Poli Case Digests 7 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [7]: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ VS
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
GR NO. 183533
AREVALO
DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the
petitioners rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial
evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can
be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise
necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.
It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even
threatened violations against a persons right to life, liberty or security.
Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity nevertheless constitute a violation
of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat.
FACTS:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be
granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers
for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and
killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the
Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be
excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007,
he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain Joel, a former
colleague at Bayan Muna. Joel pretended peddling pandesal in the
vicinity of the petitioners store. Three days before the petitioner was
apprehended, Joel approached and informed him of his marital status
and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. Joel inquired if
the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA
justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan
after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that
he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.
CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how
the supposed threat or violation of petitioners [right to] life, liberty and
security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances
attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioners right
to life, liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the
writs prayed for.
Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is likewise denied because
allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of
Section 6 [Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The
petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to
how petitioners right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated.
The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (then incumbent
president) as a party respondent.
The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA. Hence, this
peititon.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the
petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent.
2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it
failed to conclude from the evidence offered by the petitioner the fact that
by being placed in the order of battle list, threats and violations to the
latters life, liberty and security were actually committed by the
respondents.
HELD:
1) No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of
proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to
make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against
life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included
the Presidents name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to
show the latters actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged
violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request
or demand for any investigation that was brought to the Presidents
attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a
respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit,
the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President,
as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. However,
1 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept hook, line and
sinker, so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the
granting of the petition is a different matter altogether.
In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats
against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the
militarys order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made
on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a
military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle
of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioners
case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack
corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence,
and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
(Details of the petitioners claim and respective reasons why it was not
considered sufficient:)
-it was claimed that Joel once inquired from the petitioner if the latter
was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish
with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored.
- The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was
asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latters control. The
respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who
voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as
the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.
- inclusion in the order of battle - it was categorically denied by
respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who stated that he does not have
knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) order of
battle which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP.
- Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioners mobility was never
curtailed. From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August
of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN- ST,
there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he
went home to Mindoro on several instances.
accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the
national or local elections.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC
to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment,
devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials. On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution
No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of
three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I Computerized system of
registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of
registration; (2) PHASE II Computerized voting and counting of votes;
and (3) PHASE III Electronic transmission of results. It resolved to
conduct biddings for the three phases. Problems were encountered as to
the enforcement of phase I and II, leaving Phase III imposable. The
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6712 regarding the said phase which leads
to this petition. Resolution 6712 provides for the electronic transmission
of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the
resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive
power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President
and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the
citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided
under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec
added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution 6712 was valid?
BRILLANTES VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
CRUZ, CHANINE
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
The quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not
only be pre-emptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would
also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Congress has the sole
and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of
President and Vice-President. NAMFREL is solely authorized and the duly-
NO. The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell
within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court. It is a justiciable
question. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA
8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially
canvass the votes for the elections of President and VicePresident. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No.
8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize

NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under
the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be pre-emptive of the
authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
constitutional and/or statutory basis. The assailed resolution usurps, under
the guise of an unofficial tabulation of election results based on a copy of
the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. The
contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by
the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is
puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and VicePresident, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an
unofficial canvass of said votes. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC
resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of
public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and
Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The
Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the
Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the
adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)
consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political
parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have
not been substantially met. Resolution 6712 was null and void.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PHILIP ELLA
C. JUICO, ET. AL.
GR No. 83896, GR No. 83815 || February 22, 1991
DUMALANTA
DOCTRINE:
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when
such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President,
the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified

therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials
FACTS:
These are two petitions assailing the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 284 issued by President Cory Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent
provisions of the EO provide:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position,
a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary
or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more
positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions
other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of
the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners argue that this EO allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
positions in addition to their primary positions, however limited by Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This provision prohibits
respondents as members of the Cabinet, alongside other certain public
officials, from holding any other office or employment during their tenure.
ISSUE:
WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned, admit of the

