POLITICAL LAW

AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

conformity with its traditions, and the

demands of its mission in the world. Indeed,
the world-wide interests and activities of the
Vatican City are such as to make it in a
sense an international state.

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL

LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW)

We reiterate that the DPWH is an

unincorporated government agency without
any separate juridical personality of its own
and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
now DPWH, was created under Executive
Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO
710 abolished the old Ministry of
PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public
Highways and transferred their functions to
the newly-created Ministry of Public Works
of Highways.

POLITICAL LAW
HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No.
101949,December 1, 1994
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood
of the Vatican City for the purpose of
assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible
independence and of guaranteeing to it
indisputable sovereignty also in the field of
international relations.
In view of the wordings of the Lateran
Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in
the Vatican City. Some writers even
suggested that the treaty created two
international persons the Holy See and
Vatican City.
The Vatican City fits into none of the
established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of sovereignty must be
made in a sense different from that in which
it is applied to other states. In a community
of national states, the Vatican City
represents an entity organized not for
political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and
object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who
is also head of the Roman Catholic Church,
as the Holy See or Head of State, in

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA

vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar

Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al.
vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as
Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. However, a public
official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the US respondents were sued
in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its

crew. The alleged act or omission resulting

in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds
by the US government, the suit is deemed to
be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
127325, March 19,1997
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the
system of initiative and referendum for local
legislation and national statutes, without
providing for initiative for the amendment of
the Constitution. A petition was filed to
amend the constitution regarding term
limits. However, the SC held that the
constitutional provision on peoples
initiatives under the 1987 Constitution
(Article XVII 2) required implementing
legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735
lacked the implementing rules for peoples
initiatives and such lack could not be cured
by Comelec providing rules. Congress also
could not delegate its legislative authority to
Comelec, so Comelec could not validly
promulgate rules on the matter as it was not
empowered to do so under law.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC,
174153, October 25, 2006

G.R.

only if the people sign a petition that

contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. To do otherwise would be
deceptive and misleading and would render
the initiative void, since there should be both
direct proposal and authorship by the person
affixing their signature to the petition.
TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295,
May 2, 1997
By its very title, Article II of the
Constitution is a declaration of principles
and state policies. The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the
basic political creed of the nation by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II
are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. As held in the leading
case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections
of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

No.

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987

Constitution
via
peoples
initiative.
However, his petition did not include the full
text of the proposed amendments. The SC
ruled that the initiative did not meet the
requirements of the Constitution. An
amendment is directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition

A provision which lays down a general

principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is

self-executing if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.

the
well-spring
of
Philippine
jurisprudence on this subject is for the
most part, benevolent neutrality which
gives room for accommodation.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN,
101083, February 30, 1993

In case of conflict between the religious

beliefs and moral convictions of individuals,
on one hand, and the interest of the State, on
the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people
to determine the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children, the Court is of
the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the
RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of the
principle of non-coercion enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.

G.R.

No.

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent

further logging licenses from being issued.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the
intergenerational equity of the petitioners as
the basis of their standing, held that the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is
explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the
Constitution. While it is found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less
important than any civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing
less than self- preservation and selfperpetuation and is assumed to exist from
the inception of mankind. Thus, those
provisions are self-executing.
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P02-1651. August 4, 2003
Considering the American origin of the
Philippine religion clauses and the intent to
adopt the historical background, nature,
extent and limitations of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it
was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is
not surprising that nearly all the major
Philippine cases involving the religion
clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in
explaining the nature, extent and limitations
of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny
of these cases would also reveal that while
U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows
into two main streams of interpretation
separation and benevolent neutrality

IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819,

April 8, 2014

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC.

LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, CSP CLARO
ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor,
National Prosecution Service, and
PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed
by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No.
197291, April 3, 2013
Consistent with the principle of separation
of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to
interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of
Justice, exclusively to determine what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish

probable cause for the prosecution of

supposed offenders. By way of exception,
however, judicial review may be allowed
where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters
involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted
to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to
be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of judgment or discretion.
DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859,
October 15, 1991
Dimaporo, while serving as Representative
of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of
ARMM Governor. He lost the latter
election, and despite making known his
desire to continue as Representative, was not
able to return to that office. The Supreme
Court did not allow him to take office as
Representative again. It differentiated a
term, i.e. the period an official may serve as
provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the
period that an official actually serves. The
Constitution protects the term, not the
tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy,
Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there
is no violation of the Constitution when he
was prevented from re-assuming his post. A
term of office prescribed by the Constitution
may not be extended or shortened by law,
but the period during which an officer
actually serves (tenure) may be affected by

circumstances within or beyond the power

of the officer.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176970, December 8, 2008
RA 9371, which provided for apportionment
of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro
was assailed on constitutional grounds, on
the ground that it is not re-apportionment
legislation but that it involves the division
and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme
Court held that RA 9371 is simply a
reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to
Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
July 8, 2009
The filling-up of all available party-list seats
is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the
party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election. If only
ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54
seats, the maximum possible number of
occupied party-list seats would only be 30
because of the three-seat cap. In such a case,
the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941,
garnering 2% of the total votes cast
guarantees a party one seat. This 2%
threshold for the first round of seat
allocation does not violate any provision of
the 1987 Constitution. In the second round
allocation of additional seats, there is no
minimum vote requirement to obtain a
party-list seat because the Court has struck
down the application of the 2% threshold in
the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b)
of the Party-List Act stating that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the

votes shall be entitled to additional seats in

the proportion to their total number of
votes can no longer be given any effect.
Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in
the total membership of the House of
Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be
impossible to fill up. However, a party-list
organization has to obtain a sufficient
number of votes to gain a seat in the second
round of seat allocation. What is deemed a
sufficient number of votes is dependent
upon the circumstances of each election,
such as the number of participating parties,
the number of available party-list seats, and
the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented
by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 203766, April 2, 2013
The recognition that national and regional
parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be marginalized and
underrepresented
will
allow
small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who
lack
well-defined
political
constituencies a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other
hand, limiting to the marginalized and
underrepresented the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will
give
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will

give rise to a multi-party system where those

marginalized and underrepresented, both
in economic and ideological status, will
have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the partylist system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off
party-list representatives to masquerade as
wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity, even as they attend sessions in
Congress riding in SUVs.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies. The
participation of major political parties in
party-list elections must be geared towards
the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the marginalized and
underrepresented and those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, giving
them a voice in law-making. Thus,to
participate in party-list elections, a major
political party that fields candidates in the
legislative district elections must organize a
sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women
or youth wing, that can register under the
party-list system.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members

of the House of Representatives. To be

considered a Member of the House of
Representatives,
there
must
be
a
concurrence of all of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction over the said contests.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No.
L-15905, August 3, 1966
The expression speeches or debates herein
in Art. VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions,
such
as
speeches
(sponsorship,
interpellation,
privilege
uttered
in
Committees or to Congress in plenary
session), statements and votes cast while
Congress is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress. It also includes
other acts performed by the same either in or
out of Congressional premises while in the
official discharge of their duty when they
performed the acts. It does not include acts
not connected with the discharge of their
office.
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June
22, 1993
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, being
appointed to other government posts, does
not automatically forfeit his elective office
nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an
incumbent elective official is not eligible to
the appointive position, his appointment or
designation thereto cannot be valid in view
of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
This provision should not be confused with
Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where
(n)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or

