Vicarious Liability 1

VICARIOUS LIABILITY (Art.
2180)
DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE
aka
A. PARENTS & GUARDIANS

G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

DELFIN
CAPUNO
and
DANTE
CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was
accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina
and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal
Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperina, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the
accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found
guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the
Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante
Capuno was only (15) years old when he
committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde
filed the present action against Delfin Capuno
and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages
in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the
death of her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants
set up the defense that if any one should be
held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he
is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former
was not under the control, supervision and
custody, of the latter. This defense was
sustained by the lower court and, as a
consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno
to pay the damages claimed in the complaint.
From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the case was certified to us on
the ground that the appeal only involves
questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member
of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student
of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in
a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March
31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr.
Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the
city school's supervisor. From the school
Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and
when the same started to run, he took hold of
the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on
his left side. They have not gone far when the
jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers,
Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperia, died as a
1 | Vicarious Liability
consequence. It further appears that Delfin

Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son
at the time of the accident, nor did he know
that his son was going to attend a parade. He
only came to know it when his son told him
after the accident that he attended the parade
upon instruction of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is
whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held
civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of
Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the
Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by
the
next
preceding
articles
is
enforceable not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of
persons
for
whom
another
is
responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children
who live with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and

trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin
Capuno is liable for the damages in question
jointly and severally with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of
the victim, he was a minor and was then living
with his father, and inasmuch as these facts
are not disputed, the civil liability of the father
is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower
court erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under
the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts
and trades and not to any academic
educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953,
Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p.
557). Here Dante capuno was then a student
of the Balintawak Elementary School and as

part of his extra-curricular activity, he
attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that
Dante boarded a jeep with some companions
and while driving it, the accident occurred. In
the circumstances, it is clear that neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's
supervisor, could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not
then a student of an institute of arts and
trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon
the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means",
while, on the other hand, gives them the "right
to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The
only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage(Article 1903,
last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This
defendants failed to prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of
P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in
their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL,
as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et
al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon
motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint
of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living

and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the
following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against
but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior
judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action
against defendant Marvin Hill, because
he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by
marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was
upon motion for reconsideration of
defendants of such denial, reiterating
above grounds that the following order
issued:
only
the
the
was
Considering
the
motion
for
reconsideration filed by the defendants
on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments
therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and wellfounded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December
8,
1964
is
hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal
of the above entitled case. SO
ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29,
1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants,
the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE
LOWER
COURT
ERRED
IN
DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY
AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111,
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES
OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS,
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN
HILL
BECAUSE
HE
WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son,
Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendantappellee
Reginald
Hill
was
prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically,
none of the parties has favored Us with a copy
of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's
decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this
case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages
barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil
liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs)
of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at
the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistenee from

already legally married?
his
father,
was
The first issue presents no more problem than

the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis
of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result
in civil liability not only under the Penal Code
but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the
opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it
shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have
been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in
the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action
with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate
and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate
individuality
of
a cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just

cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless
or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless
this
Court
awarded
damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73
Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases
already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines
that
have
been
little
understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate
to
indicate
their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in
articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons
and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in
the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will
not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown
development
as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which
is
conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in
a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of

criminal negligence which can not be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in
a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would
be
many
instances
of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of
the provisions of both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence
of
spheres
already
discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpa aquiliana, there has
grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code. Although this habitual
method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless
rendered
practically
useless
and
nugatory
the
more
expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such
practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may
no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one
might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplate only acts

of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the
thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so
limited, but that in fact it actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa,
not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the
Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of
Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by
law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter
II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasidelicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that
Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such fullgrown
development
as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the
said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear
that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes
acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to
said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The
foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while

the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal
negligence
and
"culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission,
p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem
to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from
crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court,
under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant
language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability

for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration
of
Garcia,
that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law. 4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of
Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the
effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage
on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that
the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is
already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of
the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It
shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber
real property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In
the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is
not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to

Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the
other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
sued without the assistance of the parents, is
that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the
duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article
2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-9734

JUAN
FAUSTA
March 31, 1915
BAHIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

LITONJUA, defendant-appellee,
SYLLABUS
1. MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGLIGENCE OF
SERVANT; PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE OF
EMPLOYER. Under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, if an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee the law presumes
that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee or in supervision over
him after the selection, or both.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REBUTTAL. Such presumption

is not a conclusive presumption, but is a
rebuttable one; and if the master or employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
3. ID; SUPERVISION BY EMPLOYEE.

Supervision includes, in proper cases, the
making and promulgation by the employer of
suitable rules and regulations and the issuance
of suitable instructions for the information and
guidance of his employees, designed for the
protection of persons with whom the employer
has relations through his employees.
4. ID.; RELATION OF PARTIES. A person
engaging temporarily an automobile, with a
driver and mechanic, for the carrying of
passengers for hire, who obtains the machine,
driver and mechanic from a reputable garage,
selecting a machine at the time in apparent
good condition and a driver and mechanic of
experience and reputation and duly licensed
under the law, is not liable for the death of a
child who was struck by the automobile, it
appearing that the accident was caused by a
defect in the steering gear, neither the
employer nor his employees having notice,
either actual or constructive, of such defect.
DECISION
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant Leynes
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila against him for the sum of P1,000,
with costs; and by the plaintiff from Fausta
Litonjua.
This is an action to recover damages from the
defendants for the death of plaintiff's daughter
alleged to have been caused by the negligence
of
defendant's
servant
in
driving
an
automobile over the child and causing her
death.
It appears from the evidence that one Ramon
Ramirez was the owner and manager of a
garage in the city of Manila known as the
International
Garage.
His
mother,
the
defendant Fausta Litonjua, sometime before
the accident from which this action springs,
purchased an automobile and turned it over to
the garage to assist her son in the business in

which he was engaged. On the 14th of May,
1911, Ramirez rented the automobile so
purchased and donated by his mother to the
defendant Mariano Leynes, together with a
chauffeur and a machinist, to be used by him
for a short time between Balayan and Tuy,
Province of Batangas, to carry persons living in
Balayan to and from the fiesta which was
about to take place in Tuy. According to the
arrangement between them, Ramires was to
furnish the automobile, chauffeur, and
machinist, and the defendant Leynes was to
pay him therefor P20 a day.
On the 16th of May, 1911, while passing from
Balayan to Tuy, the automobile, by reason of a
defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the
direction of the driver in turning a corner in the
streets of Balayan, and, as a consequence, ran
across the street and into the wall of a house
against which the daughter of plaintiff was
leaning at the time. The font of the machine
struck the child in the center of the body and
crushed her to death.
The action was brought against the mother of
Ramirez, who bought the automobile, and
Leynes, under whose direction and control the
automobile was being operated at the time of
the accident. Ramirez was not made a party.
The plaintiff and the defendant Leynes
appealed from the judgment, the former on
the ground that the court erred in dismissing
the action as to the mother of Ramirez and the
latter from that portion of the judgment
requiring him to pay to plaintiff P1,000.
We are of the opinion that the action was
properly dismissed as to Fuasta Litonjua. It is a
fact proved in the action and undisputed that,
although
the
mother
purchased
the
automobile, she turned it over to the garage of
her son for use therein. The establishment
belonged to the son, Ramon Ramirez, and he
had the full management and control of it and
received all the profits therefrom. So far as
appears, the contract with Leynes was made
without her knowledge or consent by Ramirez
as the owner and manager of the International
Garage. While she may have been in one
sense the owner of the machine, that fact does
not, under the other facts of the case, make
her responsible for the results of the accident.
We are of the opinion that the judgment
against Leynes must be reversed and the
complaint dismissed as to him. While it may be
said that, at the time of the accident, the
chauffeur who was driving the machine was a
servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits

derived from the trips of the automobile
belonged to him and the automobile was
operated under his direction, nevertheless, this
fact is not conclusive in making him
responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur
or for defects in the automobile itself. Article
1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes
liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when that liability shall cease. It says:
The liability referred to in this article
shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damages.
From this article two things are apparent: (1)
That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of a law that
there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employees
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the
master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarly of the Spanish law negligence. It is,
of course, in striking contrast to the American
doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant is conclusively the
negligence of the master.
In the case before us the death of the child
caused by a defect in the steering gear of the
automobile
immediately
raised
the
presumption that Leynes was negligent in
selecting a defective automobile or in his
failure to maintain it in good condition after
selection, and the burden of proof was on him
to show that he had exercised the care of a
good father of a family. As to selection, the
defendant has clearly shown that he exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. He obtained the machine from a
reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen
were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their
particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a

few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant
had no notice, either actual or constructive, of
the defective condition of the steering gear.
From the commencement of the use of the
machine until the accident occurred sufficient
time had not elapsed to require an
examination of the machine by the defendant
as a part of his duty of inspection and
supervision. While it does not appear that the
defendant formulated rules and regulations for
the guidance of the drivers and gave them
proper instructions, designed for the protection
of the public and the passengers, the evidence
shows, as we have seen, that the death of the
child was not caused by a failure to
promulgate rules and regulations. It was
caused by a defect in the machine as to which
the defendant has shown himself free from
responsibility.
The defendant Leynes having shown to the
satisfaction of the court that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family
is relieved of responsibility with respect to the
death of plaintiff's child.
The judgment, in so far as it dismisses the
complaint against Fausta Litonjua, is affirmed
with costs, and, in so far as to finds against
Mariano Leynes, is reversed and the complaint
as to his dismissed, without special finding as
to costs in this instance. So ordered.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO
and
AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON.
ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by
petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic

incident. In addition to this case for damages,
a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case
No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground
that he bad acted without discernment.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a

petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning
the
trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987
and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June
1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their
right to appeal.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981,

the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on,
18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto
had shot and killed Jennifer.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners

once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the
action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of
this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1)
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court
may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out
of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of
adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so
as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed
by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,

Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result
of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed
that not they, but rather the adopting parents,
namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura,
were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed
petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action. Petitioners
received a copy of the trial court's Decision on
7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to
comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned
at least three (3) days before the hearing of
said motion; and that said notice shall state
the time and place of hearing both motions
were denied by the trial court in an Order
dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order
dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed
the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the
notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion

(and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed before the trial court, not having complied
with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41,
and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of
Court, were considered pro forma and hence
did
not
interrupt
and
suspend
the
reglementary period to appeal: the trial court
held that the motions, not having contained a
notice of time and place of hearing, had
become useless pieces of paper which did not
interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is
mandatory is the service of the motion on the
opposing counsel indicating the time and place
of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue
raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court,
invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice,
elects to treat the notice of appeal as having
been seasonably filed before the trial court,
and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial
court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held
in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical

grounds is frowned upon where the
policy of the courts is to encourage
hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied
in a very rigid technical sense, rules of
procedure are used only to help secure
not override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's
voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action
on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil
liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor
child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
(Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of
what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or
the
doctrine
of
"imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law,
where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a
10 | V i c a r i o u s L i a b i l i t y
certain relationship and for whom he is

responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents their parental
authority which includes the instructing,
controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The
basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was
explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With
respect
to
extra-contractual
obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected to
limit such liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to
extend that liability, without regard to
the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence
of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal
fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control
over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability with
certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may
consist in having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of persons
who, by reasons of their status, occupy
a position of dependency with respect
to the person made liable for their
conduct. 7(Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents
for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based
upon the parental authority vested by
the Civil Code upon such parents. The
civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the
parents
were
negligent
in
the
performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who
is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored
upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction
is, of course, only presumed and the

presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the
prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus
follow that the natural parents who had then
actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however,
stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting
parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto
had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc
spouses contend that they were therefore free
of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's
allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which
reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after
considering
the
report
of
the
Department of Social Welfare or duly
licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the
court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall
be effective he date the original petition
was filed. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is thenceforth
to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the
above Article 36 should be read in relation to
Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect
adoption shall:
of
Adoption.
xxx xxx xxx
The
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the

natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be
deemed to have been dissolved as of the time
the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted,
under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and
the minor child living with them and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians
are responsible for the damage caused
by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious
act, shall have beer in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or
omissions of
their unemancipated
children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the
air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider
that retroactive effect may be giver to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that

parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016

is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is
REMANDED
to
that
court
for
further
proceedings consistent with this Decision.
Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses.
This Decision is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code

fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article
35 provides as follows:
1.
CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are
and should be held primarily liable for the civil
liability
arising
from
criminal
offenses
committed by their minor children under their
legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary
liability is premised on the provisions of Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment;
and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Under
said
Article
2180,
the
enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
upon the mother or, in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability
may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative
or family friend of the youthful offender.
However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents
and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the
same rules shall apply in accordance with
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for

adoption shall be finally granted unless
and until the adopting parents are given
by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess
their
adjustment
and
emotional
readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody,
parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority
is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before
the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either
had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting;
in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was
then with his natural parents, not the adopting
parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent
Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI,
Petitioners,
v.
HON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and
SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so

modified.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been
said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone
of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still
in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for
those whose lives they have touched. While we
cannot
expect
to
award
complete
assuagement to their families through
seemingly
prosaic
legal
verbiage,
this
disposition should at least terminate the
acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial
contest resulting from the unfortunate
occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial
recourse the stages whereof were alternately
initiated by the parties, petitioners are now
before us seeking the reversal of the judgment
of respondent court promulgated on January 2,
1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the
following decretal portion:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court
dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following
amounts:
1.
Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2.
Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3.
Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees

counterclaims is affirmed."
Synthesized from the findings of the lower
courts, it appears that respondent spouses are
the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on
January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between
18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid
parents, and who also died in the same event
on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their
deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until December, 1978 when
Julie Ann broke up her relationship with

Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and
second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her
refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie
Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina
and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell
died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner
of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account
of the circumstances surrounding the death of
both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their
respective
theories
drawn
from
their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence,
available reports, documents and evidence of
physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death
of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected
the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must
have caused Wendells death and then shot
Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby
avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie
Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latters vicarious liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court
below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered,

judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise
denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment
of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and
another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in
the present appeal by certiorari, now submit
for resolution the following issues in this case:
1.
Whether or not respondent court
correctly reversed the trial court in accordance
with established decisional laws; and
2.
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil
Code was correctly interpreted by respondent
court to make petitioners lable for vicarious
liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr.
Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of
Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on
some postulates for determining whether or
not the gunshot wound was inflicted on
Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However,
undue emphasis was placed by the lower court
on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing
around the wound at the point of entry of the
bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that
this is not the only circumstance to be taken
into account in the determination of whether it
was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he
found no evidence of contact or close-contact
of an explosive discharge in the entrance
wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell
Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof
a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself
could not categorically state that the body of
Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral
parlor before he was able to conduct his
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna
was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of
gunpowder residue on Wendells hands was
forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he
conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell
Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or,
to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20)
minutes based on the record of death; that

when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, the body of the deceased was already
on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor
mortis; and that said body was not washed,
but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect
examination, he admitted that during the 8hour interval, he never saw the body nor did
he see whether said body was wiped or
washed in the area of the wound on the head
which he examined because the deceased was
inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on crossexamination, he had earlier admitted that as
far as the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound are concerned, it is possible that
Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun
was not pressed on the head of the victim and
that he found no burning or singeing of the
hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot
wound of entrance which are general
characteristics of contact or near-contact fire.
On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless
made these clarification:
"Q
Is it not a fact that there are certain
guns which are so made that there would be
no black residue or tattooing that could result
from these guns because they are what we call
clean?
A
Yes, sir. I know that there are what we
call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ: Q
Yes. So, in cases, therefore,
of guns where the powder is smokeless, those
indications that you said may not rule out the
possibility that the gun was closer than 24
inches, is that correct?
A
If the . . . assuming that the gun used
was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q
At any rate, doctor, from . . .
disregarding those other matters that you
have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the
trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet
as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact
that the gun could have been fired by the
person himself, the victim himself, Wendell
Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little
above the right ear and point of exit a little
above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A
As far as the point of entrance is
concerned and as far as the trajectory of the
bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or
the manner of fire is concerned, it could have
been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two
used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime,
each of which were the bullets that hit Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively.

Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal
Division
of
the
National
Bureau
of
Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one
gunshot wound of entrance located at the right
temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report
prepared by Dr. Cerna states:
x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4

cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by
0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward,
located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external
auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft
tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial
cavity, lacerating extensively along its course
the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left,
and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular,
2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal
region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms.
above left external auditory meatus.
x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such

as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging,
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or
separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated
his theory which was made of record, thus:jgc:
"Q
Now, will you please use yourself as
Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit
of the wound, and measuring yourself 24
inches, will you please indicate to the
Honorable Court how would it have been
possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will
you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:
A
Actually,
sir,
the
24
inches
is
approximately one arms length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness
has demonstrated by extending his right arm
almost straight towards his head."
Private respondents assail the fact that the
trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an
apartment across the street from the Gotiongs
and the second, a resident of the house

adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who
declared having seen a "shadow" of a person
at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing
shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that
the apartment where she was staying faces
the gas station; that it is the second
apartment; that from her window she can see
directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that
there is a firewall between her apartment and
the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump
from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of
the Tans, she called the police station but the
telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked
with James Enrique Tan and told him that she
saw a man leap from the gate towards his
rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he
saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with
anyone regarding what he saw. He explained
that he lives in a duplex house with a garden
in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe
Gotiongs house; and he further gave the
following
answers
to
these
questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q
What is the height of the wall of the
Gotiongs in relation to your house?
WITNESS:
A
It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q
And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:
A
From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q
From Your living room window, is that
correct?
WITNESS:
A
Yes, but not very clear because the wall
is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree
with respondent court that the same do not
inspire credence as to the reliability and
accuracy of the witnesses observations, since
the visual perceptions of both were obstructed
by high walls in their respective houses in
relation to the house of herein private
respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested
without contradiction that he and his sister,
Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann
Gotiong when they heard her scream; that
when Manolo climbed the fence to see what
was going on inside the Gotiong house, he

heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5)
seconds later, he heard another shot.
Consequently, he went down from the fence
and drove to the police station to report the
incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid
testimony establishes and explains the fact
that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at
the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete
and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It
is significant that the Libi family did not even
point to or present any suspect in the crime
nor did they file any case against any alleged
"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts
dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by
his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence testimonial, documentary and
pictorial the confluence of which point to
Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his
motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent
pleas
for
a
reconciliation.
Petitioners defense that they had exercised
the due diligence of a good father of a family,
hence they should not be civilly liable for the
crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell,
testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of
these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her
bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking
or using the gun. She admitted, however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in
the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly,
cannot but entertain serious doubts that
petitioner spouses had really been exercising
the diligence of a good father of a family by
safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell
could not have gotten hold thereof unless one
of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free
access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a
required by law in a parent and
relationship consists, to a large extent,
instruction and supervision of the
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their
family
child
of the
child.
duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the

activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the
time of Wendells death that they allegedly
discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencios gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting
in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in
dangerous work such as being drug informers,
17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie
Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright
what clearly appears as a revolver and on how
or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a
quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion,
respondent
court
waved
aside
the
protestations of diligence on the part of
petitioners and had this to say:
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the
activity of their children who may be engaged
in this dangerous activity involving the menace
of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been
diligent in supervising the activities of their
son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell
from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which provides:
The father, and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who
live in their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing
Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit
box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the
criminal act of said minor who was living in
their company. This vicarious liability of herein
defendants-appellees has been reiterated by
the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent
of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al.
(L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367),
which held that:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and

criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from
the criminal acts of their minor children who
acted with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and
under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code,
because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and
not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by
his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. (3
SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein
defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow
got hold of the key to the drawer where said
gun was kept under lock without defendantspouses ever knowing that said gun had been
missing from that safety box since 1978 when
Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he
proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this
picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong;
also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have
kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his
supposed role of a CANU agent . . ."
x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the

assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower
court was not correct in dismissing herein
plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as
preponderantly
shown
by
evidence,
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise
all the diligence of a good father of the family
in preventing their minor son from committing
this crime by means of the gun of defendantsappellees which was freely accessible to
Wendell Libi for they have not regularly
checked whether said gun was still under lock,
but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been
committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent
court that petitioners should be held liable for
the civil liability based on what appears from
all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son. We take this opportunity, however,
to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor
on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require
clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called

vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent
court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which
supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability
of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed
by an extended quotation ostensibly from the
same case explaining why under Article 2180
of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor
children. The quoted passages are set out two
paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring
for purposes of the discussion hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the
doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but
the categorization of their liability as being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires
a hard second look considering previous
decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern
stems from our readings that if the liability of
the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their
minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil
liability on the defense that they acted with
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages. On the other hand, if such
liability imputed to the parents is considered
direct and primary, that diligence would
constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for
quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in
this case the minor and the father and, in case
of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence
the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
prevent damages."
We are also persuaded that the liability of the
parents for felonies committed by their minor
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ARTICLE 101.
Rules
liability in certain cases.
x
regarding
civil
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of

Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by
one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under
their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision
the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise
direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their
part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the
parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in
both codes that the minor transgressor shall
be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability
ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the
Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil
liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
"Should there be no person having such . . .
minor under his authority, legal guardianship
or control, or if such person be insolvent, said .
. . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with civil law."
The civil liability of parents for felonies
committed
by
their
minor
children
contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from
the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject
of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court,
viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v.
Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24
Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and
Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically,
the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue

of the civil liability of parents for crimes
committed by their minor children over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of
aye or over, since these situations are not
covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In
both instances, this Court held that the issue
of parental civil liability should be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2180
of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the
civil liability under Article 2180 would apply
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal
offenses would result in the absurdity that in
an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is
caused with criminal intent. In said cases,
however, there are unfortunate variances
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the
Courts determination of whether the liability
of the parents, in cases involving either crimes
or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is
primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was
convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising
from the crime the minor and his father were
held jointly and severally liable for failure of
the latter to prove the diligence of a good
father of a family. The same liability in solidum
and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in
a separate civil action in Araneta on the
parents and their 14-year old son who was
found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the
authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less
than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180
but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, as already
explained, the petitioners herein were also
held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas
which purportedly declared the parents
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for
serious physical injuries committed by their
13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan,
the mother and her 19-year old son were
adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising
from his conviction for homicide by the
application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101

of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano,
although the son was acquitted in a homicide
charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with
mistake," it was ruled that while under Article
2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary
liability for damages, since the son, "although
married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of
equity" the father was only held subsidiarily
liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised
Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only
for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers,
persons and corporations engaged in industry;
29 and principals, accomplices and accessories
for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused
in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts
reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present
case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the
parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that
what respondent court quoted verbatim in its
decision now on appeal in the present case,
and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the
syllabus on the law report of said case which
spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in
the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after
reviewing therein the cases of Exconde,
Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said
cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this
Court concluded its decision in this wise:
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the
Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
submitted
therein
by
both
parties,
independent of the criminal case. And
responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action
was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault or
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177),
and having in mind the reasons behind the law
as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minors criminal responsibility is of no
moment."
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore,

we hereby rule that the parents are and should
be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority
or control, or who live in their company, unless
it is proven that the former acted with the
prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment;
and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of
such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother. This was amplified by the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian, but the liability may also
be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender. 32 However,
under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who
exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from
quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
rules shall apply in accordance with Articles
2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so
modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the
hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell
Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioners
liable
for
damages
arising
therefrom.
Subject
to
the
preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
findings that said petitioners failed to duly
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED
and the assailed judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs

against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
B.
OWNERS
&
ESTABLISHMENTS
MANAGERS
of
G.R. No. L-12191
October 14, 1918
JOSE
CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise
to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was
in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk, with a
monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's office in the city of Manila where he
worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company's trains free of charge. Upon the
occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making, his
exit through the door, took his position upon
the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers
alight at the San Mateo station there is a
cement platform which begins to rise with a
moderate gradient some distance away from
the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to
cover the length of several coaches. As the
train slowed down another passenger, named
Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely
at the point where the platform begins to rise
from the level of the ground. When the train
had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose
Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car,
where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved forward
possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock

on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where
the accident occurred were difficult to discern
especially to a person emerging from a lighted
car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of
melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is found in the fact that it was the
customary season for harvesting these melons
and a large lot had been brought to the station
for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been
piled on the platform in a row one upon
another. The testimony shows that this row of
sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the
plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His
statement that he failed to see these objects in
the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in
an unconscious condition, and it appeared that
the injuries which he had received were very
serious. He was therefore brought at once to a
certain hospital in the city of Manila where an
examination was made and his arm was
amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then
carried to another hospital where a second
operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff
expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover damages of the
defendant company, founding his action upon
the negligence of the servants and employees
of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains.
At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his
Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that,
although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks
of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to
use due caution in alighting from the coach

and was therefore precluded form recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of
the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this

court was made to rest squarely upon the
proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code
is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.
It can not be doubted that the employees of

the railroad company were guilty of negligence
in piling these sacks on the platform in the
manner above stated; that their presence
caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from
the train; and that they therefore constituted
an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows
that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. In resolving this problem it is
necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of
the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.
Upon this point the Court said:
It is important to note that the foundation of

the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant
to exercise due care in its performance. That is
to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from
that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article
1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted
by proof of the exercise of due care in their
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the
Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extracontractual obligations or to use the
technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries
upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code,
clearly points out this distinction, which was
also recognized by this Court in its decision in
the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the
difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not
formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the
performance
of
an
obligation
already
existing . . . ."
The acts to which these articles [1902

and 1903 of the Civil Code] are
applicable are understood to be those
not growing out of pre-existing duties of
the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract
or quasi-contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to article 1101,
1103, and 1104 of the same code.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.,
7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance.
The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is,
in certain cases imposed upon employers with
respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are not bound by contract, is not
based, as in the English Common Law, upon
the principle of respondeat superior if it
were, the master would be liable in every case
and unconditionally but upon the principle
announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their
fault or negligence, do injury to another, the
obligation of making good the damage caused.
One who places a powerful automobile in the
hands of a servant whom he knows to be
ignorant of the method of managing such a
vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of
negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences
of
his
imprudence.
The
obligation to make good the damage arises at
the very instant that the unskillful servant,
while acting within the scope of his
employment causes the injury. The liability of
the master is personal and direct. But, if the
master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person
injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence
and care in the selection and control of the
servant relieves the master from liability for
the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof
shows that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the

liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage
to another. A master who exercises all possible
care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should
possess for the discharge of the duties which it
is his purpose to confide to them, and directs
them with equal diligence, thereby performs
his duty to third persons to whom he is bound
by no contractual ties, and he incurs no
liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within the
scope of their employment, such third person
suffer damage. True it is that under article
1903 of the Civil Code the law creates
a presumption that he has been negligent in
the selection or direction of his servant, but
the presumption is rebuttable and yield to
proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in
interpreting identical provisions, as found in
the Porto Rico Code, has held that these
articles are applicable to cases of extracontractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports,
215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this
Court in its decision in the case of
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep.,
624), which was an action brought upon the
theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused
by the carelessness of his employee while
acting within the scope of his employment.
The Court, after citing the last paragraph of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are
apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved from

liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of
the
master
ultimately
on
his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of
negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that,
in
relations
with
strangers,
the
negligence of the servant in conclusively
the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to
the
effect
that
in
case
of
extracontractual culpa based upon negligence, it is
necessary that there shall have been some
fault attributable to the defendant personally,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903
merely establishes a rebuttable presumption,
is in complete accord with the authoritative
opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611)
that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties
inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called
upon to repair the damage and the one who,
by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and
employers for the negligent acts or omissions
of their servants or agents, when such acts or
omissions cause damages which amount to the
breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in
their selection or control, and proof of exercise
of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his liability for
the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be
extra-contractual
or
contractual.
Extracontractual obligation has its source in the
breach or omission of those mutual duties
which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations,
other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the
concept of status. The legal rights of each
member of society constitute the measure of
the corresponding legal duties, mainly
negative in character, which the existence of
those rights imposes upon all other members
of society. The breach of these general duties
whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to
an obligation to indemnify the injured party.
The
fundamental
distinction
between
obligations of this character and those which
arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in

cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual
relations
the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary
duty assumed by the parties when entering
into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation
arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to
elect and our Legislature has so elected
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of
public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of
those person who acts or mission are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are
in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit
extra-contractual liability with certain welldefined exceptions to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the
persons
to
be
charged.
This
moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control
of one's agents or servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reason of their status, occupy
a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person
who has undertaken by contract to render
service to another, is wholly different from that
to which article 1903 relates. When the
sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's
cause of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rests upon
plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does
not his action fails. But when the facts averred
show a contractual undertaking by defendant
for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the
contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
specify in his pleadings whether the breach of
the contract is due to willful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract
and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima
facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in
case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing
creditor should assume the burden of
proof of its existence, as the only fact
upon which his action is based; while on
the contrary, in a case of negligence
which presupposes the existence of a

contractual obligation, if the creditor
shows that it exists and that it has been
broken, it is not necessary for him to
prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an
action for the breach of a contract to show that
the breach was due to the negligent conduct of
defendant or of his servants, even though such
be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is
obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his servants
or agents caused the breach of the contract
would not constitute a defense to the action. If
the negligence of servants or agents could be
invoked as a means of discharging the liability
arising from contract, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the
medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would be in a
better position than those acting in person. If
one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker
who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a
personal negligent act causes its destruction,
he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical
to free him from his liability for the breach of
his contract, which involves the duty to
exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant
whose negligence caused the injury? If such a
theory could be accepted, juridical persons
would enjoy practically complete immunity
from damages arising from the breach of their
contracts if caused by negligent acts as such
juridical persons can of necessity only act
through agents or servants, and it would no
doubt be true in most instances that
reasonable care had been taken in selection
and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as
collateral, and they are lost by reason of the
negligence of some clerk employed by the
bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit
the bank to relieve itself of liability for the
breach of its contract to return the collateral
upon the payment of the debt by proving that
due care had been exercised in the selection
and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as
the source of
an
obligation,
and culpa
contractual as a mere incident to the
performance of a contract has frequently been
recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20,
1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the
decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared
that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but
that defendant sought to avail himself of the

provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a
defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected
defendant's contention, saying:
These
are
not
cases
of
injury
caused, without
any
pre-existing
obligation, by fault or negligence, such
as those to which article 1902 of the
Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to
carry out the undertakings imposed by
the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this
court involving the liability of employers for
damage done by the negligent acts of their
servants will show that in no case has the
court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to
constitute a defense to an action for damages
for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep.,
663), the court held that the owner of a
carriage was not liable for the damages caused
by the negligence of his driver. In that case the
court commented on the fact that no evidence
had been adduced in the trial court that the
defendant had been negligent in the
employment of the driver, or that he had any
knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's
Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil.
Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for
damages caused by the loss of a barge
belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get
adrift by the negligence of defendant's
servants in the course of the performance of a
contract of towage. The court held, citing
Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the
"obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . .
we do not think that the provisions of articles
1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27
Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover damages for the personal injuries
caused by the negligence of defendant's
chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile
in which defendant was riding at the time. The
court found that the damages were caused by
the negligence of the driver of the automobile,
but held that the master was not liable,
although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the

driver are continued for a length of time
as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to
direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . .
The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner
for such length of time that the owner
by his acquiescence, makes the driver's
acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co.
and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil.
Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its
conclusion as to the liability of the defendant
upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed
that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising
out of the contract of transportation. The
express ground of the decision in this case was
that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of
a master for the negligent acts of his servants
"makes the distinction between private
individuals and public enterprise;" that as to
the latter the law creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence in the selection or
direction of servants; and that in the particular
case the presumption of negligence had not
been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision
Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's
action as though founded in tort rather than as
based upon the breach of the contract of
carriage, and an examination of the pleadings
and of the briefs shows that the questions of
law were in fact discussed upon this theory.
Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant
the practical result must have been the same
in any event. The proof disclosed beyond
doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly
negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also
affirmatively appeared that defendant had
been guilty of negligence in its failure to
exercise proper discretion in the direction of
the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable
for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the
breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa
contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp.
29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an
incident in the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or its itself the source
of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation,
its essential characteristics are identical. There
is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on
the part of the defendant. Consequently, when
the court holds that a defendant is liable in
damages for having failed to exercise due

care, either directly, or in failing to exercise
proper care in the selection and direction of his
servants, the practical result is identical in
either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not
to be inferred, because the court held in the
Yamada case that defendant was liable for the
damages negligently caused by its servants to
a person to whom it was bound by contract,
and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and
control of its servants, that in such a case the
court would have held that it would have been
a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it
did in fact exercise care in the selection and
control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be
found by directing the attention to the relative
spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual
obligation is much more broader than that of
contractual obligations, comprising, as it does,
the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability
to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff
carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains (civil code,
article 1258). That duty, being contractual,
was direct and immediate, and its nonperformance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of
its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had
come to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon

defendant's
negligence
and
plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury,
the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant
was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited
until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred. Defendant contends,
and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a
passenger to alight from a moving train. We
are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine
in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that
this proposition is too badly stated and is at
variance with the experience of every-day life.
In this particular instance, that the train was
barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop
within six meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day
of the year, and sustain no injury where the
company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to
believe that plaintiff would have suffered any
injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not
been for defendant's negligent failure to
perform its duty to provide a safe alighting
place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine
relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec.
3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether
the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from
a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered
whether
an
ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and
condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances
disclosed
by
the
evidence. This care has been defined to
be, not the care which may or should be
used by the prudent man generally, but
the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar
circumstances,
to
avoid
injury."
(Thompson,
Commentaries
on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of
exposition
used
by
this
court
in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in

the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which
would have admonished a person of average
prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so,
the plaintiff should have desisted from
alighting; and his failure so to desist was
contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the
only fact from which a conclusion can be
drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off
the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the
train was yet slowly moving. In considering the
situation thus presented, it should not be
overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which
was caused by the sacks of melons piled on
the platform existed; and as the defendant was
bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier
to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right
to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that
the platform was clear. The place, as we have
already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and
this also is proof of a failure upon the part of
the defendant in the performance of a duty
owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile
these sacks in the path of alighting
passengers, the placing of them adequately so
that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be
noted:
The
company's
platform
was
constructed upon a level higher than that of
the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The
distance from the steps of the car to the spot
where the alighting passenger would place his
feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off.
The nature of the platform, constructed as it
was of cement material, also assured to the
passenger a stable and even surface on which
to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for
him to get off while the train was yet moving
as the same act would have been in an aged
or feeble person. In determining the question
of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety

of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general
rule are less capable than men of alighting
with safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the
free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on
and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the
time of the accident, was earning P25 a month
as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has
not shown that any other gainful occupation is
open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the
opinion that a fair compensation for the
damage suffered by him for his permanent
disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is
also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical
attention, hospital
services,
and other
incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and
judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the
sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and
FELIX
PANGALANGAN, plaintiffsappellants, vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS,
INC.,
ARCHIMEDES
J.
BALINGIT
and
FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
SYNOPSIS
As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint
for damages based on culpa-aquitiana was
filed against the Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., Fernando Pineda, and Balingit as manager
of the company. The trial court dismissed the
complaint against Balingit on the ground that

he is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
making owners and managers of an
establishment responsible for damages caused
by their employees, since Balingit himself may
be regarded as an employee of the PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc. On appeal, plaintiffs
urged that the veil of corporate fiction should
be pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc.
being merely a business conduit of Balingit,
since he and his wife are the controlling
stockholders. The Supreme Court held that this
issue cannot be entertained on appeal,
because it was not raised in the lower court.
Order of dismissal affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1.
QUASI-DELICT;
EMPLOYER
AND
EMPLOYEES; "EMPLOYER" AND "OWNER AND
MANAGER
OF
ESTABLISHMENT
OF
ENTERPRISE" DO NOT INCLUDE MANAGER OF
CORPORATION. The terms "employer" and
"owner and manager of establishment or
enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code do not include the manager of a
corporation owning a truck the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage
arose.
2.
WORDS AND PHRASES; "MANAGER"
UNDER SEC. 2180 OF CIVIL CODE USED IN THE
SENSE OF "EMPLOYER." Under Article 2180
the term "manager" is used in the sense of
"employer" and does not embrace a
"manager" who may himself be regarded as an
employee or dependiente of his employer.
3.
APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE
LOWER COURT CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED ON
APPEAL. A new factual issue injected in the
brief which was not alleged in the complaint or
raised in the trial court cannot be entertained
on appeal. An appeal has to be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court,
and appellants can ventilate on appeal only
those legal issues raised in the lower court and
those within the issues framed by the parties.
4.
ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF THEORY; PARTYLITIGANT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CHANGE
THEORY OF CASE ON APPEAL. When a party
deliberately adopts a certain theory and the
case is decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal because that would be unfair

to the adverse party.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix
Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of
law from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint
against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that
Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in
an action based on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, is not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in article 2180 of
the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus
company and Pangalangan against PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda,
it was alleged that on November 24, 1962,
Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
The truck bumped the bus driven by
Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the
bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged and could not be used
for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the
defendants in their answer was that Balingit
was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him
be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him. As already stated, the
lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit.
The bus company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed

by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed
article 2176 is demandable not only
one's own acts or omissions, but also
those of persons for whom one
responsible.
by
for
for
is
xxx xxx xxx

The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
article shall cease when the persons
father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in
this appeal is whether the terms "employers"
and
"owners
and
managers
of
an
establishment or enterprise" (dueos o
directores de un establicimiento o empresa)
used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly
article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted
in the vehicular accident from which the
damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not
include the manager of a corporation. It may
be gathered from the context of article 2180
that the term "manager" ("director" in the
Spanish version) is used in the sense of
"employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint,
no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., in connection with
the vehicular accident already mentioned
because he himself may be regarded as

an employee or dependiente of his employer,
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los
efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria
establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903,
el director de un periodico explotado por una
sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su
jerarquia y aunque Ileve la direccion de
determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso
deja de estar subordinado a la superior
autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of Spanish
Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited
in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol 5th Ed.
662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their
appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue
which was not alleged in their complaint. They
argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is
merely a business conduit of Balingit because
out of its capital stock with a par value of
P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed
P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators,
namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas
and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25,
respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of
corporate fiction should be pierced and that
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and
his wife should be treated as one and the same
civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this
appeal. It was not raised in the lower court.
The case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
has a personality separate and distinct from
that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants
can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was
raised in the lower court and which is within
the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule
46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain
theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal
because, to permit him to do so, could be
unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p.
505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of

dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the
plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED.
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine

("AMEC") and its administrators. Claiming that
the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Angelita Ago ("Ago"), as Dean of AMECs
College of Medicine, filed a complaint for
damages7 against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27
February 1990. Quoted are portions of the
allegedly libelous broadcasts:
JUN ALEGRE:
G.R. No. 141994
January 17, 2005
FILIPINAS
BROADCASTING
NETWORK,
INC., petitioner, vs. AGO MEDICAL AND
EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and
ANGELITA F. AGO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 4 January
1999 Decision2 and 26 January 2000 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
40151. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification
the
14
December
1992
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi
City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The
Court of Appeals held Filipinas Broadcasting
Network,
Inc.
and
its
broadcasters
Hermogenes Alegre and Carmelo Rima liable
for libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago
Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian
College of Medicine moral damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit.
The Antecedents
"Expos" is a radio documentary 4 program
hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima ("Rima") and
Hermogenes Jun Alegre ("Alegre"). 5 Expos is
aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is
owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc.
("FBNI"). "Expos" is heard over Legazpi City,
the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. 6
In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989,
Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged
complaints from students, teachers and
parents against Ago Medical and Educational
Let us begin with the less burdensome: if you

have children taking medical course at
AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all
subjects because if they fail in any
subject they will repeat their year level,
taking up all subjects including those
they have passed already. Several students
had approached me stating that they had
consulted with the DECS which told them that
there is no such regulation. If [there] is no such
regulation why is AMEC doing the same?
xxx
Second: Earlier AMEC students in Physical
Therapy had complained that the course
is not recognized by DECS. xxx
Third: Students are required to take and
pay for the subject even if the subject
does not have an instructor - such greed
for money on the part of AMECs
administration. Take the subject Anatomy:
students would pay for the subject upon
enrolment because it is offered by the school.
However there would be no instructor for such
subject. Students would be informed that
course would be moved to a later date
because the school is still searching for the
appropriate instructor.
xxx
It is a public knowledge that the Ago Medical
and Educational Center has survived and has
been surviving for the past few years since its
inception because of funds support from
foreign foundations. If you will take a look at
the AMEC premises youll find out that the
names of the buildings there are foreign
soundings. There is a McDonald Hall. Why not
Jose Rizal or Bonifacio Hall? That is a very
concrete and undeniable evidence that the
support of foreign foundations for AMEC is
substantial, isnt it? With the report which is
the basis of the expose in DZRC today, it would
be very easy for detractors and enemies of the
Ago family to stop the flow of support of
foreign foundations who assist the medical

school on the basis of the latters purpose. But
if the purpose of the institution (AMEC) is to
deceive students at cross purpose with its
reason for being it is possible for these foreign
foundations to lift or suspend their donations
temporarily.8
scholarship committee at that. The reason is

practical cost saving in salaries, because an
old person is not fastidious, so long as she has
money to buy the ingredient of beetle juice.
The elderly can get by thats why she (Lola)
was taken in as Dean.
xxx
xxx
On the other hand, the administrators of
AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School
and
the
AMEC-Institute
of
Mass
Communication in their effort to minimize
expenses in terms of salary are absorbing
or continues to accept "rejects". For
example how many teachers in AMEC are
former teachers of Aquinas University but were
removed because of immorality? Does it mean
that the present administration of AMEC have
the total definite moral foundation from
catholic administrator of Aquinas University. I
will prove to you my friends, that AMEC is a
dumping ground, garbage, not merely of
moral and physical misfits. Probably they
only qualify in terms of intellect. The Dean of
Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola, as the
family name implies. She is too old to work,
being an
old woman. Is the AMEC
administration
exploiting
the
very
[e]nterprising
or
compromising
and
undemanding Lola? Could it be that AMEC is
just patiently making use of Dean Justita Lola
were if she is very old. As in atmospheric
situation zero visibility the plane cannot
land, meaning she is very old, low pay follows.
By the way, Dean Justita Lola is also the
chairman of the committee on scholarship in
AMEC. She had retired from Bicol University a
long time ago but AMEC has patiently made
use of her.
xxx
MEL RIMA:
xxx My friends based on the expose, AMEC is a
dumping ground for moral and physically misfit
people. What does this mean? Immoral and
physically misfits as teachers.
May I say Im sorry to Dean Justita Lola. But
this is the truth. The truth is this, that your are
no longer fit to teach. You are too old. As an
aviation, your case is zero visibility. Dont
insist.
xxx Why did AMEC still absorb her as a
teacher, a dean, and chairman of the
xxx On our end our task is to attend to the

interests of students. It is likely that the
students would be influenced by evil. When
they become members of society outside
of campus will be liabilities rather than
assets. What do you expect from a doctor
who while studying at AMEC is so much
burdened with unreasonable imposition? What
do you expect from a student who aside from
peculiar problems because not all students
are rich in their struggle to improve their
social status are even more burdened with
false regulations. xxx9(Emphasis supplied)
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a
reputable learning institution. With the
supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre
"transmitted malicious imputations, and as
such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago)
reputation." AMEC and Ago included FBNI as
defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre,
through
Atty.
Rozil
Lozares,
filed
an
Answer10 alleging that the broadcasts against
AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and
Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled
by a sense of public duty to report the "goingson in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued
with public interest."
Thereafter,
trial
ensued.
During
the
presentation of the evidence for the defense,
Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of
Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on
FBNIs behalf. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate
Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of Rima and
Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a
broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an
application; (2) be interviewed; and (3)
undergo an apprenticeship and training
program after passing the interview. FBNI
likewise claimed that it always reminds its
broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and
objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain
from using libelous and indecent language."
Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to

pass the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas ("KBP") accreditation test and to
secure a KBP permit.
On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered
a Decision12 finding FBNI and Alegre liable for
libel except Rima. The trial court held that the
broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court
rejected the broadcasters claim that their
utterances were the result of straight reporting
because it had no factual basis. The
broadcasters did not even verify their reports
before airing them to show good faith. In
holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court
found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial
court ruled that Rimas only participation was
when he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial
court found Rimas statement within the
"bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and
of the press." The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court
finds for the plaintiff. Considering the
degree of damages caused by the
controversial utterances, which are not
found by this court to be really very
serious and damaging, and there being
no showing that indeed the enrollment of
plaintiff
school
dropped, defendants
Hermogenes "Jun" Alegre, Jr. and Filipinas
Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio
station DZRC), are hereby jointly and severally
ordered to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine
(AMEC-BCCM)
the
amount
of P300,000.00
moral
damages,
plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys
fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
13
(Emphasis supplied)
Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre,

on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
judgment with modification. The appellate
court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and
Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim
for damages and attorneys fees because the
broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and
not against her. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
that broadcaster Mel Rima is SOLIDARILY
ADJUDGED liable
with
FBN[I]
and
Hermo[g]enes Alegre. SO ORDERED.14
FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for
reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.
Hence, FBNI filed this petition.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts
ruling that the questioned broadcasts are
libelous per se and that FBNI, Rima and Alegre
failed to overcome the legal presumption of
malice. The Court of Appeals found Rima and
Alegres claim that they were actuated by their
moral and social duty to inform the public of
the students gripes as insufficient to justify
the utterance of the defamatory remarks.
Finding no factual basis for the imputations
against AMECs administrators, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the broadcasts were made
"with reckless disregard as to whether they
were true or false." The appellate court
pointed out that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed
to present in court any of the students who
allegedly complained against AMEC. Rima and
Alegre merely gave a single name when asked
to identify the students. According to the Court
of Appeals, these circumstances cast doubt on
the veracity of the broadcasters claim that
they were "impelled by their moral and social
duty to inform the public about the students
gripes."
The Court of Appeals found Rima also liable for
libel since he remarked that "(1) AMEC-BCCM is
a dumping ground for morally and physically
misfit teachers; (2) AMEC obtained the
services of Dean Justita Lola to minimize
expenses on its employees salaries; and (3)
AMEC
burdened
the
students
with
unreasonable
imposition
and
false
regulations."16
The Court of Appeals held that FBNI failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees for allowing Rima
and Alegre to make the radio broadcasts
without the proper KBP accreditation. The
Court of Appeals denied Agos claim for
damages and attorneys fees because the
libelous remarks were directed against AMEC,
and not against her. The Court of Appeals
adjudged FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily

liable to pay AMEC moral damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit.1awphi1.nt
Issues
FBNI raises the following issues for resolution:
I. WHETHER THE
LIBELOUS;
BROADCASTS
ARE
II. WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO

MORAL DAMAGES;
III.
WHETHER
THE
AWARD
ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER; and
OF
IV. WHETHER FBNI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE

WITH RIMA AND ALEGRE FOR PAYMENT
OF MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS OF SUIT.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
This is a civil action for damages as a result of
the allegedly defamatory remarks of Rima and
Alegre against AMEC.17 While AMEC did not
point out clearly the legal basis for its
complaint, a reading of the complaint reveals
that AMECs cause of action is based on
Articles 30 and 33 of the Civil Code. Article
3018 authorizes a separate civil action to
recover civil liability arising from a criminal
offense.
On
the
other
hand,
Article
3319 particularly provides that the injured party
may bring a separate civil action for damages
in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries. AMEC also invokes Article 1920 of the
Civil Code to justify its claim for damages.
AMEC cites Articles 217621 and 218022 of the
Civil Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with
Rima and Alegre.
I.
Whether the broadcasts are libelous
A libel23 is a public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act or omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.24
There is no question that the broadcasts were
made public and imputed to AMEC defects or
circumstances tending to cause it dishonor,

discredit and contempt. Rima and Alegres
remarks such as "greed for money on the part
of AMECs administrators"; "AMEC is a
dumping ground, garbage of xxx moral and
physical misfits"; and AMEC students who
graduate "will be liabilities rather than assets"
of the society are libelous per se. Taken as a
whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a
money-making institution where physically and
morally unfit teachers abound.
However, FBNI contends that the broadcasts
are not malicious. FBNI claims that Rima and
Alegre were plainly impelled by their civic duty
to air the students gripes. FBNI alleges that
there is no evidence that ill will or spite
motivated Rima and Alegre in making the
broadcasts. FBNI further points out that Rima
and Alegre exerted efforts to obtain AMECs
side and gave Ago the opportunity to defend
AMEC and its administrators. FBNI concludes
that since there is no malice, there is no libel.
FBNIs contentions are untenable.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed
malicious.25 Rima and Alegre failed to show
adequately their good intention and justifiable
motive in airing the supposed gripes of the
students. As hosts of a documentary or public
affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have
presented
the
public
issues
"free
from inaccurate and
misleading
information."26 Hearing the students alleged
complaints a month before the expos, 27 they
had sufficient time to verify their sources and
information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly
made a thorough investigation of the students
alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about
nor confirm the purported irregularities in
AMEC from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he
merely went to AMEC to verify his report from
an alleged AMEC official who refused to
disclose any information. Alegre simply relied
on the words of the students "because they
were many and not because there is proof that
what they are saying is true." 28 This plainly
shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of
whether their report was true or not.
Contrary to FBNIs claim, the broadcasts were
not "the result of straight reporting."
Significantly, some courts in the United States
apply the privilege of "neutral reportage" in
libel cases involving matters of public interest
or public figures. Under this privilege, a
republisher who accurately and disinterestedly
reports certain defamatory statements made
against public figures is shielded from liability,

regardless of the republishers subjective
awareness of the truth or falsity of the
accusation.29 Rima and Alegre cannot invoke
the privilege of neutral reportage because
unfounded
comments
abound
in
the
broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing
controversy
involving
AMEC
when
the
broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral
reportage applies where the defamed person is
a public figure who is involved in an existing
controversy, and a party to that controversy
makes the defamatory statement.30
However, FBNI argues vigorously that malice in
law does not apply to this case. Citing Borjal
v. Court of Appeals,31 FBNI contends that the
broadcasts "fall within the coverage of
qualifiedly privileged communications" for
being commentaries on matters of public
interest. Such being the case, AMEC should
prove malice in fact or actual malice. Since
AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual malice,
there is no libel.
FBNIs
reliance
on Borjal is
misplaced.
In Borjal, the Court elucidated on the
"doctrine of fair comment," thus:
[F]air commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious,
nevertheless,
when
the
discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either
be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.32(Emphasis supplied)
True, AMEC is a private learning institution
whose business of educating students is
"genuinely imbued with public interest." The
welfare of the youth in general and AMECs
students in particular is a matter which the
public has the right to know. Thus, similar to
the newspaper articles in Borjal, the subject
broadcasts dealt with matters of public
interest. However, unlike in Borjal, the
questioned
broadcasts
are not based
on established facts. The record supports
the following findings of the trial court:
xxx Although defendants claim that they were
motivated by consistent reports of students
and parents against plaintiff, yet, defendants
have not presented in court, nor even gave
name of a single student who made the
complaint to them, much less present written
complaint or petition to that effect. To accept
this defense of defendants is too dangerous
because it could easily give license to the
media to malign people and establishments
based on flimsy excuses that there were
reports to them although they could not
satisfactorily establish it. Such laxity would
encourage
careless
and
irresponsible
broadcasting which is inimical to public
interests.
Secondly, there is reason to believe that
defendant radio broadcasters, contrary to the
mandates of their duties, did not verify and
analyze the truth of the reports before they
aired it, in order to prove that they are in good
faith.
Alegre contended that plaintiff school had no
permit and is not accredited to offer Physical
Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a
certificate coming from DECS that as of Sept.
22, 1987 or more than 2 years before the
controversial broadcast, accreditation to offer
Physical Therapy course had already been
given the plaintiff, which certificate is signed
by no less than the Secretary of Education and
Culture herself, Lourdes R. Quisumbing (Exh.
C-rebuttal). Defendants could have easily
known this were they careful enough to verify.
And yet, defendants were very categorical and
sounded too positive when they made the
erroneous report that plaintiff had no permit to
offer Physical Therapy courses which they
were offering.
The allegation that plaintiff was getting
tremendous aids from foreign foundations like
Mcdonald Foundation prove not to be true also.
The truth is there is no Mcdonald Foundation
existing. Although a big building of plaintiff
school was given the name Mcdonald building,
that was only in order to honor the first
missionary in Bicol of plaintiffs religion, as
explained by Dr. Lita Ago. Contrary to the
claim of defendants over the air, not a single
centavo appears to be received by plaintiff
school from the aforementioned McDonald
Foundation which does not exist.
Defendants did not even also bother to prove