exceptions made for other appointive officials under Section 7, par (2),
Article IX-B of the Constitution?
HELD:
NO. Section 7, Article IX-B contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government for both
elective and appointive public officials. The prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII is stricter and more specific, wherein it prohibits the President,
the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution.
Such disqualification is absolute and all-embracing, and covers both public
and private office or employment. It bears repeating though that in order
that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such
additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of
the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
ESTRADA V. GMA
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 [DISIERTO], 146738 [GMA], March 02, 2001
GATACELO
CAVEAT: TIN CRUZ NEED NOT SUBMIT A DIGEST FOR THIS ROUND
BECAUSE WE HAVE THE SAME CASE, APPARENTLY. LATE NA NAPANSIN.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO AND ESTRADA V. GMA ARE CONSOLIDATED
CASES. DI KO ALAM KUNG BAKIT PA NILAGAY TO NI SIR. DODOBLE NA
LANG SI TIN NEXT WEEK, GANYAN.
DOCTRINE:
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. Using the totality test (e.g. Angaras diary
published in Philippine Daily Inquirer [WEIRD!], press statement, overt
acts before, during, and after Estrada left Malacanan), Estrada has
resigned from Office and thus Arroyos [THE BEST PRESIDENT EVER!]
assumption of power is valid and legal.
FACTS:
EDSA DOS! Upon Singsons revelation that the President received millions
of pesos from jueteng, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated.
The more detailed revelations of President Estrada's alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against
him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives
which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In
express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more
than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary
of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar
defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior
economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and
Industry. As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's
call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when
the 11 members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second
envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of
January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying
for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies
and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace. Part of
his press statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will
prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. Allegedly,
on the same day, Estrada signed a letter addressed to the House of
Representative, which states: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11,
Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the
Acting President.
On January 22, however, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution
recognizing Arroyos presidency. Consequently, several cases for bribery,
graft and corruption, perjury, serious misconduct, among others, were
filed against Estrada before the Ombudsman.
Now, Estrada came before the Supreme Court asking the Ombudsman to
prohibit from conducting the investigation since his term as President had
not yet ended, and that Arroyo was only performing in acting-capacity.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada.
3. Whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
RULING:
1. NO. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.
It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as
the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases
at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that
petitioner resigned as President.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is
provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of
Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January
19, Estradas loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the
crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc
committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas
na si Angelo." An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided
to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not
be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in
May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that
time.
Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country. At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary
Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days
to a week in the palace." This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind
was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could
stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) heacknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
With respect to the letter he allegedly sent to the Congress saying
he was only incapable of performing his duties, to say the least,
the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate,
the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument.
Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate
the
resignation
of
the
petitioner.
If
it
was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing
his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press
release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's
resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is

another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to
petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of
this Decision.
2. No. Estrada claims that "Congress has the ultimate authority under
the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11
of Article VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is
only an Acting President. However, the facts speak otherwise.
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed
on January 24, 2001 House Resolutions recognizing and confirming
Arroyos assumption of power. Thereafter, Senate also passed a
resolution of the same tenor. Give this, the Court has no
jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court
cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative . . . branch of the government."
Thus, SC rejects his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that
led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution.
3. No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.
By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule
is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any other trespasser.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
So it is argued, Mr. Estrada remains to be the President because under the
1987 Constitution, the Vice-President may assume the presidency only in
its explicitly prescribed instances; to wit, firstly, in case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President;
secondly, when the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and thirdly, when a majority of all the
members of the cabinet transmit to the President and to the speaker of
the House of representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the latter two
grounds being culled as the "disability." Resignation is an act of giving up
or the act of an officer by which he renounces his office indefinitely. In
order to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer
or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
position accompanied by an act of relinquishment.
Resignation implies, of the intention to surrender, renounce, relinquish the
office. Abandonment of office is a species of resignation, and it connotes
the giving up of the office although not attending by the formalities
normally observed in resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a
positive act or can be the result of an omission, whether deliberate or not.
Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11,
Article VII of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the
temporary incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are
personal, either by physical or mental in nature, and innate to the
individual. Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a
revolutionary government. A revolutionary government is one which has
taken the seat of power by force or in defiance of the legal processes.
EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The government structure has
remained intact. Succession to the presidency has been by the dulyelected Vice-President of the Republic. All told the installation of Mme.
Macapagal-Arroyo perhaps came close to, but not quite, the revolutionary
government that we know. The new government, now undoubtedly in
effective control of the entire country, domestically and internationally
recognized to be legitimate, acknowledging a previous pronouncement of
the court, is a de jure government both in fact and in law. A reminder of
an elder to the youth.