employment in the Government . . . during

his term without forfeiting his seat . . . .
The difference between the two provisions is
significant in the sense that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts
only after they have been appointed to
another government office, while other
incumbent elective officials must first resign
their posts before they can be appointed,
thus running the risk of losing the elective
post as well as not being appointed to the
other post. It is therefore clear that
ineligibility is not directly related with
forfeiture of office. . . . . The effect is quite
different where it is expressly provided by
law that a person holding one office shall be
ineligible to another. Such a provision is
held to incapacitate the incumbent of an
office from accepting or holding a second
office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan,
283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v
Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render
his election or appointment to the latter
office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63
Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR
945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla
272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941). Where the
constitution, or statutes declare that persons
holding one office shall be ineligible for
election or appointment to another office,
either generally or of a certain kind, the
prohibition has been held to incapacitate the
incumbent of the first office to hold the
second so that any attempt to hold the
second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van
Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala
445).
AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821,
March 4, 1949
As there were 23 senators considered to be
in session that time (including Soto,
excluding Confesor), twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty
three senators. When the Constitution

declares that a majority of each House

shall constitute a quorum, the House does
not mean all the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute the
House. There is a difference between a
majority of all the members of the House
and a majority of the House, the latter
requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt about Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and
one abstained
OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L17144, October 28, 1960
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution
provides that for any speech or debate in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative shall not be
questioned in any other place. This section
was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless,
be questioned in Congress itself. Observe
that they shall not be questioned in any
other place than Congress. Furthermore,
the Rules of the House which petitioner
himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the Houses power to hold a
member responsible for words spoken in
debate.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v.

ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1,
2005
Congress did not give President the power to
exercise discretion in making a law, only the
power to ascertain the facts necessary to
exercise the law. The criteria for valid
delegation are that:(1) Law is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits
of which are determinate and determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
GARCILLANO
v.
HOUSE
COMMITTEE
ON
PUBLIC
INFORMATION, G.R. No. 170338,
December 23, 2008
It would be an injustice if a citizen is
burdened with violating a law or rule he did
not get notice of. It consists of publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law
shall only take effect 15 days after said
publication. Publication via the Internet
alone is considered invalid since the
provisions state that the rules must be
published in the OG or in a newspaper.
According to RA 8792, an electronic
document serves as the functional equivalent
of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet
a medium for publishing laws, rules, and
regulations. The rules must also be
republished by the Senate after every expiry
of the term of 12 Senators as it is a
continuing body independent of the Senate
before it, and its own rules state that they
expire after every Senate.

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE,
G.R.
No.
89914,
November 20, 1991
Investigations must be in aid of legislation
in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure and must respect the rights of the
persons appearing in or affected by the
inquiries. Senator Enriles privilege speech
that prompted the committee investigation
contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation, only a call to look into a possible
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The call seems to fall under
the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the
legislature, such as the case filed with the
Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe
and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy
already
before
the
Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment
into the exclusive domain of the court.
SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006
In question hour, attendance is meant to be
discretionary. In aid of legislation,
attendance is compulsory. In the absence of
a mandatory question period, it becomes a
greater imperative to enforce Congress
right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function.
When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, department heads can only exempt
themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The
only officials exempt are the President on
whom the executive power is vested and
members of the Supreme Court on whom
the judicial power is vested as a collegial
body as co-equal branches of government.
For 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of
department heads in the question hour but
not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a
valid claim of privilege is made by the
President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold

information
covered
by
executive
privilege, there can be no implied claim of
executive privilege thereby exempting some
officials from attending inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress has a right to know the
reasons behind the claim of executive
privilege before an official would be exempt
from the investigation.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v.
SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173,
December 27, 2007
The exercise by Congress or by any of its
committees of the power to punish contempt
is based on the principle of selfpreservation. As the branch of the
government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial branch,
it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Such power is
sui generis, as it attaches not to the
discharge of legislative functions per se, but
to the sovereign character of the legislature
as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008
Any post-enactment congressional measure
such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress
power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the

power of Congress to conduct inquiries in

aid of legislation.

208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No.

209251, November 19, 2013

Any action or step beyond that will

undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the

principle
of
non-delegability
since
legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress.
The power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision

requiring the President or an administrative
agency
to
present
the
proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law
to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a right or
power to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such,
a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash
(other
than
through
scrutiny
and
investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated
broad powers. It radically changes the
design or structure of the Constitutions
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws.
LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L28089, October 25, 1967
The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills:
1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1
statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The
title of the bill must be couched in language
sufficient to notify legislators and the public
of the import of the single title. Complying
with the second directive is imperative since
the Constitution does not require Congress
to read a bills entire text during
deliberations.
BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v.
DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v.
PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount

of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion.
As
these
intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside
of the law, it means that the actual items of
PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/postenactment
legislative
identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power

of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,

the President is forced to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to
the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al.
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund
nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds
were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA,
were merely being realigned via the DAP.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
CHAIRPERSON,
BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the
courts have in actual case ascertain its
meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion
and instability in judicial processes and
court decisions. Herein, the Executive has
violated the GAA when it stated that savings
as a concept is an ordinary species of

interpretation that calls for legislative,

instead of judicial determination.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the
Administrative Code provide: Section 39.
Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations
to Cover Deficits.Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act,
any savings in the regular appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriations
Act for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a
deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: Provided, that the creation of
new positions or increase of salaries shall
not be allowed to be funded from budgetary
savings except when specifically authorized
by law: Provided, further, that whenever
authorized positions are transferred from
one program or project to another within the
same department, office or agency, the
corresponding amounts appropriated for
personal services are also deemed
transferred, without, however increasing the
total outlay for personal services of the
department, office or agency concerned.
On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in
conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution because it
allows the President to approve the use of
any savings in the regular appropriations
authorized in the GAA for programs and

projects of any department, office or agency

to cover a deficit in any other item of the
regular appropriations. As such, Section 39
violates the mandate of Section 25(5)
because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an
item in the GAA to only those in his own
Department out of the savings in other items
of his own Departments appropriations.
Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a
valid authority to justify cross-border
transfers under the DAP. Augmentations
under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the
requisites under Section 25(5) are complied
with.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2, 2001
Estrada had constructively resigned, because
both elements of resignation were present,
namely: 1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment
(calling for snap election in which Estrada
would not be a candidate, listening to
Pimentels
advice
for
resignation,
negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer
of power, declaring his intent to leave
without anything about reassuming the
presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him,
resignation or retirement is not a bar to
prosecution. Neither was there a pending
impeachment case when he resigned; if this
were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he
would be perpetually immune. Finally,
Congress has already recognized Arroyo as
the new President, and so the decision can
no longer be reviewed by the Court.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and
ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

When the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and
its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is
the principal penalty pardoned which
relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that (h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political
rights, expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from
the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office, neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored. A
preamble is really not an integral part of a
law. It is merely an introduction to show its
intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text.
Hence if the pardon was intended be
conditional, it should have explicitly stated
the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since it did not make an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause
cannot be interpreted as a condition to the
pardon extended.

NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643,
September 4, 2008
Executive privilege is not a personal
privilege, but one that adheres to the Office
of the President. It exists to protect public
interest, not to benefit a particular public
official. Its purpose, among others, is to
assure that the nation will receive the benefit
of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information
between the President and his/her advisers in
the process of shaping or forming policies
and arriving at decisions in the exercise of
the functions of the Presidency under the
Constitution. The confidentiality of the
Presidents
conversations
and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to
the confidentiality of judicial deliberations.
It possesses the same value as the right to
privacy of all citizens and more, because it
is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of
governmental powers.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO,
170516, July 16, 2008

G.R.

No.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears

a close resemblance to the deliberative
process and presidential communications
privilege. It may be readily perceived that
the rationale for the confidential character of
diplomatic
negotiations,
deliberative
process, and presidential communications is
similar, if not identical.
MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369,
August 11, 1999
Conformably, as consistently interpreted and
ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs.
Mison, and in the subsequent cases of
Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs.
Constitutional Commission, and Calderon

vs. Carale; under Section 16, Article VII, of

the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed
by the President:
First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential
appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the
first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter
its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the

Commission on Appointments or until the

next adjournment of Congress.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA,
164978, October 13, 2005

G.R.

