTS
AT OPERATION DEEP FREEZE

This is the second in a series of articles that will appear from time to time in
'Peace Researcher' on the subject of the dark side of Operation Deep Freeze.

In this issue: ** What about the Workers?

** 'PR' Comment: Nuclear Ships under a National Government

** The Black Birch Astrometric Programme

** NZ War Industry Booming?

** Cooptation of NZ Academia Continues

** East-West Center Probes A-NZ-US Relations

** Book Review: "Blood on Their Banner"

** An Invitation to 'Tour the NZ Bases' from ABC

WHAT ABOUT THE WORKERS?
NZ Civilians Deprived of Rights
at Operation Deep Freeze

by Murray Horton

Operation Deep Freeze is perceived as a military operation· whether one accepts the cover story
that the US Navy and Air Force simply provide logistic support for peaceful Antarctic scientific
research; or whether onc correctly sees it as a medium level, multi-purpose US military base, with
Antarctic logistics as ouly onc of its military missions, Of course, there are large numbers of civilians
involved, but they are scientists, both American and New Zealanders,

What about the New Zealanders who work for the American military at Deep Freeze? Well,
every Antarctic summe r season, New Zealand Army and Air Force personnel are employed at Deep
Freeze in a variety of support tasks, such as loading aircraft for the flights south, NZ military personnel
also work for the US on the Ice; American and NZ civilians work at McMurdo for the N alional Science
Foundation'S Antarctic contractor,

But there is a permanent wOlkforce of New Zealand civilians who work at Operation Deep
Freeze, They work there 12 months of the year, not just during the summer flying season, As such, they
are the only true permanent employees at Deep Freeze, Simultaneously with the customs investigation
into drug smuggling and duty free abuses in the early 1980s, there was major NZ worker dissatisfaction
with wages and conditions provided by the US military, and a persistent attempt by the NZ trade union
movement to secure coverage of those workers, This latter move, once again, led to a high level
sovereigoty dispute, with the US view prevailing once more.

No Unions Allowed at Deep Freeze

The attempt to secure NZ union coverage for NZ civilians at Deep Freeze predated the mid 1980s
by several years, and involved several strata of the union movement· the Canterbury branches of the
then Stores and Packers' Union [now the Distribution Workers Federation (DWF)]; Hotel, Hospital and
Restaurant Union; the Clerical Workers' Union; the then Canterbury District Trades Council; and the
then NZ Federation of Labour [now the NZ Council of Trade Unions (CI'U), with its regional groupings,
such as the Canterbury District Council of the CTU],

The Southern DWF, from its old Stores and Packers days, maintains a "dead" file on the issue, It
cuiminates in an Apr'Jl 1986 letter from a WeIlington law firm to its national office, advice which
effectively ended fhe attempt at unionisation, "The New Zealand Courts will not exercise jurisdiction
over the person Of the property of a foreigo sovereigo State unless it is willing to submit to the judicial
process", It would appear from the papers made available to us that the workers whose work is covered
by the relevant award are employed by the Department of State of the United States Government If that
be so, enforcement proceedings for breach of Award cannot be brought against the United States
Government as employer,»" 1

Thus the issue of sovereigoty is at the heart of the unionisation argument The US Government
actually advanced three reasons why Deep Freeze civilians were not allowed to belong to unions (NZ or
American), Firstly, it stated that Deep Freeze wasn't covered by the 1973 Industrial Relations Act, and
thus could not be cited in the Arbitration Court as a party to an award, because none of the base facilities
were operated for "pecuniary gain" (this whole system has been replaced by the Labour Relations Act j
i"" and the Labour Court), This quite extraordinary claim was patTored by Jim Bolger and Warren Cooper,
when they were Ministers of Labour and Foreign Affairs, respectively, It is inconceivable that military
base facilities, such as a PX, are not run for "pecuniary gain", Whether they make a profit it quite
another matter. Ironically the pecuniruy aspects of Deep Freeze were themselves the subject of a major
2
NZ Customs investigation in the early 198& ,

The US Governmeut (and its Ministerial allies) did not persist with this particularly silly
approach, Its central ground is that of "sovereign immunity", Its correspondence with NZ unions is
studded with references to this doctrine, e,g" in March 1982, George F. Rodman, the Administrative
Officer at the US Embassy wrote to t.lJe
the United States Government is not subject to New Zealand industrial relations legislation in the
establishment of rates and other conditions of employment. The SaIne principle applies to employees of
the New Zealand government in the United States and is an established principle of international
relations , ..3
..

But the real. crunch comes with the third ground. This was succinctly explained in a June 1979
letter from the US Emba.�sy's Labor Attache to the Canterbury Clerical Worlcers' Union: ",.,Civilian
employees of the US Government are not prohibited from joining or fonning employee associations, per
se, They are prohibited, however, from striking agais
n t
member of an employee organisation which he or she knows asserts the right to strike against the
Government of the US, To the extent that most NZ employee organisations do assert the right to strike
against all employers, it is apparent that, in a pmctical sense, NZ civilian employees of the US
Government would not be pennitted to join employee associations" 4

So this third reason, the denial of the right to strike, is at the heart of the argument. Incidentally,
this doesn't just apply to civilians at US military bases, but to all US Government employees,

The US Government attaches extraordinary importance to this "no strike" condition, Every Deep
Freeze worker, upon starting the job, has to swear an affidavit. Once agaln this is not peculiar to
Harewood, nor to US military bases - it covers all US Government employees,

The appointment affidavit is breathtaking (at least, to New Zealand eyes). Under "Oath of
Office" it reads: "1 will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the SaIne .., so HELP ME GOD",

The next pamgraph is titled: "Affidavit As To Subversive Activity and Affiliation, I aIn not a
Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organisation that
advocates the overthrow of the constitutional fonn of the Government of the US, nor which seeks by
force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the US . . .',5

(In 1987 correspondence with Citizens for the Demilitarisation of Harewood, David Lange, the
then Prime Minister, claimed that the "Oath of Office" section was crossed out before NZ civilians
signed; and that a poSl- 1970 version did not include the "Subversive Activity" section, Paul Piesse,
Secretary of the Southern Distribution Workers' Union, denied both claims, pointing out that he
obtained the union's copy from a Deep Freeze civilian worker in 1982, and it was a 196 7-dated form,6)

The third paragraph is the clincher: "Afildavit As To Striking Against The Federal Government.
I aIn not participating in any strike against the Government of the US or any agency thereof, and I will
not so participate while an employee of the Govemment of the US or any agency thereof. I do not and
will not assert the right to strike against the Govemment of the US or any agency thereof... I do further
swear (or affmn) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that
asserts the right. to strike against the Government of the US .. , and I will not, while an employee of the
US or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization", 7

(In his 1987 correspondence, this is the one section of the Appointment Aft1davit that David
�
Lange did not mention at all, let alone deny,)
4

?" This affidavit comes complete with two pages of closely typed explanations of terms. It is
bizarre, to say the least. Job applicants can be checked for: "Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral
or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitoal use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction or sexual
perversion". That seems to cover everything. "Saboteurs, spies, traitors, seditionists, anarchists or
revolutionists" need not apply either. Strildng, or asserting the right to strike against Uncle Sam, carries
a penalty of a $US 1000 fine or imprisonment for a year and a day, or both.

There is no suggestion that the US military plans to fme or jail any of its NZ civilian employees at
Harewood. But it regards striking or asserting the right to strike as the most serious offence in the book .
Its "Range of Disciplinary Action Penaities" includes 29 'offences', which go from insubordination to
off-duty conduct bringing disgrace to Deep Freeze to 'immoral, indecent or notoriously disgraceful
conduct, e.g., incest, child abuse, self-mutilation". All of these 'offences' carry a range of penalties. But
"conducting, assisting or participating in any strike against the Government of the US or any agency
thereof' carries only onc penalty: "Termination of Appointment". 8

The NZ union movement has always consistently treated Deep Freeze as an "essential industry",
indeed that is acknowledged in internal US correspondence and diplomatic cables. But a central tenet of
NZ unionism is the right le strike, or at the very minimum, to assert that right. The US military allows
no manifestation of unionism at Harewood. Correspondence from the US Embassy, held in the DWF ('I)
file, makes clear that the Embassy would not provide the names and addresses of NZ civilian workers,
would not allow union officials into Deep Freeze, would not allow any union membership drives, and
would not deduct any union dues from workers' pay. Any inroads by trade unions were to be
strenuously resisted.

The Industrial Dangers of Civilianisation

This American wariness of NZ trade unions went well beyond the worldwide application of a
policy forbidding US Government employees the right to strike (or even to assert that right). It went
into the realms of ideological paranoia that have always characterised US policy. 'This is made
abundantly clear in a quite extraordinary farewell cable from Anne Martindell, retiring US Ambassador,
9
to the Secretary of State in March 1981. The whole lengthy cable is fascinating, covering the
hypothetical effects of civilianisation in three areas: relations with the NZ Government and local bodies,
trade union relations, and public/community relations. The trade union section is worth quoting in full.