After two non-violent civilian uprising within just a short span of years
between them, it might be said that popular mass action is fast becoming
an institutionalized enterprise. Should the streets now be the venue for the
exercise of popular democracy? Where does one draw the line between the
rule of law and the rule of the mob, or between "People Power" and
"Anarchy?" If, as the sole justification for its being, the basis of the Arroyo
presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on
loose and shifting sands and might tragically open a Pandora's box more
potent than the malaise it seeks to address. Conventional wisdom dictates
the indispensable need for great sobriety and extreme circumspection on
our part. In this kind of arena, let us be assumed that we are not
overcome by senseless adventurism and opportunism. The country must
not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people power for no bond can be
stretched far too much to its breaking point. To abuse is to destroy that
which we may
hold dear.
MENDOZA, J.:
To recall these events is to note the moral framework in which petitioner's
fall from power took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed petitioner was
forced out of Malacaang Palace, seat of the Presidency, because
petitioner was "threatened with mayhem." What, the President of the
Philippines, who under the Constitution is the commander-in-chief of all
the armed forces, threatened with mayhem? This can only happen because
he had lost his moral authority as the elected President. Indeed, the
people power movement did not just happen at the call of some ambitious
politicians, military men, businessmen and/or prelates. It came about
because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft
and corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo
Espiritu, and other witnesses against petitioner. This is the confession of
one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability referred to in the
Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the President
unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. This is the
clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at least
as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the
transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional
principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the people to revolt will
carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is
affirmed as a natural right. Even then, it must be exercised only for
weighty and serious reasons. What took place at EDSA was not a
revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative fact
which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume the
presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the
executive leadership which made the government rife for seizure by

lawless elements. For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petitions
in these cases.
N.B. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA
People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power
of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial
review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is
not inappropriate.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211. OCTOBER 27, 1989
GLORIA
DOCTRINE:
The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. Also, among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect
and promote the interest and welfare of the people.
FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was overthrown from presidency by Corazon Aquino,
and he was forced into exile. The presidency of Corazon Aquino was
challenged by failed coup attempts, and plots of Marcos loyalists and the
Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has expressed his desire to
return to the Philippines. But President Aquino, considering the dire
consequences of his return to the nation has firmly decided to bar the
return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition, asking the Courts to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar

their return to the Philippines. Having the petition initially denied by the
Court, petitioners filed this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has power to bar a Filipino from his own
country, and if he/she has such power, whether or not President Aquino
exercised it arbitrarily.
HELD:
Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President,
upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for
her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for
the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of
the general grant of executive power.
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the
President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage
for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual
powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate.
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under
the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6
refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment
No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance
with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the
absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not
enjoin the implementation of this decision.
Separate Opinions:
Cruz, dissentingNothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the
petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms
of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. This only shows that if he
was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund,
that feeble threat has died with him.
Paras, dissenting(2) The former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain
rights.
(3) The alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and
consequently, unpersuasive.
(4) Reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the
return is granted.
(5) The entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As
Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely,
compassion is the better part of government.
Padilla, dissentingRespondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2)
rights, i.e. to return to and die in this country. The remaining right of this
Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the right to be
buried in this country. Respondents should not be allowed to complete the
circle of denying the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel
which, as stated in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to,
die and be buried in this country, if the Constitution is to still prevail. We
are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last
right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the
treasured land of his birth.
Sarmiento, dissentingIf the Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers of the
President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power.
The Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court
order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law intended a
presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints
on the right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend
the Charter. Also, the military has shown no hard evidence that "the return
of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002
GOMEZ