their claim, though denied by Dra. Ago, that
when medical students fail in one subject, they
are made to repeat all the other subject[s],
even those they have already passed, nor their
claim that the school charges laboratory fees
even if there are no laboratories in the school.
No evidence was presented to prove the bases
for these claims, at least in order to give
semblance of good faith.
As for the allegation that plaintiff is the
dumping ground for misfits, and immoral
teachers, defendant[s] singled out Dean Justita
Lola who is said to be so old, with zero visibility
already. Dean Lola testified in court last Jan.
21, 1991, and was found to be 75 years old.
xxx Even older people prove to be effective
teachers like Supreme Court Justices who are
still very much in demand as law professors in
their late years. Counsel for defendants is past
75 but is found by this court to be still very
sharp
and
effective.l^vvphi1.net So
is
plaintiffs counsel.
Dr. Lola was observed by this court not to be
physically decrepit yet, nor mentally infirmed,
but is still alert and docile.
The contention that plaintiffs graduates
become liabilities rather than assets of our
society is a mere conclusion. Being from the
place himself, this court is aware that majority
of the medical graduates of plaintiffs pass the
board examination easily and become
prosperous and responsible professionals. 33
Had the comments been an expression of
opinion based on established facts, it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts. 34 However, the
comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed
up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not
privileged and remain libelous per se.
The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code 35 of
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas,
Ink. ("Radio Code"). Item I(B) of the Radio Code
provides:
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND
COMMENTARIES
1. x x x
4. Public
affairs
program
shall
present
public
issues
free
from personal
bias,
prejudice
and inaccurate
and
misleading
information. x x x Furthermore, the
station shall strive to present balanced
discussion of issues. x x x.
xxx
7. The station shall be responsible at all
times in the supervision of public affairs,
public issues and commentary programs
so that they conform to the provisions
and standards of this code.
8. It shall be the responsibility of the
newscaster, commentator, host and
announcer to protect public interest,
general welfare and good order in the
presentation of public affairs and public
issues.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The broadcasts fail to meet the standards
prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays down
the code of ethical conduct governing
practitioners in the radio broadcast industry.
The Radio Code is a voluntary code of conduct
imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its
own members. The Radio Code is a public
warranty by the radio broadcast industry that
radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a
code by which their conduct are measured for
lapses, liability and sanctions.
The public has a right to expect and demand
that radio broadcast practitioners live up to the
code of conduct of their profession, just like
other professionals. A professional code of
conduct
provides
the
standards
for
determining whether a person has acted justly,
honestly and with good faith in the exercise of
his rights and performance of his duties as
required by Article 1937 of the Civil Code. A
professional code of conduct also provides the
standards for determining whether a person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another
has acted in a manner contrary to morals or
good customs under Article 2138 of the Civil
Code.
II.
Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages
FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to
moral damages because it is a corporation. 39
A juridical person is generally not entitled to
moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering
or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral

shock.40 The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al.41 to justify the
award of moral damages. However, the Courts
statement in Mambulao that "a corporation
may have a good reputation which, if
besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.42
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages
falls under item 7 of Article 221943 of the Civil
Code. This provision expressly authorizes the
recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation.
Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
Therefore, a juridical person such as a
corporation can validly complain for libel or
any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages.44
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per
se, the law implies damages.45 In such a case,
evidence of an honest mistake or the want of
character or reputation of the party libeled
goes only in mitigation of damages. 46Neither in
such a case is the plaintiff required to
introduce evidence of actual damages as a
condition precedent to the recovery of some
damages.47 In this case, the broadcasts are
libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral
damages.
However, we find the award of P300,000 moral
damages unreasonable. The record shows that
even though the broadcasts were libelous per
se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or
material damage to its reputation. Therefore,
we reduce the award of moral damages
from P300,000 to P150,000.
III.
Whether the award of attorneys fees is proper
FBNI contends that since AMEC is not entitled
to moral damages, there is no basis for the
award of attorneys fees. FBNI adds that the
instant case does not fall under the
enumeration in Article 220848 of the Civil Code.
The award of attorneys fees is not proper
because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its
claim for attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce
evidence to warrant the award of attorneys
fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate
courts failed to explicitly state in their
respective decisions the rationale for the
award of attorneys fees.49 In Inter-Asia
Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals ,50 we held that:
[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award
thereof as an item of damages is the exception
rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a
suit. The power of the court to award
attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the
award is a conclusion without a premise,
its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In all events,
the court must explicitly state in the text of the
decision, and not only in the decretal portion
thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorneys fees.51 (Emphasis supplied)
While it mentioned about the award of
attorneys fees by stating that it "lies within
the discretion of the court and depends upon
the circumstances of each case," the Court of
Appeals failed to point out any circumstance to
justify the award.
IV.
Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and
Alegre for moral damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit
FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable
with Rima and Alegre for the payment of
damages and attorneys fees because it
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly Rima
and
Alegre.
FBNI
maintains
that
its
broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre,
undergo a "very regimented process" before
they are allowed to go on air. "Those who
apply for broadcaster are subjected to
interviews,
examinations
and
an
apprenticeship program."
FBNI further argues that Alegres age and lack
of training are irrelevant to his competence as
a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the "minor
deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima
and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI
did not exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting and supervising them."
Rimas accreditation lapsed due to his nonpayment of the KBP annual fees while Alegres
accreditation card was delayed allegedly for
reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office.
FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is
merely voluntary and not required by any law
or government regulation.
FBNIs arguments do not persuade us.

The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint
tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for
the tort which they commit.52 Joint tort feasors
are all the persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit.53 Thus, AMEC correctly
anchored its cause of action against FBNI on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.1a\^/phi1.net
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima
and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for
damages arising from the libelous broadcasts.
As stated by the Court of Appeals, "recovery
for defamatory statements published by radio
or television may be had from the owner of
the station, a licensee, the operator of the
station, or a person who procures, or
participates in, the making of the defamatory
statements."54 An employer and employee are
solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by
the employee within the course and scope of
his or her employment, at least when the
employer
authorizes
or
ratifies
the
defamation.55 In this case, Rima and Alegre
were clearly performing their official duties as
hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when
they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged
nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond
the scope of their work at that time. There was
likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize
and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on
record that FBNI exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of
its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI
merely showed that it exercised diligence in
the selection of its broadcasters without
introducing any evidence to prove that it
observed
the
same
diligence
in
the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did
not show how it exercised diligence in
supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged
constant reminder to its broadcasters to
"observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to
refrain from using libelous and indecent
language" is not enough to prove due diligence
in the supervision of its broadcasters.
Adequate training of the broadcasters on the
industrys
code
of
conduct,
sufficient
information on libel laws, and continuous
evaluation of the broadcasters performance
are but a few of the many ways of showing
diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.
FBNI claims that it "has taken all the

precaution in the selection of Rima and
Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their
qualifications."
However,
no
clear
and
convincing evidence shows that Rima and
Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented process"
of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that
Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP
accreditation,56 which
is
one
of
FBNIs
requirements before it hires a broadcaster.
Significantly, membership in the KBP, while
voluntary, indicates the broadcasters strong
commitment to observe the broadcast
industrys rules and regulations. Clearly, these
circumstances show FBNIs lack of diligence in
selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre.
Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages
together with Rima and Alegre.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision of 4 January 1999 and
Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages
is
reduced
from P300,000
to P150,000 and the award of attorneys fees
is deleted. Costs against petitioner. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FILAMER
CHRISTIAN
INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs.
HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XIV,
Roxas
City
and
POTENCIANO
KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The private respondents, heirs of the late
Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of
the decision rendered by this Court on October
16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the
appellate court's conclusion that there exists
an employer-employee relationship between
the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha.
The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable
for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
grounds that the latter was not an authorized
driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
directly and primarily answerable, and that
Funtecha was merely a working scholar who,
under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
is not considered an employee of the
petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the

circumstances obtaining in the present case
call for the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an
employee of the petitioner. The private
respondents maintain that under Article 2180
an injured party shall have recourse against
the servant as well as the petitioner for whom,
at the time of the incident, the servant was
performing an act in furtherance of the interest
and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha
allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use
it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the
school authorities.
walking in his lane in the direction against

vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed
that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to
the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had
only one functioning headlight.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to

the facts found by the trial court and the
appellate court, the Court reconsiders its
decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals'
decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio
Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying
Civil Code provisions, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court decision which ordered
the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the
Zenith
Insurance
Corporation
policy,
P10,000.00
moral
damages,
P4,000.00
litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00
attorney's fees.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of

the school president where both Allan and
Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job
demands that he drive home the school jeep
so he can use it to fetch students in the
morning of the next school day.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working

student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar
of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the
school, an employee even if he was assigned
to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha
requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was
allowed, to take over the vehicle while the
latter was on his way home one late afternoon.
It is significant to note that the place where
Allan lives is also the house of his father, the
school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is
also the house where Funtecha was allowed
free board while he was a student of Filamer
Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha
only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the
road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79)
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving
truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a
collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound
as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did not stop to check.
Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the
pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the

same time a security guard of the petitionerschool. He further said that there was no
specific time for him to be off-duty and that
after driving the students home at 5:00 in the
afternoon, he still had to go back to school and
then drive home using the same vehicle.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that

the school president had knowledge that the
jeep was routinely driven home for the said
purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of
Funtecha's possession of a student driver's
license and his desire to undergo driving
lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the
vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep
was intended by the petitioner school. (See L.
Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577,
80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of
Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618
[1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school
cannot
deny
any
responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned
tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption
of liability of an employer, includes any act
done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of
the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va
906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some
benefit from the act, the existence of a

presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of
whether or not the servant was at the time of
the accident performing any act in furtherance
of his master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland,
210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v.
Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, on which the
petitioner
anchors
its
defense,
was
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of
the Labor Code on conditions of employment.
Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides
guidelines on the manner by which the powers
of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on
what records should be kept; maintained and
preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of
working scholars from, and inclusion of
resident physicians in the employment
coverage as far as compliance with the
substantive labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the
enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so
holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for
damages instituted by an injured person
during a vehicular accident against a working
student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor
dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer.
It invokes a claim brought by one for damages
for injury caused by the patently negligent acts
of a person, against both doer-employee and
his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by
an employer as a shield to avoid liability under
the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in
the
present
case
an
extra-contractual
obligation arising from the negligence or
reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts
or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction,
to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia
v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer.

He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not
acting within the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of
rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed
to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family
over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes
the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of its employees
and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations
through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and
Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction,
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353
[1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for
in the performance of any act indispensable to
the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not
shown that it has set forth such rules and
guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles
if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the
school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or
warned its employees against the use of its
vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay
damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle.
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768,
772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that
the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263
[1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979];
Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA
792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North
Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989])

The liability of the employer is, under Article
2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are
paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of
the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a
party defendant in the civil case for damages.
This is quite understandable considering that
as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff
Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle
and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs
should not now be left to suffer without
simultaneous recourse against the petitioner
for the consequent injury caused by a janitor
doing a driving chore for the petitioner even
for a short while. For the purpose of recovering
damages under the prevailing circumstances,
it is enough that the plaintiff and the private
respondent heirs were able to establish the
existence of employer-employee relationship
between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and
the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act
not for an independent purpose of his own but
in furtherance of the business of his employer.
A position of responsibility on the part of the
petitioner
has
thus
been
satisfactorily
demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
appellate court affirming the trial court
decision is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163609
2008
November 27,
SPS.
BUENAVENTURA
JAYME
AND
ROSARIO
JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO
APOSTOL,
FIDEL
LOZANO,
ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO
Q.
MIGUEL,
MUNICIPALITY
OF
KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL),
PROVINCE
OF
SOUTH
COTABATO,
represented
by
the
MUNICIPAL
TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST
INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable

for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to
him, which resulted in the death of a minor
pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Polomolok, Cotabato City, Branch 39, insofar
as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is
concerned. The CA absolved Mayor Miguel
from any liability since it was not he, but the
Municipality of Koronadal, that was the
employer of the negligent driver.
The Facts
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of
Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee
of
the
Municipality
of
Koronadal.2 The pick-up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was
then
in
the
possession
of
Ernesto
Simbulan.3 Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck
from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan
Airport at General Santos City to catch his
Manila flight.4
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C.
Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok,
South Cotabato.5 The intensity of the collision
sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
the point of impact, a clear indication that
Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the
time of the accident.6
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with
subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral
contusion.7 He was initially treated at the
Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. 8 Due to
the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted
to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao
City for more intensive treatment. 9Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days
after the accident.10
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario
Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint
for
damages
with
the
RTC
against
respondents.11 In their complaint, they prayed
that all respondents be held solidarily liable for
their loss. They pointed out that that
proximate cause of Marvin's death was
Lozano's negligent and reckless operation of
the vehicle. They prayed for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages,
litigation expenses.
attorney's
fees,
and
In their respective Answers, all respondents

denied liability for Marvin's death. Apostol and
Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel
and Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden
sprint across the highway made it impossible
to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being
on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The
Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer
of Lozano and Miguel. As for First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the
vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is
contributory and is only conditioned on the
right of the insured. Since the insured did not
file a claim within the prescribed period, any
cause of action against it had prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of spouses Jayme, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos

as Attorney's fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
the death of Marvin Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as
litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel
interposed an appeal to the CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the
RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano's
employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the
latter's negligent act. Records showed that the
Municipality of Koronadal was the driver's true
and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied
that he did not exercise due care and diligence
in the supervision of Lozano. The incident,
although unfortunate, was unexpected and
cannot be attributed to him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

the defendant Municipality of Koronadal
cannot be held liable for the damages
incurred by other defendant (sic) being
an agency of the State performing a
(sic) governmental functions. The same
with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan,
not being the owner of the subject
vehicle, he is absolved of any liability.
The complaint against defendant First
Integrated Bonding Insurance Company,
Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there
being no cause of action against said
insurance company.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the

appeal, disposing as follows:
However, defendants Fidel Lozano,

Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando
Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
are hereby ordered jointly and severally
to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following
sums:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted

that Mayor Miguel was not the employer
of Lozano. Thus, paragraph 9 of the
complaint alleged that the Municipality
of Koronadal was the employer of
both Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not
being the employer of Lozano, Mayor
Miguel could not thus be held liable for
the
damages
caused
by
the
former. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at
the time of the accident.14 (Emphasis
supplied)
1. One Hundred Seventy Three