"Trade unions. Turning to the second major area to be considered in any civilianization proposals
for the operations at Christchurch, I believe that all who know the Jabor relations scene in New
Zealand would agree that it is a minefield within which one must tread with exceeding care.
Obviously US employers in New Zealand cope for better or worse with the peculiarities of the
New Zealand jabor relations system. However, the special vulnerability of Antarctic program
operations could make it hostage to both economic demands and political exploitation. Given the
shortness of the austral summer season and the finely tuned logistical flow required to sustain the
Antarctic program, strikes even for purely economic reasons could seriously disrupt and possibly
even destroy part of the program for a season. Worse still would be a politically motivated strike,
as in fact happened in 1978 when the USNS "Boland" was 'hijacked' by the Communist­
dominated NZ Boilermakers' Union. (For those who do not recall that situation, the "Boland" was
damaged at McMurdo and brought to Wellington for repairs. After the vessel was put in dry dock
and an 18 foot hole cut in its side, the boilermakers, in a clearly politically motivated strike,
refused to proceed with the work. Since the "Boland" carries most of the tonnage for the McMurdo
operation, its inability to continue the annual rcsupply could have been disastrous for the program.)
The Embassy was able to marshall a strong reaction by the New Zealand Government to resolve
that particular strike. Whether a future New Zealand Government would so wholeheartedly back
us in a politically motivated strike is questionable. Even the present Government might have
difficulties supporting us in an economically motivated strike,
/" "New Zealand trade unions themselves have always been willing to make exceptions to allow the
Antarctic program to continue during strikes against third parties, for example, during the recent
fuel truck drivers' strike, Much credit is due to them for that cooperation, I would doubt, however,
that any union could take the same attitude if the employees of a civilian contractor running the
Antan-'tic program were directly involved in strike action.

"On the employers' side it took some considerable effon to convince the New Zealand Employers'
Federation during the recent tank truck strike that they should make an exception for the US
antarctic program, The Employers' Federation initially took the attitude that, however damaging
their lockout might be for continuation of the US scientific program in Antarctica and costly to
NSF, they could not sacrifice their interests for ours.

"1 would expect that kind of situation to arise again and, with a largely civilianized program, I
would anticipate major industrial relations problems both in situations where the US contractor is
being directly struck and where third parties are involved in strikes or lockouts. Because of the
time factor in Antarctic operations, the leverage of others on a civilian contractor would be
extreme, Furthermore the option of substituting military personnel in critical situations would
likely be met with union charges of 'strike breaking' and we could not expect the automatic
support of the New Zealand Goyemment of the day in that situation.',9

How ironic that although the Ambassador expressed great concern about being held to ransom by
"Communist-dominated" unions, the only serious disruption she could cite was from the Employers'
Federation which refused to exempt Deep freeze from a lockout of workers, Indeed she acknowledges
that the Christchurch union movement has always treated Deep Freeze as an essential industry, and
exempted it from industrial action (a policy which continues today). It is also interesting to see proof of
the Embassy getting the Muldoon govermnent to "marshal a strong reaction" to the boilermakers over
the "Boland", and to see the same diplomatic pressure tactics applied to the employers.

Direct Bargaining

Lack of any union representation has left the NZ civilians in a vulnerable and ambiguous
position, From the late 1960s until the mid '80s, there developed a range of industrial grievances of the
sort that would normally by dealt with by a union or unions, and which would have been incorporated
into an NZ award. Deep Freeze workers, of course, have no award (explain award system?).

A July 1984 unattributed background paper lays out the history of the workers' case. At that time
there were 37 NZ civilians at the base, with a total of over 300 yearS service. It points out that the 24
December 1958 Memorandum of Understanding between the US and NZ governments, establishing
Deep Freeze, makes only two mentions of NZ civilians (one being to make it clear that they are not US
persormel). The very command structure complicates things - Detacbment Christchurch repons to three
different military commands [COMNA VMARlANAS in Guam, COMTHIRDFLT in Pearl Harbor, and
Commander Naval Support Force Antarctica (CNSFA) in Pon Hueneme, California], plus reponing to
the US Embassy in Wellington, representing the State Department. Qespite the fact that the National
Science Foundation (NSF) has been in charge of all aspects of the Antarctic programme since 1971, it
plays no part in employee relations. The non-unionised civilians must deal with the US military and/or
the US Embassy. Grievances date back to 1963, in some cases. They were investigated by a 1976 US
Navy audit, and by an informal COMTHIRDFLT Judge Advocate General inquiry in 1981/82. Both of
these were military inquiries into civilian grievances. The 1976 US Naval Audit Service repon stated,
"The problem of indigenous hire at the Christchurch NZ Detacbment has been a continuous one...the
subject o f benefits, entitlement.�, and particularly retirement credits is in need of review ... they are not
working uuder a formalized employment contract or agreement that delineates their personnel
entitlements. For example, annual/sick leave entitlements, grievance procedures ... are not formally
addressed ... ". The 1981 JAG report (referred to as Report 17), which looked at the major problems that
arose at Harewood from 1974-81 inclusive involving drugs, dutyfree entitlements and internal
corruption, heavily criticised the calibre of military management at the base. The July 1984
;r backgrounder points out that military personnel at Harewood are transient, inexperienced in
management, and low calibre, whereas "the New Zealand civilians are the only true permanent
employees at Detachment Christchurch. Furthermore, that"... US military management has final
authoriry in any grievance by New Zealand civilians in their employ. This arrangement has stood for 19
years. The employment contract is US Military instruction. As such it does not allow personal
grievance procedures as established by either New 7�aland or United States labor law".

The sorts of grievances involved were not earth shattering, but the sort of thing that unions are
called o n to sort out every day. The backgrowlder gives several examples: "In the off-season of 1982
[March through September]l was taken otf a 40 honr week and given a 10 hour week. This was done
without any notice and no attempt made to give me a fulltime position in any other part of the base ..."
And another worlcer stated: "From March to September 1982 my hours were cut to 35 per week resulting
in a 12.5% pay cut. I have no guarantee lbat this will not happen again. Aonual leave not paid at
commencement of holiday. Income tax not deducted from pay. No redundancy pay. No retirement
plan". And so on. The backgrounder concludes by stressing the political nature of the problem.
Because the US claims sovereign immunity from NZ industrial laws, a claim recognised by successive
NZ governments, then any grievances end up being dealt with by the US Embassy, where they fbrmed
but a small part of ongoing sovereignty-related problems in the early 1980s.

B y 1984 the workers were sick of being ignored, ripped off, or treated as small pawns in a bit
game. They had taken their concerns to US politicians; in 1983 they had hired Christchurch QC Brian
McClelland to represent them, and by, mid 1984 they were actively looking at union representation and
l0
had made their case public, through both the local and national media.

It is very interesting to t.'1lce

March 1983 29 Deep Freeze civilians signed a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
11
Committee.

"Rather than embarrass the United States Government locally, or internationally, politically or
througil the news media, we are respectfully writing this letter to you.. All of our employees have
.

been promised the rights and benefits afforded to the US Civil Service employees, including
retirement and severance pay, and other privileges ;,ince 1967. Yet we have received nothing but
promises and indications of 'it's on the way' ...we have confidentially taken this matter to the
appropriate New Zealand grievance authorities, who, in view of the sovereign immunity issue,
have suggested that we elevate the issue to the highest US Government levels possible. We are
not, or ever have been [sic], militant, or have ever belonged to unions. in fact the US Embassy,
Wellington, havedaimed sovereign immunity from union conditions and directives...

"Sir, before writing this letter we feel that we have exhausted all appropriate avenues of redress;
exhausted an fair and reasonable time limits; have listened to enough procrastination and false
promises; and so we therefore appeal to constitutional conscience and request assistance from you.
We do not wish this letter to be interpreted as militant or disre;,-pectful of the administrative system,
for because of short tours of duty performed by both United States Navy and Embassy personnel, it
has involved many people over a number of years. But if we cannot obtain satisfactory resolution
to these problems we feel we have no other option but to employ senior legal. counsel to act on our
behalf through High Coun injunction... Be assured of our commitment and loyalty while this
matter is investigated and hopefully resolved. Senior civilian employees here are trying to cool
ever increasing disappointment and anger over the frustrations and disappointments caused by this
issue. '1

The committee chairman, Senator Charles H. Percy, wrote to the State Department on their
, for
behalf. Its view was expressed on 17 May 1983 by Powell A. Moore, Assistant SecretarY
Congressional Relations. -
- p
 "Our review of the situation described in the letter shows that, regrettably, incorrect statements
have been made to the employees regarding their entitlement to US Civil Service benefits,
implying eligibility for US Civil Service benefits. Civil Service Retirement is not available to
these employees both by Department of Defense policy and US law". Unfortunately any promises
which may have been made specifically relating to US Civil Serviee Retirement cannot be
honored."

Moore also pointed out that everybody in NZ is eligible for NZ national superannuation at age 60,
and that the Embassy intended to follow the practice of other employers by drawing up a supplemental
retirement plan"... and make it available to all eligible employees of the Embassy and the Naval Support
Force at Christchureh".

This State Department fob off was far from satisfactory to the Deep Freeze workers, So,
ironically, in light of their rather servile pride in never having belonged to a union, by May 1984 they
had a five-person elected committee to represent their grievances. This committee had drawn up a
backgrounder listing 11 Facts, 4 Prime Issues, and 25 Questions. It concluded:

"Why are regarding benefit� denied, conditions of employment, or association with

afllliated unions/frades Council, considered anti-American? The loyalty of the civilian employees
has never been in question and all channels available within the command and the US Embassy in
Wellington bave been solicited in an endeavour to obtain answers to questions posed, and a just
settlement reached on all issues.