DOCTRINE:
The term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment by
the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in
the meantime that Congress is in recess. An ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office, and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he
qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
removal from office.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the
appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L.
Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections; and (2)
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason,Jr. as COMELEC
Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment
of Velma J. Cincoas Director IV of the COMELECs Education and
Information Department (EID for brevity).
The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the
EID. Thereafter,
her appointments were subsequently renewed in
temporary capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring
on February 2, 2008. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason took their respective
oaths of office. The Office of the President then submitted to the
Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments of the three for
confirmation. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on
said appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same
term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths
of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on
June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on
their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
to the same positions. The Office of the President submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They

took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum
dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and
to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-inCharge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department but he denied her request.
Petitioner then appealed to the COMELEC en banc. Likewise, she also filed
an administrative and criminal complaint against Benipayo.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the
right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the
ad interimappointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as
on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members.
ISSUES:
WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis
of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption
of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the
renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of
office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
HELD:
(1)
The SC found petitioners argument without merit.An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next

adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment
made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does
not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at
any time.
The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution,
has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at
that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil
service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that [n]o officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes
complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The
withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it
is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.
Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office
which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can
only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.
(2) There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new
appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing
authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits,
being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent
after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the
appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on
reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or
failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter.
A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on
the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session
of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as
required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to
renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments.
The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim
appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present
Constitution. The established practice under the present Constitution is
that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim
appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under
the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did
not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing
power in the President.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad
interimappointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a
new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will
not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
G.R. NO. 164978. October 13, 2005
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
The law expressly allows the President to temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.
FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular
session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of
Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.

Appointee|||
Department|||
Arthur C. Yap|||
Alberto G. Romulo|||
Raul M. Gonzalez|||
Florencio B. Abad|||
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.||
Rene C. Villa|||
Joseph H. Durano|||
Michael T. Defensor|||
Agriculture
Foreign Affairs
Justice
Education
National Defense
Agrarian Reform
Tourism
Environment
and
Natural Resources
Date
Appointment|||
15 August 2004|||
23 August 2004|||
23 August 2004|||
23 August 2004|||
23 August 2004|||
23 August 2004|||
23 August 2004||
23 August 2004|||
of
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting

secretaries.
Petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004,
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
ISSUE:
WON Arroyo's appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An
alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is

in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President's
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient
that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "the
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in
an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.
Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested
in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to
appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that
Congress is not the only source of law. "Law" refers to the Constitution,
statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules
issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting
capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section
17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this
safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way
to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But adinterim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but,
if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the Court finds no abuse in the present case. The absence of
abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo's issuance of ad interim

appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 141284. AUG. 5, 2000
DOCTRINE:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.
FACTS:
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall,

Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed
the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. IBP argues that
no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the
military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the
IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
said troop [Marine] deployment."|||
ISSUE:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like

robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President (Estrada), in a
verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the
said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief,
through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the
joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace
and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols. The President
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
WON there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President in

calling the armed forces to warrant judicial review.
HELD:
No. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in
any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-inchief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling
of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus,
cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its
own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view
of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to

determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed
because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation" before declaring
an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse
of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's
judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider
the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could
spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial
scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may
be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order
every time it is exercised.
concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take

judicial notice.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found
guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo
Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC.
RTC: finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of
Alfredo Arevalo and for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra,
Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
DOCTRINE:
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by

his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of
the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the
facts and circumstances of the case. Prosecution witness Nonito Malto
testified that on the accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested
permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a
person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's
house be extinguished and Malto complied. Around 2:00 o'clock in the
early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When
he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person
who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two
gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away
the dead man. Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was
Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the
military.The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the
property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the
mother of the victim. After she was informed by her tenant Alegria
Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People's Army
(NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked
for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA
passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for
drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA.
After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member
and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose
Patriarca, Jr.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be

pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's
death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was
issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the