Thousand One Hundred One and Forty
Centavos (P173,101.40) Pesos as actual
damages with legal interest of 12% per
annum computed from February 11,
1989 until fully paid;
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos
as exemplary damages;
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed

from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor
Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and
the complaint against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.13
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be
held liable for damages for the death of Marvin
Jayme. Said the appellate court:
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is

the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly
and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers or third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death

sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the
present recourse and assign to the CA the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL
CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
MARVIN JAYME WHICH CONCLUSION IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE SETTLED
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL;
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE
CONTRADICTED
BY
THE
EVIDENCE
ON
RECORD; MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS
DRAWN BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON CONJECTURES
AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH
URGENTLY CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT'S SUPERVISION.15
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or
imputed liability finds no application in
the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that
vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. He
was not a mere passenger, but instead one
who had direct control and supervision over
Lozano during the time of the accident.
According to petitioners, the element of direct
control is not negated by the fact that Lozano's
employer was the Municipality of Koronadal.
Mayor Miguel, being Lozano's superior, still had
control over the manner the vehicle was
operated.
Article 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a
person is not only liable for one's own quasidelictual acts, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed
liability. To sustain claims against employers
for the acts of their employees, the following
requisites must be established: (1) That the
employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the
service to be rendered in accordance with
orders which the employer has the authority to

give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of
the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.17
Significantly, to make the employee liable
under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it
must be established that the injurious or
tortuous act was committed at the time the
employee was performing his functions. 18
Furthermore,
the
employer-employee
relationship cannot be assumed. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
relationship
by
preponderant
evidence.
In Belen v. Belen,19 this Court ruled that it was
enough for defendant to deny an alleged
employment relationship. The defendant is
under no obligation to prove the negative
averment. This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the
courts that the burden of proving the
action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he
fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the defendant
is under no obligation to prove his
exceptions. This rue is in harmony with
the provisions of Section 297 of the
Code of Civil Procedure holding that
each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations, etc.20
In resolving the present controversy, it is
imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is,
indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore
liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To
determine the existence of an employment
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This
involves: (1) the employer's power of
selection; (2) payment of wages or other
remuneration; (3) the employer's right to
control the method of doing the work; and (4)
the employer's right of suspension or
dismissal.21
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly
held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal
which was the lawful employer of Lozano at
the time of the accident. It is uncontested that
Lozano was employed as a driver by the
municipality. That he was subsequently
assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of
the accident is of no moment. This Court has,
on several occasions, held that an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the
employee was loaned by the employer to
another person or entity because control over
the employee subsists.22 In the case under
review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains

to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding
Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had
at least supervision and control over Lozano
and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu
pick-up during the time of the accident. They,
however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel
had authority to give instructions or directions
to Lozano, he still can not be held liable.
In Benson v. Sorrell,23 the New England
Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of
directions to the driver does not establish that
the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Neither does it render one the employer of the
driver.
This
Court,
in Soliman,
Jr.
v.
24
Tuazon, ruled in a similar vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company
may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does
not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable for
their wrongful acts and omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily
no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency. x
x x25 (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed
against a fellow employee although the person
may have the right to control the manner of
the vehicle's operation.26 In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship establishing
vicarious liability, the driver's negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee
who only happens to be an occupant of the
vehicle.27 Whatever right of control the
occupant may have over the driver is not
sufficient by itself to justify an application of
the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v.
Lombardi28 is instructive on this exception to
the rule on vicarious liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal
of the driver of the truck, but only an
intermediate and superior employee or
agent. This being so, the doctrine
of respondeat superior or qui facit per
alium is not properly applicable to
him. His power to direct and control the
driver was not as master, but only by
virtue of the fact that they were both
employed by Kruse, and the further fact
that as Kruse's agent he was delegated

Kruse's authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the
rule is well settled both in this state and
elsewhere that the negligence of a
subordinate employee or subagent is
not to be imputed to a superior
employee or agent, but only to the
master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204
Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac.
425; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374
[1 Pac. (2d) 528; Ellis v. Southern Ry.
Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378,
52 S. E. 228; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M.
Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac.
588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the
elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and
particularly that part commencing at p.
290.) We can see no logical reason for
drawing any distinction in this regard
between actionable negligence and
contributory negligence. x x x29
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific
Elec. Ry. Co.[30 and again in Sichterman v.
Hollingshead Co.31
In Swanson v. McQuown,32 a case involving a
military officer who happened to be riding in a
car driven by a subordinate later involved in an
accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered
to the general rule that a public official is not
liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates
on a vicarious basis since the relationship is
not a true master-servant situation. 33 The court
went on to rule that the only exception is when
they cooperate in the act complained of, or
direct or encourage it.34
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither
Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered
owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used
that will make him accountable for Marvin's
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at
the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the
failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by
providing him warnings or by serving as
lookout does not make the passenger liable for
the latter's negligent acts. 35The driver's duty is
not one that may be delegated to others.36
As correctly held by the trial court, the true
and lawful employer of Lozano is the
Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for
Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be
sued because it is an agency of the State

engaged in governmental functions and,
hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme,37 where this Court held:
It has already been remarked that
municipal corporations
are
suable
because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not
liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions
and can only be held answerable only if
it can be shown that they were acting in
proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.38
Verily, liability attaches to the registered
owner, the negligent driver and his direct
employer. The CA observation along this line
are worth restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered
owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers and
third persons as a consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of
who the actual owner of the vehicle is,
the operator of record continues to be
the operator of the vehicle as regards
the public and third persons, and as
such is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences incident (sic) to its
operation x x x.39
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a
tragic loss for his parents. However, justice
demands that only those liable under our laws
be held accountable for Marvin's demise.
Justice can not sway in favor of petitioners
simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law
on the matter is clear: only the negligent
driver, the driver's employer, and the
registered owner of the vehicle are liable for
the death of a third person resulting from the
negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172122
June 22, 2007
MERCURY
DRUG
CORPORATION
and
ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN
HUANG,
and
STEPHEN
HUANG, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981,
dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006,
respectively which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, dated September 29, 2004. The
trial court found petitioners jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents damages
for the injuries sustained by respondent
Stephen Huang, son of respondent spouses
Richard and Carmen Huang.
First, the facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury
Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler
1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE
641 (truck). It has in its employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent
spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the
parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own
the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with
plate number PTT 775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident
on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m.
within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the
car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del
Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058
kg. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway,
north bound, coming from the general
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The
car was on the left innermost lane while the
truck was on the next lane to its right, when
the truck suddenly swerved to its left and
slammed into the front right side of the car.
The collision hurled the car over the island
where it hit a lamppost, spun around and
landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit
a lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged
towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah
Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt
(TVR).
His
drivers
license
had
been
confiscated because he had been previously

apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total
wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face,
and lung. Despite a series of operations,
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life
from his chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for
committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence while driving, and petitioner
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the
immediate and proximate cause of the
accident was respondent Stephen Huangs
recklessness. According to petitioner Del
Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost
lane when the car bumped the trucks front
right tire. The truck then swerved to the left,
smashed into an electric post, crossed the
center island, and stopped on the other side of
the highway. The car likewise crossed over the
center island and landed on the same portion
of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims
that it exercised due diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of
all its employees.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September
29, 2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug and
Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding
defendants Mercury Drug Corporation, Inc. and
Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable
to pay plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y. Huang and
Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen Huang the
following amounts:
1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy Three
Thousand
Pesos
(P2,973,000.00)
actual
damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a. Twenty Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One
Thousand,
and
Sixty-Two
Pesos
(P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b. Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and

for lost or impaired earning capacity of
Stephen;
3. Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral
damages;
4. Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
exemplary damages; and
as
5. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)

attorneys fees and litigation expense.4
as
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the decision of the trial court but
reduced the award of moral damages
to P1,000,000.00. The appellate court also
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners cite the following grounds for their
appeal:
1. That the subject Decision which dismissed
the appeal of petitioners herein but AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, in
that the award of moral damages was reduced
to P1,000,000.00 and its Resolution dated
March 30, 2006, which dismissed outright the
Motion for Reconsideration must be set aside
because the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed reversible error:
A. IN DENYING OUTRIGHTLY THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON ALLEGEDLY BEING
FILED OUT OF TIME FOR ONE DAY;
B. IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENTS
HEREIN AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN;
C. IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY ALL
EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN AND PROCEEDED TO RENDER ITS
DECISION BASED ON PRESUMPTIONS AND
PERSONAL OPINIONS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE
NOT WITNESSES TO THE ACCIDENT;
D. IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS HEREIN;
E. IN FINDING THAT MERCURY DRUG
CORPORATION FAILED TO EXERCISE THE
DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN SUPERVISING ITS
EMPLOYEES
EVIDENCE
COMPANY;
DESPITE
PRESENTED
OVERWHELMING
BY
PETITIONER
F. IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO DEL

ROSARIO WAS NEGLIGENT IN DRIVING THE
TRUCK AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT AND
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCES
PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
G. IN PRESENTING ONLY IN THE DECISION
TESTIMONIES
FAVORABLE
TO
THE
RESPONDENTS HEREIN AND COMPLETELY
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED
BY
THE
PETITIONERS
HEREIN
WHICH
CONTRADICTED SUCH TESTIMONIES NOT ONLY
THROUGH ORAL TESTIMONIES BUT AS WELL
AS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES.5
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was
negligent. The evidence does not support
petitioners claim that at the time of the
accident, the truck was at the left inner lane
and that it was respondent Stephen Huangs
car, at its right, which bumped the right front
side of the truck. Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario
could not precisely tell which part of the truck
was hit by the car, 6 despite the fact that the
truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the
car. Petitioner Del Rosario could not also
explain why the car landed on the opposite
lane of C-5 which was on its left side. He said
that "the car did not pass in front of him after
it hit him or under him or over him or behind
him."7 If the truck were really at the left lane
and the car were at its right, and the car hit
the truck at its front right side, the car would
not have landed on the opposite side, but
would have been thrown to the right side of
the C-5 Highway. Noteworthy on this issue is
the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza,
an expert in the field of physics. He conducted
a study based on the following assumptions
provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more
massive than the other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same
direction and at the same speed of about 85 to
90 kilometers per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the
innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle
was at its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing

assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right
front portion of the heavier vehicle, the
general direction of the light vehicle after the
impact would be to the right side of the heavy
vehicle, not the other way around. The truck,
he opined, is more difficult to move as it is
heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which
would move to the right of, and away from the
truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the
car will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to
the left of the truck.
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis
of the same assumptions except that the car is
on the left side of the truck, in accordance with
the testimony of respondent Stephen Huang.
Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction
of the car after impact would be to the left of
the truck. In this situation, the middle island
against which the car was pinned would slow
down the car, and enable the truck to catch up
and hit the car again, before running over it. 8
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to
show the damages that the truck sustained at
its front right side. The attempt does not
impress. The photographs presented were
taken a month after the accident, and Rogelio
Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the
truck and authenticated the photographs,
admitted that there were damages also on the
left side of the truck.9
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further
admitted that after the impact, he lost control
of the truck and failed to apply his brakes.
Considering that the car was smaller and
lighter than the six-wheeler truck, the impact
allegedly caused by the car when it hit the
truck could not possibly be so great to cause
petitioner to lose all control that he failed to
even step on the brakes. He testified, as
follows:
ATTY. DIAZ:
May I proceed, Your Honor. You were able to
apply the brakes, were you sir?
WITNESS:
No more, sir, because I went over the island.
ATTY. DIAZ:
Because as you said you lost control, correct
sir?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DIAZ:
In other words, sir from the time your truck
was hit according to you up to the time you
rested on the shoulder, you traveled fifty
meters?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, about that distance.
ATTY. DIAZ:
And this was despite the fact that you were
only traveling at the speed of seventy five
kilometers per hour, jumped over the island,
hit the lamppost, and traveled the three lanes
of the opposite lane of C-5 highway, is that
what you want to impress upon this court?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.10
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. The evidence proves petitioner Del
Rosarios negligence as the direct and
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del
Rosario failed to do what a reasonable and
prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.
We now come to the liability of petitioner
Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario.
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the
negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint
and solidary with the employee.11
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury
Drug should show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family, both in

the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties.
Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to
examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. 12 With respect
to the supervision of its employees, the
employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for their breach.
To
establish
compliance
with
these
requirements,
employers
must
submit
concrete
proof,
including
documentary
evidence.13
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug
presented testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic,
the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are
required to take theoretical and actual driving
tests, and psychological examination. In the
case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs.
Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests
and psychological examination when he
applied for the position of Delivery Man, but
not when he applied for the position of Truck
Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner
Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light
vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving
tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the
motor skills development, perceptual speed,
visual attention, depth visualization, eye and
hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner
Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were
also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario
attended only three driving seminars on June
30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In
effect, the only seminar he attended before
the accident which occurred in 1996 was held
twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug
does not provide for a back-up driver for long
trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario has been out on the road for more
than thirteen hours, without any alternate.
Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know
of any company policy requiring back-up
drivers for long trips.14
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show
that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees.
In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario was driving without a license. He
was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his
superior, but nothing was done about it. He
was not suspended or reprimanded. 15 No

disciplinary action whatsoever was taken
against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore
affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug
has failed to discharge its burden of proving
that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del
Rosario.
We now consider the damages which
respondents
should
recover
from
the
petitioners.
The trial court awarded the following amounts:
1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy-Three
Thousand
Pesos
(P2,973,000.00)
actual
damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a. Twenty-Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One
Thousand,
and
Sixty-Two
Pesos
(P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b. Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and
for lost or impaired earning capacity of
Stephen;
3. Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral
damages;
4. Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as
exemplary damages; and
5. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
attorneys fees and litigation expense.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court but reduced the award of moral
damages to P1,000,000.00.
With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of
the Civil Code provides that "[E]xcept as
provided by law or by stipulation one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved x x x." In the instant case, we
uphold the finding that the actual damages
claimed by respondents were supported by
receipts.
The
amount
of P2,973,000.00
represented cost of hospital expenses,
medicines, medical services and supplies, and
nursing care services provided respondent
Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of
the accident, until December 1998.
Petitioners are also liable for all damages
which
are
the
natural
and
probable
consequences of the act or omission
complained of.16 The doctors who attended to
respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis
that his chances of walking again and
performing basic body functions are nil. For the
rest of his life, he will need continuous
rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further

complications such as pneumonia, bladder and
rectum
infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed
sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other
spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be
completely dependent on the care and support
of his family. We thus affirm the award
of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of
respondent Stephen Huang, based on his
average monthly expense and the actuarial
computation of the remaining years that he is
expected to live; and the conservative amount
of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial
court, for the loss or impairment of his earning
capacity,17considering his age, probable life
expectancy, the state of his health, and his
mental and physical condition before the
accident. He was only seventeen years old,
nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds.
He was in fourth year high school, and a
member of the school varsity basketball team.
He was also class president and editor-in-chief
of the school annual. He had shown very good
leadership qualities. He was looking forward to
his college life, having just passed the
entrance examinations of the University of the
Philippines, De La Salle University, and the
University of Asia and the Pacific. The
University of Sto. Tomas even offered him a
chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but
the accident prevented him from attending the
basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an
exceptional student. He excelled both in his
academics and extracurricular undertakings.
He is intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as
testified by Francisco Lopez, respondent
Stephen Huangs godfather and a bank
executive.18 Had the accident not happened,
he had a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted
to embark on a banking career, get married
and raise children. Taking into account his
outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed a
successful professional career in banking. But,
as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for
someone like respondent to ever secure a job
in a bank. To his knowledge, no bank has ever
hired
a
person
suffering
with
the kind of disability as Stephen Huangs. 19
We likewise uphold the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
"The award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante." 20 Moral damages
are designed to compensate and alleviate in
some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly

caused a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary
computation,
they
must
be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.21 The
amount of the award bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.
In the instant case, respondent Stephen Huang
and respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang testified to the intense suffering they
continue to experience as a result of the
accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares
and traumas he suffers almost every night
when he relives the accident. He also gets
depression when he thinks of his bleak future.
He feels frustration and embarrassment in
needing to be helped with almost everything
and in his inability to do simple things he used
to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the
rest of the family undergo their own private
suffering. They live with the day-to-day
uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huangs
condition. They know that the chance of full
recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen
Huangs paralysis has made him prone to
many other illnesses. His family, especially
respondent spouses, have to make themselves
available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day.
They have patterned their daily life around
taking care of him, ministering to his daily
needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had
been accustomed.
Respondent Carmen Huangs brother testified
on the insensitivity of petitioner Mercury Drug
towards the plight of respondent. Stephen,
viz.:
Maybe words cannot describe the anger that
we feel towards the defendants. All the time
that we were going through the crisis, there
was none (sic) a single sign of nor offer of help,
any consolation or anything whatsoever. It is
funny because, you know, I have many
colleagues, business associates, people even
as far as United States, Japan, that I probably
met only once, when they found out, they
make a call, they sent card, they write small
notes, but from the defendant, absolute
silence. They didnt care, and worst, you know,
this is a company that have (sic) all the
resources to help us. They were (sic) on our
part, it was doubly painful because we have no
choice but to go back to them and buy the
medicines that we need for Stephen. So, I
dont know how someone will really have no
sense of decency at all to at least find out
what happened to my son, what is his
condition, or if there is anything that they can

do to help us.22
On the matter of exemplary damages, Art.
2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The records show that at the time
of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was
driving without a license because he was
previously ticketed for reckless driving. The
evidence also shows that he failed to step on
his brakes immediately after the impact. Had
petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries
which respondent Stephen sustained could
have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such
as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario
need be suppressed; and employers like
petitioner Mercury Drug should be more
circumspect in the observance of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The award of exemplary damages
in favor of the respondents is therefore
justified.
With the award of exemplary damages, we
also affirm the grant of attorneys fees to
respondents.23 In addition, attorneys fees may
be granted when a party is compelled to
litigate or incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the
other party.24
Cost against petitioners.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and March
30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
83981, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
C. STATE
G.R. No. L-11154
March 21, 1916
E.
MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GOVERNMENT
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
horn, by which movement it struck the

plaintiff, who was already six feet from
the southwestern point or from the post
place there.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the
sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial
court erred (1) "in limiting the general
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000,
instead of P25,000 as claimed in the
complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when
plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months
and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of
P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his
complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the
defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a)
in finding that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of
the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the
Government of the Philippine Islands is liable
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the collision, even if it be true that the
collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully
supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for
the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, was going
toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side
thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles
an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and
when he was ten feet from the
southwestern
intersection
of
said
streets,
the
General
Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south,
after passing the center thereof, so that
it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the
ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act,
turned suddenly and unexpectedly and
long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or
By reason of the resulting collision, the

plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined
him on the very same day that he was
taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left
parietal region, a would in the same
place and in the back part of his head,
while blood issued from his nose and he
was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or
more fractures of the skull and that the
grey matter and brain was had suffered
material injury. At ten o'clock of the
night in question, which was the time
set for performing the operation, his
pulse was so weak and so irregular that,
in his opinion, there was little hope that
he would live. His right leg was broken
in such a way that the fracture extended
to the outer skin in such manner that it
might be regarded as double and the
would be exposed to infection, for which
reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before
the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed
that the plaintiff's leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a
curvature that made his leg very weak
and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a
notable readjustment of the functions of
the brain and nerves. The patient
apparently was slightly deaf, had a light
weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was
always noticed when the plaintiff had to
do any difficult mental labor, especially
when he attempted to use his money for
mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who
testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's
mental and physical condition prior to
the accident was excellent, and that
after having received the injuries that
have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had
constantly displayed before the accident
as one of the best constructors of
wooden buildings and he could not now
earn even a half of the income that he

had secured for his work because he
had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As
a contractor, he could no longer, as he
had before done, climb up ladders and
scaffoldings to reach the highest parts
of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the
plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
work as a contractor, he had to
dissolved the partnership he had formed
with the engineer. Wilson, because he
was
incapacitated
from
making
mathematical calculations on account of
the condition of his leg and of his mental
faculties, and he had to give up a
contract he had for the construction of
the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full
accord with the trial court to the effect that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was
due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the
P14,741 and which are drawn in question by
the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded
for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the
amount allowed for the loss of wages during
the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from
pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the
amount of the first. As to the second, the
record shows, and the trial court so found, that
the plaintiff's services as a contractor were
worth P1,000 per month. The court, however,
limited the time to two months and twenty-one
days, which the plaintiff was actually confined
in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the
plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period
of six months. The mere fact that he remained
in the hospital only two months and twentyone days while the remainder of the six
months was spent in his home, would not
prevent recovery for the whole time. We,
therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on
his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is
a tort committed by an agent or employee of
the Government, the inquiry at once arises
whether the Government is legally-liable for
the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915,

reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit
against
the
Government
of
the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against
the Government of the Philippine Islands
by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages
resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is
responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant
is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works
and the Attorney-General recommended
that an Act be passed by the Legislature
authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in
the courts against the Government, in
order that said questions may be
decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it
enacted by the Philippine Legislature,
that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby
authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila
against
the
Government
of
the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between
his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to
which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on
account of said collision, and the
Attorney-General of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the
behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defendant said Government
at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its
passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above

quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from
suit or did it also concede its liability to the
plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be
held that the Act created any new cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the
defendant's liability to any case not previously
recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the
defendant) cannot be sued by an individual
without its consent. It is also admitted that the
instant case is one against the Government. As
the consent of the Government to be sued by
the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part,
it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of
the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action
against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, . . . ."
These were the two questions submitted to the
court for determination. The Act was passed
"in order that said questions may be decided."
We have "decided" that the accident was due
solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who
was at the time an employee of the defendant,
and we have also fixed the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for
that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere
for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands
having been "modeled after the Federal and
State Governments in the United States," we
may look to the decisions of the high courts of
that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is
not liable for the torts committed by its officers
or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment, is
well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest." (Claussen
vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S.
vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199;
and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed.,
991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16),

the plaintiff sought to recover damages from
the state for personal injuries received on
account of the negligence of the state officers
at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving
agricultural
and
kindred
industries;
to
disseminate information calculated to educate
and benefit the industrial classes; and to
advance by such means the material interests
of the state, being objects similar to those
sought by the public school system. In passing
upon the question of the state's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers or agents, the
court said:
No claim arises against any government
is favor of an individual, by reason of the
misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized
exercise of powers by its officers or
agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall.,
269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51,
53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs.
State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn
vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep.,
203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments
permitting individuals to sue the state where
the cause of action arises out of either fort or
contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915,
thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144,
advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the
Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of
this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to
George Apfelbacher, of the town of
Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin,
to bring suit in such court or courts and
in such form or forms as he may be
advised for the purpose of settling and
determining all controversies which he
may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers
and agents, relative to the mill property

of said George Apfelbacher, the fish
hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on
the Bark River, and the mill property of
Evan Humphrey at the lower end of
Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use
of the waters of said Bark River and
Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of
Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court
said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of
this law the legislature admitted liability
on the part of the state for the acts of its
officers, and that the suit now stands
just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act
does, or was intended to do, more than
remove the state's immunity from suit.
It simply gives authority to commence
suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the estate. Nowhere
in the act is there a whisper or
suggestion that the court or courts in
the disposition of the suit shall depart
from well established principles of law,
or that the amount of damages is the
only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the
plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just
where it would be in the absence of the
state's immunity from suit. If the
Legislature had intended to change the
rule that obtained in this state so long
and to declare liability on the part of the
state, it would not have left so important
a matter to mere inference, but would
have done so in express terms.
(Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth,
152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A.,
399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the
provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and
considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter
have, claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed
by the state board of examiners, are
hereby authorized, on the terms and
conditions herein contained, to bring
suit thereon against the state in any of
the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to
final judgment. The rules of practice in
civil cases shall apply to such suits,

except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this
court in at least two cases, arising under
different facts, and in both it was held
that said statute did not create any
liability or cause of action against the
state where none existed before, but
merely gave an additional remedy to
enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been
enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs.
State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887
gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all
claims against the commonwealth, whether at
law or in equity," with an exception not
necessary to be here mentioned. In construing
this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose
no intention to create against the state
a new and heretofore unrecognized
class of liabilities, but only an intention
to provide a judicial tribunal where well
recognized existing liabilities can be
adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the
board of the canal claims had, by the terms of
the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims
for damages for injuries in the management of
the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be
conceded that the state can be made liable for
injuries arising from the negligence of its
agents or servants, only by force of some
positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not
operate to extend the Government's liability to
any cause not previously recognized, we will
now examine the substantive law touching the
defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5
of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it
acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the

preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the
scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for
damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated,
by
his
own
fault
or
negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office,
because
neither
fault
nor
even
negligence can be presumed on the part
of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all
foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves
the general weal an that of private
persons interested in its operation.
Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can
arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of
acquiring
rights
and
contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16,
book 4, regulates the obligations which
arise out of fault or negligence; and
whereas in the first article thereof. No.
1902, where the general principle is laid
down that where a person who by an act
or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done,
reference is made to acts or omissions
of the persons who directly or indirectly
cause the damage, the following articles
refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who
maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the
damage, because the law presumes that
in consequence of such relations the evil
caused by their own fault or negligence
is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof,

however, because, as held in the last
paragraph of article 1903, responsibility
for acts of third persons ceases when
the persons mentioned in said article
prove that they employed all the
avoid the damage, and among these
persons, called upon to answer in a
direct and not a subsidiary manner, are
found, in addition to the mother or the
father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment
or enterprise, the state, but not always,
except when it acts through the agency
of a special agent, doubtless because
and only in this case, the fault or
negligence, which is the original basis of
this kind of objections, must be
presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state
might by virtue of the general principle
set forth in article 1902 respond for all
the damage that is occasioned to
private parties by orders or resolutions
which by fault or negligence are made
by
branches
of
the
central
administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as
an external expression of its sovereignty
in the exercise of its executive powers,
yet said article is not applicable in the
case of damages said to have been
occasioned to the petitioners by an
executive official, acting in the exercise
of his powers, in proceedings to enforce
the collections of certain property taxes
owing by the owner of the property
which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is
limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is
one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a
special
official)
so
that
in
representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations."
(Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;

98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others,
of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts
through
a
special
agent,
duly
empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said
entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class
referred
to,
has
by
erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
(Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the
Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
liable, according to the above quoted decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of
its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that
the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
appealed from must be reversed, without costs
in this instance. Whether the Government
intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefor, we are not called
upon to determine. This matter rests solely
with the Legislature and not with the courts.
G.R. No. L-1120
August 31, 1948
INOCENCIO
ROSETE, petitioner, vs.
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the

Insular Auditor denying the claim of Inocencio
Rosete and others against the Government in
the amount of P35,376, for damages caused to
buildings belonging to the claimant, which
according to the appellant's claim were
destroyed by fire that came from the
contiguous warehouse of the Emergency
Control Administration, ECA, located at No.
2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a
certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting
recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five
gallon drum into which gasoline was being
drained, and of the officers of the said ECA,
which is an office or agency of the
Government, in storing gasoline in said
warehouse contrary to the provisions of
Ordinances of the City of Manila.
It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts
alleged by the appellant, but only on the
question whether, assuming them to be true,
the Insular Auditor erred in denying or
dismissing the appellant's claim.
The claimant contends that the Auditor
General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known
as the Emergency Control Administration of
the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence
in
storing
a
highly
combustible
and
inflammable substance in its warehouse on
bodega in Manila in violation of City
Ordinances, and therefore the government is
liable for the damages sustained by the
claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by
the preceding article is enforceable not
only for personal acts and omissions but
also for those persons for whom another
is responsible.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The state is liable in the scene when it

caused by the official to whom it
properly pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions
of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
THE
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311), this Court
held the following:
. . . Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the

Civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it
caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in
which cast the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining
the scope of this paragraph said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for
damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated,
by
his
own
fault
or
negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damage
suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office,
because
neither
fault
nor
even
negligence can be presumed on the part
of the state in the organization of
branches of the public service and the
appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all
foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves
the general weal and that of private
persons interested in its operation.
Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can
arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of
acquiring
rights
and
contracting
obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.).
xxx
xxx
xxx
"That the responsibility of the state is

limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is
one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a
special
official)
so
that
in
representation of the state and being

bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations."
(Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;
98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.).
"That according to paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others,
of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts
through
a
special
agent,
duly
empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility. Consequently, the
trial court in not so deciding and in
sentencing the said entity to the
payment of damages, caused by an
official of the second class referred to,
has
by
erroneous
interpretation
infringed the provisions of article 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code.' (Supreme
Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur.
Civ., 146.)"
There being no showing that whatever
negligence may be imputed to the Emergency
Control Administration or its officers, was done
by an special agent, because the officers of the
Emergency Control Administration did not act
as special agents of the government within the
above defined meaning of that word in article
1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in
warehouse of the ECA, the government is not
responsible for the damages caused through
such negligence.
The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39
Phil., 29, cited by the appellant, is inapplicable,
because the plaintiff in that case recovered
under the special provisions of articles 862,
827, 828 and 830 of the Code of Commerce
and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the
Collector of Customs, regarding collision of
vessels, and not on the ground of tort in
general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil

Code.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims
against the Government with the Insular
Auditor, and appeal by the private persons or
entities from the latter's decision to the
Supreme Court, does not make any and all
claims against the Government allowable, and
the latter responsible for all claims which may
be filed with the Insular Auditor under the
provisions of said Act.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE
INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, appellant, vs. SPOUSES
JOSE
FONTANILLA
and
VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA, appellees.
Constitutional Law; Immunity from suit;
Liability of State for torts has two aspects.
the liability of the State has two aspects,
namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects
where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects
(as when it engages in private enterprises)
where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines:
Annotated, Paras 1986 Ed.)
Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Torts; The State
assumes a limited liability for the damage
caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its
special agent.In this jurisdiction, the State
assumes a limited liability for the damage
caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its
special agent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of
assumption of the States liability for acts done
through special agents who are either public
officials or private individuals.Under the
aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the
State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts
done through special agents. The States
agent, if a public official, must not only be
specially commissioned to do a particular task
but that such task must be foreign to said

officials usual governmental functions. If the
States agent is not a public official, and is
commissioned to perform non-governmental
functions, then the State assumes the role of
an ordinary employer and will be held liable as
such for its agents tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual
for a special governmental task, it is acting
through a special agent within the meaning of
the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p.
347, 1984 Ed.)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability of
State for tort liability when functions and
activities
are
either
governmental
or
proprietary.Certain functions and activities,
which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed
to be governmental in character, and so the
State is immune from tort liability. On the other
hand, a service which might as well be
provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it,
the function is considered a proprietary one,
as to which there may be liability for the torts
of agents within the scope of their
employment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National
Irrigation Administration is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the Government; Since the NIA
is
a
corporate
body
performing
nongovernmental functions, it becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident
resulting from the tortious acts of its driveremployer.Indubitably,
the
NIA
is
a
government
corporation
with
juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body
performing non-governmental functions, it now
becomes liable for the damage caused by the
accident resulting from the tortious act of its
driver-employee. In this particular case, the
NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Assumption
of liability by NIA ispredicated upon the
existence of its negligence, which is the
negligence of supervision.This assumption of
liability, however, is predicated upon the
existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to
here is the negligence of supervision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that the
accident happened in an urban area and within
the city limits and that the victim was thrown

50 meters away from the point of impact,
means that the driver was driving at high
speed.It should be emphasized that the
accident happened along the Marikina National
Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an
urban area. Considering the fact that the
victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication
that driver
Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is
confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as abovedescribed and the fact that the NIA group was
then in a hurry to reach the campsite as early
as possible, as shown by their not stopping to
find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There was
negligence in the supervision of the driver as
they were travelling at a high speed within city
limits.Evidently, there was negligence in the
supervision of the driver for the reason that
they were travelling at a high speed within the
city limits and yet the supervisor of the group,
Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the city. Under the situation, such
negligence is further aggravated by their
desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus
showing imprudence and recklessness on the
part of both the driver and the supervisor in
the group.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the
employer can prove the diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee, it
would still be liable if he ratifies the wrongful
acts or take no step to avert further damage.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if
the employer can prove the diligence in the
selection and supervision (the latter aspect
has not been established herein) of the
employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts,
or take no step to avert further damage, the
employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597.)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Driver guilty
of negligence.Thus, too, in the case of Vda.
de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held
that a driver should be especially watchful in
anticipation of others who may be using the
highway, and his failure to keep a proper look
out for reasons and objects in the line to be

traversed constitutes negligence.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of
the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Br. 8, San Jose City.
PARAS, J.:
In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on
certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision
dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San
Jose City and its modification with respect to
the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National
Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of
the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The
original appeal of this case before the Court of
Appeals was certified to this Court and in the
resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with
the aforecited number. And in the resolution of
April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R.
No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about
6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration,
a government agency bearing Plate No. IN651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver,
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along
the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the
impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto
Deligo were injured and brought to the San
Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment.
Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent
National Irrigation Administration who, at the
time of the accident, was a licensed
professional driver and who qualified for
employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written
and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National
Irrigation Administration authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the
action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by
petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against
respondent NIA before the then Court of First

Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose
City, for damages in connection with the death
of their son resulting from the aforestated
accident.
spouses individually and

in
varying
amounts depending upon proof of
mental and depth of intensity of the
same, which should not be less than
P50,000.00 for each of them.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on

March 20, 1980 which directed respondent
National Irrigation Administration to pay
damages (death benefits) and actual expenses
to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads thus:
2. The decision of the trial court had

made an impression that respondent
National Irrigation Administration acted
with gross negligence because of the
accident and the subsequent failure of
the National Irrigation Administration
personnel including the driver to stop in
order to give assistance to the, victims.
Thus, by reason of the gross negligence
of respondent, petitioners become
entitled to exemplary damages under
Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil
Code.
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered

ordering
the
defendant
National
Irrigation Administration to pay to the
heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the
death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00
which the parents of the deceased had
spent for the hospitalization and burial
of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla;
and to pay the costs. (Brief for the
petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration
filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which
respondent trial court denied in its Order of
June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration thus appealed said decision to
the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R)
where it filed its brief for appellant in support
of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the
aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners
filed the instant petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is:
Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is
legally proper in a complaint for damages
based on quasi-delict which resulted in the
death of the son of herein petitioners.
Petitioners allege:
1. The award of moral damages is
specifically allowable. under paragraph
3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code
which provides that the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Should moral damages be
granted, the award should be made to
each
of
petitioners58 | V i c a r i o u s L i a b i l i t y
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of

attorney's fees, the amount of which
(20%) had been sufficiently established
in the hearing of May 23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for
the purpose of reviewing the findings of
the lower court upon which the
disallowance
of
moral
damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees
was based and not for the purpose of
disturbing the other findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for
public
respondent
National
Irrigation
Administration, contends thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot
proper in view of the appeal taken by
respondent
National
Irrigation
Administration to the Court of Appeals
against the judgment sought to be
reviewed. The focal issue raised in
respondent's appeal to the Court of
Appeals involves the question as to
whether or not the driver of the vehicle
that bumped the victims was negligent
in his operation of said vehicle. It thus
becomes
necessary
that
before
petitioners'
claim
for
moral
and
exemplary damages could be resolved,
there should first be a finding of
negligence on the part of respondent's
employee-driver. In this regard, the
Solicitor General alleges that the trial
court decision does not categorically
contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and