"All endeavours have, to date, produced little satisfaction for civilian employees, and a seeming
reluctance on the part of the US, Government to deal with the issues raised, leave the civilian
�
employees with no alternative but to attem t to resolve the issues via the New Zealand
1
Government or Trades Council officials."

En masse, the workers wrote back to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
27 July 1984. They had decided to get tough, and indeed issued none too subtle threats.

"To further enlighten you we now suggest you obtain. under the Freedom of Information Act, a
copy of the COMfHIRDFLT Judge Advocate General (JAG) Informal Investigation, which was
conducted in December 1981 and released in mid-1982, regarding some aspects of the Detachment
Christchureh operation. Many of our people were questioned or gave statements during that
investigation. The facts contained in this investigation will disclose gross mismanagement during
the 1970-1981 time frame. which is the period of time we consider the New Zealand civilian
employees were most harmed. by incompetent management and corrupt and illegal practices. We
also consider the report to be a whitewash of the ttue nature of events, because it only dealt wih
t
some symptoms, or the lip of the iceberg. of the overall management problem, and probably
because COMfHIRDFLT should have monitored this activity more closely during that period, and
because of its inability to investigate the overall managers of the US Antarctic Program, the
National Science Foundation (the Presidentially appointed Executive Agency). This report
contalned (or should have contalned) evidence of:

a. Misappropriation of US Government funds, approximately $190,000 (tip of the iceberg).

b. Fraud (falsifying U S Government documents to N Z Government agencies).
c. Kickbacks.
d. Abuse of NZ Government privileges, totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars
e. Compromises, coverups, plus many other things, even though it was, as we say,
'whitewashed' .

"We raise this issue to you, oniy to amplify the climate that existed in Detachment Christchurch
prior to 1981, leading to the gross injustices existing today, and that appear unresolvable without JI
8

dramatic action, such as court action or union measures which can oniy hurt the goodwill existing
between our two countries..."

The lener then goes on to list the workers' grievances: a retirement plan. backdated to time of
hire, is demanded; non-payment of overtime; and the need for a document of terms and conditions of
employment.

"Many of our people requested we contact the Washington 'Post' and ask for news media
investigation and assistance, along with assistance from Senator Proxmire. However, as your letter
requested that we come back to you if there were further problems, we have chosen this route so as
not to further confuse the issue.

"I think you will agree, after reading the Informal JAG Investigation Report, that our loyalty has
been exemplary, however our group are now more resolute over more militant approaches... We
would prefer other methods than those suggested by the New Zealand Trade Union Movement
Can you please come to our aid in the interests of US/NZ relations and common jm;tice?

"Finally, we respectfully request an on-site non-military formal investigation of all factors of this
operation to verify our statements to you regarding US/NZ relations, which involve the National
Science Foundation, United States Navy, United States Air Force, m Corporation, the New
Zealand Government and its citizens.

"Our comminnent and loyalty to the US Government remain unchanged. However, we ask you
protection from US Government interest groups involved while this whole regrettable maner is
14
being senJed and put to sleep."

Anached to the letter was an article from the 'New Zealand Times' of22 July 1984 entitled,
15
"Harewood workers rush award bid". It stated that the Canterbury Trades Council had served notice
that week on the US Navy to begin award negotiations, and that it could lead to the country's first site
union. It was all for nought, as we know. The US simply stonewalled with "sovereign immunity",
successive NZ governments wore it, and by 1986, the NZ trade union movement, both locally and
nationally, had accepted defeat.

Wages and Conditions

There have always been pecullarities associated with NZ civilians working at Deep Freeze. For
example, one of the more anractive perks is that they are entitled to both NZ and US holidays. On the
downside, the employers do not deduct PAYE income tax, imposing instead (the US system of)***omit
an annual tax payment made by the individual worker. This was to prove a real bone of contention in
worker grievances.

Nor were NZ workers allowed access to classified informatioIl. ??? (doesn't seem to fit here)

G rievance procedures were strictly individualised, i.e., between worker and employer, with no
union involvement. And the US position on sovereignty is crystal clear and paramount: "Local laws
and regulations relating to appoinnnent, termination, social security, or any other condition of
employment do not govern the services of Direct Hire Local National employees. DHLN persOlmel
programs conform as closely as feasible with local laws and customs, but must be based in accordance
1
with US Laws and Regulations". 6

A s far back as 1978, Deep Freeze was adamant that it didn't want unions involved in its labour
relations. A memorandum from Political Officer James H. Holmes to Ambassador Armistead l. Selden
dealt with a complaint that Holmes had received from Ashley Russ, national secretary of the NZ
Carpenters' Union (it had been passed on to Russ by his Canterbury secretary Jack Oough). It j
? concerned the wages and conditions of a Deep Freeze handyman/carpenter called Barnes. The Embassy
immediately notified Commander Chrans, who advised (among other points) that: "Barnes signed the
basic employment contract which notes that while he may remain a member of a union, he may not
grieve pay and conditiolJS to union representatives but must take problems in this area to his supervising
employer...". Holmes' memo concluded: "I emphasized again to Russ that there have been no labor
problems at Deep Freeze for over20 years; we hope this record of good relations will continue; and we
are anxious that this inquiry be dealt with in a way which will not elevate the matter above that of a more
or less personal complaint. He said he understood". 17 Very chummy.

How to fix wage scales for NZ workers was to exercise the minds of the US military for several
years. Most countries with US bases had a system whereby local civilians were paid according to the
"Embassy Pay Plan" regardless of whether they were being pald from the Appropriated Fund or the Non­
Appropriated Fund (NAP). But not at Deep Freeze, Those civilians paid from the NAF had never been
pald according to the Embassy Pay Plan, but a variety of other systems, A July 1980 internal audit
S
recommended regularising the situation,l In October1980 a US team visited NZ to carry out a job
9
classification and salary survey at Deep Freeze.1 It surveyed18 companies (13 in Wellington and 5 in
Auckland) to comparative data on wages and fringe benefits.

Ironically, at the same time as Deep Freeze was reSisting any encroachment by NZ unions, the US
Navy was fuifilling its statutory obligation to inform its American civilian employees in Stateside bases
of their right to union representation in certain circumstances,
Commander Jones when he received a letter from Martin Moodle, organiser with the Canterbury Hotel,
Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees Industrial Union of Workers, in January198 2. The
union's letter suggested that the Air New Zealand award was the one applicable for NZ civilians
working for Deep Frecz.e in mess and restaurant jobs, Jones merely acknowledged receipt, and promptly
sent it off 10 the Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, Charles B, Salmon Ir, with a covering note that
said: "It would appear one or more of this command's non-appropriated fimd personnel have joined the
2
union, for the Union to have become involved,, 1 This issue was so sClJSitive that even Jones' brief
letter of acknowledgement 10 Moodie was rewritten a couple of times before being sent.

The US military recognised it Ileeded to address grievances in the wage fixing area, and
accordingly NZ civilians paid from the NAF were put onto the Embassy Pay Plan from21 December
1981.
"As a sovereign entity the United States Government employment conditions in New Zealand do not fall
within the ambit of New Zealand industrial relations leglslation.. ,. Though the United States in principle
does not waive its rights under the principle of sovereign immunity, the Embassy pay plan attempts to
3
follow curren t levels of direct compensation and additional benefits as closely as possible,. 2
.',

I t was during this period that the new version of the Conditions of Employment was being
drafted, and internal debate on the document is both fascinating and revealing. An unidentified
employee has added comments to the draft, for example on tax: "Payment of income tax should not be
our responsibility. We are class [sic] as Self Employed for Tax purposes. Would like this changed".
The draft says baldly on superannuation: "Presently the US Government does not provide a retirement
scheme for Detachment employees. Employees are covered by National Superannuation when reaching
age 60 or over". This drew the most scathing comment: "The above statement astounds me. National
Super as it stands now could change, with a change in Government. National Super has nothing to do
with a Retirement plan based on Sal.ary
statement being made".

The US position on paying tax and union membership was put in a nutshell.
Executive Administrator for NZ Affairs: "The United States, as a sovereign power, does not pay taxes to
a foreign government, nor deduct levies, wage taxes or union fees.,., Membership of any New Zealand
Union automatically asserts the right to strike against an employer (Le., the US Government), Standard
FOIlll 61, Section lU(3) and Section C (Striking Against The Governmellt), clearly defines the position
of the U S Government on any foreign unions who assert their right to strike, or withdraw labour. " 24 y!
..
10

t"" These industrial grievances couldn't just be waved away with the sweep of an imperial hand
however. By May 1982 Commander Jones was responding to Ambassador H. Monroe Browne:
"Superannuation. The apparent lack of progress on initiating a retirement plan for local national
employees continues to cause consternation among many of my employees. The recommendation to
adopt a retirement scheme was made and accepted in the Oct-Nov 1980 time frame. The fact that one
has not yet been promulgated is perceived by many employees as a prevailing tangible financial benefit
that is being denied them. It has become an increasingly difficult issue for me to respond to. ! therefore
respectfully solicit your assistance to bring this particular issue to the from burner..." 2 5

