Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54904 January 29, 1988
HEIRS OF TITO RILLORTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO N. FIRME, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La
Union; and ANDREW COSTALES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the
heirs of the offended party? Of course. May the criminal
aspect of the decision be modified as a basis for the increase
in the civil award? Certainly not. Is the case at bar covered
by the rule on double jeopardy or by the exception? We shall
come to that.
Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held
guilty only of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to
twenty days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said the
defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the
wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The
certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was
obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was
needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had
succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect
any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's
gross incompetence. 1
The heirs of the deceased, herein petitioners, did not agree.
Through their counsel acting "under the direct control and
supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision notified to them on January
him for the same offense. This Court, as early as ninety (90)
years back, in Julia v. Sotto, said
"Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the
accused, his fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be
entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness, who might
repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and
whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or
restriction than his own will and pleasure. The accused
would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a
never-ending charge, which the malice of the complaining
witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his head . . ."
Que v. Cosico enumerates the requisites which must concur
for double jeopardy to attach: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the accused has
been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The concurrence of all these circumstances constitutes a bar
to a second prosecution for the same offense, an attempt to
commit the said offense, a frustration of the said offense, or
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense charged.
In the cases before Us, it is undisputed that valid
Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos.
7396 and 7397 were filed against private respondents before
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent
jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that private respondents,
after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty.
The only question then remaining is whether the cases
against them were dismissed with their express consent.
Express consent has been defined as that which is directly
given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to
supply its meaning. This is hardly what private respondents
gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation
of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare
null and void the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City dated October 27, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
051672 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Segundina
Rosario y Sembrano," the issues raised are (1) whether or
not double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of
acquittal of the accused without a trial on the merits; and (2)
whether or not the complainant or private offended party in
a criminal case can file a special civil action for certiorari
questioning the validity of said judgment of acquittal without
the intervention of the Solicitor General.
On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772
was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with
the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city
against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among
others, as follows:
That on or about 16th day of December, 1986,
and for sometime prior thereto and persisting
up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the University of the
Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in occupying and/or
possessing a portion of the said property, by
then and there construct his/her house therein
for residential purposes, without the consent
and against the will of the said offended party. 1
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held on August 14, 1987 wherein the
accused informed the court that she has a title, a building
permit and survey plan covering the subject land. The trial
she informed U.P. of her claim and asked them not to intrude
into her property.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of
the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas
in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for
theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on
the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city
judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises
of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned
and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia.
The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally
concealed inside the walls of the building" 1owned by the
private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions
were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely
to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice
and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent
investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written
statement that he had caused the installation of the
electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation
of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction for the annulment of the resolution dated
September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C.
Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and
4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal
Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said motion
to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double
jeopardy as these offenses were already included in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124,
and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter
Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower court. In both
sets of criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment before the lower court. However,
immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases,
petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his
plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which
was denied by respondent Judge ruling as follows:
The motion to quash should be and is hereby
denied. Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued
the checks in favor of complainant Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil
products which the latter delivered to him
simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of
bouncing checks is not committed by mere
issuance of a check. Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 4885, the following are the
elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the
payment of a pre-existing
obligation and the position of the
Government should turn out to be
correct that there is no estafa,
then the drawer of the check
would only be liable under this Act
but not under the Revised Penal
Code. But if he issues a check in
payment, or contemporaneously
with incurring, of an obligation,
then he will be liable not only for
estafa but also for violation for this
Act. There is a difference between
the two cases. In that situation
where the check was issued in
payment of a pre-existing
obligation, the issuance of the
check does not cause damage to
the payee and so it is but
appropriate that he should not be
held for estafa but only for
violating this Act. But if he issued
a check to induce another, to part
with a valuable consideration and
the check bounces, then he does
inflict an injury to the payee of the
check apart from violating this
law. In that case, it should be but
fair that he be subject to
prosecution not only for estafa but
also for violating this law.
MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with
the Solicitor General on that point
but my worry is with respect to
situations where there is
prosecution first to estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is
estafa . . .
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and
the order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March
13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for
violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged
with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. The information against him reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990,
in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without the corresponding license or
prescription did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of
Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a
regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twentysix could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the
city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first
formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of
the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo,
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of
Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be
struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons
for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision.
We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation
to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not
the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
question By authority of what law did the Mayor and the
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands
in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General
can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all
persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a
prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law
from one locality to another within the country, then
officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed
that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
(Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196,
220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and
makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the
primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy,
respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court
should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in
question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It
was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and
the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the
city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by
counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition
for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to
be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The
law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's
jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been
asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
x---------------------------------------------------------x
September 7, 2010
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
"RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her
came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of
Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and
returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. 31 Before being
released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular
phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail
address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits
and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair
of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report
the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward
will happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive
calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her.37Out of
apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing
for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the
cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well
as the suppression of any existing government files or
records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner
filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief
that it was government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her
suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1)
respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the
inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division,
Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be
Police Action
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the
Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to
any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court
finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying
an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We
agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would
be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which
was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the
interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit
position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does
not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may
grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require
that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of
an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case.
This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner
are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that
she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the
military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order
cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the
petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or
causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though
not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is
constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of
the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us,
an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the
Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of
its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records,
intelligence reports and reports on the investigations
conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be
produced and eventually expunged from the records.
Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order
of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political
opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed
based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner
could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan,
Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press
conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the
organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover
claimed that said information reached them thru a letter