Urgent Motion For Leave to File PlaintiffAppellee's Brief" dated December 28,
1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CAG.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045)
of the respondent National Irrigation
Administration before the Court of
Appeals, is an explicit admission of said
petitioners that the herein petition, is
not proper. Inconsistent procedures are
manifest because while petitioners
question the findings of fact in the Court
of Appeals, they present only the
questions of law before this Court which
posture confirms their admission of the
facts.
3. The fact that the parties failed to
agree on whether or not negligence
caused the vehicular accident involves a
question of fact which petitioners should
have brought to the Court of Appeals
within the reglementary period. Hence,
the decision of the trial court has
become final as to the petitioners and
for this reason alone, the petition should
be dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his
jurisdiction, sound discretion and in
conformity with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners'
claim to moral and exemplary damages
by reason of the shock and subsequent
illness they suffered because of the
death of their son. Respondent National
Irrigation Administration, however, avers
that it cannot be held liable for the
damages because it is an agency of the
State
performing
governmental
functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a
regular driver of the vehicle, not a
special agent who was performing a job
or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence,
the liability for the tortious act should.
not be borne by respondent government
agency but by driver Garcia who should
answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the
failure or laxity of respondent National
Irrigation Administration in exercising
due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, the matter
of due diligence is not an issue in this
case since driver Garcia was not its
special agent but a regular driver of the
vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not

petitioners may be entitled to an award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees can very well be answered with the
application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew
Civil Code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing cotractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as
follows:
scope of their assigned tasks, even the
The State is responsible in like manner
when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects.
namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects
where it is liable for the tortious acts of
special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as
when it engages in private enterprises)
where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the
Philippines;
Annotated,
Paras; 1986
Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited
liability for the damage caused by the tortious
acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art.
2180, the State has voluntarily assumed
liability for acts done through special agents.
The State's agent, if a public official, must not
only be specially commissioned to do a
particular task but that such task must be

foreign to said official's usual governmental
functions. If the State's agent is not a public
official, and is commissioned to perform nongovernmental functions, then the State
assumes the role of an ordinary employer and
will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
Where the government commissions a private
individual for a special governmental task, it is
acting through a special agent within the
meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages,
Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be
performed only by the government, are more
or less generally agreed to be "governmental"
in character, and so the State is immune from
tort liability. On the other hand, a service which
might as well be provided by a private
corporation, and particularly when it collects
revenues from it, the function is considered a
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be
liability for the torts of agents within the scope
of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an
agency
of
the
government
exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of
Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act
provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body
corporate is hereby created which shall
be known as the National Irrigation
Administration, hereinafter called the
NIA for short, which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this
Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for
the proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the
NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA
shall have the following powers and
objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each
irrigation system constructed by it such
fees as may be necessary to finance the
continuous operation of the system and
reimburse within a certain period not
less than twenty-five years cost of

construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to
transact all such business as are directly
or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the
above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the
damage caused by the accident resulting from
the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the
responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
such, it becomes answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is
predicated upon the existence of negligence
on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence
referred to here is the negligence of
supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on
the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial
issue in determining its liability since it has
been established that respondent is a
government agency performing proprietary
functions and as such, it assumes the posture
of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of
Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages
caused by its employees provided that it has
failed to observe or exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of
the trial court that "as a result of the impact,
Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance
50 meters away from the point of impact while
Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further
away. The impact took place almost at the
edge of the cemented portion of the road."
(Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a
speeding vehicle coming in contact with a
person causes force and impact upon the
vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail
to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was
so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle
suffered dents on the right side of the radiator
guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the
radiator as shown by the investigation
report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page
29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident

happened along the Maharlika National Road
within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban
area. Considering the fact that the victim was
thrown 50 meters away from the point of
impact, there is a strong indication that driver
Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is
confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as abovedescribed and the fact that the NIA group was
then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early
as possible", as shown by their not stopping to
find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the
supervision of the driver for the reason that
they were travelling at a high speed within the
city limits and yet the supervisor of the group,
Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the city. Under the situation, such
negligence is further aggravated by their
desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus
showing imprudence and reckelessness on the
part of both the driver and the supervisor in
the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if
the employer can prove the diligence in the
selection and supervision (the latter aspect
has not been established herein) of the
employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts,
or take no step to avert further damage, the
employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs.
B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should
be especially watchful in anticipation of others
who may be using the highway, and his failure
to keep a proper look out for reasons and
objects in the line to be traversed constitutes
negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is
hereby directed to pay herein petitionersspouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the
death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for
hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral
damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages
and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
D. TEACHERS &
ESTABLISHMENTS
HEADS
OF
ACADEMICS
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON
A.
AMADORA,
JOSE
A.
AMADORA
III,
LUCY
A.
AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA,
SERREC
A.
AMADORA,
VICENTE
A.
AMADORA
and
MARIA
TISCALINA
A.
AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
COLEGIO
DE
SAN
JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
natural
guardians,
MR.
and
MRS.
NICANOR
GUMBAN,
and
ROLANDO
VALENCIA,
thru
his
guardian,
A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo
Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would
ascend the stage and in the presence of his
relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on
April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were
in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence
. 2 Additionally,
the
herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil

action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal,
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students,
through
their
respective
parents.
The
complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance
of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00,
representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses,
moral
damages,
exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to
the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved . 4
returned it to him without making a report to

the principal or taking any further action . 6 As
Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon
when the latter fired the gun that killed
Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was
the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have
been killed if it had not been returned by
Damaso. The respondents say, however, that
there is no proof that the gun was the same
firearm that killed Alfredo.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this

petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts
and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were
not in the custody of the school at the time of
the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of
the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury. 5
Lastly,
teachers
or
heads
of
establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody.
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo

Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate.
On the implications and consequences of these
facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in
the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics
report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already
ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the
gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from
Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later
Resolution of all these disagreements will

depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
which, as it happens, is invoked by both
parties in support of their conflicting positions.
The pertinent part of this article reads as
follows:
Three cases have so far been decided by the

Court in connection with the above-quoted
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado
v.
Court
of
Appeals, 8 and
Palisoc
v.
9
Brillantes. These will be briefly reviewed in
this opinion for a better resolution of the case
at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student
of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy
Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After
the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over
its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of
its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In
the separate civil action flied against them, his
father was held solidarily liable with him in
damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180)
of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the
15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice
Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated
the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was
riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and
Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that
it was the school authorities who should be
held liable Liability under this rule, he said,
was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular.
The
modifying
clause
"of
establishments of arts and trades" should
apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case,
and with an elaboration. A student cut a
classmate with a razor blade during recess
time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon
City, and the parents of the victim sued the
culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter
(as the school itself had also not been sued
that the school was not liable because it was
not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not
been proved as this "contemplates a situation
where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part
but the other members of the court concurred
in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4,
1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer who was already of age was
not boarding in the school, the head thereof
and the teacher in charge were held solidarily
liable with him. The Court declared through
Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article
"so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing
in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student
who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were
covered by the provision since they were
equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three
others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining
the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to

torts committed by students not yet of age as
the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed
with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case
but added that "since the school involved at
bar is a non-academic school, the question as
to the applicability of the cited codal provision
to academic institutions will have to await
another case wherein it may properly be
raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de
San
Jose-Recoletos
has
been
directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable
under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of
whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the
problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting
opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting
Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic
ones.
What
substantial
difference is there between them insofar
as concerns the proper supervision and
vice over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic
teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a
tort to the detriment of third Persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise
authority and Supervision over the pupil.
In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and
trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades" does
not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of

vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem
to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such
vigilance where the school is non-academic.
Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused
by the student and not by the school itself nor
is it a result of the operations of the school or
its equipment. The injury contemplated may
be caused by any student regardless of the
school where he is registered. The teacher
certainly should not be able to excuse himself
by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the
head would be held liable if the school were
non-academic.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the

basis of the presumption of negligence
of
Art.
1903
in
some culpa
in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
are supposed to have incurred in the
exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places
the child under the effective authority of
the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable
for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason/that the
parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction. And
if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the

teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in
a school of arts and trades? And in the case of
the academic or non- technical school, why not
apply the rule also to the head thereof instead
of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
There is really no substantial distinction

between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching.
The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado
Cases is that the provision would make the
teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort
were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the
school head. All other circumstances being the
same, the teacher or the head of the academic
school would be absolved whereas the teacher
and the head of the non-academic school
would be held liable, and simply because the
latter is a school of arts and trades.
The reason for the disparity can be traced to

the fact that historically the head of the school
of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged
in
the
training
of
artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the
task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was
not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers
who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be
so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of
the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and

personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to
its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in
the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit
to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration
of the responsibility of the teacher or the head
of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive
with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly
admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes,
does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury. This does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes
and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period,
such as the period of registration, and in the
case of graduating students, the period before
the commencement exercises. In the view of
the Court, the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student
comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and
thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon
the last day of classes notwithstanding that
there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances
and the like. During such periods, the student
is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its
rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is
in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of
a legitimate student right, and even in the

enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way
that the parents are responsible for the child
when he is in their custody. The teacher-incharge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of
the injury, the teacher be physically present
and in a position to prevent it. Custody does
not connote immediate and actual physical
control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled
in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for
the injuries caused by the student, the teacher
and not the parent shag be held responsible if
the tort was committed within the premises of
the school at any time when its authority could
be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the
liability imposed by this article is supposed to
fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the
general principle of respondeat superior, but
then it may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of
a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to
the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180, which
also states that:
article shall cease when the Persons

father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that
the teacher will be held liable not only when he
is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of
minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the
act of the student under him regardless of the
student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case,
liability attached to the teacher and the head
of the technical school although the wrongdoer
was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180
treats the parent more favorably than the
teacher.
The
Court
is
not
unmindful
of
the
apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal
in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the
school may be unduly exposed to liability
under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to
cause violence and resulting injuries in the
school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that,
under the present ruling, it is not the school
that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the
defense of due diligence is available to it in
case it is sought to be held answerable as
principal for the acts or omission of its head or
the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers
and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils
pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In
almost all cases now, in fact, these measures
are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the
students. Ms should bolster the claim of the
school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by
its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this
defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold
him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in
the school premises and presumably under his
influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed
not to expect from the teacher the same
measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not
equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can
expect more obedience from the child because

the latter's dependence on him is greater than
on the teacher. It need not be stressed that
such dependence includes the child's support
and sustenance whereas submission to the
teacher's influence, besides being coterminous
with the period of custody is usually enforced
only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las
discipline on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than
the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the
article in question, the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or
apprentice even if he is already of age and
therefore less tractable than the minor then
there should all the more be justification to
require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove
reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under
the former's control, there is then all the more
reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the
Court has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally
shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes
had formally ended. It was immaterial if he
was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics experiment or merely to submit his
physics report for what is important is that he
was there for a legitimate purpose. As
previously observed, even the mere savoring
of the company of his friends in the premises
of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of
the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in
charge of particular classes or sections and
thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student
was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had

gone to school that day in connection with his
physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the
teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline
upon Daffon or that he had waived observance
of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on
that day. And while it is true that the offending
student was still in the custody of the teacherin-charge even if the latter was physically
absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his
laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had
exercised
due
diligence,
through
the
enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador
as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly
liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither
can it be held to answer for the tort committed
by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending
student or has been remiss in the discharge of
his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as
disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that
resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium

of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April
13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic
circumstances
here
related,
we
nevertheless are unable to extend them the
material relief they seek, as a balm to their
grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA
P.
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO
V. VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and
trades, known under the name and style
of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.),
VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions
of law from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteenyear old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student
in automotive mechanics at the Manila
Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila,
had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for
damages arising from the death on March 10,
1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow
student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the
laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are:
"(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the
time when the incident which gave rise to his
action occurred was a member of the Board of
Directors of the institute; 1 the defendant
Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the
defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of
the class to which the deceased belonged; and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased. At the beginning the
Manila Technical Institute was a single
proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it
was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of
plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial
court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were

classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10,
1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio
Cruz were in the laboratory room located on
the ground floor. At that time the classes were
in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon
were working on a machine while Dominador
Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon
made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was
acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.
Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat
blow on the face, which was followed by other
fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died.
The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness
to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this
version of the incident, as testified to by the
lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate
of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested
witness who "has no motive or reason to
testify one way or another in favor of any
party" and rejected the self-exculpatory
version of defendant Daffon denying that he
had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo
Singian of the Manila Police Department who
performed the autopsy re "Cause of death:
shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th
and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and
stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and
slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain,"
and his testimony that these internal injuries of
the deceased were caused "probably by strong
fist blows," the trial court found defendant
Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. 3 It held that "(T)he act,
therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the
deceased strong fistblows in the stomach
which ruptured his internal organs and caused
his death falls within the purview of this article
of the Code." 4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability
the three other defendants-officials of the
Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the

provisions of Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and
students and apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of
the Code is not applicable to the case at
bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence
of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and
actions by the pupil supersedes those of
the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180.
NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED:
The clause "so long as they
remain
in
their
custody"
contained in Article 2180 of the
new civil code contemplated a
situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such
that the control or influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In those circumstances
the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil
as well as the responsibilities for
their sort would pass from the
father
and
mother
to
the
teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado,
Petitioner vs. the Court of
Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.,
et al., respondents, G.R. No. L14862, May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the accused
Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials
of the school. These defendants cannot
therefore be made responsible for the
tort of the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial
court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of
the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador
Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00

for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for
loss of earning power, considering that
the deceased was only between sixteen
and seventeen years, and in good health
when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for
attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3.
Dismissing
the
defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal
question that under the factual findings of the
trial court, which are now beyond review, the
trial court erred in absolving the defendantsschool officials instead of holding them jointly
and severally liable as tortfeasors, with
defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded
them as a result of their son's death. The Court
finds the appeal, in the main, to be
meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school
officials on the ground that the provisions of
Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades ... liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students and apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody," are not
applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is
no evidence that the accused Daffon [who
inflicted the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendantsofficials of the school. These defendants
cannot therefore be made responsible for the
tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion
expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs.
Court of Appeals, 7 that "(I)t would seem that
the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody," contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father and mother to the teacher; and
so would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the
case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school
during school hours and go back to their
homes with their parents after school is over."
This dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor
son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at
Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to

the case] should be held responsible, rather
than him as father, for the moral damages of
P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a
classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a
piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way
of medical expenses to treat and cure, since
the wound left no scar.] The moral damages
award was after all set aside by the Court on
the ground that none of the specific cases
provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for
awarding
moral
damages
had
been
established, petitioner's son being only nine
years old and not having been shown to have
"acted with discernment" in inflicting the
injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on
another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde
vs. Capuno, 8 where the only issue involved as
expressly stated in the decision, was whether
the therein defendant-father could be civilly
liable for damages resulting from a death
caused in a motor vehicle accident driven
unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor
son, (which issue was resolved adversely
against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum
in such earlier case that "It is true that under
the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage
caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody, but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational
institution" was expressly cited and quoted
in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly
against the school officials and squarely raises
the issue of liability of teachers and heads of
schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for
damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at
fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the
tragic incident. There is no question, either,
that the school involved is a non-academic
school, 9 the Manila Technical Institute being
admittedly
a
technical
vocational
and
industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal
article, defendants head and teacher of the
Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton
and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly
and severally for damages to plaintiffsappellants for the death of the latter's minor
son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the
school's laboratory room. No liability attaches

to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of
the school's board of directors. The school
itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it
has not been properly impleaded as party
defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so
implead
it,
by
impleading
improperly
defendant
Brillantes,
its
former
single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had
been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and
therefore
the
school
itself,
as
thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as
party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his codefendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request
for admission had expressly manifested and
made of record that "defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of
the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
corporation and is not owned by any individual
person." 10
3. The rationale of such liability of school
heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child." 11 This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the
Civil Code. 12 In the law of torts, the governing
principle is that the protective custody of the
school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence,
it becomes their obligation as well as that of
the school itself to provide proper supervision
of the students' activities during the whole
time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students
in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including
injuries that some student themselves may
inflict willfully or through negligence on their
fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde,
"the basis of the presumption of negligence of
Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of
their authority" 13 and "where the parent
places the child under the effective authority
of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the
very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor
with the authority and supervision of the

teacher while the child is under instruction."
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for
the fault or negligence of its school head and
teachers under the same cited article. 14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in
absolving defendants-school officials on the
ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student
who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with
his teacher or the other defendants officials of
the school." As stated above, the phrase used
in the cited article "so long as (the students)
remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by
the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as
president and teacher-in-charge of the school
must therefore be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant
Daffon in the latter's having caused the death
of his classmate, the deceased Dominador
Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from
the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants
but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of
fellow students or other parties. At any rate,
the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with
the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code,
by "(proving) that they observed all the
prevent damage." In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption
from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the
award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death
of their son should be increased to P12,000.00
as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, 15 and
observed in all death indemnity cases
thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja,
after noting the decline in the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its