Military anxiety about union involvement kept recuning. in November 1982 Deep Freeze sent a
message to the Embassy entitled, "Union Lritcresl in Deep Freeze". ClNCPACFLT wanted to be advised
of any "union organiSing effort of local national employees". Worse still, repelling NZ unions was
starting to look like a lot of hard work. That same month the Embassy asked ClNCPACFLT "for
services of CNSFA JAG [Judge Advocate General] 10 conduct a study of NZ labor laws to access [sic]
impact of unionization of NZ employees in Deep Freeze". The command was having none of it. "A
study of the NZ laboT laws is of such magnitude that the CNSFA JAG cannot handle it on a fulltime
basis. In addition the JAG has other Navy responsibilities which this Command considers more urgent.
Recommend that ClNCPACFLT disapprove asSignment of CNSFA JAG to do a jillltime study of New
Zealand labor laws and advise AmEmb of other means to accomplish this study". 27

By early 1983 the NZ workers had decided to adopt the direct approach and sent off their first
letter to the chaIrman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.l! The Deep Freeze Commander
reported to the Embassy: "On 14 March 83, I received a courtesy copy of subject letter signed by all
CivPers of my Command and addressed to Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with copies
to SecState; Constitutional Advisor to tlle White House: Head, Civilian Manpower Management
WashDC, and US Embassy, Wellington.... My CivPers Officer (Lt Webb) has received assurances of
domestic confidentiality and non-militant attitudes from all CivPers pending appropriate response to
subject letter. CivPers performance is unaffected - it appears they are simply tired of hanging on to a
promise received in 1967, and are now seeking assistance from a higher authority".28

The Navy realised that it had to address these civilian grievances. So in June 1983 Herbert
Dauber, visited Deep Freeze. He was the Director, Pacific Field Division, Naval Civilian Personnel
Command/Fleet Civilian Personnel Director, CINCPACFLT. His visit was to "provide guidance and
assistance on civilian .personnel admiillstration requirements for local national and US citizen
appropriated and non-appropriated frmd employees".29 His itinerary listed15 subjects for discussion, to
be addressed in various meetings, including a general one in the auditorium. Dauber was the
Anstralasian troubleshooter. From Christchurch, he was flying to Perth to renegotiate the industrial
agreement for the North West Cape Naval Communications Station, with the Western Australia Trades
and Labour Council.

The superannuation issue would not go away. On 1 July 1983, George F. Rodman, the US
Embassy Counselor for Administration, wrote to all civilian workers. He detailed the 1980 State
Department team's wage and position classification survey, and how he had to subsequently survey big
companies operating in NZ 10 fmd out their practices with regard to supplemental superannuation
schemes. "As you can imagine, there were times during this period when I wished I had never heard the
word superannuation.... If you have stayed with me this far, you will realize that it was easy enough for
the survey team to say in 1980 'let's have a superannuation plan for the FSNs in New Zealand' but not
so easy to accomplish. I am confident, however, thal we are on the tlueshold of success .... In the
meantime I ask your patience for little while longer". 30

But the workers had run out of patience, and engaged eminent Christchurch QC, Brian
McClelland to represent them. He wrote to the Ambassador concerning Rodman's letter. "1 need hardly
point out how completely unsatisfactory that Jel1er is from the point of view of the employees. With the
greatest respect it appears to me to be an incredible admission of the apparent lack of ability to honour yt
 1 1

;v undertakings that have been given tim" and again over the years.... I have no desire to embarrass the
USA Government or Naval Authorities if this can be avoided hence my desire to have a discussion with
you.,,

The local unions became more assertive, and in Octnber 198

Freeze, asklng questions like the number of workers and the type of work perfonned. The Americans
32
declined to provide wage details pending guidance from the Embassy, but "... the meeting was polite..
The workers' case was taken to the media and articles started appearing. By November the Canterbury
Hotel Workers' Union had started proceedings under the industrial Relations Act to have a disputes
hearing before a mediator. Union secretary Graham Harding complained that he was getting the run
around from the US authorities. The monthly meeting of the Canterbury Trades Council urged unions
involved with Deep Freeze to withdraw all goodwill until the Navy met its industrial obligations.
Harding aeknowledged that that would have no immediate effect, but if any of the unions became
involved in an iodustrial dispute, it could mean that there would not be the usual dispensation for Deep
Freeze. The Embassy reported: "Union goodwill has in the past been invaluable to the continuation of
suppon for Antarctic programs during times when New Zealand unions have instituted local industrial
33
action"

The pressure paid off. 'The Star' reponed on3 1December1983,

Graham Haniing revealed that many of the NZ civilians had gained a50c per hour wage rise, but it was
not retrospective, and it still didn't bring their pay up to NZ award rates. The Muldoon government had
ruled that sovereign immunity did not apply to the American civilian contractor. ITI, so its workers
came under union coverage.
number of grievances were still outstanding. such as sick pay, bereavement leave. and weekend pay
rates. The threatened black ban was in abeyance pendiog discussions between the FOL and the
Embassy.

Deep Freeze representatives met again with Messrs Smith and Lawson of the Clerical Workers'
Union and Brent Burnen-Jones of the (then) Store�,.and
One item on the agenda was imminent - the Muldoon government's voluntary unionism law came into
effect the next day. The unions suggested that the Air New Zealand Clerical Employees' award
provided the best model for Deep Freeze workers because it provided for workers within a transportation
system. "It was agreed that Union officials would draw up a special A ward based on the lines of the two
considered best for ITT's purpose. Mr GIice asked for a rider stating ITT were considered an essential
service. Union offidals agreed to this request".

The workers were still not happy with the proposed new Conditions of Employment in May
1984
aspeeta of the leave provisions, and demanded that Deep Freeze implement the NZ PAYE tax deduction
36
system But the tax. question required a political solution: "Withholding ho:;t country income taxes of
Loeal Nationals direct hire employees of Navy in foreign areas is provided oniy when country-to­
country agreements exist and benefits Navy ....
agreement to contrary, an income tax,..levied by a foreign government on its nationals may not be
37
withheld by an agency of the United States from the salaries of nationals employed in that country".
In the Asiil/Pacific area, the US has just such country-to-country agreements with both South Korea and
the Philippines.

Finally, on I April18
9 4,
civilians. It recognised prior service. The Canterbury Trades Council was still unhappy about the
overriding issue of extra-territoriality: ..... the trade union movement here in Cantethury believes that the
Antarctic Treaty is a treaty of peace but when it was made we New Zealanders never envisaged thal one
3
country would claim extra-territorial rights whilst being hosted in this country.. 8 In June, Navy
and worker representatives met with industrial mediator Mauriee Teens. He identified the problem areas
as the superannuation scheme still not having been registered, and the grievance procedure allowing for
no independent input Teens said if the Embassy agreed with an annual wage survey, he would accept ,;I
12

/F the Navy's package (Le., its new Conditions of Emplo �ent instruction). The Navy wante(i no press
3 The workers were still keeping the pressure on
coverage of the meetings and no union involvement.
with their direct approaches to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with the second, more biting
letter being sent in July.
14

The Navy was finally facing up to years of neglect of its NZ civilians. "Since the Det's
[Detachment's] inception, local CIVPERS management had been a collateral duty of untrained
individuals and from a professional viewpoint, virtually non-existent Initiatives taken during 1983
uncovered some major problems dating back some 1 5 years. Deeply rooted employee dissatisfaction
had been festering for years, recentiy fmding its outlet in adverse media coverage and the hiring of legal
counseL.. A superannuation plan was approved and implemented on 1 April 1984 . Aspects of
retroactivity (hack beyond 1980) are still to be resolved.... While a decision is expected in the near
40
future, this issue continues to frustrate harmonious relations with Det CIVPERS . . . . ,, And the union
movement still had its hooks into Deep Freeze. The Cll11terbury Trades Council wrote in July that it had
appointed a standing committee to represent the NZ civilians, and it wanted to meet the Navy to
establish a site agreement. Once again that was forwarded to the Embassy.

Conclusion

The upshot of all this effort, both by the NZ union movement and by the Deep Freeze civilians
themselves, was predetennined. The US consistently treated it as a political matter, and NZ
governments, both National and Labour, acquiesced to that view. As such, the US set the rules. It was a
sovereignty issue: the US Government exercises sovereignty at Harewood (or rather has " sovereign
immunity" from NZ control). US Government policy prohibits its workers from the right to strike
(which makes fervent US support of movements like Solidarity in Poland rather hypocritical), so unions
are barred from operating at Deep Freeze. Thus the only issue outstanding was what wages and
conditions could be directly negotiated between management and workers at the base. Deep Freeze
made few concessions.

The situation of NZ workers at Deep Freeze is yet another undesirable by-product of hosting a US
military base on NZ soil. An enclave of 19th century industrial relations is currently operating in
Christchurch with impunity and immunity.

Reference.

1. Letter from G.L. Evans, of C,]. Arndt Peters and Evans, Wellington 10 Rob Campbell.
Secretary, Distribution Workers Federation, Wellington. 4 April
1986.
2. See for example the letter of 1 1 May 1982 from Warren Cooper, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, to Geoffrey Palmer, Opposition MP, Christchurch Central.
3 . Letter from George F. Rodman, US Embassy Administrative Officer to ,

Canterl:mry Clerical Workers Union. 8 March 1982.