No.

Ad-interim
appointments
must
be
distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon
acceptance.
But
ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time
there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the
Commission
on
Appointments
for
confirmation
or
rejection;
acting
appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need
for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their

respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which
they were created. While powers and
functions associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees, the concerned
GOCCs are also tasked to perform other
corporate powers and functions that are not
personnel-related. All of these powers and
functions, whether personnel-related or not,
are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs.
Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the
concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these
powers and functions, which are not
anymore derived from his position as CSC
Chairman. Such being the case, the
designation of Duque was unconstitutional.
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

DENNIS FUNAv. ACTING SECRETARY

OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al.,
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015

The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the

Constitution makes no reference to the
nature of the appointment or designation, as
such, the prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent
or
temporary.

The Court cannot rule on the validity of the

alleged approval by the then President
Estrada of the grant of additional allowances
and benefits. MIA failed to prove its
existence. The alleged approval of the
President was contained in a mere
photocopy of the memorandum The
original was not presented during the
proceedings. A copy of the document is not
in the Malacaang Records Office.

DENNIS
A.
B.
FUNA
vs. THE
CHAIRMAN,
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO
T.
DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672,
November 25, 2014

Further, the grant of allowances and

benefits amounts to double compensation
proscribed by Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987
Constitution.
DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the

regular elections to be held on the second
Monday of May, letting the elections fall on
May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the
latest. If the regular presidential elections
are held on May 8, the period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are
held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory
90-day period to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court. The result is that there
are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the
difference between the shortest
possible
period of the ban of 109 days and the 90day mandatory period for appointments) in
which the outgoing President would be in no
position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme
Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of
the Constitution could not have intended
such an absurdity. In fact, in their
deliberations on the mandatory period for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices
under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers
neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor
referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, Article VII,
or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice
versa. They did not need to, because they
never intended Section 15, Article VII to
apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or
in any of the lower courts.
GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16,
2015
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered
as
midnight
appointments
those
appointments to offices that will only be
vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even
though the appointments are made prior to
11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to
the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is

prevented from continuing to rule the

country indirectly after the end of his term.
IBP
v.
ZAMORA,
141284. August 15, 2000

G.R.

No.

Calling out armed forces is discretionary

power solely vested in the Presidents
wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by
the Court to see whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion.
SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004
Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of
public safety are not required for calling out
the armed forces. Nothing prohibits
President from declaring a state of rebellion;
it springs from powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling
out of the armed forces is not the same as a
declaration of martial law.
DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006
Let it be emphasized that while the President
alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to take over privately
owned
public
utility
or
business
affected with public interest. The President
cannot
decide
whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional
circumstances
have
ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types
of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to
exercise all the powers of the State under

Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an

emergency powers act passed by Congress.

MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No.

133064, September 16, 1999

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No.

88211, October 27, 1989

A political question connotes a question of

policy and referred to those questions which
under the constitution were 1) to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity or
2) in regard to which full discretionary
authority had been delegated to the
legislative/executive branch of government.

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from

Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres.
Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and
abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her
from returning to the Philippines as an
exercise of the Presidents residual powers.
Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive. The Presidents residual power
is for protecting peoples general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution,
protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day
problems. Even the Resolution proposed in
the House urging the President to allow
Marcos to return shows recognition of this
power. Residual powers are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20,
1987
This Court has declared that while lower
courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they
are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This
simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by
these lower courts.

Political questions are concerned with issues

on the wisdom and not legality of a
particular measure. Additionally, a political
question has no standards by which its
legality or constitutionality could be
determined. A purely justiciable issue
implied a given right, legally demandable
and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of such right and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242,
April 16, 2013
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would
reveal that several provisions were indeed
adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to
bicameralism. It is also very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in
the JBC because it was not in the exercise of
its primary function to legislate. In the
creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4)
regular members, three (3) representatives
from the major branches of government. In
so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it
was in the interest of a certain constituency,
but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government. Hence, the argument that a
senator cannot represent a member of the

House of Representatives in the JBC and

vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the
entire Congress.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF
JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL
AND
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a
qualified applicant is challenged. In every
case where the integrity of an applicant who
is not otherwise disqualified for nomination
is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote
of all the Members of the Council must be
obtained for the favorable consideration of
his
nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision
undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher
voting requirement is absolute in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is
questioned. Simply put, when an integrity
question arises, the voting requirement for
his or her inclusion as a nominee to a
judicial post becomes unanimous instead
of the majority vote required in the
preceding section. Considering that JBC-009
employs the term integrity as an essential
qualification for appointment, and its
doubtful existence in a person merits a
higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the
JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that
integrity as used in the rules must be
interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a
situation where an applicants moral fitness
is challenged. It follows then that the
unanimity rule only comes into operation

when the moral character of a person is put

in issue. It finds no application where the
question is essentially unrelated to an
applicants moral uprightness.
ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
167011, April 30, 2008
The test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and
practice. This Court has similarly stressed
that the vagueness doctrine merely requires
a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude.
FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE
OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN
FACTFINDING
AND
INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria
Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121,
April 3, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman was created
by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked
to exercise disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, save only
for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction extends only to public officials
occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act
or omission of a public officer or employee
occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and of the regular courts or
other investigative agencies.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No.
93867, December 18, 1990

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman,

was appointed by the President as Chairman
of the COMELEC. Brillantes challenged
Yoracs appointment for being contrary to
Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987 Constitution,
where (I)n no case shall any Member (of
the Commission on Elections) be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. The SC agreed. The appointment
was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1
provides for the independence of ConCom
from the executive department.

AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001,

January 21, 2004

DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344,

December 21, 1989

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

(LDP) was reorganized resulting in a
political realignment in the lower house.
LDP also changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. They
withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP
member) and gave it to the new LDP
member. Thereafter the chamber elected a
new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except
Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement on the ground
that the LDPs reorganization was not
permanent and stable.
The LDP has been existing for more than
one year and its members include the
Philippine President, and its internal
disagreements are expected in any political
organization in a democracy. The test that
the party must survive a general
congressional election was never laid down
in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of
the authority of the House to change its
representation in the CoA to reflect at any
time the permanent changes and not merely
temporary alliances or factional divisions
without severance of loyalties/formal
disaffiliation that may transpire in the
political alignments of its members.

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987

Constitution provides that in times of
national emergency, when the public interest
so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with
public interest.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v.

SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No.
175356, December 3, 2013
Traditional distinctions exist between police
power and eminent domain. In the exercise
of police power, a property right is impaired
by regulation, or the use of property is
merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to
promote public welfare. In such cases, there
is no compensable taking, hence, payment of
just compensation is not required. Examples
of these regulations are property condemned
for being noxious or intended for noxious
purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of
collapse to be demolished for public safety,
or obscene materials to be destroyed in the
interest of public morals) as well as zoning
ordinances prohibiting the use of property
for purposes injurious to the health, morals
or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a
citys territory into residential and industrial
areas).
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v.
CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846,
January 20, 2009
Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in
general
terms
to
underscore
its

comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies

and provide enough room for an efficient
and flexible response as the conditions
warrant. Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions
by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls, movie theaters,
gas stations and cockpits. The awesome
scope of police power is best demonstrated
by the fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in our nations legal system, its use
has rarely been denied.
REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L20620, August 5, 18974
The SC said that the prices in 1959 will
apply since in 1947, they did not possess the
property with a permanent characteristic
seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly
basis. Their possession did not also deprive
the owner of the benefits of the land since
they were paying rent. It was only in 1959
when they filed the expropriation
proceedings that they gained possession
with a permanent character when the lower
court granted them such possession. The
price of Php 10.00 however was quite high
taking in consideration that the said
properties could be sold on a range of Php
2.50 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that
the value of the peso went down. The proper
price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements
of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private
property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal
authority

4. The property must be devoted to a

public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
HACIENDA
LUISITA
INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No.
171101, April 24, 2012
Precisely because due regard is given to the
rights of landowners to just compensation,
the law on stock distribution option
acknowledges that landowners can require
payment for the shares of stock
corresponding to the value of the
agricultural lands in relation to the
outstanding capital stock of the corporation.
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed
without being afforded due process, the
petitioners filed the instant petition assailing
the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA.
In order to be proper and immune from
constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is
sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be
apprised of the specific charges against him,
and be given an adequate opportunity to
present his or her defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence. In the case at
bar, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias
Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices
in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor
Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his
options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. Thus, the petitioners could
not argue that Cadet Cudia was not afforded
due process.

ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496,

February 27, 1940

discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner

has sorely failed in discharging that burden.

The fact, however, that the Court of

Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this
character.

PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING
MILLS
EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987,

May 5, 1939
It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable
classification.
And
the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010
In the instant case, the fact that other
administrations are not the subject of the
PTCs investigative aim is not a case of
selective prosecution that violates equal
protection. The Executive is given broad
discretion to initiate criminal prosecution
and enjoys clear presumption of regularity
and good faith in the performance thereof.
For
petitioners
to
overcome
that
presumption, they must carry the burden of
showing that the PTC is a preliminary step
to selective prosecution, and that it is laden
with a discriminatory effect and a

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human

rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been
sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic
tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the
human personality, the all-consuming ideal
of our enlightened civilization becomes
Our duty, if freedom and social justice have
any meaning at all for him who toils so that
capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is a
potent means of inhibiting speech and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.
BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838,
April 25, 2005
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880
thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does
not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection.

Neither are the words opinion,

protesting and influencing in the
definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The
words petitioning the government for
redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008
It is not enough to determine whether the
challenged act constitutes some form of
restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction
has to be made whether the restraint is (1)
a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards;
or
(2)
a content-based restraint
or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech.
The cast of the restriction determines the test
by which the challenged act is assayed with.
THE
DIOCESE
OF
BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and
THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL
CAPACITY
vs.
COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND
THE
ELECTION
OFFICER
OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop
posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral
which aimed to dissuade voters from
electing candidates who supported the RH
Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered the

latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation

of its regulation which imposed a size limit
on campaign materials, the case is about
COMELECs breach of the petitioners
fundamental right of expression of matters
relating to election. Thus, the COMELEC
had no legal basis to issue said order as the
tarpaulins were not paid for by any
candidate or political party and the
candidates therein were not consulted
regarding its posting. It was part of the
petitioners advocacy against the RH Law.
Jurisprudence which sets the limit to free
speech of candidates during elections but do
not limit the rights of broadcasters to
comment on the candidates do not apply to
the petitioners, as the petitioners are private
individuals who have lost their right to give
commentary on the candidates when the
COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin removed.
Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech.
The size of the tarpaulins is fundamentally
part of protected speech, as it is important to
convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who
are also part of the electorate. More
importantly, every citizens expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection. While the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in
return for consideration by any candidate,
political party or party-list group. The
COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to
issue its order as it lacks the requisites of a
valid content-based regulation of speech.
Third, the tarpaulins and their messages are
not religious speech, as they do not convey
any religious doctrine of the Catholic
Church. With all due respect to the Catholic
faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its

members of a tarpaulin as religious speech

solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not
religious speech.
IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC
April 6, 1995
Liability
for
published
statements
demonstrably false or misleading, and
derogatory of the courts and individual
judges, is what is involved in the proceeding
at bar than which, upon its facts, there is
perhaps no more appropriate setting for an
inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it
relates to public comment about the courts
and their workings within a constitutional
order.
SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571,
May 5, 2001
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to
enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4
of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which
prohibits the publishing of election surveys
15 days before the election of national
candidates and 7 days before the election of
local candidates. The petitioners wish to
publish surveys covering the entire election
period and argue that the resolution violates
their right to free speech and expression.
The SC held that the resolution is invalid as
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and that (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS.
MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA,

vs.
ST.
THERESAS
COLLEGE,
MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND
JOHN DOES,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
The concept of privacy has, through time,
greatly
evolved,
with
technological
advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted
in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos
speech, The
Common
Right
to
Privacy, where he explained the three
strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational
privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about
themselves.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING
v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and
ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013
An individuals right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase prying into the privacy of anothers
residence, therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private, including a
business office. In this day and age, video
surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy,
unless the consent of the individual, whose
right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Simply put, a person have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his

property, whether he uses it as a business

office or as a residence and that the
installation of video surveillance cameras
directly facing his property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without his
consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy.
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459,
March 13, 1997
Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, filed for a
writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz,
Director of Posts, to stop him from selling
postage stamps which commemorated the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Catholic Church in Manila.
Petitioner alleges that this violates the
Constitutional provision prohibiting the use
of public money for the benefit of any
religious denomination. The Court denied
the petition. The Director of Posts acted by
virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated
60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of
stamps with new designs. The stamps
themselves featured a map of the
Philippines. The governments goal was to
promote the Philippines. There was no
religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of
the stamps also went to the government and
not to any church.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY
OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30,
1957
American Bible Society (ABS) is a
nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary
corporation
distributing
and
selling
bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines.
ABS was informed that it has to comply
with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a mayors
permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay
municipal license fee for the period covering
1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45).

ABS paid in protest and filed a case to

declare said Ordinances void and to seek a
refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled
that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely
requires a mayors permit. Ordinance 2529
is also valid but cannot be made to apply to
ABS because such license fee constitutes a
restraint in the free exercise of religion. The
constitutional guaranty of the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right could only be justified
like other restraints of freedom of expression
on the grounds that there is clear and present
danger of any substantive evil, which the
State has the right to prevent.
EBRALINAG
v.
DIVISION
SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770,
March 1, 1993
Petitioners in this consolidated petition are
high school and elementary students from
Cebu who were expelled for not
participating in the flag ceremony of their
schools. They are represented by their
parents. As Jehovahs Witnesses, they
consider the flag as an idol which, according
to their religion, should not be worshipped.
They believe that the flag ceremony is a
form of worship which is prohibited by their
religion. Respondents counter by invoking
RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling
of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which
upheld that all students should participate in
the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the
Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. Expelling them based on their
religious beliefs would be a curtailment of
their right to religious profession and
worship and their right to free education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)

The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV

program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television classified such program as rated
X, being not fit for public viewing as it
offends and constitutes an attack against
other religions. The SC held that INC is
protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution. The Board failed to show any
imminent or grave danger that would be
brought about by the telecast of the show.
Also, the show itself is not an attack against,
but rather a criticism of, other religions.
Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid
ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting
of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs
power to regulate these types of television
programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v
Ruiz regarding the Director of Posts power
to check as to whether or not publications
are of a libelous character.
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7,
1919
The right to travel can validly be suspended
in the valid exercise of police power.
CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July
9, 2002
The right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before
a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets,
and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L19550, June 19, 1967

Two points must be stressed in connection

with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had
committed a violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.
In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR
ALIAS NOY, G.R. No. 207950,
September 22, 2014
The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by
the Constitution to the accused during
custodial investigation. Republic Act No.
7438 even expanded its definition to
include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law. This means
that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights. For one, the same
pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario. Chavez is also being questioned
by an investigating officer in a police
station. As an additional pressure, he may
have been compelled to surrender by his
mother who accompanied him to the police
station.

MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
The right to remain silent and to counsel can
be invoked only in the context in which
the Miranda doctrine applies when the
official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial
interrogation. There are no cases extending
them to a non-coercive setting. The rights
are invocable only when the accused is
under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation and, hence,
the audit examiner may not be considered
the law enforcement officer contemplated by
the rule. By a fair analogy, Marieta may not
be said to be under custodial investigation.
She was not even being investigated by any
police or law enforcement officer. She was
under administrative investigation by her
superiors in a private firm and in purely
voluntary manner. She was not restrained of
her freedom in any manner. She was free to
stay or go. There was no evidence that she
was forced or pressured to say anything.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MEDARIO
CALANTIAO
y
DIMALANTA
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
The purpose of allowing a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
is to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by the person arrested, who might
be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. It is therefore a reasonable
exercise of the States police power to
protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that
may be inflicted on them by a person they
have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence

from being destroyed by the arrestee. It

seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting
officers and the integrity of the evidence
under the control and within the reach of the
arrestee.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
A person apprehended or arrested cannot
literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime. The phrase must be
read in context and understood in
consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15
comprehends
persons arrested
or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law. Hence, a drug test can
only be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested
or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act
is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase a
person apprehended or arrested in Section
15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only
under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of
all persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime. Moreover, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to
search warrants is stop and frisk. Stop
and frisk searches are often confused with

searches incidental to lawful arrests under

the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a
lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the
search conducted within the vicinity and
within reach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well
as to preserve the evidence.
The balance lies in the concept of
suspiciousness present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience of the police officer.
Hence, they should have the ability to
discern based on facts that they
themselves observe whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the
police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer
should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon ones basic
right to security of ones person and effects.
Police officers cannot justify unbridled
searches and be shielded by this exception,
unless there is compliance with the genuine
reason requirement and that the search
serves the purpose of protecting the public.
MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June
8, 2006
The right against self-incrimination is
accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding. The

right is not to be compelled to be a witness

against himself.
GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA,
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
If bail can be granted in deportation cases,
we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014
Charging offenders of violation of RA
10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel;
likewise with RA 9775 on Child
pornography constitutes double jeopardy.
The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law
involve essentially the same elements and
are in fact one and the same with the RPC
and RA 9775.
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A.
AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
David argued that the Court has disregarded
the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the
same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by
legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at
the time of his naturalization in Canada and
through the time when he was said to have
falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his
Miscellaneous Lease Application. However,
while Section 2 declares the general policy

that Filipinos who have become citizens of

another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship, such
is qualified by the phrase under the
conditions of this Act. It provides that those
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
151914, July 13, 2002
A person loses Philippine citizenship and
domicile of origin by becoming a U.S.
citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as
residence in the U.S. is a requirement for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results
in the abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. The person may only be said to
have been domiciled in the Philippines again
once he repatriates or by an act of Congress,
but the period before this act of reacquisition
will not count in the residency requirement
for elected officials. His status during that
period is one of an alien who has obtained
an immigrant visa and has waived his status
as a non-resident.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS,
G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
A Petition for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship is different from
judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the
first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino
citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm
his status as a Philippine citizen. In the
second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire
the privilege of becoming a Philippine
citizen based on requirements required
under CA 473.

ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
YRA v. ABANO,
November 15, 1928

G.R. No. 30187,

Abano was a native of Meycauayan who

studied in Manila, where he was registered
to vote. After completing his studies as a
lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and
ran for office though his cancellation of
voters registration in Manila was denied
because of his failure to deposit in the mails
on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the
Court explained that the registration of a
voter does not confer the right to vote; it is
but a condition precedent to the exercise of
the right. Registration is a regulation, not a
qualification.
SVETLANA
P.
JALOSJOS
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.,
G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013
A change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time,
otherwise the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649,
April 16, 2013
Dual citizens by naturalization are required
to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in
order to qualify as a candidate for public
office. If by the time an aspiring candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and foreign
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by

the express disqualification under Section

40(d) of the Local Government Code, he
was not qualified to run for a local elective
position. By being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been counted. This
leaves the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes. Therefore, the
rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 205136, December 2, 2014
The COMELEC has no discretion to give or
not to give due couse to COCs. The Court
emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC
to give due course to COCs filed in due
form is ministerial in character, and that
while the COMELEC may look into patent
defects in the COCs, it may not go into
matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The
determination of whether a candidate is
eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where
parties must be allowed to adduce evidence
in support of their contentions. Thus, in
simply relying on the Memorandum of
Director Amora Ladra in cancelling
Kimberlys COC and denying the latters
substitution by Olivia, and absent any
petition to deny due course to or cancel said
COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC
once more gravely abused its discretion.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC
and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No.
206698, February 25, 2014

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

states that the false representation in the
contents of the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) must refer to material matters in
order to justify the cancellation of the COC.
Material misrepresentation under the
Omnibus Election Code refers to
Qualifications
for
elective
office
(residency, age, citizenship, or any other
legal qualifications necessary to run for local
elective office as provided in the Local
Government Code) coupled with a showing
that there was an intent to deceive the
electorate.
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
192856, March 8, 2011
We find it necessary to point out that
Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6646, contrary to the erroneous arguments
of both parties, did not in any way amend
the period for filing Section 78 petitions.
While Section 7 of the said law makes
reference to Section 5 on the procedure in
the conduct of cases for the denial of due
course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates
(retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v.
Commission on Elections explains that the
procedure
hereinabove
provided
mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed
to refer to Section 6 which does not provide
for a procedure but for the effects of
disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to
the procedure provided in Section 5 of the
said Act on nuisance candidates x x x.), the
same cannot be taken to mean that the 25day period for filing sec. 78 petitions
under the oec is changed to 5 days counted
from the last day for the filing of COCs. The
clear language of Section 78 certainly
cannot be amended or modified by the mere
reference in a subsequent statute to the use
of a procedure specifically intended for
another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in

statutory construction that repeals by

implication are disfavored and will not be so
declared by the Court unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest. In addition, it is
noteworthy that Loong, which upheld the
25-day period for filing Section 78
petitions, was decided long after the
enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we
therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal
mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
As the law stands, the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy.
SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE
TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2013
The existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua
non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled
or denied due course, the candidate cannot
be validly substituted.
RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013
When there has been no valid substitution,
the candidate with the highest number of
votes should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor.
EMILIO RAMON E.R. P. EJERCITO
vs.
HON.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR EGAY S.
SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November
25, 2014
San Luis filed a disqualification case against
co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The

COMELEC First Division and COMELEC

En banc granted the disqualification petition.
In the said petition, San Luis alleges that
Ejercito was distributing an Orange Card
with the intent to entice voters to vote for
him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable
amount for campaign funds. Ejercito alleges
that a preliminary investigation should have
been conducted prior to the decision of the
COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme
Court ruled that, As contemplated in
paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2050, a complaint for disqualification filed
before the election which must be inquired
into by the COMELEC for the purpose of
determining whether the acts complained of
have in fact been committed. Where the
inquiry results in a finding before the
election, the COMELEC shall order the
candidates disqualification. In case the
complaint was not resolved before the
election, the COMELEC may motu propio
or on motion of any of the parties, refer the
said complaint to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
PENERA v. COMELEC,
131613, November 25, 2009

G.R.

No.

Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty

candidate for engaging in election
campaigning before the campaign period.
The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is
any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy. Any person who
files a certificate of candidacy within the
period for filing shall only be considered as
a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only
liable for an election offense for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. Any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period, when partisan

political acts become unlawful as to a

candidate. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900,
April 22, 2014
As a general rule, statutes providing for
election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power
to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice,
including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matters pending before it. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective
and efficient implementation of its
objectives ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC.
Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It
involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling
the uncertainty which beclouds the real
choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has
the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, whom the
people truly chose as their rightful leader.
ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B.
JULIA
G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014

It bears noting that the actual difference in

the population of the old Second District
from that of the current Third District
amounts to less than 10% of the population
of the latter. This numerical fact renders the
new Third District as essentially, although
not literally, the same as the old Second
District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunian members are
elected by district, it does not alter the fact
that the district which elected him for the
third and fourth time is the same one which
brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
Accordingly, Naval is disqualified to serve
another term a Sangguniang Member.
Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of
violation of the three-term limit rule, does
not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the
renamed Third District, which he labels as a
new set of constituents, would still be
represented, albeit by another eligible
person.
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015
Petitioner filed the instant petition
contending that he was denied due process
for being considered a nuisance candidate
even before a clarificatory was even
conducted. The SC ruled that nuisance
candidates are persons who file their
certificates of candidacy to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity
of the names of the registered candidates or
by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate. To minimize

the logistical confusion caused by nuisance

candidates, their certificates of candidacy
may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may
be motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, subject to an
opportunity to be heard. Respondent in this
case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain
his bona fide intention to run for office.
Respondent had already declared petitioner
a nuisance candidate even before the
clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective
opportunity to be heard.
GMA
NETWORK,
INC.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

vs.

It
must
be
emphasized
that
a
decision/resolution/order
of
an
administrative body, court or tribunal which
is declared void on the ground that the same
was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is
elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court
or
tribunal
is
an essential and
mandatory requirement before it can act on
a case or controversy. And even if said
body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over
a case, but has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, such act is still invalid. The
decision nullifying the questioned act is
an adjudication on the merits.

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

There is no question that the COMELEC is
the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it
cannot exercise its powers without
limitations or reasonable basis. It could not
simply adopt measures or regulations just
because it feels that it is the right thing to
do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does
have discretion, but such discretion is
something that must be exercised within the
bounds and intent of the law. The
COMELEC is not free to simply change the
rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular
manner in the past. If ever it has to change
the rules, the same must be properly
explained with sufficient basis. Clearly, the
respondent in this instance went beyond its
legal mandate when it provided for rules
beyond what was contemplated by the law it
is supposed to implement.
FORTICH v. CORONA,
131457, November 17, 1998

G.R.

No.

REPUBLIC
v.
EXPRESS
TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC.
G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002
The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were
not published in a newspaper of general
circulation, thus, they did not take effect.
Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with
the UP Law Center, in accordance with
Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code, the same is not the
operative act that gives rules valid force and
effect since the bulletin of codified rules by
the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of
the President, Congress, all appellate courts,
the National Library, and other public
officers or agencies specified by Congress.
Publication in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation is required
before laws can take effect.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v.
MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2,
2011
The assailed resolutions pertain only to
internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel,

thus, there was no need to comply with the

publication
or
filing
requirements.
According to the UP Law Centers
guidelines, interpretative regulations, and
those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public
need not be filed with the center.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v.
SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No.
170599, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
the LLDA has the power to impose fines in
the exercise of its function as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
In expounding on this issue, the Court held
that the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a
special law, such as the LLDA Charter,
provides for another forum. The Court
further ruled that although the PAB assumed
the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect
to adjudication of pollution cases, this does
not preclude the LLDA from assuming
jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area
of responsibility and to impose fines as
penalty.
OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July
23, 1998
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O.
No.
308
merely
implements
the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the
primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza

states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the allimportant freedom of thought. As said
administrative
order
redefines
the
parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the
line that separates the administrative power
of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN
MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006
A unified ID system for all these
government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. If the government entities
can individually adopt a format for their
own ID pursuant to their regular functions
under existing laws, they can also adopt by
mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result
in substantial savings, greater efficiency,
and optimum compatibility. This is purely
an administrative matter, and does not
involve the exercise of legislative power.
Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway
Co. (1933)
Public Service Commission granted the Phil.
Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in
order to compete with the rates of road
trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid.
The Legislature delegated to the PSC the
power of fixing rates of public services but it
was not authorized by law to delegate to
Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its
freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot
determine whether such new rates will be
just and reasonable.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were
taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of
the land so it filed a petition for a
determination of just compensation for its
property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the orders of the
DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of
the Adjudicator on the land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to
the Board but shall be brought to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court
within 15 days from receipt of the notice
thereof. Since Veterans petition in the RTC
was filed beyond the 15-day period, the
RTC correctly dismissed the case.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN
HIS
CAPACITY
AS
ACTING
OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L.
SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs.
JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661,
December 10, 2014
Falsification of an official document such as
the SALN is considered a grave offense. It
amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification
and dishonesty are grave offenses
punishable by dismissal from the service,
even for the first offense, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave
benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. The
act of falsifying an official document is in

itself grave because of its possible

deleterious effects on government service.
At the same time, it is also an act of
dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and
integrity. Under Civil Service regulations,
falsification of an official document and
dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both
may be committed in one act, as in this case.
The
constitutionalization
of
public
accountability shows the kind of standards
of public officers that are woven into the
fabric of our legal system. To reiterate,
public office is a public trust, which
embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart
from these standards, but our society has
consciously embedded them in our laws so
that they may be demanded and enforced as
legal principles, and the Court is mandated
to apply these principles to bridge actual
reality to the norms envisioned for our
public service.
SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791,
February 13, 2007
All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is
required to publish the list of vacant
positions and such publication shall be
posted by the chief personnel or
administrative officer of all local
government units in the designated places.
The vacant positions may only be filled by
the appointing authority after they have been
reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after
publication. In this case, the publication of
vacancies was made even before the
positions involved actually became vacant.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES
UNION
(CAAP-EU)
vs.
CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE
PHILIPPINE, et al.,

G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014

Apropos then is the Courts ruling in
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy
Regulatory Board v. Barin, to wit: however,
abolition of an office and its related
positions is different from removal of an
incumbent from his office. Abolition and
removal are mutually exclusive concepts.
From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant
in an abolished office. Where there is no
occupant, there is no tenure to speak of.
Thus, impairment of the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure does not arise
in the abolition of an office. On the other
hand, removal implies that the office and its
related positions subsist and that the
occupants are merely separated from their
positions. Based on the premise that there
was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence
of any bad faith, we rule that the ATO
employees right to security of tenure was
not violated.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.
MARICELLE M. CORTES
G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Nepotism is defined as an appointment
issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
any of the following: (1) appointing
authority; (2) recommending authority; (3)
chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person
exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that
respondent Cortes is a relative of
Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of
consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the
daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The
defense of respondent Cortes that her
appointment was made by the Commission
En Banc and that his father, a member of the
Commission, abstain from voting for his
appointment did not cure the nepotistic

character of the appointment because the

evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition
still exists. His mere presence during the
deliberation for the appointment of IO V
created an impression of influence and cast
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of
the Commission En Banc.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
AURELIO
M.
UMALI
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and
THE
CITY
GOVERNMENT
OF
CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
The plebiscite called for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city into
a highly urbanized citys should be
participated by the qualified registered
voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija
not of Cabanatuan City only. While
conversion to an HUC is not explicitly
provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that
the conversion of a component city into an
HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, substantial alteration
of boundaries involves and necessarily
entails a change in the geographical
configuration of a local government unit or
units. However, the phrase boundaries
should not be limited to the mere physical
one, referring to the metes and bounds of the
LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It
also connotes a modification of the
demarcation
lines
between
political
subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of
corporate power ends and that of the other
begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration
must be substantial for it to be within the
ambit of the constitutional provision.