"considered opinion that the amount of award
of compensatory damages for death caused by
a
crime
or quasi-delict should
now
be
P12,000.00." The Court thereby adjusted the
minimum amount of "compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as
per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old
stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00,
which amount is to be awarded "even though
there
may
have
been
mitigating
circumstances" pursuant to the express
provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal
that the lower court should have awarded
exemplary damages and imposed legal
interest on the total damages awarded,
besides increasing the award of attorney's fees
all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has
not been shown any error or abuse in the
exercise of such discretion on the part of the
trial court. 16 Decisive here is the touchstone
provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that
"In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." No gross negligence on the part
of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages,
as well as of interest and increased attorney's
fees, and the Court has not been shown in this
appeal any compelling reason to disturb such
finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
modified so as to provide as follows: .
1.
Sentencing
the defendants Virgilio
L.
Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.
Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs
as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages;
(d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and
(e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs
of
this
action in
both
instances;
2.
absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from
the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants'
counterclaims
G.R. No. 143363
2002
February 6,
ST.
MARY'S
ACADEMY, petitioner, vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL
II,
JAMES
DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO

VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the
resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an
accident that resulted in the death of a student
who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only
son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June
9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog
City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following
sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00)
actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial
and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for
attorneys fees;
d.
FIVE
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay
costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary,
defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel
are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the
amount of damages above-stated in the event
of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys

Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at
the time of the commission of the tort and who
was under special parental authority of
defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED
from paying the above-stated damages, same
being adjudged against defendants St. Marys
Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby
ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this
decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED." (Decision, pp. 32-33;
Records, pp. 205-206)."
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20
February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 19951996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was
the
visitation
of
schools
from
where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along
with other high school students were riding in
a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. Allegedly, the
latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident." 2
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reducing the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise
affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys
Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding the petitioner liable for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in

affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys
Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the
Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in
not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and
responsibility
applies
to
all
authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies
to field trips, excursions and other affairs of
the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody. 10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to
the accident.11
"In order that there may be a recovery for an
injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be
the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and
the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless
it is the proximate cause of the injury

complained of. And the proximate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."12
In this case, the respondents failed to show
that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the
cause of the accident was the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence,
the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva.
Respondents,
including
the
spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report
and testimony of the traffic investigator who
stated that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that "those
given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor" was
unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to
drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James
Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering

wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence,
unbroken
by
any
efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner
St. Marys Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise
cannot be held liable for moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly
liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay
death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of
attorneys fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.15 The power of
the court to award attorneys fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal and equitable justification.16 Thus, the
grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner
is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the
registered
owner
of
the
vehicle
was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in
fact admitted this fact.1wphi1 We have held
that the registered owner of any vehicle, even
if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons
for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or

streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals18 and that of the trial court. 19 The
Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants,
excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy,
Dipolog City.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82465
February 25, 1991
ST.
FRANCIS
HIGH
SCHOOL,
as
represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES
AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN
ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO
VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA
CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of
the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal
is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages
in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby
awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the
actual damages of P30,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's
fees in the amount of P15,000.00
awarded to plaintiffs in the decision
under appeal; (2) St. Francis High
School, represented by the Spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula,
and Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held

jointly
and
severally
liable
with
defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de
Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis
for the payment to plaintiffs of the
abovementioned actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3)
Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones
are hereby absolved from liability, and
the case against them, together with
their respective counterclaims, is hereby
ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo,
then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the
St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's
parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of
short notice, did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the
teachers for the picnic, with the directive that
he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the
beach.
During the picnic and while the students,
including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of
the female teachers was apparently drowning.
Some of the students, including Ferdinand,
came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore
failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in
Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel
General Hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena
City, against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes
and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its
principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves,
Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones,
Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which
respondents allegedly incurred from the death
of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo.
Contending that the death of their son was due
to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the
proper diligence of a good father of the family
in
preventing
their
son's
drowning,
respondents prayed of actual, moral and
exemplary damages,
expenses for litigation.
attorney's
fees
and
The trial court found in favor of the

respondents and against petitioners-teachers
Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and
Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally
to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as
actual
damages,
P20,000.00
as
moral
damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence
presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie
Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves,
Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria
Cadiz had failed to exercise the
diligence required of them by law under
the circumstances to guard against the
harm
they
had
foreseen.
(pp.
2930, Rollo)
xxx
xxx
xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants

Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at
the picnic site, the drowning incident
had already occurred, such fact does not
and cannot excuse them from their
liability. In fact, it could be said that by
coming late, they were remiss in their
duty to safeguard the students. (p.
30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then
(12 to 13 years old), were easily
attracted
to
the
sea
without
aforethought of the dangers it offers.
Yet, the precautions and reminders
allegedly performed by the defendantsteachers definitely fell short of the
standard required by law under the
circumstances. While the defendantsteachers admitted that some parts of
the sea where the picnic was held are
deep, the supposed lifeguards of the
children did not even actually go to the
water to test the depth of the particular
area where the children would swim.
And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs
that the picnic area was dangerous was
confirmed by the fact that three persons
during the picnic got drowned at the
same time. Had the defendant teachers
made
an
actual
and
physical
observation of the water before they
allowed the students to swim, they
could have found out that the area
where the children were swimming was

indeed dangerous. And not only that,
the male teachers who according to the
female teachers were there to supervise
the children to ensure their safety were
not even at the area where the children
were swimming. They were somewhere
and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness
they were having a drinking spree. (pp.
55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed
the case against the St. Francis High School,
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the
court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this
Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school
sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence
has been shown to hold defendants
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna
responsible for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo
together
with
the
other
defendant teachers. It has been
sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin
had himself not consented to the picnic
and in fact he did not join it. On the
other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna
had then her own class to supervise and
in fact she was not amongst those
allegedly invited by defendant Connie
Arquio to supervise class I-C to which
Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses
assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring
the defendant St. Francis High School
and its administrator/principal Benjamin
Illumin as equally liable not only for its
approved co-curricular activities but also
for those which they unreasonably failed
to exercise control and supervision like
the holding of picnic in the dangerous
water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
the St. Francis High School and principal
Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily
liable with their co-defendants-teachers
Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic
death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last
March 20, 1982.

higher amount for actual and moral
damages for the untimely and tragic
death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants against all the
defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission
well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in
question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be
gainsaid that the same was held under
the
supervision
of
the
teachers
employed
by
the
said
school,
particularly the teacher in charge of
Class I-C to whom the victim belonged,
and those whom she invited to help her
in supervising the class during the
picnic. Considering that the court a
quo found negligence on the part of the
six defendants-teachers who, as such,
were charged with the supervision of the
children during the picnic, the St. Francis
High School and the school principal,
Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article
2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th
and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. They cannot escape
liability on the mere excuse that the
picnic was not an "extra-curricular
activity of the St. Francis High School."
We find from the evidence that, as
claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the
school principal had knowledge of the
picnic even from its planning stage and
had even been invited to attend the
affair; and yet he did not express any
prohibition against undertaking the
picnic, nor did he prescribe any
precautionary measures to be adopted
during the picnic. At the least, We must
find that the school and the responsible
school
officials,
particularly
the
principal,
Benjamin
Illumin,
had
acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under
Article
2180, supra, the
defendant school and defendant school
principal must be found jointly and
severally liable with the defendantsteachers for the damages incurred by
the plaintiffs as a result of the death of
their son. It is the rule that in cases
where the above-cited provisions find
application, the negligence of the
employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of

negligence on the part of the owner
and/or manager of the establishment (in
the present case, St. Francis High School
and its principal); and while this
presumption is not conclusive, it may be
overthrown only by clear and convincing
proof that the owner and/or manager
exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection
and/or supervision of the employee or
employees causing the injury or damage
(in this case, the defendants-teachers).
The record does not disclose such
evidence as would serve to overcome
the aforesaid presumption and absolve
the St. Francis High School and its
principal from liability under the abovecited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed
by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot
but commiserate with the plaintiffs for
the tragedy that befell them in the
untimely death of their son Ferdinand
Castillo and understand their suffering
as parents, especially the victim's
mother who, according to appellants,
suffered a nervous breakdown as a
result of the tragedy, We find that the
amounts fixed by the court a quo as
actual damages and moral damages
(P30,000.00
and
P20,000.00,
respectively) are reasonable and are
those which are sustained by the
evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or
corrective damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is
hereby, imposed in the present case by
way of example of correction for the
public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of
the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers
assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie
Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria
Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly
and severally liable for damages such
finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim

interposed by the defendants. (p.
59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The
main
thrust
of
defendantsappellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the
parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo,
were not able to prove by their evidence
that they did not give their son consent
to join the picnic in question. However,
We agree with the trial court in its
finding that whether or not the victim's
parents had given such permission to
their son was immaterial to the
determination of the existence of
liability on the part of the defendants for
the damage incurred by the plaintiffsappellants as a result of the death of
their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there
was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of
the victim's group during the picnic;
and, as correctly found by the trial
court, an affirmative reply to this
question
has
been
satisfactorily
established by the evidence, as already
pointed out.
However,
We
sustain
defendantsappellants insofar as two of the
defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones, are concerned. As to them,
the trial court found:
While it is alleged that when
defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic
site, the drowning incident had
already occurred, such fact does
not and cannot excuse them from
their liability. In fact, it could be
said that by coming late, they
were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two
defendants had satisfactorily explained
why they were late in going to the picnic
site, namely, that they had to attend to
the
entrance
examination
being
conducted by the school which is part of
their duty as teachers thereof. Since
they were not at the picnic site during
the occurrence in question, it cannot be
said that they had any participation in
the negligence attributable to the other
defendants-teachers who failed to

exercise diligence in the supervision of
the children during the picnic and which
failure resulted in the drowning of
plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not
attribute any act or omission to the two
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones,
as to make them liable for the injury
caused to the plaintiffs because of the
death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they
must be absolved from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised
by defendants-appellants, We agree
with
the
court a
quo that
the
counterclaim must be dismissed for lack
of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence
attributable to the defendants which will
warrant the award of damages to the
plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation
to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of
exemplary and moral damages is proper
under the circumstances surrounding
the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave
due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence,
this is because of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. In the
instant case however, as will be shown
hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of
their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at
all of any negligence. Consequently they
cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that
respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the
excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam.

by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for
money to buy food, did you not ask him
where he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he
answered, I am going to the picnic, and
when I asked him where, he did not
answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did
not tell him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that
your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the
news that your son was drowned in the
picnic came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to
12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982,
you did not know that your son join the
picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during
that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that
is why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that
your son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too
busy that you did not inquire whether
your son have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984
witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy
food for the picnic even without knowing
where it will be held, is a sign of consent for
his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of
examination:
Dr. Lazaro
on
cross
Q How did you conduct this mental and

physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons
and the patient herself She even felt
guilty about the death of her son
because she cooked adobo for him so
he could join the excursion where her
son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was
feeling guilty because she was the one
who personally cooked the adobo for her

son?
A It was during the interview that I had
gathered it from the patient herself. She
was very sorry had she not allowed her
son to join the excursion her son would
have not drowned. I don't know if she
actually permitted her son although
she said she cooked adobo so he could
join. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19,
hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro
witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an
error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code
in rendering petitioner school liable for the
death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
xxx
xxx

scope of their assigned tasks, even
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence
of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners
were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers
and students were holding a purely private
affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning
that the incident happened while some
members of the I-C class of St. Francis High
School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach.
This picnic had no permit from the school head
or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this
picnic is not a school sanctioned activity
neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere
knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and

their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the
holding of the same. The application therefore
of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither
is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we
were to affirm the findings of respondent Court
on this score, employers wig forever be
exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed
to Court to answer for the misdeeds or
omissions of the employees even if such act or
omission he committed while they are not in
the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to
the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award
of damages to the respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of IC, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did
her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who
joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de
Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming. Moreover, even respondents'
witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the
defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers
especially brought by the defendants in case of
emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also
show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas
did all what is humanly possible to save the
child.
Testimony
of
examination,
Luisito
Vinas
on
cross
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand

Castillo, you approached the boy and claim
also having applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called
first aid, the children were covering you up or
were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful
condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer
responding to your application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q
You
have
never
been
disturbed,
"nababahala" in the process of your
application of the first aid on the body of

Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the
application of first aid that we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure
and which you claimed the boy did not
respond, were you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the
back to back pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied
the pressure of your body on the body of
Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a
single act of back to back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay
first downwards, then the face was a little bit
facing right and doing it by massaging the
back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing
of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of
examination
Tirso
de
Chavez
on
direct
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or
artificial respiration to the child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the
guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help
of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back
to back pressure and took notice of the
condition of the child. We placed the
feet in a higher position, that of the
head of the child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that
particular position, where the feet were
on a higher level than that of the head,
what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly
myself, was that after putting the child
in that position, I applied the back to
back pressure and started to massage
from the waistline up, but I noticed that
the boy was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back
to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15
seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not
responding, what did you do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not
responding, we changed the position of
the boy by placing the child facing
upwards laying on the sand then we

applied
the
mouth
to
mouth
resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)
BAUTISTA
and
BAUTISTA, respondents.
ARSENIA
D.
PADILLA, J.:
With these facts in mind, no moral nor
exemplary damages may be awarded in favor
of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does
not fall under any of the grounds to grant
moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove,
petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be
assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did
give their consent to their son to join the
picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners
were already relieved of their duty to observe
the required diligence of a good father of a
family in ensuring the safety of the children.
But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to
prove that they had exercised the required
diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or
exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the
questioned
decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and
liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby
SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are
concerned, but the portion of the said decision
dismissing their counterclaim, there being no
merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
OF
BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN
P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO
SACRO
and
LT.
M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA
ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional
Trial
Court,
Manila,
SEGUNDA
R.
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which

caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on
the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court
of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for
damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death,
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year
commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community
but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and
the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President),
Benjamin
P.
Paulino
(VicePresident),
Antonio
M.
Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief
of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
private respondents) sought to adjudge them
liable for the victim's untimely demise due to
their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack
of security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the
victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M.
Soriano terminated his relationship with the
other petitioners by resigning from his position
in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to
have the suit dismissed, alleging that since
they are presumably sued under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the
ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and thru an order dated
8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss.
A
subsequent
motion
for
reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an
order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then
assailed the trial court's disposition before the
respondent appellate court which, in a
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988,
affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August
1988, the respondent appellate court resolved
to
deny
the
petitioners'
motion
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
for
At the outset, it is to be observed that the

respondent appellate court primarily anchored
its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate
court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of
the Civil Code is an adoption from the
old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of
Manresa and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present day
changes. The law is not fixed and
flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact,
the greatest value and significance of
law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its
flexibility to adopt to changing social
conditions and its capacity to meet the
new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day
educational system, Article 2180 cannot
be construed in its narrow concept as
held in the old case of Exconde
vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals; 3hence,
the
ruling
in
the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to
all kinds of educational institutions,
academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers
and heads of the school staff liable
unless they relieve themselves of such
liability pursuant to the last paragraph
of Article 2180 by "proving that they
observed all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be done at a
trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate
court that the motion to dismiss the complaint
was correctly denied and the complaint should
be tried on the merits, we do not however
agree with the premises of the appellate
court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176
of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in
the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and,
more
recently,
in Amadora
vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had
been stressed that the law (Article 2180)
plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of he educational institution sought to
be held liable for the acts of its pupils or

students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present
case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It
does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students
for
enrollment,
there
is
established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide
by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the
implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the
air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace
and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasidelict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from
tort, not one arising from a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for

the view that liability from tort may exist even
if there is a contract, for the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort. (AustroAmerica S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for
even as early as 1918, this Court was already
of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher
elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is
much broader than that of contractual
obligation, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical
human
relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of
the contract would have constituted the
source
of
an
extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the
chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the
airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private
respondent to cater to the comfort of a white
man who allegedly "had a better right to the
seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages
to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be
concluded that should the act which breaches
a contract be done in bad faith and be violative
of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the
act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that
the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security

measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally
to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Using
the
test
of Cangco, supra,
the
negligence of the school would not be relevant
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation
is a condition sine qua non to the school's
liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school,
like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of
its students against all risks. This is specially
true in the populous student communities of
the so-called "university belt" in Manila where
there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to
expect of schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding
the
security
measures
installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the
students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and
place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to
commence on the substance of the private
respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of
all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage,
only the trial court can make such a
determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE,
the
foregoing
premises
considered, the petition is DENIED. The court
of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
to continue proceedings consistent with this
ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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Vicarious Liability 1

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VICARIOUS LIABILITY (Art.

A. PARENTS & GUARDIANS

June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

consequence. It further appears that Delfin

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and

of the Balintawak Elementary School and as

defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living

getting subsistenee from

The first issue presents no more problem than

It is most significant that in the case just

damages. There are numerous cases of

Code therein referred to contemplate only acts

former is a violation of the criminal law, while

Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability

It must be borne in mind that, according to

G.R. No. L-9734

March 31, 1915

BAHIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REBUTTAL. Such presumption

3. ID; SUPERVISION BY EMPLOYEE.

the garage to assist her son in the business in

servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits

competent. The machine had been used but a

whom he was living at the time of the tragic

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981,

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical

certain relationship and for whom he is

is, of course, only presumed and the

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the

child. In the instant case, however, to hold that

6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code

Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for

[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so

Moral damages, P30,000.000;

Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees

Julie Ann broke up her relationship with

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered,

minutes based on the record of death; that

Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively.

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such

and the second, a resident of the house

was going on inside the Gotiong house, he

as parents in not diligently supervising the

obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the

In imposing sanctions for the so-called

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of

the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue

since this is likewise not covered by Article 101

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore,

of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs

G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918