4. See file held by Southern Distribution Workers Federation (SDWF).
5. Mfidavit in file held by SDWF.
6. Correspondence between Citizens for the Demilitarisation of Harewood and David Lange
is reproduced in 'Foreign Control Watchdog' , 6 June 1987. (???)
7. See Mfidavit in file held by SDWF.
8. S ee Mfidavits, attachments, and Range of Disciplinary Action Penalties in
SWDF file.
9. US Embassy to SecState, Washington D.C. Subject: Civilianization of Naval Support
Force Antarctica and OL-D 619 MASS Activities (USAF MAC) at Christchurch. Confidential. March
1981.
10. Unattributed and untitled backgrounder stating the NZ workers' case. July 1984.
1 1. Letter from 29 Deep Freeze civilian workers 10 Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
10 March 1983.
 13
12. Powell A. Moore, Assis!ant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
to Senator Charles H. Percy, Chainnan, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 17 May 1983.
13. Rackgrounder o f Facts, Prime Issues, and Questions b y elected committee representing
NZ civilians: W. Marie Bcnnett, Heather A. Bulling, A Bruce Crawford, Trovor J. Grice, Diana Jewitt.
3 1 May 1984.
14. NZ civilian employees (as signed in ref 13) to Chainnan, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. 27 July 1984.
15. 'New Zealalld Times': "Harewood workers rush award bid", 22 July 1984.
16. NAVSUPFORANTARCTICA Det Christchurch. Instruction 12300-lE. Subject:
Direct Hire Local National Civilian Employment, policies concerning Conditions of Employment.
Undated. Issued by Commander Jones.
17. Memo from Political Officer James H. Holmes to Ambassador Selden. Subject:
Trade Union Complaint Involving Operation Deep Freeze. Unclassified. 24 July 1978.
18. Commander Pearigen, US NAVSUPFORANTARCTICA, to Officer in Charge (OIC),
Del ChCh. Subject: Periodic Audit A 10150, Commander, USNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA, ChCh. I
July 1980
19. Nrurdtive Report of Position Classification/Salary Survey Conducted in New Zealalld
between 6 Ocrober 1980 and 3 1 October 1980. Team - JA CirriIJo, D.G. McLaughlin. RE
FerrandillO.
20. NavResso BrookJyn New York to AlO Seven Seven Six Three. Subject: Notification
of Navy Exchange Employees to Right of Union Representation in Certain Investigatory Interviews.
Unclassified. March 1981.
21. Commander Jones t o Charles Salmon, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), US Embassy,
enclosing Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union letter to Deep Freeze Personnel Officer, with Air New
Zealalld award atlllched, and Jones' acknowledgement of same. 27 January 1982.
22. mc, USNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA Det ChCh to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) Pearl Barbor. Subject US Forces Direct Hire Local National Employees, NZ. 20
January 1982.
23. George F. Rodman, US Embassy Administrative Officer, to Martin Moodie, organiser,
Canterbury Hotel Workers' UniOll. 24 February 1982.
24. Trevor J. Gnce, Executive Administrator for NZ Affairs, to OlC, Det ChCh. Subject:
Union Affiliatioll/Jurisdiction. 25 February 1982.
25. Commander Jones, personal for Ambassador Browne and Captain Crummer. Subject:
Command Matters. Unclassified. May 1982.
26. NAVSUPFORANTARCTICA Det ChCh to AmEmbassy. Subject: Union Interest in
Deep Freeze. Unclassified. November 1982.
27. COMNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA to COMTHIRDFLT. November 1982.
28. Personal for Ambassador Browne and Captain Lawler from Commander Jones.
Subject CivPers Retirement letter dated 1 0 March 1983. Unclassified. March 1983.
29. N AVSUPFORANTARCTICA Det ChCh Notice 5050. Subject: Visit of Mr Herbert
Dauber. 9 June 1983.
30. Goorge F. Rodman, US Embassy Counselor for Administrution. To all Foreign
Service NationalB. 1 July 1983.
31. Brian McClelland Q C to US Ambassador. 1 3 July 1983.
32. Trevor Once, Executive Administrator for NZ Affaira, to Linda Stillman,
Political AtIllcne, US Embassy. 27 October 1983.
33. AmEmbussy to Sec State. Subject Formal Dispute over Worker Representation
at Deep Freeze. Unclassified. November 1983.
34. 'The SIllr' , "US base staff gain pay rise". 31 December 1983.
35. Minutes of meeting in office of National Science Foundation Contractor
Representative, NZ. Subject Basis for Employment - !TT Antarctic Services Temporary Employees
(Auslr'd1 Summer Hlre). 3 1 January 1984.
36. Del ChCh CivPcrs to Executive Qfficer, US Navy, Del ChCh. Subject
NAVSUPFORANTARCTICA Del ChCh Instruction 12300 lE. May 1984.
3? NCPC PACR Pearl Harbor to AmEmbassy, Wellington. Subject: Withholding of NZ
Income Tax. Unclassified. January 1984.
38. Canterbury Trades Council press statement. 9 March 1984.
39. Pre-Wage Survey Visit of Mr J. LeFebvre. Summary. June 1984.
40. Lt Webb. Subject Civilian Personnel Management. 25 August 1984.
14 PEA CE

RESEARCHER
COMMENT: NUCLEAR SHIPS UNDER A NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT

by Bob Leonard

On 9 March of this year, 'The Press' in Christchurch headlined the lead story on page 1 ,
t! National walks nul 011 ANZUS" and said: "The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Bolger, was forced into
the humiliating position of having to accept that Labour had been right to ban ships believed to be
nuclear-armed" .

Can New Zealanders now rest assured that American warships will not be returning to our
harbours if National wins the election in October? I think not. Why?

It might be instructive first just to remind ourselves how close Mr Lange came to allowing the
USS Buchanan into NZ in early 1985. The Labour nuclear-free policy at the time, as does the existing
nuclear-free law, left the decision about admitting a particular ship up to the prime minister. But Mr
Lange was not then, and never has been, strongly anti-nuclear and his initial reaction to the American
request for a visit by the Buchanan was to say OK. Only pressure from the peace movement and
Lange's anti-nuclear colleagues forced him to face the infamous neither confmn nor deny (NCND)
policy and admit there was a distinct possibility that the Buchanan was carrying nuclear weapons.
Rejection of the proposed ship visit made the US government feel double-crossed because earlier
consultation with Lange had led them to believe that he would not question the NCND policy.

Mr Lange quickly saw the political mileage that was to be made out of appearing to be anti­
nuclear and he has assumed that mantle ever since, much to the disgust of many in the peace movement.
As the right wing Labour government trod doWll the free market path to impending oblivion in the 1990
election, the paperthin anti-nuclear policy remained intact; being aquatically anti-nuclear was just about
all the glue Labour had to hang on to its base of support. We say 'aquatically' anti-nuclear because the
Labour government has allowed hundreds of NCND aircraft into New Zealand at Operation Deep Freeze
(and made no inquiry as to their contents), and retains an anachronistic ANZUS bond via dozens of
military/intelligence agreements with the US and Australia. The failure to cut ANZUS ties completely
places the Labour government squarely in the nuclear camp, despite the ship ban. That Mr Lange has
recently called for ANZUS ties to be cut, a subject he first gently floated in his famous Yale speech on
ANZAC Day 1989, is to his credit, but he has come to the party a bit too late.

A National government, having fmally accepted Labour's anti-nuclear law while in opposition, is
likely sooner or later to be tempted by the Americans to admit a teeny-weeny, harmless US military
vessel. Our so-called anti-nuclear law has been long on symbolic value, but would likely be proven
short on substance under National. The interesting thing about the US reaction to the Buchanan incident
in early 1985 is that they probably could have sent a clearly non-nuclear warship to New Zealand at any
time thereafter but they chose not to. (The anti-nuclear group CANWAR even published a list of
acceptable ships that it judged to be non-nuclear capable. Lange must have considered such lists.) The
reason the US did not push the issue was apparently to make an example out of little New Zeaiand, to
puuish a radical new government that dared question any aspect of US nuclear strategy. Many
predicted, and they have been proven correct, that the American move to puuish NZ would backfire, It
did not succeed in changing the ship ban, but it did focus international attention on what would
otherwise have been a rather inconsequential expression of anti-nuclearism in a remote corner of the
globe. Prime Minister Lange' s puuishment became his passport to international fame thanks to the J
/' wooden-headed Reagan administration. 15

Although the US has expressed disappointment at National' s sudden conversion to the anti­
nuclear camp, Bush and rus henchmen would be very unlikely to punish a National government. (The
anti-nuclear dirty trick that National pulled on Labour would probably be grudgingly admired in Bush
campaign circles.) One might predict that the US, having learnt a lesson trying to bully the Labour
government, will follow a different tack and gently begin to erode National's ill-fitting anti-nuclearism,
after allowing a reasonable period for the new government to settie in. Indications of that process are to
be found in waffiy utterances about how the srups issues can be reopened: "the United States shifts
gears on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and New Zealand srufts gears on the 'neither confirm nor
deny' principle on nuclear weapon deployment" (Congressman Jim Leach, 'Dominion Sunday Times', 4
March 1 990). That statement was made a few days before Mr Bolger made rus aunouncement of
support for the srup ban. But there is reason to believe the Americans may have suspected something
was up. Referring to the ice-breaking meeting between James Baker and Mike Moore in early March,
MP Philip Burdon stated, "On reflection, the Administration recognised that they had made it
particularly difficult for the National Party to continue ro support the neither confirm nor deny policy"
('The Press', 7 April 1990). In the same article it was reported that, "After the Ocrober election, Mr
Burdon expects the Bush Administration to be dealing with a National Government on a more
sympathetic basis than might be imagined. The Americans, in turn, recognise a responsibility to assist in
establishing a new relationsrup".