CITY
OF
GENERAL
SANTOS,
represented by its Mayor, HON.
DARLENE
MAGNOLIA
R.
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
Designing and implementing a local
government units own organizational
structure and staffing pattern also implies
the power to revise and reorganize. Without
such power, local governments will lose the
ability to adjust to the needs of its
constituents.
Effective
and
efficient
governmental services especially at the local
government level require rational and
deliberate changes planned and executed in
good faith from time to time. However, the
assailed decision by respondent Commission
on Audit was anchored on Section 28,
paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4968, which proscribes all
supplementary retirement or pension plans
for government employees.
NAVARRO v. ERMITA,
180050, April 12, 2011

G.R.

No.

Republic Act 9355 is valid and

constitutional. The exemption from the
minimum land area requirement when the
Local Government Unit to be created
consists of one or more islands is
expressly stated in the Local Government
Code for municipalities but is absent in the
requisites for the creation of a province, but
such exemption is expressly stated in Art.
9(2) of the Local Government Code
Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGCIRR). The omission of the exemption in the
case of provinces was intended to be
corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to
reflect the true legislative intent. This will

also be consistent with the declared policy to

provide said local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy by
construing liberally the contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units in order
to achieve the desired results.
MMDA
v.
BEL-AIR
VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March
27, 2000
The MMDAs power is limited to
administration and implementation of metrowide services in Metro Manila and is not a
Local Government Unit nor a public
corporation endowed with legislative power
nor police power to enact ordinances for the
closure or opening of roads. It can only lay
down policies and coordinate with various
agencies, as well as the private sector.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011
The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
Senator Pimentel during the deliberations
showed that Republic Act 9009 would not
apply to the conversion bills then pending
deliberation in the Senate during the 11th
Congress, for Local Government Units
covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a
class of their own, having proven
themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective
provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of
trade and commerce, points of convergence
of transportation, and havens of agricultural,
mineral and other natural resources).
AQUINO v. ROBREDO,
189793, April 7, 2010

G.R.

No.

Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec.

5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city

to be entitled to a representative, but not for

a province. Records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the population was
not the sole determinant of the creation of a
legislative district.
SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597,
July 16, 2008
Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities. Regional
legislative bodies may be delegated the
power to create municipalities and
barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the
Constitution but only Congress may create
provinces and cities.
ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
93054, December 4, 1990
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the CAR. The Constitution is
clear that the autonomous regions must
consist of more than one province, as the
term region used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. Further, it can
be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic
Act of the CAR) that Congress never
intended that a single province can
constitute an autonomous region; otherwise,
the province will be composed of two sets of
officials: one for the Ifugao Local
Government Unit and another set of regional
officials for the CAR, both of whom will be
exercising executive and legislative powers
over the same area.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v.
MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6,
1994
The Municipality of San Andres attained a
status closely approximating that of a de
facto municipal corporation, by virtue of the

circumstances of the case, such as the

existence of governmental acts (e.g., EO 174
classifying the municipality of San Andres
as a fifth class municipality) that point to the
states recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres.
Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the
Local Government Code, which states that
municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of the Code
shall be considered regular municipalities, it
has now attained the status of a de jure
municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged
the legality of EO 353 only thirty years after
its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding
assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision should be timely raised.
SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ05-1953, December 21, 2009
The IRA may not be automatically released.
The automatic release of the IRA under Sec.
286 is a mandate to the national government
through the Department of Budget and
Management to effect automatic release of
the said funds from the treasury directly to
the local government units, free from any
holdbacks or liens imposed by the national
government, but this automatic realease of
the IRA from the national treasury does not
prevent the proper court from deferring or
suspending its release to particular local
officials when there is a legal question
presented in court as to the rights of the
parties to receive the IRA.
PIMENTEL
v.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17,
2012
There was no recentralization as the local
government units have no power over a

program for which funding has been

provided by the National Government under
the General Appropriations Act, even if the
said program is within the jurisdiction of an
LGU. The programs and services involved
in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
are funded by the National Government,
which it may designate to implementing
agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of
local
autonomy
does
imply
the
establishment of local government units into
mini-states, as what is involved in local
autonomy
is
decentralization
of
administration and not of power.
GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
177807, October 11, 2011
Congress granted the city government,
through its city council, police power by
virtue of the Revised Quezon City Charter,
which allowed the regulation of the
construction of buildings. Property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in the exercise of police power,
but the methods and means used in
exercising such power to protect public
health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view. The
ordinance in question is valid as the citys
primary goal in enacting it was to increase
health and safety of the city since these
arcardes were intended to provide safe and
convenient passageways along the sidewalk
for pedestrians.
SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November
25, 2014
The Local Government Code of 1991
expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to
reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city116 subject to the pertinent provisions of
the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance

may be modified or repealed by another

ordinance.
The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist
target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing
reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, we hold that
Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No.
148408, July 14, 2006
The Resolution was an invalid exercise of
police power as the Ordinance which served
as its basis only prohibits gasoline service
stations within 100 meters from any school,
church or hospital, and not gasoline filling
stations. The ordinance makes a distinction
between gasoline filling stations and
gasoline service centers, prohibiting the
latter and not the former. Also, there was no
due process as the Sangguniang Bayan
sought to abate the alleged nuisance
(Paraynos gasoline filling station) without
proper judicial proceedings.
CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE
COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No.
L-14355, October 31, 1919
Though the City Charter of Manila allows it
to expropriate land for public purposes, the
right of expropriation is not an inherent
power in a municipal corporation in that
where the statute does not designate the
property to be taken nor how it may be
taken, the necessity of taking a particular
property is a question for the courts to
decide. In this case, the first condition on
expropriation by the City of Manila was
met, as the land sought to be expropriated is

private but the second condition (public

purpose) was not met as it was not shown
that the extension of the street was necessary
and its extension through the cemetery was
also not shown to be necessary as other lots
have been offered to the city free of charge.
JIL
CHRISTIAN
SCHOOL
FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG,
G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005
The expropriation was improper as there
was no valid and definite offer. Before a
local government unit can exercise the
power of eminent domain, there must first
be a) an ordinance enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property; b) The power of
eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless; c) There is payment
of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and
other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and
definite offer has been previously made to
the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted. There was no offer because the
letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the
invitation to the engineers office only
proved its intent to acquire the property for a
right of way and did not amount to a valid
and definite offer.
ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No.
182065, October 27, 2009
The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by
the municipal ordinance are charges, making
the municipal ordinance void and
unenforceable as there was no valid public
hearing conducted as mandated by Sec. 186
of the Local Government Code, which

expressly provides that ordinances levying

taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted
without any public hearing.
QUEZON
CITY
v.
BAYAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No.
162015, March 6, 2006
Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its
properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise. Congress may grant a tax
exemption previously withdrawn by the
LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X
of the Constitution gives local legislative
bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this
power may be subject to guidelines and
limitations as Congress may provide. Thus,
the power to tax is still primarily vested in
Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local
Government Code which provides that a
province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an
annual ad valorem tax on real propertynot
hereinafter specifically exempted, the
Congress highlighted its power to thereafter
exempt certain realties from the taxing
power of local government units. The use, in
turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this
franchise in Republic Act 7633, which was
the basis for Bayantes exemption from
realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the
intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGCs delegated
taxing power all of the franchisees
properties actually, directly and exclusively
used in the pursuit of its franchise.
MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
No. 155650, July 20, 2006
MIAA, not being a government-owned and
controlled corporation, is exempt from real
estate tax because it is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate
powers. An instrumentality refers to any

agency of the National Government not

integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the
LGC states that the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.
This
constitutes
a
limitation imposed by Congress on the local
governments exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore,
the
power
of
local
governments to tax national government
instrumentalities is construed strictly against
local governments and the rule is that a tax
is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.
QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No.
166408, October 6, 2008
While Congress has the inherent power to
tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution confers on
municipal corporations a general power to
levy taxes and otherwise create sources of
revenue and they no longer have to wait for
a statutory grant of these powers. In
interpreting
statutory
provisions
on
municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
In this case, the in lieu of other taxes
provision does not expressly provide in clear
and unambiguous language what kind of
taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a
claim of tax exemption is not favored nor
presumed in law but must be clearly shown,
ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon Citys
franchise tax.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY

OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16,
2008
Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax
because its legislative franchise did not
expressly provide the specific taxes from
which it was exempt. The in lieu of all
taxes clause in Smarts legislative franchise
did not expressly and categorically state that
the exemption applies to both local and
national taxes and thus, the phrase in
question must be applied only to national
internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are
never presumed and are construed strictly
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority.
SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169,
December 22, 1988
The Mayors act is valid because in this
case, the city has the power to open a city
street for public use. Despite loss of privacy
among Bel-Air residents, more important
than this is the duty of a local executive to
take care of the needs of the majority at the
expense of the minority.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R.
No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189
of the Civil Code as it governs liability due
to defective streets, which Teotico alleged
to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the
City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it
refers merely to liability arising from
negligence in general, regardless of the
object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs
liability due to defective streets in
particular. On the allegation of the City of
Manila that it is not liable because the street
where Teotico was injured was a national
highway, the Court ruled that under Art.
2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary

that the defective roads or streets belong to

the province, city or municipality on which
responsibility is placed. It is enough that the
said province, city or municipality have
either control or supervision over the said
street or road.
TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L29993, October 23, 1978
The provision simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but
it does not impose upon it a duty to observe
one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is
to commemorate a religious or historical
event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed
in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed
was not to secure profit or gain but merely
to provide entertainment to the town
inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the nonetheless it is
private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and
the like which are for public service.
KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No.
141375, April 30, 2003
Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code,
requiring that boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of
different provinces be jointly referred for
settlement to the sanggunians of the
provinces concerned, has no application in
this case since one party is an independent
component city. Since there is no legal
provision specifically governing jurisdiction
over boundary disputes between a
municipality and an independent component
city, the general rules governing jurisdiction
should then be used and as the RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all

controversies except those expressly

withheld from their plenary powers, the
RTCs have the power to hear and resolve the
dispute in the case at bar.
SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
154512, November 12, 2002
The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn
is not disqualified from running in the recall
election as any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition on serving for more than 3
consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of
the Local Government Code. Any
subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms and the intervening
period
constitutes
an
involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
180444, April 8, 2008
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code
provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms,
and that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. For an official to be
disqualified from running because of the
three-term limit, the official must have been
elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and he must
have fully served three consecutive terms. In
this case, there was an interruption in
Potenciosos second term as municipal
councilor as he succeeded the retired Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local
government offices is by operation of law
and does not constitute voluntary
renunciation of office. Thus, since the
succession did not amount to a voluntary
renunciation of office (which does not
interrupt the continuity of service),
Potencioso could not be said to have fully

served his second term and as such, he is

entitled to run for another term as municipal
councilor.
MENDOZA v. LAXINA,
146875, July 14, 2003

G.R.

No.

The re-taking of an oath of office by a dulyproclaimed but subsequently unseated local

elective official is not a condition sine qua
non to the validity of his re-assumption into
his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and
duly sworn into office the first time, he
became entitled to assume office and
exercise its functions. The pendency of an
election protest is not sufficient basis to stop
him from assuming office or discharging his
functions. When the COMELEC nullified
the writ of execution pending appeal issued
by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs
decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo or
when Laxina was occupying the office of
Barangay Captain was restored. As such,
the re-taking of his oath was a mere
formality, because through the stay of the
MTCs decision, it was as if the writ of
execution was not issued and he was not
ousted from office.
VALLES v. COMELEC,
137000, August 9, 2000

G.R.

No.

Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the

Local Government Code uses the term dual
citizenship as a disqualification, meaning
dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing
of their certificate of candidacy to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship.
As such, if in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto,

such a declaration, under oath, operates as

an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not be
disqualified as the Philippine law on
citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth.
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that
Lopez was born in Australia did not amount
to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an
alien certificate of registration did not mean
that she was renouncing her Filipino
citizenship since a renunciation must be
express to result in the loss of citizenship.
MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No.
135083, May 26, 1999
Manzano should not be disqualified because
the dual citizenship meant in Sec. 40 (d)
of the Local Government Code as a ground
for disqualification, refers to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states, while dual
allegiance, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. Manzanos
oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country,
shows his election of Philippine citizenship.

MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L7708, May 30, 1955

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No.

187167, August 6, 2011

The investigation and suspension were

illegal
because,
although
provincial
supervision over municipal officials belongs
to the Provincial Governor and he may
submit written charges before the Provincial
Board and suspend the official, the charges
in this case are not malfeasances
contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the
Revised Administrative Code. The charges
may be considered as involving moral
turpitude, but before the Provincial
Board/Governor may formally charge and
suspend the petitioner, there must first be a
conviction which was lacking in this case.

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory

mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties
to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty
over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right
to exploit the living and non-living resources
in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77).

TALAGA v. COMELEC,
196804, October 9, 2012

G.R.

No.

Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations

in his COC, therefore the same was null and
void. The false representation here must be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate
from running in an electoral race, one may
resort to either a petition for disqualification
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code (the effect of which will be the
prohibition of the person from continuing as
a candidate) or to a petition to deny due
course to, or cancel, a certificate of
candidacy grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate
that is false (the effect of which is the
cancellation or denial of due course of the
persons certificate, with the said person not
treated as a candidate at all as if she never
filed a COC). A person whose COC was
cancelled does not give rise to a valid
candidacy and therefore cannot be
substituted by another person.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since
become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a valuebased international public order. However,
as is so often the case, the reality is neither
so clear nor so bright. Whatever the
relevance of obligations erga omnes as a
legal concept, its full potential remains to be
realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with
the international law concept of jus cogens.
In international law, the term jus cogens
(literally, compelling law) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory
in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only
by general international norms of equivalent
authority.

As a general principle and particularly

here, where such an extraordinary length of
time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the
Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010
At this time, we are not prepared to declare
that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international
law, and do not find basis in any of the
sources of international law enumerated
under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has
not undertaken any objective and rigorous
analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true
status.
PHARMACEUTICAL
AND
HEALTHCARE
ASSOCIATION
v.
DUQUE, G.R. No. 173034, October 9,
2007
Under the 1987 Constitution, international
law can become part of the sphere of
domestic
law
either
by
transformation or incorporation.
The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere

constitutional declaration, international law

is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land
through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which
provides that [n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate. Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.
PIMENTEL
v.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005
In our system of government, the President,
being the head of state, is regarded as the
sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the countrys sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with
foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In
the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole
authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of
all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him.
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment,
ICTY, 2003)
Galic was convicted of crimes against
humanity for acts during the Siege of
Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. His many acts included
intentionally launching attacks to spread
terror among the civilian population, which
he defended as an act of military necessity.
The Court convicted him, explaining that if
excessive casualties are expected to result,
the attack should not be pursued. The test
for proportionality is whether a reasonably
well-informed person in the circumstances
of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable
use of the information available to him or
her, could have expected excessive civilian
casualties to result from the attack.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case,
1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought
under the American Alien Torts Statute
charging Pena-Irala, then the InspectorGeneral of the police in Paraguay, of
torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The
Court held that deliberate torture under the
color of official authority violated
customary international law, regardless of
the nationality of the parties.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this
article are of the author/s and not necessarily state or
reflect those of the University of Santo Tomas,
Faculty of Civil Law, its administrators or faculty
members.