President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless
the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded
respect from this Court.
PEOPLE V. JOSE PATRIARCA
G.R. No.135457, Sept.29, 2000
Matillano

When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to
identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the
burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the
waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board
concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for amnesty should be granted?
HELD:
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the
Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a
particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and
his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving
at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the
Constitution.
FACTS:
Yes 'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the
Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in armed activities:
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the
applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done
in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998
the grant of his application for amnesty.
The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was
approved and one of the acts listed in the resolution of the Natl Amnesty
Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The approval was
pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shall apply
who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit of their
political beliefs.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the
concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it
in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent

Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project
awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions
relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions
on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these
three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on
November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On
November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause
letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On
November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to respondent Committees, he
manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and

that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to
appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just
requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to
clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory.
Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that
he should still clarify, they issued the Order citing petitioner in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two
grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
ISSUE:
WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are not covered by executive privilege because the
elements of the presidential communications privilege are not
present.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign
loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone,
but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does
not make such power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the
most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of
substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or
duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an

executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely
to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but,
in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the
application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason that "it
may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President but who may have "no direct
communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid
down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a
limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined
its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of
the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational
proximity" to direct presidential decision-making.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath
of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is
absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,
properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego
and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in
which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in
the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity
test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In
determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to
the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of
their positions in the Executives organizational structure. Thus,
respondent Committees fear that the scope of the privilege would be
unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is
unfounded.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based

on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent
Committees and the Presidents clashing interests, the Court did
not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government
transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the
Presidents invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive
privilege because (a) between respondent Committees specific and
demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized interest in
confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former;
and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency,
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the
Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal
department.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
Presidents communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a
foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of
the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China.
Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while
official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view
with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions
subject of this Petition involves the Presidents dealings with a foreign
nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that
Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts
of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with
her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague
legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily
foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to
unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and
great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional
functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the
core of the Presidents decision-making process, which inevitably would
involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional
prescriptions regarding the right of the people to information and public
accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these
arguments to support respondent Committees case.
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent

Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the
peoples right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid
down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and
"neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong
to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner
Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any
individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate
legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.
CLINTON VS JONES
520 U.S. 681 (1997)
Murillo
DOCTRINE:
A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil
lawsuits based on the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public
actions as President.
FACTS: Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency
in 1992, and reelected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20,
2001. In 1991, he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent,
Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991, she lived in
Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission. Respondent filed a complaint containing four counts against
President Clinton, alleging that the petitioner made unwanted sexual
advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. She alleged
that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors
in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner filed motions asking the
district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity, and
to prohibit Jones from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument,
but held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer
president. Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his
presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency
and that were not related to official duties of the presidency?
HELD:
YES. The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during
his tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President. It was
an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit
until after the Presidents tenure. The District Courts decision to order a
stay was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account
whatsoever of the Respondents interest in bringing the suit to trial. It is
important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with
the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary
case-management principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with
private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based
requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid
significant interference with the Presidents ongoing discharge of his official
responsibilities. A sitting President of The United States does not have
immunity from civil lawsuits based on the Presidents private actions
unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against
the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is
concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal
branches of government. As Madison explained, separation of powers does
not mean that the branches "ought to have no partial agency in, or no
controul over the acts of each other." The fact that a federal court's
exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden
the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a
violation of the Constitution. Two long-settled propositions, first
announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion. First, it has
been long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has
the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Second, it
is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in
appropriate circumstances. In sum, "[i]t is settled law that the separationof-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the
President of the United States." If the Judiciary may severely burden the
Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official
conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself,
it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality
of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy
that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as
onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional
invalidation of his official actions.

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