Under Labour that 'new relationship' has not been possible. Under National the prinCiple of 'the
thin edge of the wedge' will begin ro take effect as the Bolger and Bush governments nurture a
relationship of mutual sympathy and support for the old ANZUS alliance. Ultimately, the US will be
satisfied with no less than a return of their warships to NZ harbours and our acceptance of the neither
confirm nor deny policy. The key to success of this strategy is not arousing the sleeping masses of the
peace movement. Under the toothless nuclear free law Bolger as Prime Minister would be free to make
judgements about nuclear capability based on unrevealed sources of information (or none at all for all
we would know), and no-one could legally challenge rus actions. And thus the warsrups return to
Aotearoa....

THE NUCLEAR SHIPS ISSUE IN TASMANIA .-

A reminder that we will very likely have ships to protest agalnst if the next government in NZ is
even slightly more sympathetic to US nuclear strategy in the South Pacific.

From a Hobart newspaper, 4 April 1990:

n A peace activist found guilty of trespassing during the 1988 visit to Hobart of the American
warship, USS New Jersey, was yesterday arrested for non-payment of fines.

"Joan Elizabeth Denham appeared before the Hobart Magistrates' Court for failing to pay the fines
and costs, rotalling $140.10.

"Ms Denham, a member of the People for Nuclear Disarmament group [and 'PR ' subscriber], said
she did not intend paying the sum or doing community service because she believed her act of
trespass had 'alerted people ro the dangers of nuclear weapons ' and was in itself a community
service.

"Magistrate lan Matterson granted her a further2 8 days to pay the sum."

According to her last missive to 'PR', Liz was expecting ro spend a few days in the slammer. We
wish her well in her courageous stand against nuclear weapons. The Aussie situation should make us
appreciate our own freedom from nuclear ships, temporary as it may be.
16

THE BLACK BIRCH ASTROMETRIC PROGRAMME

by Peter Wills
(submission to the Public Advisor y Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control)

On 11 NovemHer 1982, the United States Ambassador, H. Monroe Browne, gave the New
Zealand government an assuranee that the programme at Black Birch had "not Heen conceived for
military purposes" but noted that the information collected by the observatory "could have military
applications", adding that "no military direction will He applied to the data collection process" .

The assuranees of the Ambassador, an official of the U .S. Department of State, were in
contradiction to statements to Congress by officials of ,,'le Department of the Navy who had given
testimony that the of the observatory was to "obtain locatiollS of stars in the Southern
Hemispbere with L'1e increased accuracy that is for military purposes".

A Public Affairs Counselor frOm the U.S, Embassy claimed in a letter on 18 May 1984 that
enquiries had Heen made with the Department of Defense and it had been determined that the budget
reference paper "was in error", but that the inlonnation "was drawn from diplomatic exchanges, which
are not made public".

I have been tmable to unearth any evidence that the New Zealand Government has required a
resolutio n to this state of affairs which calls into serious question the credibility and the honour of its
dealings with the United States Government.

During this early period, from 1982 until 1987 or so, the New Zealand Department of Foreign
Affairs made repeated statements about the benefits of civilian navigation and surveying which would
eventuall y accrue from operation of the Black Birch observatory. In a letter dated 7 OctoHer 1985, Mr
Lange assigned military applications of the data to the "hypothetical domain of ... future strategic and
other military systems", even though it was evident that any possible improvements to navigation and
geodesy would He at a level which could only be of interest to military users.

From 1982 unill late 1988 the New Zealand Government refused to acknowledge that astrometry
is an important military science. The Government thereby managed to hinder public debate about the
ethics of the role it was playing in supporting a Pentagon programme directly related to nuclear
targeting. Those us who were interested in the issue were forced instead to seek irrefutable
evidence that there was a real connection Hetween the Navy's astrometric programme, of which Black
Birch is a part, and nuclear targeting.

Now that papers copied from hearings of tJ'le District of Columbia Zoning Commission establish
unequivocally the military importance of the U,S. Navy's astrometry programme, there should He an
informed and open debate abnut the appropriateness of New Zealand 's support for the programme.
From the outset, the agreemem with the United States concerning the establishment and operation of the
Black Birch facility must He set aside.

Setting aside tbe Black Birch agreement

Whether they originate in Wellington or Washington, assurances from government officials and
representatives concerning the essentialiy civilian character of the Black Birch programme are without
merit. It remain,� a fact that the Black Birch programme is being conducted by a branch of the United
States Government whose dUly it i s to provide astrometric data for the pmposes of nuclear targeting.
Furthermore, it is the intention of this branch of the U .S. Governmell1 1o make any possible use of the
data gathered at Black Birch in il� of the targeting of counterforce weapons. This is the .;/.
 17

�
)"'" issue which must; Je addressed, irrespective of whether the military benefit derived from Black Birch is
,
of great significar ::e or rninor significance.
i

The portra)ihl of the scientists who run the Black Birch programme as innocent academics whose
prime goal is the pllTSuit of knowledge contributes nothing to the question of what support New Zealand
should give to activities which are conducted in conjunction with the nuclear strstegy of the United
Ststes Government. New Zealand should take every step conceivable to ensure that the development
and refinement of all means of mass destruction are brought rapidly to a conclusion and that all weapons
of mass destruction are made inoperative. At the very least we should exercise a policy of non­
cooperation in activities which are intended to contribute dlrectly to the enterprise of building,
maIntaining and operating a nuclear arsenal.

Unfortunately, the New Zealand Government has adhered to a dlfferent policy on the question of
Black Birch. Attempts are being made currently to quantify the military benefit which will be extracted
from the Black Birch data. It is impliCitly assumed that if the derived benefit is minimal, then there is no
ethical question to be answered. As a scientist who recognizes that humanity is on the verge of
destruction largely on account of the action of my well-meaning colleagues, I am unimpressed by this
line of reasoning; and I might note in passing that I am dlstrustful of scientists who argue the case for
their work in terms of the number of MX missiles which would miss their targets in a hypothetical strike
against Soviet missiles, oniy to turn around later and say they dldn't really mean it. [See PR Nos. 2 0 and
22 for details of this deceit. Bd.]

TIle United States Government should be informed that its assurances concerning the civilian
character of the Black Birch programme are inadequate and that New Zealand is withdrawing its support
for the gathering of astrumetric data which are intended for use in the refinement of coordlnates for
nuclear targeting. Such support is inconsistent with our desire to dlssociate ourselves from the obscene
excesses of military nuclear tecbnology. New Zealand's current position is ethically unacceptable.
Support for the U.S. Navy's astrometry programme should be terminated forthwith. If such a move on
the part of New Zealand forced the United States to place at least one arm of its astrometry programme
under the control of a civillan agency, just in order to keep it going, a great deal would be achieved. The
process o f setting aside the Black Birch agreement would draw worldwide attention to the problems
caused by the ubiquitous military control of science. New Zealand would become a champion of the
demilitarization of the quest for knowledge. Scientists who adhere to this ideal currently have no
champion. They are systematically ignored and marginallzed by governments in the pursuit of military
superiority and economic gain.

Comments on the strutegic utility of the Black Birch data

The considered assessment of independent astronomers seems to be that the effect of the Black
Birch programme on the accuracy with which we know the positions of individual stars in catalogues
such as the FK5 will be minimal. That is, provided the HIPPARCOS * sateilite continues to fimction,
and so on. Although the question of accw:scy in individual positions, and indeed the accw:scy of
reference frames, was central to dlscussions at the Washington D.C. Zoning Commission hearings in
1988, it is not necessarily the most important question in the application of astrometric data to missile
gnidance and other strategic enterprises. As far as I know, there is no authoritative description of the
astrumetric requirements of stellar inertial guidance (SIG) systems such as that under development for
use in Trident n.

I fPACDAC seriously considera that it must know how much benefit the military will actually
extract from the Black Birch data before deciding whether New Zealand should continue supporting the
U.S. Navy's astrumctric programme, then it should consult with experts who have knowledge of how
real SIG systems work. Such experts are to be found in the Draper Laboratories [in Massachusetts] and
other locations where missile and other guidance systems are designed and built. There are a lot of
questions which need to be answered about the Trident II SIG system alone. What is the sighting
telescope's angular aperture? In what direction does the telescope point relative to the missile's axes o f ..;tf
18
/'" translation and rotation? What i s its sensitivity? How many stars are on average in the field o f view and
what is the expected number distribution for stars of different magnitudes? With what certainty can the
system distinguish different stars, on average? Which stars are used in the course of typical ballistic
trajectories for missiles fired from U.S. strategic submarine zones at Soviet targets?

Until all of these details and a host of others are known, it is impossible to conclude that Black
Birch does not have considerable direct military utility. No further disingenuous assurances should be
accepted from the U.S. Government nor should extant assurances be cited by New Zealand Government
officials or representatives as proof that the Black Birch programme is essentially civilian. New Zealand
should demand that all of the facts pertaining to the military application of astrometric data be made
public, especially the details of how the data is used in nuclear targeting. Only after exhaustive
investigation will it be possible to make a properly infonned judgment as to the degree of military
benefit which the U .S. Government intends extracting from the data.

