Planters Products, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101503
Facts:
Planters Products (Planters) purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation of USA
of 9,000 metric tons of urea fertilizer which the latter shipped abroad the cargo vessel owned by
private respondent Kyosei Kisin Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from America to La Union. Prior to its
voyage, a time charter party was entered into between Mitusbishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK
as ship-owner. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedored hired by the shipper, the
steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids which remained closed during the entire journey.
Upon arrival of the vessel, the hatches were opened with the use of the vessel boom.
Planters unloaded the cargo from the holders into the steel bodied dump trucks. Each time the
dump trucks were filled up, its load of urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was transported
to the consignees warehouse located some (50) fifty meteres from the wharf. It took (11) eleven
days from planters to unload the cargo. The report submitted by private marine and cargo
surveyors revealed a shortage in the cargo, and some portion in the cargo was contaminated with
dirt, rendering the same unfit for commerce. Planters filed an action for damages bu the appellate
court absolved the carrier from liability.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent is a common carrier.
2. Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages.
Held:
1. The court rules the affirmative as to the respondent being a common carrier. The term
common carrier is defined in Article 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition refers to carriers
either by land, water, or air which holds themselves out as ready to engage in carrying
goods on transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and
not as a casual occupation; if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the
general business or corporation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, then
the person or corporation offering such services is a private carrier. In the case at bar
respondent carrier transports goods indiscriminately for all persons. Being such, he is a
common carrier.
2. The court rules the negative. True, being a common carrier, respondent must have
observed extraordinary diligence over the goods it carries. In the case at bar it has been
proven that the respondent has sufficiently overcome this, by clear and convincing proof,
the prima facie presumption of negligence, due to the manner of storage of the goals
during the vogyage. In fact, it was pointed out that there was a risk in shipping the urea
due to its character.

Fabre vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111127
Facts:
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used
the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the
bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it
being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The
road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and
sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on
its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road.
A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap,
several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.
Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly
liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a
common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered
to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?
Held:
Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.
The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners,
the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions
of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732,
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.

Pedro de Guzman v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-47822
Facts:
Herein respondent Ernesto Cendana was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap
metal in Pangasinan. Normally, after collection respondent would bring such material to Manila
for resale. He utilized (2) two six-wheelers trucks which he owned for the purpose. Upon returning
to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicle with cargo belonging to different merchants to different
establishments in Pangasisnan which respondents charged a freight fee for.
Sometime in November 1970, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and dealer
of General Milk Company Inc. in Pangasinan contracted with respondent for hauling 750 cartons
of milk. Unfortunately, only 150 cartons made it, as the other 600 cartons were intercepted by
hijackers along Marcos Highway. Hence, petitioners commenced an action against private
respondent.
In his defense, respondent argued that he cannot be held liable due to force majuere, and
that he is not a common carrier and hence is not required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent can be held liable for loss of the cartons of milk due to force
majeure.
2. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.
Held:
1. The court ruled the affirmative. The circumstances do not fall under the exemption from
liability as enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. The general rule is established by
the article that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration
of the goods which they carry, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disasters;
b. Act of the public enemy, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. Character of the goods or defects in the packing;
e. Order or act of competent public authority.
2. The court ruled the affirmative. Article 1732 of the New Civil Code avoids any distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids a distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation services on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such services on an occasional, episodic, and unscheduled basis.

First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125948
Facts:
Herein petitioner applied for a mayors permit to operate its pipeline concession. Before
such permit was issued, the City treasurer required petitioner to pay local tax. In order not to
hamper its operations, petitioner paid the tax under protest.
Then the petitioner filed a letter protest addressed to the treasurer claiming exemption
from payment of the tax because according to the Local Government Code of 1991, transportation
contractors are not included in the enumeration of contractors which are liable to pay taxes. The
city treasurer denied the protest. The petitioner filed a case before the trial court for tax refund,
however it was subsequently dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier as contemplated to be exempted under
the law.
Held:
The court rules the affirmative. The court enunciated the (4) tests in determining whether
the carrier is that of a common carrier:
a. must be engaged int eh business of carrying goods for other as a public employment
and must hold itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods generally as
a business and not a casual occupation
b. it must undertake to carry goods of the kind which its business is confined;
c. it must undertake the method by which his business is conducted and over its
established roads;
d. the transportation must be for hire.
In the case at bar, the court categorically ruled that the transporting of oil through pipelines
is still considered to be an activity of a common carrier. The petitioner is a common carrier
because it is engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods; like petroleum. It
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. The fact that the petitioner has limited clientele
does not exclude it from the definition of common carrier. Under the petroleum act of the
Philippines, the petitioner is considered a common carrier even if it is a pipeline concessionaire.
And even as regards the petroleum operation, it is of public utility. Specifically, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue considers petitioners as common carrier not subject to withholding tax.