* The Hipparcos satellite is now in orbit with a mission to conduct space-based astrometry of much
greater accuracy and precision than are possible from ground-based telescopes such as at Black Birch.
Hipparcos was launched on 8 August 1989 on an Ariane rocket but failed to make its correct orbit.
Consequently the star mapping data it can collect will be of much lower quality than originally planned.

LAYOFFS HIT DRAPER LABORATORY

[From ' Science' magazine, vo1 247, p. 63 2, 6 February 1990J

"Cuthacks in defense research are forcing the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to lay off 145 researchers, engineers, and support personnel.

"The layoffs are to take place over the next 10 months. The primary reason is the impending
completion of a program to develop the guidance system for the Trident II missile.

"A spokeswoman said that some layoffs were anticipated as a result of the end of the 8-year
program. The laboratory had hoped to offset them with new contracts from the Department of
Defense, but these have not been forthcoming."

The good news is - there appear to be some cuts in military spending in the U.S.; in the above
case the cuts relate to nuclear weaponry.
The bad news is - they finished the Trident II missile guidance system. Perhaps PACDAC could
get one of the redundant Draper Lab engineers. to enlighten them on Stellar Inertial Guidance, as Peter
Wills has suggested in the preceding article. \.
pr; 7'7f;.c. c./�

C OOPTATION OF NZ ACADEMIA CONTINUES

by Nuclear Free Ki wis

Two publications reviewed this April in 'The Press' by ex-professor of American Studies
(University of Canterbury) Alan Conway highlight the continuing cooptation of NZ academics by US
connections. NFK has drawn attention to the various strands of this process in past articles. The
following article in this issue on the East-West Centre updates a major current example.

One review by Conway ('The Press',7 April 1990) was of a book entitled "The Impact of
American Ideas on New Zealand's Educational Policy, Practice and Thinking", edited by David Phillips,
Geoff Lealand and Geraldine McDonald (NZ-US Educational [sic] Foundation! NZ Council for
Educational Research). This was a collection of papers presented at a Fulbright Education Seminar in J
"... Wellington in September 1988. 19

in 'Peace Researcher' No. 23 (Jurie 1989, p. 18) we reviewed some US connections involving
Victoria University academics. The Sto.ill Research Centre there is involved in a publication called
"New Worlds? The Comparative History of New Zealand and the United States" edited by Jock Phillips.
This was a joint publication by the Centre and the US Education Foundation. As Conway puts it, the
study compares mice and elephants ('The Press', 14 April 1990). He notes " ...this published collection
of papers [is] incongruously hand-stamped 'with thanks to Mobil Oil NZ Lld"'. It doesn't seem
incongruous to us given the often close association between US multinationals and US foreign
policy.

Conway says that "this collection of papers iodicates that New Zealand is likely to benefit more
from a continuance of the Fulbright exchange of scholars between the two countries than from the
frequent 'fact-finding' missions of American and NZ pOliticians to each others' countries". NFK has
repeatedly indicated that these two types of exchanges. ever since the establishment of our nuclear-free
policy, are not always of benefit to New Zealand, and indeed may in some cases be to our detriment

EAST-WEST CENTER PROBES AoNZ-US RELATIONS

by Nuclear Free Kiwis

Past articles in 'Peace Researcher' by NFK have drawn attention to likely avenues of economic
leverage on NZ. Tying io with these trends was an East-West Center conference in Wellington, 1 4- 1 6
August 1989. The East-West Center i n Honolulu ls sponsoring a project, launched io 1988, on
Australla, New Zealand, and US ANZUS links. Its fonnal title is "Australia, New Zealand and the
United States: National Evolution and Alliance Relations". This project was a response to NZ's nuclear­
free policy (see PR Nos. 1 8 and 19, March and June 1988). The Australlan Institute of International
Affairs in Canberrn. and the Institute of Policy Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, are worldng
on the project with the Center's international Relations Programme.

The East-West Center strategy for possible manipulation of NZ is clear. Such a project serves a
number of functions: it provides infonnation on good poiots for leverage; it fosters ideclogical bonds
between US, Australian and NZ academics, official decision-makers and other influential elements; it
can shape foreign and economic policy among the three countries. To quote from one of the East-West
Center's own documents: "The project brings together experta drawn from the academic, government,
business, and media communities of the three countries. A senior advisory group from each country
provides overall guidance".

The preoccupation with shaping future policy is a stated alm of the project. To quote again - "Future
relations: What conclusions can be drawn from the previous analyses concerning commonallties and
discontinulties in economic trends in the three countries? What does this say about the likely nature of
the economic policy dialogue among the three over the coming decade or more?"

Some key New Zealanders wbo are involved in Phase II of the project dealing with economic
structures and relations are: Bemard Galvin, Chainnan of the Economic Development Commission in
Welliogton, a fonner director of the Treasury, and a fonner head of the Prime Minister's Department;
Gary Hawke, Professor of Economic History at Victoria University, and Direetor of the Institute of
Policy Studies; Sir Frank Hohnes, visiting fellow at the IPS, and emeritus professor at Victoria
University; and Peter Nicholl, assistant governor of the Reserve Bank of NZ.

An interesting array of prominent New Zealanders took part in the August conference. Besides
those named above, they included politicians and government department officials. Seen io the context
of the Project Surnntary, the highly political nature of the conference was demonstrated by the presence
of American Embassy staff. J
 20
Based on evidence presented in our earlier articles, the US appears to have no problem co-opting
;r
significant elements on the NZ economic establishment in a programme openly aimed at bringing our
foreign policy back into line with US objectives. This East-West Project is an effective substitute for the
original Ray Cline-ANZUS think tank (see 'Nuclear Free' special issues, Jan and Oet 1985) which
disappeared from sight after considerable adverse pUblicity. The 'Background' paragraph to the East·
West Project summary explicitly refers to the importance of ANZUS to the tripartite relationship.

The third and final fonnal phase of the 34 year project will involve a conference in Australia in
1 990 considering regional roles and relationships. The fruits of this project will bear watching over the
next couple of years, especially under a National. government.
----.
----_ _..............._•..__. .

NZ WAR INDUSTRY BOOMING?

by Nuclear Free Kiwis

According to a report in 'The Christchurch Mail' ( 1 3 April 1990): "The defence industry is worth
$77 million 11 year to NZ but that figure is soon likely to rise sharply, according to a Trade Development
Board survey. Some four hundred companies have indicated that domestic defence sales could increase
by 50% next year and double by 1993. Exports, currently worth $ 1 2 million, are predicted to quadruple
by next year, and increase lO·fold by 1993".

The report quotes Paul Limon, a Board development officer, saying that the results were
optimistic, but that sales can be boosted significantly.

The New Zealand war industry cranks out a range of products including foodstuffs, apparel,
technical services, engineering, software, and electronics, rather than armaments per se. Australia is
shaping up to be the biggest overseas market for NZ products, followed by Southeast Asia, Britain and
the US. Prominent among NZ companies are Cable, Price Downer and Air New Zealand.

An earlier report in the 'The Press' (3 1 Jan 1 990) also pointed to the rapid expansion of the NZ
war industry. A so-called Defence Manufacturers Association was fonned in December last year,
initially to take up the opportunities offered by the new frigate prograrume. We can see here how the
Labour government has deliberately gone about strengthenlng the military, economic, and foreign policy
links with our nuclear masters. The Ministry of External Relations and Trade has actualiy begun an
advertising campaign urging manufacturers to make themselves "an Australian military target" ('The
Press', 3 1 Jan 1 990). The Minister, Mike Moore, recently urged manufacturers to make bids for
lucrative bits of the ANZAC frigates construction projects. "A task force representing the Defence
industry [sic), the Government and trade unions would advise the Government on how companies
should go about winning up to $750 million in contracts, Mr Moore said." ('The Press ' , 28 June 1990, p.
6.

To put it bluntly, the Ministry is promoting tile subversion of NZ industry by foreign

militarisation. A spokesman for the NZ Defence Manufacturers' Association had indicated last year
that the Association would lobby politicians and officials about the strategic and economic benefits of
developing a strong "defence" industry base in NZ ('NEWelectronlcS, May 1989, p. 19). Obviously this
has been happening. The spokesman also emphasized that Australian industry was keen to see "that a
strong traru;-Tasman defence supply base is established". Thus are we being sucked into Australian
militarism.

It was in mid-1989 that Prime Minister Lange signalled the first official indication of government
support for a NZ war industry through participation in the ANZAC frigates project. Behind its figleaf
anti-nuclear policy the government has indeed erected a war industry. It is a measure of the desperation
of our manufacturing sector and the overall state of the economy that a Labour government sees fit to
hitch its hopes for recovery to the military bandwagon.
 21

11
BLOOD: ON THEIR BANNER"
Nationalist Strug�:les in the South Pacific

by Dand Robie. 314 pp, 4 maps, iIl"I<lrl1'p,,! Allell & Ullwill NZ Lld. Pri'l'llte Bag,
Wellington. $29.95.

Reviewed by Murray HoliOn

Let's Stl!!t with the obvious. is surrounded by the Pacific. And yet, from our media, we
1eam more about British or European than about our Polynesian and Melanesian neighbours.
Very few New Zealand journalists cover the Pacific at There has long been one shining exception to
tilis inexcusable myopia - David Rome. It's herd to make a living in tilis oountry as a freelance
reporter, but 11 freeiancer who specialises in the Pacific has a very hard row to hoe.
The fact tllet his features appear so very in tilt) 'Listener', 'Dominion', and 'The Press' is
attributable to the unifoml excelleoce and research. Plus the fact tIlet he is prepared to
regniarly trnvel to Asill/Pacific troublespcts a;1d hunt up the real story, rather than interview barmen and
cabdrivers.

Rome's previous Pacific book was , his 1 98 6 account of the last, fatal and fateful
voyage of the "Rainbow Warrior". The great of 1his one is that it takes a broad overview of
peoples' Indepeodence struggie in the Previously be has specialized in the Kanak independence
struggle, and has been repeatedly herassed by the Frellch cclonial authorities for his pains. His
sympathies are obvious - the book is dedicated £loi, Jean Malie, Yeiwene and the other martyrs··" .
He brings to tilis hook the quality of writing that WOIl him the 1 98 8 Qantas journalism prize for his
'Listener' cover on the French massacre of Kanaks 011 Ouvea.

"Machoro, who some saw as a sort of Guevara, had a remarkably simple aim: he was a
Kanak who wanted to be a citizen of Kanaky. His ccurage and dedication towards his goal are the
inspinnion for this book. The ensign of an indepeodem Kanaky is hung by Kanak villagers from
makeshift llagpoles throughout New Caledonia. An image of the sun represeots the dawn of hope and a
new future. Blue, red and green stripes synlbolise sky, bloodshed and earth. The blood on their
banner represents their sacrifice."

The book covers in great detail the A�ru.u_ liberation struggle; it is parricniarly valuable in its
coverage of Vanuatu (whose nuclear free is far ill advance of New Zealand's); and it tackles head
on the myths and illusious fostered by meist for Rabuka's reactionary ccups in Fiji. Robie
quite correctly regards the Fiji coups as !I test for understanding Pacific nationalism - not an
indigeoous assertion of land righis, but 11 brutal ploy by a trsditiooai ruling class to stay in
power by fostering artificial racial divisions, and the poor of both races into the dust.

Who is responsible for the iml){Jv,erishment. disenfranchisement, alienation and destabillsation of

the peoples of the Pacific? The blame rests
France, with Australia and New Zealand
have poisoned the physical and political
Fiji is another contaminant. Not ali
brsIld of Methodism, but also bravely
feudal chiefs and their stormtroopers.
with the continuing colonisers - the Us and
a lesser role. French and American nuclear politics
of the region The poison of racism in Kanaky and
are bad; Fiji has adopted a parricularly vile
for a democmcy that will benefit ail its people. not just

Rome breaks Ilew ground, for by looking at Asian Colonialism in the region.
indeed Indonesian geoocide in man and East Timor makes anything in the South Pacific look like a
Idds' picnic. The most bloodchilling illustration is of Indonesian troops displaying severed Freillin
beads. Indeed 1 98 9 saw Robie turn. his attention to Asia, specialising extensively in the Philippines (we
met there wben l was on the Peace which he covered for its whole month). ;r
22
/" Reading this book evoked painful memories. I met Jose Ramos Horta, Fretilin's foreign minister,
during that chaotic, blood drenched year of 1975. I met Alphonse Dianou who later led the Ouvea raid -
French troops accepted his surrender, kneecapped him, ripped out his IV drip, and kicked him as he bled
to death. And in January, in Manila, I met Djoubeliy Wea who several months later gunned down
FLNKS leader Jean Malie Tjibaou and his deputy, and was then himself shot dead.

Robie's expertise in Pacific politics is unparalleled. His latest trip has been to Bougainville,
where indigenous landowners are waging a guerilla war on the world's biggest mining multinational and
the army of its host nation (without the support of the pseudo-nationalists who have made Fiji safe for
mining multinationals and local capitalists). The book was first published in Swedish, and some time
later in Britain. Fortunately, it has recently become available in New Zealand. Anyone wanting to
understand "our own backyard" must read this book.

Robic's own conclusion is this: "Nationalism invokes the sovereignty of the political nation and
not just the sectional interests of one island, one tribe, one clan, or one culture. In the post-colonial age
the greatest test which faces the islands of the South Pacific is the legacy of traumatic colonialism.
Withdrawal into self-absorbed ethnocentric isolation provides no solution; instead it creates new
dilemmas.

"And what of the destabilisation created by colonial strategies of France, Indonesia and the
United States in the Pacific? Are there alternative policies avallable to these powers in the region?
There are, but they need to be based on the acceptance that the South Pacific peoples and natioI1� do
form an entity in their own right. They must endorse the validity of ' nuclear free and independent'
aspirations in Oceania. Their present colonial and military emphasis would need to be replaced by a
contribution based on mutual respect and on equal terms. The future of South Pacific countries belongs
primarily to their own people."

** Eloi Machoro, Jean Malie Tjibaou, Yeiwene Yeiwene - All Kanak nationalist leaders. Ali
assassinated.

L.O.O.T. Available
A new journal of media criticism

'Peace Researcher' has subscribed to a new journal from the United States called " Lies of Our Times" ,
or LOOT for short The first issue we have received is No. 5, Volume 1 (May 1990). We will attempt
to obtain the other four issues. The following note is quoted from the magazine.

"To Our Readers"

"'Lies of Our Times' is a magazine of media criticism. ' Our Times' are the times we live in but
also the words of the 'New York Times' , the most cited news medium in the U.S., our paper of
record. Our 'Lies' are more than literal falsehoods; they encompass subjects that have been ignored,
hypocrisies, misleading emphases, and hidden premises - the biases which systematically shape
reporting. We can address only a sampling of the universe of media lies and distortions. But, over
time, we hope ' Lies of Our Times' will go a long way toward correcting the record."

If you are interested in this magazine, let us know.

A sampling of articles from No. 5:
"The 'Times' Miscovers the ANC: Plumping for de Klerk and denigrating Mandela", by
Alexander Cockburn
"Letter from Lexington: Third World, first threat", by Noam Chomsky
" ' Times' PR for Argentine Coup: Making space for torturers" , by Edward Newton
"The Press, the Pentagon and Green Berets: If pressed, always lie", by Dave Lindorff.
 23

ANTI - BASES CAMPAIGN P O BOX 2258 e HeH

1 Jooe 1990

TOUCHING THE BASES TOUR

November 11·25 (inclusive), 1990

The Anti-Bases Campaign invites you to join us on this weeklong tour of all four of New
Zealand's foreign bases, and NZ spybases that work for foreign intelligence agencies.

COST: NZ$300 per head. This will cover one week's travel and food, and aid to Asia/Pacific
delegates who will need financial asaistance. Accomodation will be by billet, or, in the case of
Wailiopai, the traditional 'lllXury' camp.

Please note: The quoted price does NOT include the cost of getting to and from the
starting and finishing points.

PARTICIPANTS: The tour will consist of New Zealanders, Australians. and delegates
from Asia/Pacific regionai coootries sllch as the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

ITINERARY: Starting at the Tangimoana military intelligence spybase on the first

weekend; travelling south to Wellington for a regional bases campaign working meeting, and
Owen Wilkes' guided tOUT of Secret Wellington; crossing Cook Strait, and camping near
Blenheim midweek, enabling us to visit the Wailiopai satellite spybase, and the US Naval
Observatory on Black Birch ridge; finishing up at Christchurch on the second weekend, visiting
the US Navy/Air Force military base at Harewood, Christchurch Airport.

PURPOSE: To infarm and energise the participants; to tie all four installations and
bases together in one action; to involve regional delegates in OUT struggle; PTO_

YES, I wish to join the November 1990 Touchlng the Bases Tour.
I enclose by $50 deposit.
Name Tick box if prepared to help organise in your area.

Phone "v. ___________

Ballmce of cost payable by October 1. Stan saving/fund raising now!

Rerum to Anti-Bases Campaign, Box 2258, Christchurcl!, New Zealand

For further lmonnation, phone Warren Thomson, Christchurch (03)557-975
I" to focus attention of the NZ and regional peace movement on "nuclear free" NZ's foreign military ties;
To demand the real, as opposed to the symbolic, End of ANZUS; to break the remaining chains that
bind lIS to Uncle Sam.

There will be direct action at one base (at least), and possibly at all four.

WHAT TO BRING: Spending money, wam:t clothing, camping gear (for Waihopai - some tent
space previded), sleeping bag, ground sheet, nibbles, patience, a seuse of humour, a sense of purpose.

OWN TRANSPORT '" PART-TIMERS: Those unable to join us for the full week are of
course welcome to join in for part of it (e.g., the two weekends). Costs are negotiable in that case.
Those who want to travel in their own transport are also welcome to join us. Costs are likewise
negotiable.

WHAT WE NEED: People to commit themselves now, so we can have numbers to plan for;
organisers and billets in Palmerston North, Wellington, Blenheim and possibly Quisthchurch. We
especially need a $50 deposit to give us funds to book transport, etc.

AUCKLANDERS: Owen Wilkes has offered to run his tour of Military Auckland as a
preliminary attraction, before you join us at Tangimoana. Let us know if you're interested.

It will be a great week, and represents a chance to provide a significant new boost for the anti-bases
movement and the broader peace movement.

See you in November,

Murray Horton
for ABC

'PEACE RESEARCHER' is published by Educate for Nuclear Disarmament four

times per year.

Our mailing address is

Peace Researcher
P.O. Box 2
Lincoln University
Canterbury
New ZealandlAotearoa

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